DAVID T. THUMA, Bankruptcy Judge.
Before the Court is the Chapter 11 Trustee's motion to authorize monthly payment of 75% of his Trustee fees earned in the prior month. The main secured creditor in the case objected, arguing that the Trustee should not be paid until creditors have been paid in full. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion.
On July 25, 2014, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor's sole asset is a 60-unit apartment complex in Hobbs, New Mexico (the "Property").
Post-petition, Regal Manor Apartments, LLC ("Regal Manor") operated the Property pursuant to a management agreement with the Debtor. The Debtor's members also are the primary owners of Regal Manor. Under the management agreement Regal Manor collected rent, paid bills, made repairs, and signed leases in its own name. One result of this unusual arrangement is that the Debtor lacked the financial and operating information needed to complete the required monthly operating reports.
The Property has three encumbrances:
Debtor purchased the Property from Laurie Knott, Tony Knott, and Kevin White under the Escrow Agreement and Contract for Deed dated May 4, 2009 (the "REC"). The REC "wraps" the first and second mortgages. Sellers' interests in the REC were assigned to Court Properties, LLC in March, 2010. Laurie Knott and Kevin White are the sole members of Court Properties.
There appears to be equity in the Property, although the amount is unknown. In addition to the secured claims listed above, the Debtor owes $500,000 to insiders (Ritken, Inc. Rita Pilate, and Kenneth Williams) and about $14,000 to other general unsecured creditors.
After conducting a final hearing on the motion to dismiss, convert, or appoint a Chapter 11 trustee, the Court ordered the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. Mr. Craig Dill, an accountant who lives and works in Albuquerque, New Mexico, was appointed on June 15, 2015.
The Trustee faced a challenging task in organizing the Debtor's affairs. In its memorandum opinion entered June 11, 2015, the Court found that the Debtor's accounting and financial reporting was consistently and materially deficient. Despite repeated Court orders, the Debtor never retained an appropriate bookkeeper or accountant. The Debtor had not filed a monthly operating report since March 10, 2015, reporting on January 2015 activity. The Debtor failed to disclose basic information such as sources and amount of income, expenses, post-petition accounts payable and receivable, unpaid taxes, unpaid administrative expenses, payroll, a balance sheet, a cash flow statement, or check copies. The Debtor's bank statements were heavily redacted, making it impossible to determine what expenses were being paid and to whom, where the rental income is going, and the source of deposits. Further, the available rent rolls did not adequately disclose lease terms, lease expirations, deposits, or rental income received.
The Court also found that the Property's condition had deteriorated during the Chapter 11 case. When the Trustee was appointed, the Property was in need of substantial repairs, including repairs to the parking lot, landscaping, stucco, fences, windows and screens, HVAC systems, and appliances. The roof also leaked post-petition. Based on the evidence, the Court estimated that the total amount of deferred maintenance is in the range of $400,000 — $500,000.
In July 2015, the Trustee retained a broker to sell the Property. The Trustee has made considerable efforts to prepare the Property for sale. The MORs for July and August 2015 show the Trustee spent about $18,500 on repairs during those months. The MORs also show he performed a good deal of accounting work to prepare the Debtor's books and records for inspection by potential buyers.
In addition, the Trustee is working to recover estate property from the Debtor's principals. On July 21, 2015, the Trustee commenced an adversary proceeding against Rita Pilate and Regal Manor to recover funds and records necessary to repair, manage, and sell the Property. The defendants have been fairly uncooperative thus far. The Court held a hearing on September 25, 2015 to address their failure to surrender the funds and records to the Trustee.
The Trustee represents that he will need to spend a significant amount of time and money, and possibly turn down other work, to effectively administer the bankruptcy estate. He periodically drives about 320 miles from Albuquerque to Hobbs to negotiate with vendors, oversee repairs, and coordinate with management.
The Trustee seeks interim payments equal to 75% of the commissions earned on disbursements during the previous month, pursuant to the commission schedule in 11 U.S.C. § 326(a),
Given the equity cushion in the Property and the monthly cash flow, the estate appears to be administratively solvent. If the Court authorized interim compensation as requested, it is unlikely the Trustee would be required to disgorge funds.
Sections 326 and 330 govern compensation of Chapter 11 trustees. Section 326 provides a mathematical calculation of the trustee's commission based on amounts disbursed:
11 U.S.C. § 326(a).
Section 330 establishes the authority to compensate trustees. Before enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"),
Section 330(a) provided in part:
11 U.S.C. § 330(a).
Thus, before BAPCPA both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 trustees were entitled to "reasonable compensation" for their services, as determined by § 330(a)(3), up to the statutory cap. See In re Miniscribe Corp., 309 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2002) ("[A] court awarding trustee fees must begin by assessing reasonableness under § 330(a) before applying the percentage-based cap under § 326(a)"); In re Clemens, 349 B.R. 725, 730 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) (pre-BAPCPA, courts inquired into the reasonableness of all trustee fees before applying the statutory cap). See generally 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 326.02.[1][a] (16th ed. 2010) (pre-BAPCPA, trustee fees must be reasonable and under the statutory cap).
