NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Julio Ortiz appeals from the trial court's March 9, 2015 order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and overturning a $90,000 jury award in his favor. Plaintiff, a mechanic, filed a wrongful termination complaint against his employer, defendant Penske Truck Leasing (Penske), on the ground that Penske violated the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to-14, by terminating him after he objected and refused to participate in the wrongful and illegal business practices of Penske and two of its managers, defendants Paul Toms and Richard Schubert. Plaintiff alleged that, among other things, he was terminated for reporting violations of the preventative1 maintenance (PM) process occurring at Penske.2 The court granted defendants' motion for JNOV based on its determination that plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that he objectively, reasonably believed defendants' conduct threatened public safety. We agree and affirm.

I.

At trial, twelve witnesses testified for the plaintiff, four depositions were read into the record, and one videotaped testimony was presented. We glean the following facts from the trial record. In 2004, plaintiff was hired by Penske at the North Bergen location as a B-technician. He later became an A-technician and eventually was given the role of foreman from 2006 to 2010. On April 15, 2011, plaintiff and Anthony Martinez, a former Penske maintenance supervisor, sent an anonymous email from Martinez's email address to Brian Hard, the CEO and President of Penske, alleging, among other things, violations of the PM process at the North Bergen Penske location. The email was then forwarded for investigation to William Megary, Corporate Security for Penske Corporation. In connection with the investigation, Martinez was interviewed by Megary along with approximately ten mechanics, including plaintiff.

According to Martinez, every truck that is subject to federal road regulations, which includes an annual inspection, undergoes a PM inspection, which is "a full, thorough inspection of the vehicle front to back, top to bottom, everything included." Martinez testified that he went through PM training and received a training manual from Penske.3 According to Martinez, the normal practice was for the customer to bring the truck to the facility when the truck was scheduled for a PM inspection. The intervals for PM inspections would generally range from 6,000 to 20,000 miles, depending on the type and size of the vehicle. There would also be "a low mileage interval PM in between." Since federal regulations only require an annual inspection, Martinez explained that the purpose of the PM process was to protect Penske's business interests. According to Martinez, Penske's goal was to "deliver the best vehicle possible to [its] customer after each PM service," in order to "allow[] them to deliver uninterrupted service to their customers."

In describing the PM process, Martinez explained that the PM inspection would appear on Penske's internal network or "service net" as a scheduled job with the specific truck number and type of PM inspection identified. A technician or customer service representative (CSR) would then be assigned to each job. Once assigned, the CSR would "open up that repair order that's already system generated in Penske's service net. He would click on the vehicle, and he would go through the inspection portion of the vehicle from that point on." Martinez testified that the results of the PM inspection would be recorded on a PM form by the assigned CSR. The PM form contains "in shaded-gray areas ... [f]ederal road and [Department of Transportation (DOT)] regulated items that must be checked." The CSR records all defects uncovered during the PM inspection on the PM form and submits the form to a mechanic, such as plaintiff, to conduct the needed repairs.

According to Martinez, after the CSR conducts the PM inspection, records any defects found on the back of the PM form and enters the defects into the service net, "then it transfers over to a mechanic. The mechanic would then start to look into the vehicle and see what needs to be repaired." The CSR would close the PM inspection portion of the job by changing it from an "uppercase lettering to a lowercase lettering ... in service net" and then the job would move over to the mechanic to actually conduct the necessary physical repairs. Once the repairs are completed, a DOT sticker is applied to the truck, indicating that the truck is safe to operate on the roadway.

According to Martinez, he became aware of violations or falsification of the PM process in about 2008. Martinez testified that the falsified PM was known as a "paper PM." "A paper PM identified in Penske North Bergen's practice was a PM that [was done] on the computer to ... remove [it] from the system, but we didn't physically actually work on that vehicle at all ever." He explained that the purpose for removing the PMs from the computer system was to eliminate overdue PMs because Penske wanted to "look good in terms of our numbers at the facility." Martinez spelled out that "[o]verdue PM means that we were trying to get the truck in for service. The truck had not arrived and there was an urgency for us to eliminate it from the system." According to Martinez, the North Bergen facility was "top 20 in the country in worse PMs, so there were always a substantial amount of PMs that needed to be done."

