NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant William Meyer appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Defendant pled guilty in 2009 to one count of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). The court sentenced defendant in accordance with his plea agreement to four years in prison, which it suspended, and imposed Megan's Law conditions, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11, parole supervision for life, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, a requirement that he not contact his victim, and mandatory outpatient treatment.

Defendant did not file a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence. In 2013, defendant filed a petition for PCR, in which he initially argued his trial counsel did not review or discuss his case with him and failed to explain the conditions of his parole supervision for life. He also contended that when he was offered his plea deal he was under the influence of medications that affected his judgment, preventing him from making any decisions and interfering with his ability to understand what was happening or to "fight for [a] chance[] to be acquitted." According to defendant's certification, "[i]t was no[t] until [he] received a copy of the discovery from [his] PCR attorney that [he saw] what had been said about [him] and [he] knew that there were many factual discrepancies and things that were not true that and [had] been said about [him]." In a supplemental filing submitted by assigned counsel, defendant also argued his PCR claims were not procedurally barred, his trial counsel was ineffective, and "the court was in error when it did not question the defendant as to whether or not he was under the influence of any medications."

The PCR court denied defendant's petition by order dated March 10, 2014, which was supported by a written statement of reasons. In its decision, the PCR court first reviewed the charges brought against defendant, his plea, and his sentence. It then reviewed defendant's presentence report and noted defendant did not make any statement about his offense, but "indicate[d] that he drank daily and took daily seizure medication[, and] had been treated at different facilities on four different occasions, presumably for alcohol addiction." The court noted that, when defendant was evaluated for sentencing as a sex offender, he admitted to having a "co-dependency on drugs and alcohol" and reported that he took an "antidepressant" and an "antipsychotic medication."

According to the court, it was the latter medication, identified as "Thorazine," that defendant "refer[red] to ... as being responsible for his inability to understand the plea agreement." The PCR court observed, however, "[t]here was no notation by either the defendant or the psychologist of an inability to understand or communicate contained in the report. There was no complaint by defendant of the same, or indeed any complaints of any side effects of his medications."

The PCR court proceeded to state the controlling principles of law applicable to defendant's petition and apply those principles to his various claims. The court first determined that his allegations regarding counsel's failure to review his case with him and provide him with discovery materials were totally unsupported, and that defendant had failed to make any "showing [that] the discovery would have changed the outcome of the case." The court found defendant "generally complain[ed] his attorney did not talk to him and only discussed one plea offer with him," but that he did "not assert innocence or give any specifics about what was missing from the attorney-client discussions." Based on those findings, the judge rejected defendant's claim.

The PCR court turned next to defendant's claims about being under the influence of medication that interfered with his ability to understand what he was doing at the time he pled guilty. The court noted there was no medical proof that he was taking the medication at the time and found that, based on the plea court's "exhaustive questioning" about defendant's ability to understand and not being under the influence of any drugs that would affect his judgment, there was no support for defendant's contentions. The matter was put to rest, according to the PCR judge, when at sentencing defendant confirmed his understanding of his obligations under the plea agreement's recommended sentencing. As a result, the PCR court concluded that "[i]n the absence of any specifics, supporting evidence, [or] expert opinion, and in the face of an extremely thorough record to the contrary, [defendant's] allegation[s did] not rise to a prima facie showing [and did] not merit an evidentiary hearing."

The PCR court entered its order denying relief. This appeal followed.

Defendant presents the following issues for our consideration in his appeal.

We are not persuaded by any of these arguments and affirm.

The standard for determining whether counsel's performance was ineffective for purposes of the Sixth Amendment was formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must establish both that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient and he or she made errors that were so egregious that counsel was not functioning effectively as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (2) the defect in performance prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial such that there exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 698.

A defendant's entitlement to relief must be established by competent evidence. "[I]n order to establish a prima facie claim, a petitioner must do more than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999).

We conclude from our review of the record that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under the Strickland-Fritz test. All of his allegations were unsupported by any competent evidence and belied by the record. Accordingly, the PCR court correctly determined that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted, see State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992), and denied defendant's petition.1

Affirmed.