NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Penacova Builders, Inc. brought claims against its closing attorney and title insurers following the purchase of property. After a dispute as to whether plaintiff had settled its claims against its real estate attorney was resolved, the judge granted a motion to enforce the settlement. Summary judgment was granted to the title insurers on plaintiff's breach of contract claims. After a review of the contentions in light of the applicable legal principles, we affirm both orders.
I.
Plaintiff retained defendant Elisa Ambrosio-Farias to represent it in the purchase of property. Prior to closing, Ambrosio-Farias ordered a title insurance commitment from defendant General Land Abstract Company. The commitment noted a tax sale certificate that encumbered the property and a notice of lis pendens recorded by the holder of the certificate, Arianna Holding Co. LLC (Arianna), evidencing a pending tax foreclosure action. The commitment required plaintiff to cancel or discharge the certificate. Ambrosio-Farias delivered payment to the municipality, the certificate was redeemed, marked cancelled and discharged by the municipal clerk. A policy of title insurance was issued by defendant First American Title Insurance Co.
Two years later, after plaintiff sold the property, Arianna filed a complaint against plaintiff to recover monetary damages it alleged were attributable to the defective redemption and cancellation of the tax certificate. Plaintiff's failure to respond to the complaint resulted in a default judgment against it of $90,000.
After plaintiff moved to vacate the judgment, it reached a settlement with Arianna. Plaintiff did not notify either title insurer of the complaint, judgment or settlement regarding the certificate. Instead, it filed this action against the companies alleging breach of contract, negligence, and bad faith claims. In thorough written decisions, the motion judge granted the title companies' motions for summary judgment and denied plaintiff's subsequent motion for reconsideration.
II.
As described above, Ambrosio-Farias and plaintiff were apprised of the outstanding tax sale certificate and the municipal tax lien, and Ambrosio-Farias delivered checks to the municipality prior to closing to pay the balance due and redeem the tax sale certificate. However, as a result of the Arianna judgment, plaintiff claimed Ambrosio-Farias was negligent in her failure to seek leave to intervene in the foreclosure action. Her negligence, plaintiff asserted, resulted in a defective redemption of the tax sale certificate, exposing plaintiff to a $90,000 liability.
Plaintiff was represented by Bendit Weinstock in the legal malpractice claim. Bendit advised the court a settlement had been reached between plaintiff and Ambrosio-Farias in which Ambrosio-Farias would pay $500 in full settlement of all malpractice claims. A letter was sent confirming the settlement and enclosing a stipulation of dismissal to Ambrosio-Farias and plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed it had not agreed to the settlement, dismissed the Bendit firm, and retained new counsel. When current counsel filed a motion to compel Ambrosio-Farias's deposition, she moved to enforce the prior settlement.
After a hearing at which Ambrosio-Farias presented testimony, the judge1 found that a settlement had been reached between the parties. She noted the memo in the Bendit file regarding the settlement, as well as the letter and proffered stipulation of dismissal that had been sent to plaintiff and Ambrosio-Farias. Bendit stipulated it was the agent of plaintiff, and, in that capacity had tendered a settlement offer to Ambrosio-Farias. The judge stated:
It appears from the documents and from the stipulations that after lengthy negotiations Bendit Weinstock told Ms. Ambrosio-Farias that it had the consent of its client to settle, that it appears without any dispute that [plaintiff] received a letter from Bendit Weinstock confirming the conver-sation, wherein he authorized the settlement and the dismissal, rather than spend the money to hire the expert that would be necessary.
The motion to enforce settlement was granted.
III.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that it never authorized the settlement of its claims against Ambrosio-Farias and the judge erred in her conclusion that a settlement had been reached. It also argues that the second judge erred in granting summary judgment to the title companies.
We begin by addressing the purported settlement agreement.
A settlement agreement is subject to the ordinary principles of contract law. Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 379 (2007); see also New Jersey Mfrs. v. O'Connell, 300 N.J.Super. 1, 7 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 75 (1997). "Interpretation and construction of a contract is a matter of law for the court subject to de novo review." Fastenberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 309 N.J.Super. 415, 420 (App. Div. 1998). "Accordingly, we pay no special deference to the trial court's interpretation and look at the contract with fresh eyes." Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011); see Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) ("A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.").
The issue of an alleged settlement was presented to the judge as a cross-motion to enforce settlement filed by Ambrosio-Farias, as a consequence of which the judge ordered an evidentiary hearing. Bendit attorneys were subpoenaed as witnesses and, at the hearing, the attorneys reached the following stipulation: As the agent of plaintiff, Bendit agreed to a settlement on its behalf which would be binding on plaintiff if accepted by Ambrosio-Farias. Letters and a stipulation of dismissal were sent to plaintiff and Ambrosio-Farias confirming the settlement.
The limited issue before the judge at the hearing was whether Ambrosio-Farias accepted the settlement so as to require its enforcement. After hearing from Ambrosio-Farias and considering counsels' arguments, the judge determined enforcement was proper.
Plaintiff's arguments on appeal are misplaced. Its representation by Bendit and whether it consented to the settlement were not the issue; the judge was determining whether a purported settlement should be enforced. Once all the attorneys agreed that a settlement had been reached, she correctly determined it should be enforced. The claims in this action were against Ambrosio-Farias for her handling of the real estate matter, not against Bendit for its representation of plaintiff. We find no reason to disturb the judge's ruling on the settlement issue.
In turning to plaintiff's claims against the title insurers, we conclude that the arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the judge in her well-reasoned written opinions of May 24 and August 28, 2013.
Affirmed.