Section 330 was amended in 2005. First, BAPCPA added the italicized language to § 330(a)(3):
The added language meant that Chapter 7 trustees were no longer governed by the section.
After BAPCPA, courts disagree as to whether they can inquire into the reasonableness of a Chapter 7 trustee's compensation. Compare In re Clemens, 349 B.R. 725, 731 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) (even post-BAPCPA, Chapter 7 trustees are limited to reasonable compensation), with In re Rowe, 750 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2014) (absent extraordinary circumstances, a Chapter 7 trustee's compensation is based solely on the § 326 commission rate).
With Chapter 11 trustees, however, courts have generally held that, notwithstanding § 330(a)(7), such trustees are still entitled to "reasonable compensation" up to § 326(a)'s cap. See, e.g., In re Salgado-Nava, 473 B.R. 911, 919 (9th Cir. BAP 2012) ("Notwithstanding the applicability of paragraph (7) to chapter 11 trustees, they are still specifically included in paragraph (3) with its litany of reasonableness factors"); In re Coyote Ranch Contractors, LLC, 400 B.R. 84, 94 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009) (§ 330(a)(7) requires compensation awarded to Chapter 11 trustee to be in the form of a commission, even though the court must consider factors set forth in § 330(a)(3)); In re Clemens, 349 B.R. 725, 733 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) (after BAPCPA, § 330(a)(3) requires courts to rule on the reasonableness of requested Chapter 11 trustee fees). The Court agrees that post-BAPCPA, Chapter 11 trustees are limited to "reasonable compensation" up to the statutory cap. The Court need not determine how § 330(a)(7) affects compensation to Chapter 7 trustees.
Section 331 authorizes interim compensation to professionals, including trustees:
§ 331. Section 331 was added to the Bankruptcy Code "to remove any doubt that officers of the estate may apply for, and the court may approve, compensation and reimbursement during the case, instead of being required to wait until the end of the case, which in some instances, may be years." H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 330 (1977); S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42 (1978) U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 5787, 5827, 5828, 6287.
An award of interim compensation remains subject to final Court approval. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 331.04[1] (15th ed. 1996) (interim allowances are subject to reexamination because all administrative expenses "must receive the court's final scrutiny and approval"); Matter of Taxman Clothing Co., 49 F.3d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1995) ("All awards of interim compensation are tentative, hence reviewable—and revisable—at the end of the case"). Any interim compensation awarded pursuant to § 331 that exceeds the amount of compensation ultimately awarded under § 330 must be disgorged. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(5).
Courts have wide discretion in authorizing the payment of interim compensation to trustees and other professionals. See In re Paterno, 2014 WL 4929106, *2 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 2014) ("Section 331 provides that the payment of interim compensation to professionals is in the discretion of the Court").
Given the discretionary standard, guidance about when to award interim compensation to trustees is fairly sparse. Factors to consider, based on a review of the case law and on the Court's judgment, include:
1. How much work must the trustee do to effectively administer the estate?
2. Is there enough equity or cash flow in the estate to prevent administrative insolvency?
3. Would deferring compensation work a hardship on the trustee?
4. Does the estate generate monthly income from an ongoing business, or is it a liquidating estate?
5. Are there adequate safeguards in the event disgorgement is necessary? See, e.g., In re Knudsen Corp., 84 B.R. 668, 672 (9th Cir. BAP 1988) (setting forth factors to consider when awarding interim compensation to professionals); In re Stewart, 157 B.R. 893, 897-898 (9th Cir. BAP 1993) (discussing interim compensation to trustees); In re Paterno, 2014 WL 4929106, *2 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 2014) (same); In re Heatherly, 179 B.R. 872, 875 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995) (same).
The Court weighs the factors as follows:
The factors weigh in favor of authorizing interim compensation. After considering §§ 326 and 330, the creditors' interests, and the fact that the Trustee is also employed as an accountant, the Court concludes it is reasonable to allow the Trustee to be paid interim compensation of 75% of the trustee fees earned from the prior month's disbursements, capped at the amounts set forth in Budget A or B—whichever is applicable—attached to the cash collateral order entered October 1, 2015. The Court will also authorize reimbursement of expenses to the extent set forth in that order.
The Court will allow the estate to pay the Trustee monthly interim compensation payments as outlined above. A separate order will be entered.