NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants, State Troopers Fraternal Association, State Troopers Non-Commissioned Officers Association, and State Troopers Superior Officers Association, filed this appeal after receiving an August 24, 2015 letter, written by an attorney for the State of New Jersey, Division of State Police (the "Division")1 during negotiations for a new collective negotiations agreement. The letter informed appellants, among other things, of the Division's decision to suspend the factfinding process, discontinue paying step increases as requested by the factfinder, and initiate compulsory interest arbitration.

In their notice of appeal, appellants characterize the Division's letter and decisions as a "State Agency decision entered on August 24, 2015/inaction." We conclude that the Division's decision, embodied in the quoted letter, does not constitute a final action or inaction of a state administrative agency or officer for purposes of conferring jurisdiction upon the Appellate Division. We further conclude appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal.

This is the factual background. In June 2012, the collective negotiations agreements between the Division and Appellants expired. Approximately two years later, in 2014, the parties agreed to appoint a factfinder in an attempt to resolve their impasse. In August 2015, in a letter written by its attorney, the Division suspended the factfinding process and decided to initiate compulsory interest arbitration. The letter provided in pertinent part:

Appellants filed an emergent application with the Appellate Division seeking to stay the Division's decision not to issue salary increment raises pending interest arbitration. The Appellate Division denied appellants' application. Appellants next sought the same emergent relief from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied appellants' request for emergent relief, stating in its order, "it appearing, on this record, that the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter."

Having been unsuccessful in their efforts to stay the Division's decision, appellants filed this appeal, which purports to challenge the "Final Agency Decision of the Division of State Police and Governor's Office of Employee Relations dated August 24, 2015 ordering Incremental Step Increases for State Troopers frozen." Two days later, appellants and the State Troopers Captains Association filed a verified complaint in the Law Division, Mercer County, seeking the same relief sought in this appeal. The Division subsequently petitioned the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) to initiate compulsory interest arbitration, as did the State Troopers Non-Commissioned Officers Association. An arbitrator rendered decisions and awards in the matters involving the State Troopers Fraternal Association and the State Troopers Non-Commissioned Officers Association. The awards included dispositions of the issues raised on this appeal concerning the Division's payment of step increases. The State Troopers Fraternal Association filed an appeal to PERC of the arbitrator's award denying restoration of the frozen salary increments.2

We first address the issue of jurisdiction. The Division contends the appellate court is without jurisdiction to hear this matter because appellants have not appealed from a final decision of an administrative agency or officer. Appellants counter that the Division's refusal or failure to implement what appellants claim to be automatic annual increases constitutes either agency action or inaction from which appeals may be taken directly to the Appellate Division. Appellants further contend the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be relaxed in cases involving solely a question of law. They contend this case presents such a question.

Having considered the parties' arguments, we conclude we have no jurisdiction. The New Jersey Constitution provides for appellate review of both trial court decisions and administrative agency action. "Appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court from the law and chancery divisions of the Superior Court, the County Courts and in such other causes as may be provided by law." N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, ¶ 2. "Prerogative writs are superseded and, in lieu thereof, review, hearing and relief shall be afforded in the Superior Court, on terms and in the manner provided by rules of the Supreme Court, as of right, except in criminal causes where such review shall be discretionary." N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, ¶ 4.

Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) states in pertinent part that appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division as of right:

The rule requires in the first instance that an agency decision must be final. The Supreme Court has provided guidance as to when an agency action is final.

A trial court's order is generally "considered final if it disposes of all issues as to all parties." Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Educ., 224 N.J. 126, 136 (2016). Thus, "in a multi-party . . . case, an order granting summary judgment, dismissing all claims against one of several defendants, is not a final order subject to appeal as of right until all claims against the remaining defendants have been resolved by motion or entry of a judgment following a trial." Ibid. The Court added, "[t]he same principle pertains to orders and decisions of state administrative agencies." Ibid.

"Final agency action is also characterized by findings of fact, conclusions of law, a definitive ruling, and a clear statement that the interested party may seek review of the decision and the manner in which that may be accomplished." Id. at 139. So, for example, "a letter without those necessary elements and written in terms that caused the Court to consider the letter no more than `a polite refusal' by the agency to change its previously stated position could not be considered final agency action for purposes of triggering a right to appeal." Ibid.

In the case before us, neither the Division attorney's letter nor the Division's action referenced in the letter contained any indicia of a final administrative agency action. The letter certainly did not dispose of all outstanding issues the parties were negotiating in an effort to finalize a collective negotiations agreement. The letter did not undertake to set forth comprehensive findings of fact, dispositive conclusions of law, and a definitive ruling, nor did it contain a clear statement about how appellants could seek review. In short, the letter was nothing more than a statement that the Division was going to pursue its statutory right to initiate compulsory interest arbitration and therefore discontinue the course of action it had undertaken to facilitate the factfinding process.

Not only did the Division attorney's letter lack any indicia of a final agency decision or action, but appellants also had "available a right of review before an[] administrative agency." Rule 2:2-3(a)(2). This is evidenced by the course the parties chose in this very case. They initiated compulsory interest arbitration, an arbitrator rendered two decisions, and, in at least one of those instances, appellants exercised their right to take an administrative appeal to PERC.

The Supreme Court's decision in In re County of Atlantic, 230 N.J. 237 (2017), represents a further instance in which collective bargaining units exhausted their administrative remedies before resorting to an appeal to the Appellate Division. Like the case before us, the issue in In re County of Atlantic was "whether the parties to the specific collective negotiations agreements . . . at issue . . . were required to continue scheduled salary increases during the period between the expiration of those contracts and the formation of their successor agreements." 230 N.J. at 242. When Atlantic County informed the bargaining units it would no longer implement the incremental salary scheme provided for in those contracts, the unions filed charges with PERC, claiming that the County had engaged in an unfair labor practice. Ibid. Only after a hearing examiner and PERC rendered decisions did the unions seek review in the Appellate Division. Id. at 242-43.

Here, regardless of whether appellants characterize the Division attorney's letter as administrative action, namely, terminating payments respondents had been making at the urging of the fact finder; or inaction, namely, not making payments respondents were required to make; neither the letter nor the cessation of payments constituted final agency action. Consequently, the Appellate Division does not have jurisdiction under Rule 2:2-3(a)(2). The appeal must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.