In describing the paper PM process, Martinez explained that Toms and Schubert would present him with a list of "overdue PMs" generally on a Tuesday. According to Martinez,

Martinez explained that although there was no CSR to actually generate a PM form, they "would use a CSR's name." Martinez admitted that "most of the time" he was "instructed to do it," and he did.

Unlike Martinez, plaintiff presented no evidence that he was trained in the PM process or provided a Penske training manual. Plaintiff worked as Martinez's foreman. Martinez would distribute work and coordinate shifts with plaintiff, and plaintiff would assign the work to specific technicians working that shift. During the investigation, when Megary asked plaintiff if he knew anything about paper PMs being done, plaintiff replied that he "was never told to do a paper [PM]" but "during the breaks [he] heard technicians talking about it" and "[e]verybody knew that was going on."

Plaintiff testified

On cross-examination, plaintiff reiterated that he was never asked to do a paper PM, he never did a paper PM and he had only heard rumors about paper PMs. Plaintiff acknowledged that he "really didn't know anything about the paper PM[]s directly." Plaintiff also admitted telling Megary that he "could not say" whether Toms or Schubert had ever directed anyone to do paper PMs.

Although plaintiff admitted having no direct knowledge of paper PMs, he testified that he was involved in an incident in early 2011 during which he refused a direct order from Toms to falsify a brake repair order. According to plaintiff, "a preventative maintenance guy" conducted an inspection and recorded some defects, including that the truck "needed brakes," and plaintiff was "handed the repair order to work on." Plaintiff testified that, upon confirming that the truck needed brakes,

Plaintiff admitted, however, that he never saw Toms put the sticker on the truck either.

According to plaintiff, what "convinced" him to write the anonymous email with Martinez was

On August 24, 2011, over four months after plaintiff and Martinez sent the anonymous email, Penske began investigating a grievance filed by plaintiff and a report that plaintiff had falsified a leave request form. Plaintiff filed a grievance because he believed that he was incorrectly charged for a sick day, rather than a personal day, when he took two days off following his birthday on March 29 and 30, 2011. Penske believed that plaintiff had only requested March 29 off, and called out sick on March 30, resulting in him being charged for a sick day on March 30. However, believing that he had additional sick time, plaintiff called out of work on August 20, 2011, to watch his son's baseball game, resulting in him receiving a written warning from Penske for using all of his sick days.

Plaintiff's grievance specified that he had documentation to prove that both March 29 and 30 were properly approved as personal days and that March 30 should not have been charged as sick time. Penske, on the other hand, believed that plaintiff forged the leave request form based on evidence that a Penske employee observed plaintiff making copies in the supervisor's office late at night on August 24, 2011, after his shift had ended, as well as a Penske investigator's opinion that the leave request form had been altered. Plaintiff denied that he altered the leave request form, explaining that he went into the office late at night to pick up a copy of his previous request form from his shop steward.

Following the investigation into the grievance and alleged forged leave request, on September 7, 2011, plaintiff was terminated for dishonesty.4 The investigation concluded that plaintiff had been dishonest during the grievance process and failed to provide documentation to support his claim that he was properly approved for the days off in March and had not altered the leave request form.

On November 23, 2011, plaintiff filed a one-count complaint against defendants alleging he was terminated in violation of CEPA. Following a seven-day trial, at the close of plaintiff's case, defendants moved for a directed verdict, which was granted in part and denied in part. As a result, the only allegation that went to the jury was the allegation involving the paper PMs. The jury returned a unanimous verdict in plaintiff's favor, awarding plaintiff $90,000, consisting of $75,000 for lost pension benefits and $15,000 for emotional distress.

