PER CURIAM.
J.M., a juvenile, appeals from the denial of his motion to enforce the terms of a dispositional agreement for a referral in lieu of a plea. Having determined that J.M.'s reliance on the agreement, later withdrawn by the State, was not detrimental to his interests, we affirm.
We confine our recitation of the statement of facts and the procedural history to that required for the purpose of our decision.
On June 21, 2013, J.M. was charged in a juvenile complaint with two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault,
On July 22, 2013, the State filed a motion seeking a jurisdictional waiver pursuant to
While the motion was pending, the State and J.M., through his counsel, engaged in discussions regarding the disposition of the charges. Although it is not entirely clear from the record, it appears as though counsel for J.M. sought the State's agreement to a dismissal of the complaint based upon J.M.'s successful completion of treatment. In furtherance thereof, on July 15, 2013, J.M. submitted to a psychosexual evaluation and actuarial risk assessment performed by a licensed psychologist. The purpose of the evaluation was "to assess J.M.'s emotional functioning, his mental status, his need for offender-specific therapy, if any, and to estimate J.M.'s risk for sexually re-offending" if adjudicated delinquent.
In the report of the evaluation, the psychologist addressed J.M.'s background, which included his placement in a group home due to behavioral issues. J.M. was noted to have had "an extensive history of antisocial behaviors," as well as "school-related" behavior problems and had received treatment for these problems and for anger management. The report also noted that J.M. had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Oppositional Defiant Disorder and was subjected to repeated psychiatric hospitalizations. The psychologist found J.M.'s "sexual offense recidivism risk level [to be] low to moderate."
At the time of the evaluation, J.M. was in a residential placement that provided round-the-clock supervision and mental health services. The placement took place after the incident that lead to the complaint.
On September 12, 2013, the State and J.M. reached an agreement regarding the disposition. At the time of the agreement, J.M. had completed the risk assessment, was in a residential facility, and was receiving counselling. However, the plea was not placed on the record that day as the State noted that the victim was unavailable to make a victim impact statement. One week later, on the next court date, the State informed J.M.'s counsel that the victim's mother was opposed to the proposed disposition and, therefore, the State was withdrawing the offer.
In response, J.M. filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement. The court conducted a hearing on October 18, 2013. After considering the arguments of counsel and the briefs submitted in support of the motion and in opposition thereto, the court denied the motion in an oral decision.
The court concluded that although the withdrawal of a plea offer "does inure to the detriment of the accused," the State had the right to withdraw the offer "as they choose." The court framed the issue as "at what point [is the State] bound by the need to honor the offer[?]" The court determined that, notwithstanding J.M.'s compliance with the evaluation, "juveniles are referred for evaluation for placement all the time. I just do not find that the juvenile's . . . evaluation for the Voorhees program or even the submission of the treatment plan, inured to the detriment of [J.M.]."
J.M. argues that the court erred in denying the motion to enforce the plea agreement. In support of the argument, J.M. cites on appeal, as before the motion judge, our decision in
In
Following a protracted procedural history, which included a remand by our Supreme Court for an evidentiary hearing, this court reversed the conviction contingent upon defendant entering a guilty plea acceptable to the court and in accord with the plea agreement's sentence exposure.
In reaching our determination in
J.M.'s argument, viewed in the abstract, has some attraction. There can be little question of J.M.'s disappointment in not receiving the benefit of the plea offer extended (and then withdrawn) by the State. Nonetheless, our decision must take into account the distinction between "disappointment" and "detrimental reliance."
In
By contrast, to the extent J.M. relied upon the proposed plea, he did not incur a detriment; and certainly not a "substantial" detriment. J.M.'s participation in the evaluation and the counselling served a dual purpose. It was to demonstrate his amenability to a referral disposition and to demonstrate he was not a suitable candidate for waiver. As such, to the extent that the State did not pursue the waiver, J.M. benefited from that which he now argues was detrimental.
Moreover, J.M.'s evaluation facilitated the favorable plea offer he ultimately received and accepted. In addition to not being waived, defendant was adjudicated delinquent and placed on two years' probation with Megan's Law requirements. If defendant was tried and convicted on the original charges as an adult, he would have, among other aspects of the sentence, been exposed to a long period of incarceration in state prison subject to parole disqualification.
After a careful analysis of the facts and the applicable law, we conclude that the decision of the court denying the motion was not erroneous.
Affirmed.