JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.
Yazzie lived in an "eight-foot-by-eight-foot shack" in Two Grey Hills, New Mexico, with his wife and their four children, two of which were Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, Yazzie's step-daughters. United States' Response to Defendant's Motion Withdraw [sic] His Plea of Guilty at 1, filed December 30, 2011 (Doc. 62)("Response") (citation omitted). The Navajo Tribal Police Department learned that Yazzie was allegedly abusing Jane Doe 1, who was thirteen years old at the time, and Jane Doe 2, who was then ten years old, on May 3, 2010. Response at 1. On May 10, 2010, the Navajo Police interviewed Yazzie regarding the allegations. See Response at 4. Before the interview, Yazzie gave an
In the Criminal Complaint, filed May 12, 2010 (Doc. 1), Plaintiff United States of America charged Yazzie with committing "multiple acts of aggravated sexual abuse to two minor children under the ages of twelve and sixteen years in violation of" 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c) and 2246(2)(C), (D). Criminal Complaint at 1. A person convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) "shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for not less than 30 years or for life." 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). A Grand Jury indicted Yazzie on two counts of aggravated sexual abuse: as to Jane Doe 1, the Grand Jury indicted Yazzie for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241(c), and 2246(2)(C), and as to Jane Doe 2, the Grand Jury indicted him for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241(c), and 2246(2)(D). See Indictment at 1-2, filed June 10, 2010 (Doc. 12). Yazzie pled not guilty to the two counts in the Indictment. See Clerk's Minutes of Arraignment at 1, filed June 16, 201 (Doc. 14).
As part of a Plea Agreement, filed February 9, 2011 (Doc. 38), the United States charged Yazzie with Aggravated Sexual Abuse, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241(a), and 2246(2)(C). See Information at 1, filed February 9, 2011 (Doc. 35). A person convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) "shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a). That same day, Yazzie agreed to plead guilty to the Information, charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a), that being Aggravated Sexual Abuse of Jane Doe 1. See Plea Agreement ¶ 3, at 2, filed February 9, 2011 (Doc. 38). The United States and Yazzie made an agreement to a specific sentence "between 15 years (180 months) and 19 years (228 months) imprisonment," pursuant to rule 11(c)(1)(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Plea Agreement
Plea Agreement ¶ 8, at 3 (emphasis in original). Yazzie also stipulated:
Plea Agreement ¶ 10(c), at 5.
At the plea hearing, Yazzie swore that the testimony he gave was the "truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." For The Record at 12:05:45-05:58 (Sanchez, Yazzie)("FTR"); Transcript of Plea Hearing at 2:13, taken February 9, 2011, filed January 17, 2012 (Doc. 63)("Plea Tr.")(stating that the Defendant was sworn). The Honorable Richard L. Puglisi, former Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the District of New Mexico,
Assistant Federal Public Defender James C. Loonam, Yazzie's counsel at the time, stated that he was convinced that Yazzie understood the rights he gives up by pleading guilty and his likely sentence under rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Plea Tr. at 4:20-25 (Judge Puglisi, Loonam). When Judge Puglisi asked Yazzie whether the Plea Agreement is his only agreement with the United States, Yazzie stated that he wants "another agreement." Plea Tr. at 5:2-5 (Judge Puglisi, Yazzie). Loonam informed Judge Puglisi that, while Yazzie was detained pretrial, his wife gave birth to Yazzie's child, and Yazzie wants an agreement that will allow him to see his baby in person, in the presence of United States Marshalls. See Plea Tr. at 5:7-19 (Loonam). Judge Puglisi asked Yazzie whether he understood that the only agreement that was binding at the time of the plea hearing was the Plea Agreement, and Yazzie responded: "Yes." Plea Tr. at 5:21-25 (Judge Puglisi, Yazzie). Yazzie responded "no" to Judge Puglisi's question whether anybody had attempted to force him to plead guilty, in any way, and Yazzie responded "yes" to Judge Puglisi's question whether he was pleading guilty because he is "in fact guilty." Plea Tr. at 6:1-6 (Judge Puglisi, Yazzie).