On November 20, 2014, defendants moved for JNOV, or, alternatively, for a new trial. On March 6, 2015, the court granted the JNOV motion and did not address the motion for a new trial. The court described the paper PM practice as the Penske managers on site completing "pieces of paper ... that would, then, make it appear as if they had done some preventative maintenance on a Penske vehicle. And, then, would file that piece of paper." The court continued that

The court found that even though plaintiff testified that he believed the paper PM practice "threatened people's safety," he never explained

The court also rejected plaintiff's attempt to combine the "isolated incident" of the falsified brake repair order with the paper PMs. The court stated plaintiff "never said that that dispute he had with the supervisor about the one truck eight months before, about which he never complained about, which he never told anybody, ... that that truck had had one of these fake [PMs] done."5

Likewise, the court rejected plaintiff's theory that Martinez's explanation of the practice should be attributed to him. The court explained that "[a] plaintiff in a CEPA case cannot establish their own reasonable belief by pointing to someone else." The court concluded that since plaintiff never provided "to the jury his explanation for why he had an actual and reasonably objective belief that the paper PM process threatened public safety[,] ... the jury simply had no [evidentiary] basis" on which to decide that issue.

On March 9, 2015, an order and final judgment were entered dismissing plaintiff's action with prejudice. This appeal followed. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court misapplied the standard applicable to JNOV motions by failing to accept plaintiff's unrefuted evidence and failing to give plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences. Noting this court's plenary review, plaintiff contends that we should consider the issue de novo because the question on appeal is whether the verdict is sustainable as a matter of law. Plaintiff also argues that the jury verdict should be reinstated because the trial court erroneously excluded evidence establishing a substantial nexus between the complained-of conduct and a clear mandate of public policy.

II.

We have the same task as a trial court in reviewing a motion for JNOV, pursuant to Rule 4:40-2(b). Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 415 (1997).

A "jury's factual determination will be disturbed only if we find that the jury could not have reasonably used the evidence to reach its verdict." Ibid. "[This] standard ensures that appellate tribunals will not overstep their bounds by usurping the jury's task of assessing the credibility of the witnesses." Ibid.

Like the trial court, we "are not concerned with `the worth, nature or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence, but only with its existence, viewed most favorably to the party opposing the motion.'" Koseoglu v. Wry, 431 N.J.Super. 140, 155 (App. Div.) (quoting Sons of Thunder, supra, 148 N.J. at 415)) certif. denied, 216 N.J. 4 (2013). "We will not disturb the trial judge's determination [unless] `the evidence, together with the legitimate inferences therefrom, could sustain a judgment in the [non-movant]'s favor.'" Ibid. If the pivotal question on appeal, however, is whether the verdict is sustainable as a matter of law, which is the case here, our review is de novo because "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 218 N.J. 8, 26 (2014) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

"CEPA is a remedial statute that `promotes a strong public policy of the State' and `therefore should be construed liberally to effectuate its important social goal.'" Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 555 (2013) (quoting Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. 405, 431 (1994)). That social goal is "to `protect and encourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities and to discourage public and private sector employers from engaging in such conduct.'" Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 461 (2003) (quoting Abbamont, supra, 138 N.J. at 431). Thus, CEPA "shields an employee who objects to, or reports, employer conduct that the employee reasonably believes to contravene the legal and ethical standards that govern the employer's activities." Hitesman, supra, 218 N.J. at 27.

CEPA addresses separate and distinct categories of protected activity. The "clear mandate of public policy" provision of CEPA applicable in this case bars any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee:

"For purposes of CEPA, `public policy has been defined as that principle of law which holds that no person can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.'" Hitesman, supra, 218 N.J. at 28 (quoting Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 187 (1998)). "[A] clear mandate of public policy conveys a legislative preference for a readily discernable course of action that is recognized to be in the public interest." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc'ns, 179 N.J. 439, 444 (2004)). "The `clear mandate' must exist to prevent harm to the public, rather than to protect exclusively private interests." Ibid. (quoting Dzwonar, supra, 177 N.J. at 469).

