NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

This appeal arises from a billing dispute between petitioner Peter Triestman and respondent Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) in which he claims PSE&G overbilled him and that his utility service was being diverted. Triestman challenges the June 2, 2015 final decision of the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (the Board), adopting the initial decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) that dismissed Triestman's petition after it found he was not a "tenant-customer" of PSE&G entitled to the protections afforded by N.J.A.C. 14:3-7.8 and, in any event, a diversion of service had not occurred at Triestman's residence. We affirm.

In an earlier unpublished opinion, we remanded1 this dispute to the Board after it initially "adopted the ALJ's findings2 . . . that Triestman `is a commercial tenant'; [and] the BPU [should] direct[] PSE&G to bill Triestman `on the commercial tariff going forward.'" Triestman v. Pub. Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., A-2404-13 (March 13, 2015) (slip op. at 5). After our review, we directed the Board to remand the matter to the ALJ "so that Triestman may offer any additional evidence and arguments he may wish to assert about whether [his] tenancy was residential or commercial," id. at 9, because we questioned whether the scope of the ALJ's hearing was clear before it commenced, raising our concern that Triestman did not have an ample opportunity to present relevant evidence. Id. at 6.

On April 21, 2015, the ALJ conducted the remand hearing, at which Triestman was the only witness. The judge issued a written initial decision on April 27, 2015, dismissing Triestman's petition. The Board adopted that decision in its June 2, 2015 written final decision.

On appeal, Triestman argues that the Board erred in determining that he was not a residential tenant entitled to the "protect[ion]" provided by N.J.A.C. 14:3-7.8, and that its decision "improperly shifted the investigative burden to [him] and overlooked that PSE&G's untimely investigation was inadequate." The Board responds by arguing its decision should be affirmed, as the decision was supported by "sufficient credible evidence," which did not establish "Triestman was a tenant-customer," and "expanding the definition of tenant-customer[] is against public policy." PSE&G agrees with the Board as to the quality of the evidence supporting the decision and further urges that we reject Triestman's contentions "regarding residential tenants in mixed-use buildings and the diversion rule" as being without merit and unsupported by the evidence.

Our review of an administrative agency's determination is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). "An administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained [on appeal] unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007). We will intervene only where the agency action violates legislative policies, where there is no substantial evidence to support the agency's findings, or where the agency reached "a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors." Stallworth, supra, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007)).

Upon review of the factual findings of an administrative agency, "our function is not to substitute our judgment for that of the agency, particularly when that judgment reflects agency expertise." In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.'s Rate Unbundling, 167 N.J. 377, 384, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 813, 122 S.Ct. 37, 151 L. Ed. 2d 11 (2001). Accordingly, "the Board's rulings are entitled to presumptive validity and will not be disturbed unless we find a lack of reasonable support in the evidence." Id. at 385 (quoting In re N.J. Power & Light Co., 85 N.J. 520, 527 (1981)); see also N.J.S.A. 48:2-46 (stating that the appellate division may set aside the Board's order only "when it clearly appears that there was no evidence before the [B]oard to support the same reasonably or that the same was without the jurisdiction of the [B]oard").

Applying this limited scope of review, and after carefully considering the record in light of the arguments advanced by the parties, we conclude that the findings by the Board are supported by the record, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D), and the issues presented by Triestman are without sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the Board in its comprehensive fifteen-page written decision. We add only the following comments.

N.J.A.C. 14:3-7.8 provides that a utility company is required to investigate alleged diversions of service upon a good-faith application by a "[t]enant-customer," N.J.A.C. 14:3-7.8(d),3 which is defined as "a residential customer of record at the time of the complaint who rents a dwelling unit in a multifamily building or owns a condominium." N.J.A.C. 14:3-7.8(a). The provisions of this regulation, therefore, do not apply to commercial tenancies. A "[d]iversion" is defined as "an unauthorized connection to pipes and/or wiring by which utility service registers on the tenant customer's meter although such service is being used by other than the tenant-customer of record without his or her knowledge or cooperation." Ibid. A "[b]eneficiary" is defined as "the person, corporation or other entity financially benefiting from the service." Ibid.

The substantial credible evidence adduced at the remand hearing supported the Board's conclusion that Triestman's tenancy was not residential. According to the proofs, he rented commercial warehouse space in an otherwise almost vacant4 commercial building that was not zoned for residential use and attempted to convert the premises to accommodate both commercial and residential use of the space, which he ultimately acknowledged was not permitted when he entered into an agreement with his landlord requiring him to either seek the municipality's approval for residential use or abandon the premises' use as a residence. Under these circumstances, as the Board found, he was not a "tenant-customer." Also, the use of electricity to illuminate a hallway as well as the space he used was not a diversion, as Triestman was the only occupant of the building using the premises as a residence and therefore the only "beneficiary" of the lighted hallway.

Finally, contrary to Triestman's contentions, we find nothing inconsistent between the Board's determination here and the legislature's intent to protect residential tenants in substandard housing from diversion of their utilities as expressed in N.J.S.A. 2A:42-85.5

Affirmed.