NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant John W. Creamer, III appeals from an order entered by the Law Division on February 6, 2014, which denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm.

I.

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or (2) (count one); first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2/2C:11-3(a)(1) or (2) (count two); three counts of third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (counts three, four, and five); three counts of fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (counts six, seven, and eight); third-degree endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2 (count nine); two counts of third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1) (counts ten and eleven); and two counts of third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(3) (counts twelve and thirteen).

At the trial, evidence was presented which indicated that on March 20, 2006, defendant went to the Oaklyn police and reported that a woman named Lisa was dead inside his apartment in Gloucester City. Defendant was transported to the Gloucester City police headquarters. He consented to the search of his apartment and the trash cans outside. Inside defendant's apartment, the police found the badly beaten body of a female, later identified as Lisa Hoopes, lying on the couch, covered with a blanket, with duct tape around her neck. Hoopes's body and the couch were covered in blood, and there was a considerable amount of blood in the apartment.

Defendant was transported to the Camden County Prosecutor's Office, where he was informed of his Miranda1 rights, which he waived. Defendant provided the investigators with two statements. In the second statement, defendant indicated that on March 18, 2006, he was in his apartment with Karen Ann Sluzalis and Brian Springer when Sluzalis invited Hoopes to come to the apartment.

Defendant and Springer were in the kitchen when they heard a commotion in the living room. There, they found Sluzalis and Hoopes engaged in a physical altercation. Defendant said someone had a knife. It was a four-inch switchblade that Sluzalis always carried. Defendant said he initially thought Springer was trying to pull Sluzalis and Hoopes apart, but then realized that Springer was also hitting Hoopes.

According to defendant, Sluzalis pulled a hammer from his tool box and struck Hoopes. Springer also did the same. Defendant claimed he did not participate in the attack, but stomped on Hoopes to put her out of her misery. Hoopes managed to pull herself onto the couch. Defendant, Sluzalis and Springer put the hammer in the microwave, and poured bleach on the knife before they threw it into the trash dumpster.

Sara Wadsworth, defendant's downstairs neighbor, testified that defendant called her from the hospital where he had been taken after he provided his second statement. Defendant told Wadsworth that he had been in his apartment with several persons. The two women argued. Defendant saw Sluzalis slicing the other woman's throat and Springer beating her in the head with a hammer. Defendant said the injured woman was lying on the floor and looked "like a little baby bird that had to be put out of [its] misery." Defendant stomped on the injured woman's head.

Wadsworth's live-in boyfriend, John Sorranto, testified that he also spoke with defendant when he called from the hospital. Defendant admitted he stomped on the injured woman's head. He said that either Sluzalis or Springer had hit the woman with a blunt object, and the other had cut her with a bottle or some other object. Defendant said he was afraid that if he did not participate in the attack, he might be the next victim. Defendant saw that the woman was mortally injured and tried to put her out of her misery.

The County's Medical Examiner testified that Hoopes had multiple wounds to the head caused by blunt trauma, the largest of which was four and one-half inches. There was a two and one-half inch laceration on the victim's head, and a number of cutting wounds on her hands and arms, indicating that she tried to defend herself. Hoopes's right forearm was broken in multiple places. The Medical Examiner testified that the cause of death was trauma, not any pre-existing or co-morbid condition.

The trial court dismissed many of the charges and the jury considered counts one, eleven and thirteen. The jury found defendant not guilty of murder, but guilty of the lesser included offense of aggravated manslaughter. The jury also found defendant guilty of two counts of hindering apprehension or prosecution. For the aggravated manslaughter, the court sentenced defendant to an extended term of forty years of incarceration, with a period of parole ineligibility as prescribed by the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. For the convictions of hindering prosecution, the court sentenced defendant to concurrent five-year custodial terms, each with two and one-half years of parole ineligibility.

Defendant appealed and raised the following arguments:

We affirmed defendant's convictions and the sentences imposed. State v. Creamer, No. A-0784-09 (App. Div. May 8, 2012). The Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Creamer, 212 N.J. 459 (2012).