Judge Puglisi stated that he would not read through the Plea Agreement word-for-word at the plea hearing with Yazzie, because Yazzie indicated that he understood the Plea Agreement. Plea Tr. at 6:7-10 (Judge Puglisi). Judge Puglisi stated that he would, rather, ask Yazzie questions on particular parts of the Plea Agreement to assure that Yazzie understood it. See Plea Tr. at 6:10-11 (Judge Puglisi). Judge Puglisi asked Yazzie whether he could affirm that his statement in the Plea Agreement is true. See Plea Tr. at 6:12-17 (Judge Puglisi)(citing Plea Agreement at 3-4). Yazzie stated that his statement in the Plea Agreement is "not all true" and that he had tried everything he could to change it, but could not change the statement, and, therefore, he would "have to say it's true." Plea Tr. at 6:18-20 (Yazzie). Judge Puglisi informed Yazzie that he did not have to say that his statement is true. See Plea Tr. at 6:21 (Judge Puglisi). Judge Puglisi asked Yazzie which portion of his statement in the Plea Agreement is not true. See Plea Tr. at 6:22-23 (Judge Puglisi). Yazzie responded that the statement inaccurately indicates that he used "force" on Jane Doe 1. Plea Tr. at 6:24 (Yazzie). Judge Puglisi asked Yazzie why it is not true that Yazzie used "force," and Yazzie stated that he did not use force and that, rather, Jane Doe 1 kept "coming to" him. Plea Tr. at 6:24-7:2 (Judge Puglisi, Yazzie). Judge Puglisi asked whether everything in his statement, besides the allegation of force, is true, and Yazzie responded: "Yes." Plea Tr. at 7:3-5 (Judge Puglisi, Yazzie). Judge Puglisi noted that both the Information and the Plea Agreement state that Yazzie used "force," but also noted that a child of Jane Doe 1's age at the time — thirteen — cannot consent to sexual contact, so Judge Puglisi expressed that he was not certain whether Yazzie must admit to using force. Plea Tr. at 7:6-18 (Judge Puglisi). Judge Puglisi asked the United States whether Yazzie is required to admit that he used force to be found guilty of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. See Plea Tr. at 7:19-21 (Judge Puglisi). The United States responded that the second element of the charge
Judge Puglisi then asked Yazzie whether, in light of the United States' evidence against him, Yazzie believed it was "more probable than not" that a jury would find that he used force to commit a sexual act with Jane Doe 1, regardless whether Yazzie believed that Jane Doe 1 consented to the act:
Plea Tr. at 7:25-8:8 (Judge Puglisi). Yazzie conferred with Loonam and stated that, based on his conversation with Mr. Loonam, he understood that a jury would find he had used force on Jane Doe 1, because "of the age of the victim." Plea Tr. at 8:10-15 (Yazzie, Judge Puglisi). Judge Puglisi asked Yazzie: "And so even though you feel that there wasn't force used, after you have looked at all the evidence in the case is it your belief that a jury would not believe you and find that you did use force?" Plea Tr. at 8:16-19 (Judge Puglisi). Yazzie responded: "Yes." Plea Tr. at 8:20 (Yazzie). Judge Puglisi then announced that, after reviewing Yazzie's statement in the Plea Agreement, he found the facts provided an adequate foundation to the Information charging Yazzie with aggravated sexual abuse. See Plea Tr. at 8:21-24 (Judge Puglisi). The United States did not request that Judge Puglisi question Yazzie further regarding the crime. See Plea Tr. at 8:25-9:2 (Judge Puglisi, Henderson).
Judge Puglisi then asked Yazzie whether he understood that he had agreed to a sentence "between 15 years and 19 years or 180 months and 220 months," and that, if Judge Puglisi accepts his plea, Yazzie will receive a sentence of imprisonment in that range. Plea Tr. at 9:3-9 (Judge Puglisi). Yazzie responded: "[Y]es." Plea Tr. at 9:10 (Yazzie). Judge Puglisi asked Yazzie whether he understood that he could withdraw from the Plea Agreement if the Court rejects the Plea Agreement, and Yazzie responded that he did. See Plea Tr. at 9:11-15 (Judge Puglisi, Yazzie). Judge Puglisi asked Yazzie: "Are you sure you want to agree to a sentence that is in the range that I just mentioned to you?" Plea Tr. at 9:16-17 (Judge Puglisi). Yazzie stated that the sentence is "too much for me," and that he "tried everything to get it something lower," but could not, and, therefore, "yes," he accepted the agreed sentencing range. Plea Tr. at 9:18-20 (Yazzie). Judge Puglisi asked Yazzie whether he "still want[ed] to proceed with this plea?" Plea Tr. at 9:21-22 (Judge Puglisi). Yazzie replied: "Yes." Plea Tr. at 9:23 (Yazzie). Judge Puglisi asked Yazzie whether he understood that, if Judge Puglisi accepts the plea, Yazzie will be required to register as a sex offender, and Yazzie replied: "Yes." Plea Tr. at 9:24-10:1 (Judge Puglisi, Yazzie). Yazzie affirmed that he had discussed with Mr. Loonam, in detail, the requirement for registration as a sex offender. See Plea Tr. at 10:2-5 (Judge Puglisi, Yazzie).
