NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Scott Forbes appeals from the February 20, 2015 Law Division orders, which denied his motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, granted the summary judgment motion filed by plaintiff Tri-Con Construction, Ltd., and entered judgment against defendant. For the following reasons, we reverse.

We derive the following facts from the record. On February 13, 2007, the parties entered into a contract for installation of a roof for $87,000. The contract provided for the payment of interest at the rate of 15.9% per annum if the account was past due after thirty days, and payment of "attorney fees if collection efforts [were] made." Plaintiff completed the work in March 2007, but defendant failed to pay.

On July 3, 2009, defendant and his wife jointly filed a petition with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101 to 1174. On July 6, 2009, Forbes

Enterprises Corp. (FEC) filed a petition under Chapter 11. Defendant signed FEC's bankruptcy petition as its president and listed his bankruptcy matter as an affiliated case. The filing automatically stayed any action against defendant. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362. On November 9, 2009, plaintiff filed a proof of claim in each bankruptcy matter for $87,000 for "roof installation."

On February 17, 2010, the bankruptcy court converted defendant's bankruptcy matter to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. On December 2, 2013, the bankruptcy court denied defendant a discharge, and on December 4, 2013, the court served a notice of denial of discharge on all of defendant's creditors, including plaintiff. The denial terminated the automatic stay, effective December 4, 2013. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(2)(C).

On January 23, 2014, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in the Superior Court, Law Division. On February 12, 2014, FEC's bankruptcy trustee distributed $4,237.43 to plaintiff. On March 8, 2014, defendant filed an answer to the complaint and asserted the six-year statute of limitations for contract actions (SOL), N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, as an affirmative defense, among other defenses. Arbitration pursuant to Rule 4:21A-6(c) occurred on October 9, 2014. The arbitrator calculated plaintiff's damages at $233,853, but concluded that plaintiff's claims were barred by the SOL.

Plaintiff rejected the arbitration award and filed a request for a trial de novo. Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint was not time-barred because the SOL began on February 12, 2014, the date the trustee made a payment. Plaintiff conceded that if the SOL did not begin on that date, it began when the work was completed in March 2007. However, plaintiff argued, in the alternative, that even if the SOL began in March 2007, pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. § 180(c)(1), defendant's bankruptcy matter tolled the SOL, so the six-year period did not begin until December 4, 2013, when the bankruptcy court served the notice of denial of discharge. Defendant filed a cross-motion to dismiss, arguing that the bankruptcy matter did not toll the SOL and 11 U.S.C.A. § 108(c)(2) required plaintiff to file the complaint within thirty days of December 4, 2013, or by January 3, 2014.

The trial judge only considered plaintiff's alternative argument and held that defendant's bankruptcy matter tolled the SOL until December 4, 2013. The judge denied defendant's motion to dismiss, granted summary judgment to plaintiff, and entered judgment against defendant in the amount of $246,328 plus costs.

This appeal followed. On appeal, defendant contends that the judge erred in finding that plaintiff's complaint was not barred by the SOL and in entering judgment and denying the motion to dismiss. We agree.

We review a ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard governing the trial court. Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014). Thus, we consider, as the motion judge did, "`whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.'" Id. at 406 (citation omitted). If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then "`decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'" DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J.Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (citation omitted). We review issues of law de novo and accord no deference to the trial judge's legal conclusions. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013). "[F]or mixed questions of law and fact, [we] give[] deference... to the supported factual findings of the trial court, but review[] de novo the lower court's application of any legal rules to such factual findings." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576-77 (2015) (first alteration in original) (citations omitted).

11 U.S.C.A. § 108(c) provides as follows:

Here, the SOL fixed a period of six years for commencing a civil action in a contract matter and that six-year period had not expired when defendant filed his bankruptcy petition in July 2009. However, § 108(c)(1) did not toll the SOL. "[B]y its terms § 108(c) does not provide for tolling of any externally imposed time bars[.]" Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1073 (2d Cir. 1993). The federal court of appeals held,

[Ibid. (emphasis added).]1

Nor does § 108(c)(2) toll the SOL. Rather, it merely provides a thirty-day extension on deadlines, even if already expired, running from the date of notice of termination of the automatic stay. Ibid.

Consistent with the reasoning in Aslanidis, we have held, with respect to statutes of limitations, that the automatic stay does not toll the running time and a party has thirty days after notice of termination or expiration of the stay to file an action against which the limitations period has otherwise run. Nativo v. Grand Union Co., 315 N.J.Super. 185, 188 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 158 N.J. 71 (1999) (citing the logic of Aslanidis with approval). Applying the same principles here, the six-year limitations period under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 was not tolled while the automatic stay was in effect. The time period continued to run while an action against defendant was stayed, and plaintiff had thirty days after December 4, 2013 to file a complaint. That thirty-day period expired on January 3, 2014, and plaintiff did not file the complaint until January 23, 2014. Accordingly, the complaint was untimely and must be dismissed with prejudice.

We decline to address plaintiff's argument that the SOL began to run on February 12, 2014, when FEC's trustee made a payment. The trial judge did not rest his decision on this argument, and plaintiff did not cross-appeal on this issue. Although a respondent, without filing a cross-appeal, may argue "any point on the appeal to sustain the trial court's judgment[,]" Chimes v. Oritani Motor Hotel, Inc., 195 N.J.Super. 435, 443 (App. Div. 1984), if a respondent's argument goes beyond the scope of the lower court's decision, it will not be entertained on appeal unless asserted within a separate cross-appeal. See Bogey's Trucking & Paving, Inc. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 395 N.J.Super. 59, 64 n.3 (App. Div. 2007).

Nor will we consider plaintiff's newly-raised arguments that the trustee's payment served to revive the SOL because the trustee acted as defendant's agent in making the payment, and that the SOL began on November 9, 2009, when plaintiff filed its proof of claim. First, plaintiff did not raise these issues before the trial judge and they are not jurisdictional in nature nor do they substantially implicate the public interest. Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., L.P., 149 N.J. 620, 643 (1997). Second, plaintiff conceded before the judge that the SOL began in March 2007, when the work was completed. A party conceding a material fact before the trial court may not argue the contrary on appeal. Ji v. Palmer, 333 N.J.Super. 451, 459 (App. Div. 2000).

Reversed and remanded to the trial court for entry of an order vacating the two orders entered on February 20, 2015, and entry of an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice.