NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MALA NARAYANAN, Judge.

Dear Counsel:

This letter opinion constitutes the court's decision with respect to the above-captioned complaint involving plaintiff's appeal against the local property tax assessment upon her residence. The residence is located at 388 North Maple Avenue, East Orange, designated as Block 130, Lot 24 ("Subject"). For tax year 2010, Defendant ("East Orange") assessed the Subject as follows:

The Essex County Board of Taxation entered a judgment affirming the assessment on August 13, 2010. Plaintiff timely appealed this judgment to the Tax Court maintaining that the assessment should be the purchase price of the Subject, namely, $125,000. Since the evidence produced by plaintiff has failed to persuade the court in this regard, the assessment is affirmed.

FACTS

Based upon the testimony of plaintiff adduced at trial, and documents admitted into evidence,1 the court finds the following facts: The Subject comprises of a lot measuring about 0.11 acres and is improved with a three-story colonial-style residence with vinyl siding. Erected sometime in 1929, the house has five bedrooms and one full bathroom on the second floor, and a half-bathroom on the first floor. The first floor has a living room with a gas fireplace, dining room, and a kitchen. The second floor has the three bedrooms and the bath. The third floor has two bedrooms. It has a finished basement with a walkout facility. There is wood flooring throughout the house. The property is surrounded by a metal fence. It has a driveway and a detached garage. The house is not centrally air-conditioned.

The Subject was listed for sale on September 22, 2009, through a real estate broker. Details of the Subject were provided in the MLS. The asking price was $120,000. The MLS listed the features of the Subject. It stated that the Subject had "good size rooms" but needed "TLC" (or tender loving care). It also stated that the Subject was "priced right to sell" and the "owner [was] anxious" to sell.

Plaintiff, who had been residing with her mother, wanted to buy a home for herself and her three children. She had been actively looking at different residences in other localities when her real estate broker informed her of the Subject. Prior to her purchase, plaintiff inspected the Subject, which was vacant but with fully functioning utilities. She never met the owner. She met the owner's daughter, the power-of-attorney holder for the owner, only once during the closing on the purchase of the Subject. The daughter informed the plaintiff that her father (the owner of the Subject) was ill and in a nursing home.

Plaintiff decided to make an offer after her inspection because the Subject had genuine hardwood floors, a feature she valued. She testified that this feature in addition to decorations, solid structures, and its potential made her to buy the Subject despite the fact that the amenities were outdated, the tiles/bathroom was "gross," and it was not well maintained. Because the real estate broker informed her that there were other offers for the Subject, and that she would stand a better chance if she were to offer more than the listing price, plaintiff made an offer of $125,000, which was $5,000 more than the listing price. The offer was immediately accepted. The sale was completed on November 3, 2009 one month after the assessment date of October 1, 2009, and less than two months after the Subject was listed for sale. There were no seller's or financing concessions. The closing then took place on January 14, 2010.

After her purchase, plaintiff made renovations to the Subject's interior which cost about $40,000 to $50,000. She refinished the floors, updated the electrical system, installed granite, changed windows, gutted the kitchen and bathrooms and re-did them (with new cabinets, tiles and appliances), and finished the basement with sheetrock and tiles. She testified that these renovations were her personal preferences. Plaintiff moved into the Subject in March of 2010.

At the end of plaintiff's testimony, East Orange moved to dismiss the case for failure to overcome the presumptive correctness of the assessment. East Orange argued that the Subject's purchase price was not a reliable or probative indicator of its value because the owner was anxious to get rid of the Subject; the Subject was exposed to the market for only forty-two (42) days; the Subject was vacant when listed and sold; and it was in dire need of repairs and maintenance. The court denied the motion on grounds that plaintiff had provided sufficient information to initially overcome the presumption of correctness. R. 4:37-2(b) (court to accept plaintiff's evidence as true and accord plaintiff all legitimate inferences which could be deduced from such evidence); MSGW Real Estate Fund, LLC v. Borough of Mountain Lakes, 18 N.J.Tax 364, 379 (Tax 1998) (court uses "`rose-colored glasses" in viewing the sufficiency of evidence to overcome the presumption of an assessment's correctness, however, this does not equate to a conclusion that such evidence will necessarily suffice "to carry that party's burden of proof when all the evidence is subjected to critical analysis and weighing by the court"); Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5-6 (1969) ("judicial function . . . is . . . mechanical" in deciding a R. 4:37-2(b) motion where court is "not concerned with the worth, nature or extent . . . of the evidence, but only with its existence . . . "). East Orange then rested on its assessment.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

It is well-established that "[o]riginal assessments and judgments of county boards of taxation are entitled to a presumption of validity." MSGW, supra, 18 N.J. Tax at 373. The scope of this presumption has been stated as follows:

The presumption attaches to the quantum of the tax assessment. Based on this presumption the appealing taxpayer has the burden of proving that the assessment is erroneous. The presumption in favor of the taxing authority can be rebutted only by cogent evidence, a proposition that has long been settled. The strength of the presumption is exemplified by the nature of the evidence that is required to overcome it. That evidence must be "definite, positive and certain in quality and quantity to overcome the presumption."

The assessment is presumed correct because "in tax matters it is to be presumed that governmental authority has been exercised correctly and in accordance with law." Pantasote Co. v. City of Passaic, 100 N.J. 408, 413 (1985). The presumption remains "in place even if the municipality utilized a flawed valuation methodology, so long as the quantum of the assessment is not so far removed from the true value of the property or the method of assessment itself is so patently defective as to justify removal of the presumption of validity." Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Township of Bernards, 111 N.J. 507, 517 (1988) (citation omitted).

To overcome the presumption, the appealing party must provide "sufficient competent evidence to the contrary." Little Egg Harbor Twp. v. Bonsangue, 316 N.J.Super. 271, 285-86 (App. Div. 1998). The evidence "must be `sufficient to determine the value of the property under appeal, thereby establishing the existence of a debatable question as to the correctness of the assessment." West Colonial Enters, LLC v. City of East Orange, 20 N.J.Tax 576, 579 (Tax 2003) (quoting Lenal Props., Inc. v. City of Jersey City, 18 N.J.Tax 405, 408 (Tax 1999), aff'd, 18 N.J.Tax 658 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 488 (2000)).

After the presumption is overcome with sufficient evidence the court must, at the close of the trial, "appraise the testimony, make a determination of true value and fix the assessment." Rodwood Gardens, Inc. v. City of Summit, 188 N.J.Super. 34, 38-39 (App. Div. 1982). The court must decide the issue "based on a fair preponderance of the evidence." Ford Motor Co. v. Township of Edison, 127 N.J. 290, 312 (1992). "[A]lthough there may have been enough evidence to overcome the presumption of correctness at the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief, the burden of proof remain[s] on the taxpayer throughout the entire case . . . to demonstrate that the judgment under review was incorrect." Id. at 314-15.

The comparable sales approach is generally accepted as an appropriate method of estimating value for a residence. Brown v. Borough of Glen Rock, 19 N.J.Tax 366, 377 (App. Div. 2001); Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate, 300 (13th ed. 2008) (the "sales comparison approach provides the most credible indication of value for . . . properties that are not purchased primarily for their income-producing characteristics."). In this approach, the market value for the subject property is derived "by comparing similar properties that have recently sold with the property being appraised, identifying appropriate units of comparison, and making adjustments to the sale prices of the comparable properties based on relevant, marketderived elements of comparison." Id. at 299.

Plaintiff did not offer any comparable sales or any other evidence to establish that the assessment on the Subject was incorrect, or that its market value should be $125,000 (the Subject's purchase price) as of the date of assessment, October 1, 2009. She contends that because the Subject's sale was between a "willing seller, through daughter" and herself, a willing buyer, the Subject's sale is a reliable indicator of its market value.