Judge Puglisi asked Yazzie whether he understood that, in the Plea Agreement, he has waived the right to appeal any sentence up to the maximum allowed by law, which Judge Puglisi notes the Plea Agreement states is a sentence of up to life imprisonment. See Plea Tr. at 10:6-11 (Judge Puglisi). Yazzie responded: "Yes."
Judge Puglisi then asked Yazzie how he wanted to plead to the Information. See Plea Tr. at 10:24-11:2 (Judge Puglisi). Yazzie stated: "Guilty." Plea Tr. at 11:3 (Yazzie). Judge Puglisi then announced that he found Yazzie competent and capable of entering a plea, and that his plea is knowing and voluntary, and Judge Puglisi accepted Yazzie's plea of guilty and found him guilty of the offense. See Plea Tr. at 11:4-12 (Judge Puglisi). Judge Puglisi explained that the Court may accept or reject the Plea Agreement up to the date of Yazzie's sentencing hearing. See Plea Tr. at 11:13-17 (Judge Puglisi).
On May 2, 2011, Yazzie wrote the Court stating his concern with the Plea Agreement and his counsel. See Letter to the Court from Willis Yazzie, dated May 2, 2011, filed May 2, 2011 (Doc. 43)("May 2, 2011 Letter"). Yazzie asserted that Mr. Loonam was not helping him and requested that the Court replace his appointed counsel. Yazzie also stated that he was not happy with the Plea Agreement, and that he wants to proceed to trial, because he agreed to a sentence of 15 to 19 years, but the United States, he alleges, is now seeking to imprison him for life. See May 2, 2011 Letter at 1. Yazzie sent a subsequent letter to the Court, in which he asserts that the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agents "badgered" him to make a statement. Letter to the Court from Willis Yazzie, dated May 15, 2011, filed May 15, 2011 (Doc. 46)("May 15, 2011 Letter"). Yazzie wants to suppress a confession he made to FBI agents on May 7, 2010. See May 15, 2011 Letter at 1. Yazzie states that he does not remember whether he was read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona before he made the statement. See May 15, 2011 Letter at 1. Yazzie also asserts that he did not penetrate Jane Doe 1's vagina, and that, therefore, if the Court does not suppress his confession, the Court should sentence him for a lesser offense. See May 15, 2011 Letter at 1-3. Yazzie requests that the Court provide him with new counsel, because, Yazzie asserts, Mr. Loonam told him "to cut my bullshit out on the day of my sentence at the court." May 15, 2011 Letter at 4.
The Court concluded that communications had broken down between Mr. Loonam and Yazzie. See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 1-2, filed October 6, 2011, 2011 WL 5205144 (Doc. 54). On October 7, 2011, the Court appointed P. Jeffrey Jones to replace Mr. Loonam. See CJA 20 Appointment of and Authority to Pay Court Appointed Counsel, filed October 7, 2011 (Doc. 55).
