NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal, plaintiff Victor Podolec argues the trial judge erroneously granted summary judgment1 in dismissing his legal malpractice claims against defendants Ronald S. Heymann, Esq., and Heymann & Fletcher (the Heymann defendants), and defendant Jose R. Torres, Esq. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I

Because Podolec's allegations of professional negligence are based on the roles of the defendant-attorneys in other lawsuits, we briefly examine the facts concerning those earlier suits in the light most favorable to Podolec, the opponent of the defendants' summary judgment motions. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).2

The Blatterman matter. Podolec is the owner of a single-family residence on Maple Lake Road in Butler. In 1998, Podolec agreed to sell to his neighbor, Frank Blatterman, a strip of land running along their common property line and, in connection with that agreement, Blatterman obtained a survey from John Miceli defining the scope of the conveyance. Eight years later, in 2006, Blatterman obtained from DMC Associates, Inc. (DMC), a new survey of the property line in order to ascertain the precise location for construction of a retaining wall along the property line.

In 2008, plaintiff retained a law firm and filed a complaint seeking damages based on a claim that DMC was negligent in determining the location of the property line. Podolec asserted that the retaining wall was constructed on his property and, also, that the wall increased the flow of water onto his property. The Heymann defendants were later substituted as Podolec's counsel and filed an amended complaint, which also asserted claims against Miceli and Blatterman.

In connection with this suit, Podolec retained the services of an engineer, Roy Dedeic, who opined in a written report that Podolec lost 734 square feet due to the conflicting surveys of Miceli and DMC. Blatterman obtained the report of an engineer who asserted the retaining wall actually "slowed and reduced" water run-off onto Podolec's property from Blatterman's property.

Torres replaced the Heymann defendants as counsel for Podolec one day before a January 2010 arbitration, which was consequently adjourned for two months. The arbitrator found "no cause" for action because Podolec provided no proof of damages.

No demand for a trial de novo was filed.

The Tomco matter. In March 2005, Butler hired Tomco Construction, Inc. to perform roadwork on Maple Lake Road. Podolec agreed Tomco could stores its machinery and supplies on his property. Podolec later came to believe his home, driveway, and landscaping were damaged by Tomco. Specifically, he believed: the vibrations and dust from the roadwork caused structural and cosmetic damage to the residence; Tomco's storage of its equipment on his property left his yard in a state of disrepair; and the re-grading and reconstruction of the road surface lowered the roadway where his driveway met Maple Lake Road, creating a three or four foot abrupt dip at the bottom of his driveway.

As a result, Podolec presented a claim in the amount of $187,949.70 to Tomco's insurance carrier, which, in response, offered $23,276.60 and provided expert reports to support its position. The first report from the insurer concluded that "none of the damage observed was structural" but that "nail-pops in the drywall" and other cosmetic issues regarding Podolec's residence were "likely" or "possibly" caused by Tomco's construction activities; the second report concluded that any structural damage in Podolec's home was caused by long-term ground movement and settlement, not Tomco's roadwork.

Podolec retained the Heymann defendants and filed suit against Tomco in August 2009. Torres replaced the Heymann defendants as Podolec's counsel in October 2009. During the course of discovery, Podolec provided an expert report from Dedeic, who opined the damages caused by Tomco's construction activities exceeded $200,000.

Mandatory, non-binding arbitration occurred in January 2011. The arbitrator determined that Podolec was entitled to $40,000 for the cosmetic damages caused by Tomco's construction work.

Torres attempted to demand trial de novo, but his request was filed beyond the time permitted and, therefore, rejected. Torres did not move for confirmation of the arbitration award. Podolec retained another law firm, which successfully moved for confirmation; CNA thereafter paid the full award.

II

In April 2012, Podolec filed suit against Torres and the Heymann defendants based on their involvement in the Blatterman and Tomco matters. These claims were dismissed by way of summary judgment and a motion for reconsideration was later denied. Podolec appeals, arguing that Torres's negligence in the Tomco matter proximately caused him damage, and Torres's and the Heymann defendants' negligence in the Blatterman matter proximately caused him damage beyond the amount awarded by way of the arbitration.

