NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals from a March 31, 2014 order entered after the Law Division conducted a trial de novo on the record. The trial judge found defendant guilty of driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; driving while suspended, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40; and failure to stop at a stop sign, N.J.S.A. 39:4-144. We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Edward Jerejian's well-reasoned opinion.

We discern the following facts from the record. Defendant was stopped by the Dumont police on May 12, 2013, at 3:30 a.m., after failing to come to a complete stop at two separate intersections. Defendant exited his vehicle without being asked to do so, and approached the officer's vehicle. The officer asked defendant to return to his vehicle three times before defendant complied. He then approached defendant's vehicle and asked for defendant's license and registration. Defendant fumbled for his paperwork and eventually produced proof of insurance and registration but disclosed that his driver's license was suspended.

The officer smelled alcohol and observed that defendant's eyes were watery, bloodshot, and glassy. He also noticed that defendant's face was flushed and that he spoke with slurred speech. Defendant reported he had dropped his dog off at a friend's house and consumed one or two, or maybe three beers there; defendant was uncertain as to how much he drank. After defendant admitted to consuming alcohol, the officer asked defendant to exit his vehicle. Defendant was shabbily dressed; he was wearing socks, but no shoes. Defendant also stumbled as he walked. After conducting field sobriety tests, which defendant was unable to complete, the officer arrested him for DWI. Defendant was issued summonses for DWI, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, refusal to submit to a breath test, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2, driving with a suspended license, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 and failure to stop, N.J.S.A. 39:4-144.

A trial was held in the Dumont Municipal Court on August 22, 2013. Before the start of the trial, defense counsel withdrew a previously filed suppression motion. The parties stipulated to the fact that defendant was driving while suspended, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. At the close of trial, defendant moved to dismiss the refusal and the DWI charges. The municipal court found the defendant guilty of failure to stop, N.J.S.A. 39:4-144 and DWI, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, and dismissed the charge for refusal to submit to a breath test.

The municipal court sentenced defendant as a second-time DWI offender to a mandatory two-day jail sentence, two years of license suspension to be served consecutively with his previous suspension, installation of an "interlock device" on defendant's vehicle during the suspension period plus one year thereafter, and fines and monetary penalties. The court permitted the two days of jail time to be served at the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center (IDRC), and also sentenced defendant to thirty days of community service.

For driving with a suspended license, defendant was sentenced to an additional ten days in jail, a $750 fine, court costs, and an additional one-year suspension of license to run consecutively to the two-year suspension for DWI, as well as fines and costs for the failure to stop violation. Defendant appealed to the Law Division, which held a trial de novo on March 12, 2014.

Judge Edward A. Jerejian, having reviewed the municipal court record, found that the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant on suspicion of driving while intoxicated, that the State had proven that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of driving while intoxicated, and that defendant's Miranda1 rights were not violated. The trial court imposed the same penalties as the municipal court. This appeal followed.

Defendant argues the following points on appeal:

We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Jerejian's decision. His comprehensive opinion sets forth the facts and more thoroughly reviews the testimony. We need not repeat those details in this opinion. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that Judge Jerejian's opinion is supported by sufficient credible evidence and is consistent with the applicable law. See State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471-72 (1999).2

Moreover, we agree with Judge Jerejian's conclusions: that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant for suspicion of DWI, and that defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated as a result of the officer's failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to the administration of field sobriety tests. "`[T]he yardstick for making [an] arrest for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . is whether the arresting officer "had reasonable grounds to believe" that the driver was operating a motor vehicle in violation [of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50].'" State v. Moskal, 246 N.J.Super. 12, 21 (App. Div. 1991) (quoting Strelecki v. Coan, 97 N.J.Super. 279, 284 (App. Div. 1967)). Applying that standard, Judge Jerejian correctly determined that there was sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that defendant operated his motor vehicle under the influence because of the officer's observations of defendant and defendant's poor performance on field sobriety tests.

Moreover, we have previously held that a DWI suspect is not entitled to Miranda warnings prior to administration of field sobriety tests. State v. Ebert, 377 N.J.Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 2005) (citing State v. Green, 209 N.J.Super. 347, 350 (App. Div. 1986)). "[T]he United States Supreme Court held that a police officer asking a defendant a modest number of questions and requesting the defendant to perform a field sobriety test in a public place `cannot fairly be characterized as the functional equivalent of formal arrest.'" Ibid. (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 336 (1984). "Moreover, in Green, we noted that evidence relating to defendant's field sobriety and breathalyzer tests are admissible in the absence of Miranda warnings because they are non-testimonial in nature." Ibid. (citing Green, supra, 209 N.J. Super. at 352).

Affirmed.