On November 29, 2011, Yazzie filed his 1st Motion. Yazzie asserts that, at the time he entered into the Plea Agreement, he did not understand the law, and he
The United States opposes the 1 st Motion. The United States asserts that Judge Puglisi corrected any error in the plea colloquy — "Judge Puglisi misstated the burden of proof as to the element of force with, `it is more probable than not' that a jury would find that Yazzie used force against his victims" — when Yazzie "conceded that [because of] the age of the victim a jury would find that he used force." Response at 6. The United States asserts that Yazzie's further exchange with Judge Puglisi, in which he admitted that a jury would not believe him, corrected Judge Puglisi's earlier error. See Response at 6. The United States contends that Yazzie "benefitted substantially by entering into the plea agreement," because the Plea Agreement provides for a sentencing range of 15 to 19 years, whereas, if he had not pled guilty, he could face life imprisonment. Response at 7. The United States points out that Yazzie has not asserted his innocence in his 1 st Motion. See Response at 9. The United States states that it will be prejudiced if Yazzie is allowed to withdraw his plea, because the victims' "confidence in the finality of the criminal justice system would be shaken to its core." Response at 9-10. The United States contends that Yazzie delayed filing the 1st Motion. The United States contends that Yazzie's former counsel, Mr. Loonam, did not prevent Yazzie from withdrawing his plea earlier, as Yazzie could have notified the Court independent of his counsel. See Response at 10. The United States also asserts that withdrawal will substantially inconvenience the Court, because the Court maintains an "extremely large criminal docket" and permitting Yazzie to withdraw will "needlessly add another case back to this Court's ever expanding trial calendar." Response at 11. The United States asserts that Yazzie has had the close assistance of competent counsel throughout this case, noting that Mr. Loonam obtained an "extremely generous plea agreement that reduced Yazzie's imprisonment range exposure significantly." Response at 11. The United States asserts that Yazzie knowingly and voluntarily pled, and states that Yazzie has not provided the Court with "specific information as to why or how the plea was not knowing or voluntary." Response at 11. The United States asserts that the "plea hearing demonstrates reasoned discussion about Yazzie's admission of the force element of the offense." Response at 11. The United States contends that, even though Yazzie did not explicitly admit to using force on Jane Doe 1, his plea was knowing and voluntary, and akin to a plea under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), because he agreed that the United States could prove that element at trial.
On April 4, 2012, Yazzie filed the 2nd Motion, apparently without the assistance of counsel, as the 2nd Motion is handwritten. Yazzie requests that the Court permit him to withdraw his guilty plea, because he did not "knowingly and voluntarily" enter into the Plea Agreement. 2nd Motion at 1. Yazzie attaches two affidavits to the 2nd Motion — from Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, the victims of his offense. Both victims state a desire to change their previous statements alleging that Yazzie sexually abused them. See Affidavit of Jane Doe 1, dated March 7, 2012, filed April 4, 2012 (Doc. 64 at 2)("I think it was very hard for me to accept a new parent in my life. Well all I could say is that most of those reports were not true and he did not do all of those things to me, and my family."); Affidavit of Jane Doe 2, dated March 5, 2012, filed April 4, 2012 (Doc. 64 at 3)("I ... have a different point of view since now that I'm older.").
On July 6, 2012, Yazzie requested that the Court dismiss Jones, because of Jones' "[l]ack of communication" with him. Motion for Dismissal of Counsel, filed July 6, 2012 (Doc. 73). On August 8, 2012, because of Mr. Jones' retirement for health reasons from the practice of law, the Court appointed Kimberly A. Middlebrooks to represent Yazzie. See CJA 20 Appointment of and Authority to Pay Court Appointed Counsel, filed August 8, 2012 (Doc. 74).
On October 15, 2012, Ms. Middlebrooks informed the Court that she is not certain Yazzie is competent to assist in his own defense. See Unopposed Motion for Psychological Evaluation to Determine Competency, filed October 15, 2012 (Doc. 84)("Competency Motion"). Ms. Middlebrooks expressed that every time she meets with Yazzie she must explain to him the same information she previously relayed to him regarding his case. See Competency Motion ¶¶ 2-3, at 1-2 ("Every encounter with Yazzie and counsel requires starting from scratch to explain again the issues already explained previously."). Ms. Middlebrooks requested a psychological evaluation of Yazzie to determine his competency. See Competency Motion ¶ 4, at 2. The Court granted the Competency Motion on October 18, 2012. See Order
The Court held a hearing on February 4, 2013. See Transcript of Hearing, taken February 4, 2013 ("Feb. 4 Tr.").
Ms. Middlebrooks stated that it is her position that Yazzie must present the Court with a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal, and because Judge Puglisi accepted Yazzie's guilty plea, rule 11(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs whether Yazzie may withdraw his plea. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 5:15-6:23 (Middlebrooks)(citing United States v. Salas-Garcia, 698 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir.2012); United States v. Byrum, 567 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir.2009)). Ms. Middlebrooks stated that, although Yazzie has not asserted innocence, he denies one of the factual allegations against him — specifically, that he penetrated Jane Doe 1 with his finger. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 6:24-7:8 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks stated that Yazzie asserts that he told Mr. Loonam that he did not penetrate Jane Doe 1, but that statement remains in the Plea Agreement. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 7:9-14 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks noted that Yazzie did not assert at the plea hearing that he did not penetrate Jane Doe 1. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 7:15-8:7 (Middlebrooks, Court). Ms. Middlebrooks noted that Yazzie conceded at the plea colloquy that, because of Jane Doe 1's age, the United States could prove that Yazzie used force when committing a sexual act with Jane Doe 1. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 8:15-9:1 (Middlebrooks).
Ms. Middlebrooks stated that, from her review of the plea colloquy, Yazzie did not want to enter into the Plea Agreement, because he wanted a sentence of less time. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 9:4-20 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks stated, however, that she believes the plea colloquy was constitutionally adequate, notwithstanding Judge Puglisi's apparent initial misstatement of the United States' burden of proof. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 9:21-10:6 (Court, Middlebrooks).
Ms. Middlebrooks conceded that withdrawal would prejudice the United States, given the length of time that has passed and that evidence has likely grown stale.
Ms. Middlebrooks conceded that withdrawal would inconvenience the Court, given that Yazzie would file a motion to suppress his statement and the case may proceed to trial, which would require the expenditure of more judicial resources. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 12:8-13 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks contended, however, that the Court should not give much weight to the judicial resources expended, given Yazzie's assertion that the United States lacks a factual basis to convict him. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 12:13-16 (Middlebrooks).
Ms. Middlebrooks stated that, in her understanding, Yazzie's plea was knowing and voluntary, and that the psychological examination of Yazzie did not reveal any evidence that the United States or Mr. Loonam coerced Yazzie into his plea. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 12:17-18:13 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks stated that Yazzie believed that the Plea Agreement would allow his wife to receive custody of their children, but Ms. Middlebrooks conceded that there was no evidence that custody of Yazzie's children was an issue addressed in the Plea Agreement or negotiations thereof.
Ms. Middlebrooks also conceded that judicial resources would likely be wasted by allowing Yazzie to withdraw his plea, as the case would proceed to trial. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 13:20-25 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks stated that Yazzie had the close assistance of his former attorney — Mr. Loonam — during the plea negotiations, and that Mr. Loonam reviewed the Plea Agreement with him on several occasions before signing it. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 14:1-8 (Middlebrooks). In conclusion, Ms. Middlebrooks noted that, although not all of the factors weigh in Yazzie's favor, his main contention is that the United States now lacks the factual basis for his conviction. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 14:9-20 (Middlebrooks).
The Court stated that it has not seen "the withdrawal of a plea agreement that's gone well for the defendant." Feb. 4 Tr. at 14:22-25 (Court). The Court stated that a defendant withdrawing his or her plea is often a "train wreck," and the Court noted that a plea agreement is usually a substantial reduction from a defendant's guideline sentence. Feb. 4 Tr. at 15:1-7 (Court). Ms. Middlebrooks stated that she had discussed with Yazzie the outcome of United States v. Jim, in which the Court allowed a defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 15:8-13 (Middlebrooks)(referring to United States v. Jim, No. CR 10-2653 JB, 2011 WL 6013093 (D.N.M. Nov. 22, 2011)
Yazzie then spoke on his own behalf. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 17:6-7 (Court, Yazzie). Yazzie stated that, under rule 11(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, his plea negotiations would be inadmissible against him. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 17:7-9 (Yazzie). Yazzie stated that he would not have accepted the Plea Agreement if the United States had not agreed to investigate the victims further, and he stated that he agreed to a lesser sentence:
Feb. 4 Tr. at 17:9-20 (Yazzie). The Court asked Ms. Middlebrooks to clarify Yazzie's statement, and Ms. Middlebrooks stated she had discussed United States v. Jim with Yazzie, and that she told Yazzie that, if he succeeds in withdrawing his guilty plea, his Plea Agreement would be admissible as evidence against him at trial. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 17:23-18:10 (Middlebrooks). The Court then addressed Yazzie and explained to him that, under case law from the Tenth Circuit, if Yazzie withdraws his guilty plea, the Plea Agreement and his statements to Judge Puglisi would likely be admissible as statements against him at trial. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 18:11-23 (Yazzie). The Court stated, therefore, that it is very concerned about allowing Yazzie to withdraw his plea, because of the difficult situation in which he would be placed with the statements admissible against him. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 18:24-19:4 (Court). The Court also explained to Yazzie that rule 11(c)(1)(A) does not prohibit the United States from using Yazzie's statements in
The United States responded to Yazzie's contention that it lacks the factual basis to convict him, and the United States stated that the word "force" in the Information can refer to the ability of an older person to coerce a younger person, even if physical force, as it is commonly understood, was not used. Feb. 4 Tr. at 21:9-20 (Wishard). The United States distinguished United States v. Gould, No. CR 03-2274 JB, 2006 WL 4061159 (D.N.M. Sept. 23, 2006) (Browning, J.), from Yazzie's case, in which the Court allowed a defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty, because the defendant in that case found new evidence, and the United States was ready to proceed to trial at the time. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 21:21-22:4 (Wishard). The United States noted that, in United States v. Begaye, No. CR 10-0456 JB, 2012 WL 119602 (D.N.M. Jan. 3, 2012) (Browning, J.), the Court did not allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, in part because the defendant's attorney achieved a very favorable result for him. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 22:5-11 (Wishard). The United States stated that it telephoned the biological mother of the two victims in this case — Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 — and that their mother gave the United States the impression that the mother and the victims want to recant their previous statements that they made against Yazzie. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 22:15-23:2 (Wishard).
