NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SUMNERS, Jr., J.A.D.

This matter involves the interpretation of the Security Deposit Act, N.J.S.A. 46:8-19 to-26 (the SDA). Plaintiff Joann Milton claimed that defendant Lillian Sanchez, her landlord, wrongfully failed to return her rent security deposit. Defendant asserted that plaintiff had caused damage to the apartment to an extent exceeding the security deposit. After a one-day trial in the Special Civil Part, the judge found that a portion of the security deposit was wrongfully withheld and subject to the doubling provisions of N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1, and awarded plaintiff a judgment of $2,641.44. The defendant now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I

We briefly summarize the facts adduced from the record. Defendant owns an apartment building and rented an apartment to plaintiff. On March 4, 2013, defendant served plaintiff with a notice terminating her lease and advising her to vacate her apartment by no later than May 31, 2013. Plaintiff vacated the premises on June 6, 2013, six days after the lease had terminated. A week later, on June 12, 2013, by certified mail, defendant's counsel advised plaintiff that her security deposit was not being returned based on damage that she caused to the premises. The letter indicated,

On August 26, 2013, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in the Small Claims Section, Special Civil Part, against defendant demanding $2,137.50 plus costs for the return of her security deposit. The case proceeded to trial on October 21, 2013.

At trial, plaintiff testified that she received the notice from defendant terminating her lease and requesting that she vacate the premises by May 31, 2013. However, she contended that she had difficulty moving because she was nine-months pregnant at the time, and her children were not available to assist her with the move. She also indicated that she received Section 8 rent subsidies and was waiting for the approval of her new apartment before she could move.

According to defendant, plaintiff owed her a total of $2,472.38: $626.78 from Lowes and Home Depot for materials to repair damage to the doors, floors, and bathroom, $1,155.60 from Starlite Window for new window installations, $400 in attorney fees, and $290 in pro-rated rent. Defendant maintained that because the total costs exceeded plaintiff's $2,137.98 security deposit, plaintiff was not entitled to her security deposit. Plaintiff did not dispute the $290 that represented the pro-rated rent for the additional six days that she remained on the premises past May 31, 2013. She also expected that some of her security deposit would be withheld due to the damage she caused, but objected to the withholding of the entire security deposit, asking defendant for the damages' receipts, which she testified were never provided.

The judge discredited much of defendant's testimony with regard to the deductions from the security deposit. Since plaintiff only occupied the apartment three out of the eight years defendant owned the building, the judge found that it was inappropriate to charge plaintiff $1,155.60 to replace the windows, and determined that defendant was only entitled to bill plaintiff $200. As for the additional deductions in the amount of $626.78, the judge found that defendant was only entitled to $326.78 explaining that it was inappropriate for defendant to charge for certain expenses, such as a $71.00 power drill purchase. The trial judge also rejected defendant's $400 deduction for attorney's fees, reasoning that "an action for failure to return ... a deposit doesn't have anything to do with the legal fees in this agreement." The judge further determined that because the legal fees were not additional rent, defendant could not collect them in this matter. The judge did agree, however, that defendant was entitled to receive the $290 for the pro-rated rent.

Consequently, defendant was permitted to deduct a total of $816.78 from the $2,137.50 security deposit and, therefore, $1,320.72 should have been returned to plaintiff. In accordance with N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1, this wrongfully withheld amount was doubled by the court, resulting in a judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $2,641.44. This appeal followed.

II

Before us, defendant does not challenge the trial court's determination that the deductions from plaintiff's security deposit were not supported by credible evidence. Rather, defendant argues that the penalty of doubling the amount wrongfully withheld was not an available remedy for plaintiff under N.J.S.A. 46:8-21 because she properly notified plaintiff of the detailed deductions she was charging as required by the statute.

Defendant also maintains that the court never ruled "that the [security deposit] was wrongfully withheld, but only believed that [she] was not justified in charging [plaintiff] for various items that needed to be repaired at the premises." Thus, the court was not justified in doubling the net funds it ordered should be returned to plaintiff.

In addition, defendant relies on Kang in Yi v. Re/Max Fortune Properties, Inc., 338 N.J.Super. 534 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 510 (2001), for the proposition that the doubling of a portion of a security deposit wrongfully withheld by a landlord is only appropriate when those funds have not been returned by the landlord within the thirty-day statutory period. Lastly, citing O'Boyle v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 241 N.J.Super. 503, 509 (App. Div. 1990), defendant submits that the trial court circumvented the law when it "may have" chosen to apply equitable considerations; specifically, it may have considered that plaintiff was pregnant and endured financial hardships that allegedly affected her ability to find a new apartment.