The "sales price of a property may be the best indicator of its true value in some circumstances." Passarella v. Township of Wall, 22 N.J.Tax 600, 603 (App. Div. 2004). Although Plaintiff purchased the Subject one month after the assessment date, it is permissible to consider this sale because it is not too remote in time. Romulus Dev. Corp. v. Town of West New York, 7 N.J.Tax 305, 317 (Tax 1985) (sale of subject property two months after assessment date is "close enough to" the assessment date "to reflect the value on that date"); Glen Wall Associates v. Wall Tp. 99 N.J. 265, 283 (1985) (sale of subject property less than three months after the assessing date should have been considered by the Tax Court as an indicator of value); Rek Investment Co. v. Newark, 80 N.J.Super. 552 (App. Div. 1963) (sale of subject usable when sale occurred two months after assessing date).

However, while a subject property's sale price may be evidence of market value, it still requires that the sale meets the other requirements of market value. See Romulus, supra, 7 N.J. Tax at 316-18 (sale price of the subject "is a guiding indicium of fair value and ordinarily is merely evidential although it might under peculiar circumstances become controlling, subject to the limitation that the determination properly involve[s] the weighing and appraising of all component factors and adventitious circumstances") (internal quotations and citations), aff'd o.b., 9 N.J.Tax 90 (App. Div. 1987). See also Sage v. Bernards Township, 5 N.J.Tax 52, 67 (Tax 1982) ("[t]he weight, if any, to be afforded the sale must depend upon all of the facts and circumstances surrounding it").

East Orange argues that the sale of the Subject, while not a sham, is nonetheless unusable to determine its market value because it lacked market exposure, and it was not an arms' length transaction because the seller was ill and his daughter was eager to dispose of the vacant property as quickly as possible. Plaintiff counters that there were no special circumstances or conditions for the sale as she was given no financing or other concessions. She argues that the Subject had been sufficiently exposed to the market because it was listed and sold through real estate brokers and had other offers besides hers.

An arms' length transaction is one between a knowledgeable buyer, under no compelling obligation to buy, and a willing knowledgeable seller, under no compelling obligation to sell. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co. v. West Deptford Tp. 13 N.J.Tax 242, 301 (Tax 1993). See also The Appraisal of Real Estate, supra, at 23 (defining "market value" as "the most probable price, as of a specified date, . . . for which the specified property rights should sell after reasonable exposure in a competitive market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, with the buyer and seller each acting prudently, knowledgeably, and for self-interest, and assuming that neither is under undue duress").

In the instant case, the evidence as to the surrounding circumstances of the sale of the Subject tends to establish that the sale is not a reliable indicator of the Subject's market value. It is undisputed that the Subject was vacant and in need of repairs/maintenance. The MLS also noted the need for fixing up of the Subject. It is also not disputed that the owner was ill and in a nursing home, and was being represented by his daughter, his power-of-attorney. There were no negotiations with the seller or his daughter. Rather, plaintiff's first offer was immediately accepted. These facts corroborate the statement in the MLS that the owner was "anxious" to sell. The evidence thus indicates that the seller's daughter desired to make a quick sale, which tends to prove that the Subject was sold by one who was under a compelling obligation to sell.

Although plaintiff testified that her broker advised her that there were other offers, the court was not provided with any information in this regard (such as the amount offered or the extent and length of negotiations, if any). Without this information, the court cannot conclude that due to the possible existence of other offers, the seller's daughter was not compelled to sell to the plaintiff.

Finally, that plaintiff was a willing and knowledgeable buyer does not overcome the evidence that the seller's daughter desired to make a quick sale of her father's vacant house. Each party must not be under any urgency or compulsion to finalize the transaction.

Therefore, the Subject's sale price, standing alone, is insufficient to provide a reliable evidence of market value. In the absence of any other corroborative evidence of comparable sales or of market conditions in the East Orange market, the court finds that the plaintiff has not met her burden to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the judgment of the Essex County Board of Taxation is incorrect. Therefore, the assessment is affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Essex County Board of Taxation is affirmed. The Tax Court Clerk/Administrator is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this letter opinion.