The United States conceded that its case is "substantially more weak today than it was when he entered into the plea." Feb. 4 Tr. at 23:3-4 (Wishard). The United States noted that the witnesses have not made previous statements under oath and that, if this matter were to proceed to trial, the United States would have Yazzie's inculpatory statements and confession, but no corroborating witnesses. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 23:5-9 (Wishard). The United States asserted, therefore, that Yazzie's case is substantially different from that of United States v. Jim, because the United States' evidence has diminished with the passage of time. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 23:15-18 (Wishard). The United States stated, however, that it still believes it could prosecute the case, given the witnesses that are available and Yazzie's inculpatory statements. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 23:18-22 (Wishard).
The United States contended that Yazzie is not asserting his innocence, but, rather, he is contending that the law is inapplicable to him. See Feb. 4 Tr. at 23:23-25 (Wishard). The United States asserted, however, that the most persuasive factor for not allowing Yazzie to withdraw his plea is that there is no evidence that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the Plea Agreement. See Tr. at 24:14-19 (Wishard). The United States pointed out that, unlike the defendant in United States v. Jim, — who thought he would still proceed to trial after entering into the Plea Agreement — "[t]here's nothing in the record to suggest that Mr. Yazzie [] entered into this plea agreement with the United States" unknowingly or involuntarily. Feb. 4 Tr. at 251-11 (Wishard). The United States expressed that Yazzie is not asserting his innocence in his correspondence with the Court, but, rather, is "taking exception to the meaning of legal terms of argument that were contained in that plea agreement." Feb. 4 Tr. at 25:12-26 (Wishard). The United States contended that Yazzie is expressing remorse over having entered into the Plea Agreement, "but to say at this point it would be fair and just to allow him to withdraw his plea would be to commit him to a course of procedures that we saw end very badly for Mr. Jim." Feb. 4 Tr. at 25:17-23 (Wishard).
After the hearing, the Court issued an Order Finding Defendant Competent. See Order Finding Defendant Competent, filed February 7, 2013 (Doc. 93). The Court relied on a report in which Dr. William Foote found that Yazzie was competent in the proceedings. See Order Finding Defendant Competent ¶ 2, at 1.
The Court denied Yazzie's 1st Motion and 2nd Motion in a Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed June 4, 2013, 2013 WL 3270973 (Doc. 100)("MOO"). After weighing the Tenth Circuit's seven factors from United States v. Yazzie, 407 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir.2005), and the likelihood of conviction, the Court concluded that Yazzie did not give "the Court a fair and just reason for permitting him to withdraw his plea." MOO at 1, 26.
MOO at 26-36.