Plaintiff's "clear mandate of public policy" claim, under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(3),6 requires proof of four elements: (1) that plaintiff reasonably believed defendants acted in a manner incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy; (2) that plaintiff engaged in protected "whistle-blowing" activity as defined in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c); (3) that an adverse employment action was taken against plaintiff; and (4) that the termination was causally related to his whistle-blowing activity. Hitesman, supra, 218 N.J. at 29; see Dzwonar, supra, 177 N.J. at 462. Here, the first element is the only element at issue, whether plaintiff reasonably believed defendants acted in a manner incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy.

When a defendant challenges this element of a CEPA claim, "[t]he trial court must determine whether there is a substantial nexus between the complained-of conduct and a `clear mandate of public policy' identified by the court or the plaintiff." Hitesman, supra, 218 N.J. at 31 (quoting Dzwonar, supra, 177 N.J. at 464). "If the plaintiff fails to demonstrate a substantial nexus between the employer's conduct and the identified clear mandate of public policy, the trial court should ... dismiss the N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(3) claim." Ibid.

However, if the trial court "determines that the plaintiff has demonstrated such a substantial nexus," then it is up to "the jury to determine whether the plaintiff believed that the defendant's conduct was incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy and if so, whether such a belief was reasonable." Ibid. (citation omitted). "CEPA does not require that the activity complained of ... be an actual violation of a law or regulation, only that the employee `reasonably believes' that to be the case." Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 613 (2000).

Therefore, the determination of "whether there is a substantial nexus between the complained-of conduct and a `clear mandate of public policy' identified by the court or the plaintiff" is an issue of law that must be determined by the judge, not the jury. Hitesman, supra, 218 N.J. at 31; see also Mehlman, supra, 153 N.J. at 187. Accordingly, a pivotal component of a CEPA claim is the plaintiff's identification of authority that bears a substantial nexus to his or her claim. Hitesman, supra, 218 N.J. at 37-38. "The trial court can and should enter judgment for a defendant when no such law or policy is forthcoming." Dzwonar, supra, 177 N.J. at 463.

CEPA's statutory elements and this analytical framework "distinguish an employee's objection to, or reporting of, an employer's illegal or unethical conduct from a routine dispute in the workplace regarding the relative merits of internal policies[,] ... procedures" and practices. Hitesman, supra, 218 N.J. at 31 (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's CEPA claim based on, among other things, the reliance by plaintiff, a registered nurse, on the professional code of ethics, the employee handbook, and the employer's statement of patient rights as standards governing patient care to demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief that the conduct of his employer, a nursing home, was incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy); Dzwonar, supra, 177 N.J. at 467-69 (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's CEPA claim based upon general administration of union meetings and union's allegedly inadequate explanation of its actions to membership and rejecting plaintiff's contention that union by-laws constituted a clear mandate of public policy for purposes of CEPA); Maw, supra, 179 N.J. at 443-45 (rejecting employee's CEPA claims where employee "was terminated for refusing to execute an employment agreement containing a do-not-compete provision" and determining that "the dispute between employer and employee must be more than a private disagreement"); Schechter v. N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, Div. of Gaming Enforcement, 327 N.J.Super. 428, 432 (App. Div. 2000) (rejecting CEPA claim premised upon "nothing more than a policy dispute between the Division's middle and upper level management concerning the priority to be assigned to exclusion cases").

Indeed, in Dzwonar, the Court summarized its decision in Abbamont as an example of the analysis it was requiring:

In this case, plaintiff failed to establish the existence of safety rules and regulations and a clear mandate of public policy applicable to paper PMs. In fact, plaintiff could not clearly explain the paper PM practice because he never participated in it. Although plaintiff testified that he believed the paper PM practice "threatened people's safety," as the court noted, plaintiff could not explain how a paper PM caused any vehicle to be unsafe or how the practice would threaten public safety. "He just said he thought it did." Further, there was no testimony that any vehicle ever left the facility in an unsafe manner. As a result, there was no evidentiary basis upon which the jury could conclude that plaintiff had an objective, reasonable belief that the paper PM practice threatened public safety.

