NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

PER CURIAM.

After a remand to the trial court for a written statement of reasons, we consider anew plaintiff Thomas Kenyon's appeal of the grant of summary judgment to defendants.1

The facts and procedural history are detailed in our prior opinion and need not be repeated here. Kenyon v. Rutgers, No. A-1159-16 (App. Div. June 19, 2018). In short, plaintiff brought this action against defendants for violations of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to-14. In our earlier opinion, we noted plaintiff

After defendants moved for summary judgment, plaintiff filed a motion to extend the discovery date. On October 14, 2016, the trial judge denied the discovery extension motion and granted summary judgment to defendants. A handwritten note on the summary judgment order advised, "a written opinion will be issued as soon as possible." On the record, the judge stated he would issue a written opinion explaining his findings and reasons for the decision. Despite follow-up requests by plaintiff and this court, no reasons were given for the decision on the record and no written opinion was ever issued.

In the absence of any findings or reasoning for the trial court's decision, we could not perform our review function and were constrained to remand to the trial judge, directing him to provide a statement of reasons for both orders. On July 18, 2018, plaintiff received the trial judge's statement of reasons and requested this court reopen the appeal.

We conduct a de novo review of the summary judgment order, applying the same standard as the trial court. Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). Summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c); see Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995). To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party must bring forth "evidence that creates a `genuine issue as to any material fact challenged.'" Brill, 142 N.J. at 529 (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).

In his comprehensive statement of reasons, the trial judge addressed each of plaintiff's arguments and determined that plaintiff had not shown an "objectively reasonable belief that Rutgers was in violation of any law, rule, regulation or public policy, from the perspective of a reasonable man standard. . . [or] from the perspective of someone who is holding a position of expertise in the procurement field." The judge further concluded "the record is devoid of any activity characterized as whistle blowing under [N.J.S.A.] 34:19-3."

After reviewing the record in light of plaintiff's contentions and the applicable principles of law, we conclude that the record fully supports the trial judge's factual findings and, in light of those facts, his legal conclusions are unassailable. We, therefore, affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in the trial court's well-reasoned opinion and add only the following brief comments.

Plaintiff's dispute with defendants was based solely on his personal, but erroneous, beliefs. It is well-established law in New Jersey that Rutgers is not subject to state public-bidding statutes. No law, policy, or regulation supported plaintiff's assertions that Rutgers was in violation of procurement practices. As the trial judge noted, plaintiff's dispute with his employer was over internal policy; his objections to Rutgers' procurement practices stemmed from his own views of those practices. As a result, plaintiff has not presented a prima facie cause of action under CEPA sufficient to withstand summary judgment.

We are satisfied the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying plaintiff a third extension of discovery. Here, where a trial date was scheduled, plaintiff did not show the required exceptional circumstances to justify an extension. See R. 4:24-1(c).

Affirmed.