NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

After forcing his way into Danita Benson's apartment and assaulting her with a baseball bat, defendant Reginal Davis was indicted of the following offenses: second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(b)(1) and/or (b)(2) (count one); third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7) (count two); third-degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2) (count three); and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count four). Following a trial, the jury convicted Davis of the lesser included offenses of fourth-degree criminal trespass, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(a), on count one; disorderly persons simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a), on count two; disorderly persons negligent simple assault with a deadly weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(2), on count three; and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d), on count four.

On appeal, Davis raises the following contentions:

We affirm in all respects.

After calling the police three times to complain of Davis's harassment of her in a single day, Benson testified that at 9:50 p.m. that same night she heard a knock at her apartment door. As she lived in a complex with locked security doors, she assumed it was a neighbor and opened the door. When Benson realized it was Davis she "pushed [the door] back" and locked it. Davis began to kick at the door, yelling profanities at her and saying "I'm going to get you, bitch." When Davis finally pushed his way into the apartment,1 Benson "swung [a] bat at him." As she turned to check on her children, who were screaming and still in the room, Davis grabbed the bat from Benson and began to strike her with it. According to Benson, she "[w]as laying [sic] on the floor with my arm and my leg up and he just kept hitting me and grabbing at my pants." Benson testified that the tone of Davis's voice was "hard, deep [and] forceful," and she thought Davis was going to rape her.

Benson managed to get up and run into the kitchen, where she grabbed some knives and threatened Davis, forcing him to leave. After he left, Benson locked the door and called the police a fourth time.

On appeal, Davis asserts that the instructions given to the jury during trial were inadequate because they: (1) did not clarify that the trespass charge applied only to Benson's individual apartment and not the overall building, (2) failed to include self-defense as an affirmative defense with respect to the assault counts, and (3) did not instruct the jury to acquit defendant of unlawful possession of a weapon if it was proven that he only armed himself to prevent the victim from attacking him.

We note that there was no objection to the jury charge when it was given, nor were any of the above described charges requested of the trial judge. Claims not raised at trial, including failure to object to jury instructions, are reviewed under the plain error standard. R. 2:10-2; State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 473 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1146, 128 S.Ct. 1074, 169 L. Ed. 2d 817 (2008). Under this standard, appellate courts shall not reverse unless error exists that is "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2; State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 341 (2007).

Davis argues that the jury instruction regarding the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass did not correctly specify the residence of Benson2 and, therefore, the jury may have improperly convicted Davis for entering the building rather than Benson's apartment. In this respect, the judge charged the jury that "[c]riminal trespass is a lesser-included offense of count one, the burglary charge. . . . A person commits [this] offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters . . . any structure or separately secured or occupied portion thereof." It was undisputed that Davis did not have permission to enter either Benson's apartment or the building itself; he was not given the privilege or license to enter into either dwelling. We find that the oversight of not stating Benson's specific apartment number did not produce an unjust result.

Davis next contends, for the first time, that the affirmative defense charge of self-defense should have been presented to the jury. He argues that since Benson was the first person to wield the bat like a weapon, he had to defend himself from that attack and in doing so he injured her. It is Davis's contention that giving such an instruction may have led to acquittals on the assault offenses. We find no grounds to warrant the affirmative defense instruction. On three separate occasions on the day of the attack, Davis had harassed and intimidated Benson. When he arrived at her apartment that night, she refused to let him in. He then kicked at the door yelling "I'm going to get you bitch. You going to fuck me." Once Davis entered the apartment, Benson was scared. She grabbed a bat which was in the room in an attempt to defend herself and began to swing at Davis, whereupon he took the bat from her and began to hit her with it.

Davis was the initial aggressor. He entered the apartment in a violent and intimidating manner, threatening Benson with violence. "[T]o have a claim of self-defense, the aggressor must be free from fault." State v. Rivers, 252 N.J.Super. 142, 151 (App. Div. 1991). Davis was not entitled to the defense or charge.

Lastly, Davis makes a similar argument as to the jury instruction on unlawful possession of a weapon. Although he states the judge correctly listed the elements of the offense, he contends she should have further advised the jury that Davis would have been justified in possessing the bat, if his sole reason was to disarm Benson following her unjustified attack upon him. We reject this argument for similar reasons stated as to the self-defense charge. It is only in very limited circumstances, situations of immediate and imminent danger, that anticipatory self-defense is a valid reason for possession of a weapon. "If a person possesses an instrument for a legitimate purpose and makes immediate use of that instrument as a weapon in order to fight off an impending threat, then, and only then, is self-defense a justification." State v. Kelly, 118 N.J. 370, 381 (1990).

Benson only grabbed the bat after Davis forced his way into her apartment and threatened her. The proper charge was given. We find no error, let alone plain error, in the trial judge's jury charge.

We also conclude that the additional arguments set forth in Davis' supplemental brief are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-(3)(e)(2).

Affirmed.