Plaintiff asserts that the paper PMs "were a blatant violation of the standards in the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1999 and the implementing Department of Transportation [DOT] regulations, [] particularly 49 C.F.R. § 396.17 [Periodic Inspection] and associated "Appendix G" regulations listing specific component inspections and repairs required." Specifically, citing 40 C.F.R. § 396.17(1)-(2), plaintiff asserts that "an essential part of the regulations requires `inspection reports' and `other forms of documentation' of the mandated inspections and repairs." Plaintiff argues that defendants' "willful falsification" of PMs "constitutes an ipso facto violation of federal regulations and articulated policy within the meaning and intent of N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(3)." According to plaintiff, "such violations relate to policy requirements expressly intended as safety regulations, establishing not only a reasonable, but compelling, basis for [p]laintiff [] to believe there was a substantial nexus between the supervisory misconduct and a clearly mandated public policy concerning safety."

In order to ensure public safety on the nation's highways, 49 U.S.C. § 31136(a)(1) directs the DOT to promulgate regulations to "ensure that ... commercial motor vehicles are maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely." Pursuant to this authority, the DOT promulgated regulations, specifically 49 C.F.R. § 396.17, requiring commercial vehicles to be inspected at least once annually. 49 C.F.R. § 396.177 provides in part that:

Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(a)(1), "[these] rules ... are applicable to all employers, employees, and commercial motor vehicles, which transport property or passengers in interstate commerce."

49 C.F.R. § 396.17 essentially requires defendants to annually inspect commercial motor vehicles in use and certify that the vehicles have passed such inspections or be subject to penalties. Since there is no evidence that the paper PM practice is governed by these regulations or constitutes a substitute for the annual inspections mandated by the regulations, plaintiff cannot demonstrate a reasonable, objective belief that the paper PM practice was a specific "violation" of those regulatory standards and "incompatible" with their public policy mandate. Rather, paper PMs were business practices conducted to "protect exclusively private interests." Hitesman, supra, 218 N.J. at 28. They were created to "look good in terms of our numbers at the facility of not having so many overdue PM[]s." Thus, there is no "substantial nexus between the complained-of conduct and a law[.]"8

Citing Estate of Roach, supra, plaintiff argues that "all laws and regulations are imbued with the public interest." While that is true, the issue before this court is not whether violation of 49 C.F.R. § 396.17 or the federal rules cited in the Penske training manual implicate a public policy concern. The issue is whether the paper PM practice constitutes a violation of those regulatory standards and is thereby incompatible with their public policy mandate, which, we conclude, it does not.

We are cognizant of the fact that "[s]pecific knowledge of the precise source of public policy is not required[,]" because the "object of CEPA is not to make lawyers out of conscientious employees but rather to prevent retaliation against those employees who object to employer conduct that they reasonably believe to be unlawful or indisputably dangerous to the public health, safety or welfare." Mehlman, supra, 153 N.J. at 193-94. Nevertheless, we do not understand CEPA, or the cases interpreting it, to provide a viable cause of action to a plaintiff who conflates the provisions of statutes and regulations, which are an appropriate basis for a CEPA claim, with an employer's procedures or practices, which are not, when the facts as alleged by that plaintiff would not be a violation of the statutory or regulatory provisions relied upon by that plaintiff.

Contrary to plaintiff's argument, this case is distinguishable from Hernandez v. Montville Township Board of Education, 354 N.J.Super. 467 (App. Div. 2002), aff'd, 179 N.J. 81 (2004). In Hernandez, the plaintiff, a custodian for two of defendant's elementary schools, was terminated for engaging in whistleblowing activity consisting of reporting the unsanitary conditions of the bathrooms and the broken light in the fire exit sign. Id. at 472. The plaintiff, who was a custodian for over twenty years, received continual safety training and was informed about OSHA, "knew there were regulations and policies against exposing schoolchildren to urine and feces and against unlit exit signs." Id. at 474. Further, the plaintiff "was informed by defendant's safety representative that OSHA's general standards require washing facilities to be maintained in a sanitary condition" and "the staff handbook provided to [the] plaintiff stressed the importance of safety, and that it was his job to maintain the general safety of the school buildings." Ibid. There, we reversed the JNOV because we determined that plaintiff had established that he reasonably believed the unsanitary bathroom conditions and unlit exit signs violated health and safety rules and regulations and were contrary to a clear mandate of public policy. Id. at 473-74.