A

In dismissing the claim against Torres regarding his involvement in the Tomco matter, the judge determined that the Dedeic report, as illuminated by his deposition testimony, demonstrated Dedeic was offering an inadmissible net opinion. Specifically, the judge observed that Dedeic only baldly asserted the damage done totaled $200,000, which included $100,000 in damages caused by the driveway situation, concluding that because there was "absolutely no explanation . . . at all as to how he came up with that supposed figure," Dedeic had simply provided "a classic net opinion." Viewing this net opinion determination as precluding a demonstration of Podolec's alleged damages at trial, the judge dismissed the complaint insofar as it sought damages based on any professional negligence occurring in the Tomco matter.

The admissibility of expert testimony requires a demonstration that:

All three requirements were arguably met here; in keeping with the Brill standard, we will assume so.

But the net opinion rule — a "corollary" of N.J.R.E. 703—"forbids the admission into evidence of an expert's conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data." Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008). That is, an expert must "explain a causal connection between the act or incident complained of" and "the injury or damages allegedly resulting therefrom." Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981). Consequently, expert testimony must be barred when "based merely on unfounded speculation and unquantified possibilities." Yuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 240 N.J.Super. 289, 300 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 333 (1990). In a nutshell, experts must "give the `why and wherefore'" of their opinions, not "mere conclusion[s]." Koruba v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 396 N.J.Super. 517, 526 (App. Div. 2007), certif. denied, 194 N.J. 272 (2008). An expert opinion that lacks such a foundation "is worthless." State v. One Marlin Rifle, 319 N.J.Super. 359, 370 (App. Div. 1999).

In applying these principles to the Tomco allegations, we conclude that the trial judge properly determined Dedeic would not have been permitted to testify at trial about damage done to Podolec's residence or his yard. Indeed, the absence of an expert opinion regarding the residence and yard was essentially conceded. Dedeic stated at his deposition that he would only testify at trial regarding the driveway damage because he did not view the property until five or six years after the alleged damage:

In light of this testimony, the judge properly determined Dedeic would not be able to testify about a causal connection between Tomco's actions and any alleged damage sustained by the residence or the yard.

We reverse, however, insofar as the judge concluded that Dedeic would not be permitted to testify about damage to the driveway. In his report, Dedeic clearly detailed the "three to four feet abrupt dip at the driveway/roadway junction" created by Tomco's construction of the roadway and estimated the corrective work "would cost about $90,000 to $100,000," attributing this estimate to "new re-grading, new retaining walls, [and] new longer driveway alignment." He further explained at his deposition that this estimate was based on his experience with comparable projects in the area. These opinions are not disqualified by the net opinion rule.

B

Our conclusion about the viability of Podolec's claim of proximate cause and damages in the Tomco matter leaves a question as to whether Torres was negligent in his handling of the Tomco matter. In that regard, as well as all other legal malpractice claims asserted in this action, Podolec provided the reports of William M. Michelson, Esq., who opined that Torres was negligent in failing to timely demand a trial de novo of the arbitration award. We are satisfied there was sufficient evidence and expert testimony for Podolec's legal malpractice claim against Torres to continue insofar as the alleged failure to demand a trial de novo caused the loss of Podolec's claim for damages caused to his driveway by Tomco. We, therefore, reverse the summary judgment entered regarding the Tomco matter in favor of Torres to this limited extent; we otherwise affirm the entry of summary judgment of the malpractice action insofar as it relates to all other aspects of the Tomco matter.

As for the Blatterman matter, Michaelson provided an expert opinion regarding the alleged acts or omissions of both Torres and the Heymann defendants, and Dedeic opined that plaintiff lost 734 square feet as a result of the conflict between the Miceli and DMC surveys. We nevertheless affirm the entry of summary judgment on behalf of defendants on the limited ground that Dedeic was concededly unqualified to render an expert opinion about the accuracy of the surveys. Dedeic testified at his deposition that he is not a professional surveyor, has no expertise in land surveying, and did not conduct a survey of the property line in question. In the absence of evidence to suggest a factual basis for the claim that was terminated after arbitration because a demand for trial de novo was not timely asserted, the trial judge properly granted summary judgment.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.