Plaintiff submitted no opposition to this appeal. Nevertheless, we are unpersuaded that the SDA supports defendant's arguments.

Our scope of review is limited. An appellate court shall "`not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [it is] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]'" Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (quoting In re Trust Created by Agreement Dated December 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008)); see also Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). Review on appeal "does not consist of weighing evidence anew and making independent factual findings; rather, our function is to determine whether there is adequate evidence to support the judgment rendered at trial." Cannuscio v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, 319 N.J.Super. 342, 347 (App. Div. 1999) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). However, we owe no deference to the trial court's "interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). We review such decisions de novo. 30 River Court E. Urban Renewal Co. v. Capograsso, 383 N.J.Super. 470, 476 (App. Div. 2006) (citing Rova Farms, supra, 65 N.J. at 483-84).

Initially, we point out that defendant's reliance upon O'Boyle for the argument that the court circumvented the law when it "may have" chosen to apply equitable considerations is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only that defendant has failed to set forth any contention that the trial court's factual findings were not supported by the record.

Turning to the primary focus of defendant's appeal, we have said that "N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1 was specifically `intended to protect tenants from overreaching landlords who seek to defraud tenants by diverting rent security deposits to their own use.'" Reilly v. Weiss, 406 N.J.Super. 71, 83 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Jaremback v. Butler Ridge Apartments, 166 N.J.Super. 84, 87 (App. Div. 1979)). The SDA "`recognizes that the security deposit remains the tenant's money, although it is designed to provide some protection from loss to the landlord.'" Hale v. Farrakhan, 390 N.J.Super. 335, 342 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting MD Assocs. v. Alvarado, 302 N.J.Super. 583, 586 (App. Div. 1997)).

N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1 requires the landlord to return the tenant's security deposit and interest accrued "[w]ithin 30 days after the termination of the [] lease ... less any charges expended in accordance with the terms of [the] lease." Ibid. Any deductions the landlord makes must be "itemized," and notice must be forwarded to the tenant. Ibid. If the landlord violates this section of the SDA, the tenant may bring suit, and "the court upon finding for the tenant ... shall award recovery of double the amount of said moneys, together with full costs of any action and, in the court's discretion, reasonable attorney's fees." Ibid. (emphasis added).

"However, even violations of these provisions of the SDA do not accord the `doubling' remedy provided ... if in fact the tenant has violated his obligations under the lease." Reilly, supra, 406 N.J. Super. at 80. See, e.g., Penbara v. Straczynski, 347 N.J.Super. 155, 160 (App. Div. 2002) (noting that as to any violation of N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1, the tenant was limited to recovery of double "the net amount `wrongfully withheld,' not double the amount of the initial deposit") (quoting Yi, supra, 338 N.J. Super. at 539); Jaremback, supra, 166 N.J. Super. at 89 n.1 (providing that "[w]here the penalty is appropriate under the statute, the only item which should be doubled is the net amount due to the tenant on the security deposit and interest, after deduction of the charges due to the landlord[]"). When there is a dispute over whether the tenant violated his obligations under the lease, "the judge [is] required to `determine the amount of th[e] offsets and, if they [we]re greater than the security deposit withheld, there is no deposit to return to the tenant.'" Reilly, supra, 406 N.J. Super. at 81 (alteration in original) (quoting Penbara, supra, 347 N.J. Super. at 160-61).

Defendant contends that Yi is limited to those situations where a landlord refuses to return the deposit in a timely fashion. According to defendant, if a landlord refuses to return all or some of the security deposit in good faith, the statutory doubling penalty should not apply. We disagree.

Defendant's misinterpretation of our prior holdings essentially runs contrary to the public policy of the SDA. If her statutory construction was accepted, tenants would be required to file suit for the return of their funds unnecessarily, simply because their landlord disagreed, albeit in good faith, whether alleged damages were the result of their tenancy. In a similar fashion, landlords could easily withhold all or some of the monies in hope that tenants, no longer on the premises, would not attempt to seek the return of their own money.

We think that our prior precedent, the express language of the SDA and the salutary policy it embodies require that, if the tenant prevails at trial, the landlord bears the burden of the double payment remedy when it has been determined that the security deposit monies have been "wrongfully withheld." Thus, the judgment amount awarded to plaintiff was appropriate.

Affirmed.