Likewise, Gerard v. Camden County Health Services Center, 348 N.J.Super. 516 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 40 (2002), is distinguishable from this case. In Gerard, the plaintiff, a supervisor, refused to accede to the request of defendant's hospital administrator to serve disciplinary charges upon a head nurse based on what plaintiff believed were "trumped up" charges. Id. at 518-19. Basically, the plaintiff refused to participate in what she believed was "retaliatory disciplinary action ... against a nurse who had done no more than sought to protect the patients by disciplining a friend of [the hospital administrator] for leaving the patients unattended." Id. at 519.

In reversing summary judgment against the plaintiff, we determined, among other things, that the plaintiff could have established that she objectively, reasonably believed the filing of the charges would violate a law, regulation or clear mandate of public policy concerning public health. We noted "[i]t cannot be in the interest of patient care or public health to... retaliate against that employee's supervisor for refusing to file substantially unfounded disciplinary charges against that employee." Id. at 525. We observed "[t]o be sure, there must be some identifiable law, rule, public policy or fraudulent or criminal activity to which a plaintiff is `whistle blowing', but a CEPA plaintiff need not prove an actual violation thereof." Id. at 522.

Here, while plaintiff did not have to prove an actual violation, he did have to establish an objectively, reasonable belief that paper PMs violated a law, regulation or clear mandate of public policy concerning public safety. Because plaintiff could not explain how paper PMs threatened public safety, he failed to do so. By reporting the paper PMs, plaintiff highlighted bad internal management at the North Bergen facility, rather than a threat to public safety.

Plaintiff also argues that the court erred in excluding the Penske training manual from the trial and its JNOV consideration. According to plaintiff, the training manual established the substantial nexus between defendants' misconduct and a public policy concerning public safety. "Evidentiary decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court's discretion," Estate of Hanges v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010), and we grant substantial deference to the trial court's exercise of that discretion. Benevenga v. Digregorio, 325 N.J.Super. 27, 32 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 79 (2000). Reversal is not warranted unless the trial court's ruling was "so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted." State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982); see also Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J. 18, 31 (2007).

The exclusion of the training manual at trial did not result in a manifest denial of justice, as evidenced by the fact that the jury found in favor of plaintiff at trial. Moreover, plaintiff was allowed to, and, in fact, did introduce the relevant portions of the training manual through Martinez's testimony. Similarly, plaintiff's argument that the introduction of the training manual would have changed the court's JNOV ruling is without merit. The court's ruling was based on plaintiff's failure to provide evidence of his "objective, reasonable belief that the paper PM practice threatened public safety" by identifying a law, rule or public policy. The Penske training manual, which plaintiff neither received nor was trained on, could not rectify the deficiency in plaintiff's threshold showing.

Plaintiff also argues that because the court chose not to dismiss plaintiff's claim pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b), the JNOV ruling is undermined. Plaintiff's argument has no merit. Motions for involuntary dismissal in accordance with Rule 4:37-2(b) and motions for judgment occurring at the close of evidence, Rule 4:40-1, or after the verdict, Rule 4:40-2(b), are governed by essentially the same standard. See Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 30 (2004). We also use the same standard. See Barber v. ShopRite of Englewood & Assocs., Inc., 406 N.J.Super. 32, 51-52 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 210 (2009). Admittedly, our analysis and conclusion that there was no substantial nexus between the complained-of conduct and the public policy identified by plaintiff would have justified the court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b). However, since the analysis is governed by essentially the same standard, we find that any error was harmless and we affirm based on our review of the "substantial nexus" threshold. See R. 2:10-2 (the appellate court shall disregard any error or omission unless it is clearly capable of producing an unjust result).

Affirmed.