The United States Probation Office ("USPO") disclosed a Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") for Yazzie on April 27, 2011. In the PSR, the USPO notes that, according to the Plea Agreement, the parties agreed that the appropriate sentence is 15 to 19 years, and that Yazzie "cannot seek a downward departure, variance, or deviation of any kind from the agreed upon sentencing range." PSR ¶ 4(a)-(b), at 3. After comparing the 2009 edition of the United States Sentencing Guideline Manual to the 2010 edition, the USPO determined that neither edition was more beneficial and used the 2010 edition for the computations. See PSR ¶ 29, at 9. The USPO calculates Yazzie's base offense level at 30 under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(a)(2). See PSR ¶ 30, at 9. It increases the calculation by 4 levels pursuant to § 2A3.1(b)(1), which provides that "if the offense involved conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) or (b), increase by 4 levels." PSR ¶ 31, at 10. 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) defines aggravated sexual abuse by force or threat: "Whoever ... knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act — (1) by using force against that other person; or (2) by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; or attempts to do so...." 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The USPO relies on this background for a 4-level enhancement:
PSR ¶ 31, at 10. The USPO applied an additional 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 (b)(2), see PSR ¶ 32, at 10; that provision provides for a 4-level increase if the "victim had not attained the age of twelve years," or a 2-level increase if the "victim had attained the age of twelve years but had not attained the age of sixteen years," U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(2). The PSR calculates that Jane Doe 1 "was 12 years old at the time the abuse charged in the Information occurred, however, reports reflect and the defendant admitted that the abuse began in 2008, when [Jane Doe 1] was less than 12 years of age." PSR ¶ 32, at 10. Further, the PSR calculates that Jane Doe 2 was 10 years old when Yazzie sexually abused her. See PSR ¶ 32, at 10. The USPO applied a 2-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(3), which requires the 2-level increase "if the victim was in the custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant." PSR ¶ 33, at 10. "The defendant was in a long term relationship with the victim's [sic] mother and was considered their stepfather. The victim's [sic] mother stated she occasionally left the children alone to be supervised by Yazzie." PSR ¶ 33, at 10. The USPO also increases the offense by 5 levels pursuant to § 4B1.5(b)(1), an adjustment for repeat and dangerous sex offenses against minors; that provision applies "in any case in which the defendant's instant offense of conviction is a covered sex crime and the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct...." PSR ¶ 37, at 10. The USPO asserts that this increase is appropriate because of Yazzie's conduct with Jane Doe 1 between 2008 and 2010, and his conduct with Jane Doe 2 during the several months before his arrest. See PSR ¶ 37, at 10-11. Based on Yazzie's acceptance of responsibility, the USPO reduces the calculation by 2 levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and an additional 1 level for a motion it expects the United States to make at sentencing. See PSR ¶ 38-39, at 11. The USPO calculates that Yazzie has 2 criminal history points, based on an arrest on December 31, 2003, resulting in a criminal history category of II. See PSR ¶ 49, at 14. "Based on the total offense level of 42 and a criminal history category of II, the guideline imprisonment range is 360 months to life." PSR ¶ 73, at 19.
Mr. Loonam, on Yazzie's behalf, objected to the PSR's 5-level enhancement under U.S.S.G § 4B1.5(b)(1), which raises Yazzie's offense level to 45 before reducing the range for acceptance of responsibility. See Letter from James Loonam to Victoria Gutierrez, United States Probation Officer, at 1, dated April 29, 2011, filed April 29, 2011 (Doc. 129)("PSR Objections"). "Mr. Yazzie does not dispute the factual basis for this suggestion. Mr. Yazzie does dispute raising his Offense Level beyond level 43. There can be no offense level beyond level 43." PSR Objections at 1-2. He cites an application note to the sentencing table that provides: "In rare cases, a total offense level of ... more than 43 may result from application of the guidelines.... An offense level of more than 43 is to be treated as an offense level of 43." PSR Objections at 2 (citing U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table, Ch. 5 Pt. A, application note 2). He argues that the pre-plea offense level should be capped at 43; with the acceptance of responsibility reductions, his final offense level would be 40, resulting in a sentencing range of 324 to 405 months. See PSR Objections at 2.
In his May 15, 2011 Letter, Yazzie challenges the PSR's conclusion that he "touched the victim's genitalia underneath as opposed to over her clothing." May 15, 2011 Letter at 2. He argues that he did not commit a sexual act as 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) defines that term, see May 15, 2011 Letter at 3 — "the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person," or "the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person," 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(C)-(D). Yazzie asserts that the record does not support the conclusion that he committed a sexual act and that, had the PSR applied the provisions for sexual contact rather than for a sexual act, the guidelines range would be lower. May 15, 2011 Letter at 3-4. He cites United States v. Poor Bear, 359 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir.2004), in which the Eighth Circuit determined that the United States did not offer evidence that the defendant touched the victim's genitalia under her clothing as opposed to through her clothing, and so the PSR should have calculated the sentencing guidelines range for sexual conduct rather than a sexual act. See 359 F.3d at 1040-41. Yazzie also repeats the PSR's enhancements without objecting. See May 15, 2011 Letter at 3.
In the Second Addendum to the Presentence Report, disclosed July 11, 2011 ("Second Addendum"), the USPO responds to the objections that Yazzie submitted on May 12, 2011.