Thereafter, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR. Defendant's counsel thereafter filed an amended petition and supporting brief. Defendant claimed that his trial attorney was ineffective because he failed to: raise certain issues at the Miranda hearing; investigate and produce witnesses who would have established that Sluzalis had expressed a premeditated intent to cause harm to the victim; and seek appropriate limiting instructions regarding N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence. In addition, defendant claimed that appellate counsel was ineffective because he did not raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal.

On February 6, 2014, Judge Samuel D. Natal filed a written opinion in which he concluded that defendant's claims regarding counsel's handling of the Miranda hearing were barred by Rule 3:22-5 because the claim had previously been resolved in defendant's direct appeal. However, the judge addressed defendant's claim and concluded that counsel had not been ineffective in his handling of that proceeding, and even if counsel did not fully explore certain issues at the hearing, defendant was not prejudiced.

In addition, Judge Natal rejected defendant's claim that his attorney failed to properly investigate the case and produce witnesses, and erred by failing to seek appropriate limiting instructions. The judge also rejected defendant's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective, and concluded that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted. The judge entered an order dated February 6, 2014, denying PCR. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

We reject defendant's argument substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Natal in his thorough written opinion dated February 6, 2014. We add the following.

A hearing on a PCR petition is required only when a defendant establishes a prima facie case in support of PCR, the court determines that there are disputed issues of material fact that cannot be resolved by review of the existing record, and the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing Rule 3:22-10(b)). "A prima facie case is established when a defendant demonstrates `a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.'" Id. at 355 (quoting Rule 3:22-10(b)).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-part test established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). Thus, a defendant must show that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that his attorney's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693.

Here, defendant claims that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance at the hearing to suppress the statements he gave to law enforcement. Defendant contends that his attorney failed to present the trial court with evidence that, at the time he gave those statements, he was suffering from complications of a medical condition, specifically diabetes mellitus, which led to his admission to the hospital after he gave his second statement.

As noted previously, Judge Natal found that defendant was barred from pursuing this claim on PCR because it had been raised and addressed in the direct appeal. Even so, the judge addressed the claim on the merits. The judge noted that, at the suppression hearing, ample testimony was presented regarding the amount of time defendant spent with the investigators and a thorough timeline had been established.

Furthermore, after defendant's first interview, defendant was asked if he required insulin. Defendant declined the officer's offer, indicating that he did not require any insulin at that time. The judge pointed out that, in his direct appeal, defendant acknowledged that he had been repeatedly offered food, drink and insulin.

The judge noted that, when the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress, the court stated that defendant had been given food and drink, and assured that he would be taken to the hospital for insulin if and when he needed it. In addition, the trial court observed that, during the time he was interviewed, defendant did not "at any time" lose his focus or ability to understand.

The judge also noted that, in support of his PCR petition, defendant had submitted records of his hospitalization following his interviews. Those records had not been presented at the suppression hearing. The records indicated that, when defendant was taken to the hospital his blood sugar level was 410, and he had "nonspecific and nonlocaliz[ed] pains in the body" which were thought to be related to his uncontrolled diabetes. However, upon admission, the attending physician noted that defendant did not appear to be in acute distress, had no motor or sensory deficits, and was oriented.

Judge Natal observed that, while defendant was hospitalized for three days, a report of a physical exam the day after admission indicated that defendant was feeling "back to normal" and was otherwise stable. The discharge summary indicated that defendant did not take a regular dose of insulin, and he had reported that he only takes insulin when he does not feel well and only when he wants to do so. The judge found that nothing in the medical records contradicted the trial court's findings at the suppression hearing, and the presentation of the medical records at the hearing would not have changed the outcome of the motion.

The PCR court therefore concluded that defendant had not shown that his attorney was ineffective in his handling of the suppression hearing. The court further found that, if counsel had not fully explored the relevant issues at the suppression hearing, defendant was not prejudiced thereby.

We are convinced that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the PCR court's findings. The court correctly found that defendant had not established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland/Fritz test, and properly found that an evidentiary hearing on the petition was not required.

Affirmed.