In the Defendant's Amended Sentencing Memorandum in Support of Rule 11(c)(1)(C) and Objections to PSR, filed June 19, 2013 (Doc. 107)("Sentencing Memo."),
Sentencing Memo. at 2-3.
Yazzie next argues that the USPO incorrectly applied a 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(1). See Sentencing Memo. at 3. Although the USPO purports to rely on "§ 2241(a) `force or threat' to justify the enhancement," Yazzie argues that the conduct the USPO describes — "that Yazzie forced JD1 onto the bed and sat on her while he tried to kiss her" — does not constitute a "sexual act" or "sexual contact" under 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) and (3). Sentencing Memo. at 3. He also denies that he engaged in the conduct the USPO describes. See Sentencing Memo. at 3.
Although Yazzie "requested defense counsel to further object to the application of § 4B1.5(b)(1), Ms. Middlebrooks explains that, based on her review, the USPO correctly applied this adjustment. See Sentencing Memo. at 4-5.
The USPO addresses these objections in the Third Addendum to the Presentence Report, disclosed June 24, 2013 ("Third Addendum"). Regarding Yazzie's objection to the 4-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(2), the USPO maintains its position in the Second Addendum, which applies the 4-level increase based on relevant conduct with Jane Doe 2, who was 11 years old. See Third Addendum at 1. The USPO also maintains that, although Yazzie denies the conduct that led the USPO to apply the 4-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(1), "the Probation office obtained the information from the discovery pertaining to this case." Third Addendum at 2. The USPO reiterates its previous position regarding the 5-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1), based on Yazzie's pattern of activity over two years with Jane Doe 1 and over several months with Jane Doe 2. See Third Addendum at 2.
In the Defendant's Addendum to Amended Sentencing Memorandum in Support of Rule 11(c)(1)(C) and Objections to PSR, filed July 26, 2013 (Doc. 110)("Sentencing Memo. Addendum"), Yazzie again objects to the USPO's application of the 5-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1). Sentencing Memo. Addendum at 1. Yazzie argues that the prohibited sexual conduct must be a prior sex offense conviction; he starts with Application Note 4(A) to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b), which defines "prohibited sexual conduct" as "any offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 2426(b)(1)(A) or (13)." Sentencing Memo. Addendum at 2 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b) application note 4(A)). That statute in turn defines the term "prior sex offense conviction" as
Sentencing Memo. Addendum at 2 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2426(b)). Yazzie argues that U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b) thus requires the prohibited sexual conduct to be a prior sex offense conviction, and, because he does not have any prior convictions, he argues that the upward adjustment should not be applied. See Sentencing Memo. Addendum at 2-3. The USPO responds, in the Fourth Addendum to the Presentence Report, disclosed July 31, 2013 ("Fourth Addendum"), that Application Note 4(B)(i) to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 and the 2011-2012 Federal Sentencing Guideline Handbook indicates that the 5-level increase "does not require a prior conviction and the `pattern' can be conduct in the present offense." Fourth Addendum at 1.
In the Fifth Addendum to the Presentence Report, disclosed August 6, 2013 ("Fifth Addendum"), the USPO revisited Yazzie's objection to the 4-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(2), based on the age of the victims. See Fifth Addendum at 1. The USPO explains that, because Yazzie was not charged and did not plead guilty to the conduct with Jane Doe 2, that conduct is not relevant conduct in this case; instead, the USPO explains that U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(2)(B) applies, resulting in a 2-level increase. See Fifth Addendum at 1. The USPO calculates that the offense level is 40 and the criminal history category is I, resulting in a guideline imprisonment range of 292 to 365 months, but that, if the Court accepts the Plea Agreement, the sentence is 180 to 228 months. See Fifth Addendum at 3.
In a handwritten letter dated June 7, 2013, Yazzie wrote to the Court, asking it to "please reconsider my plea to withdraw or put me on a lesser charge." Motion to Reconsider at 1. Yazzie explains that he "did not understand the law," and that he accepted the plea deal because Mr. Loonam, his attorney at the time, convinced him that he would lose at trial. See Motion to Reconsider at 1. He says that Mr. Loonam tried to convince him that he would lose, because Jane Doe 2 had an STD, and Yazzie had an STD in 2008, "but I did not know that a person cannot carry STD [sic] that long." Motion to Reconsider at 1. He says that the Shiprock Police in Shiprock, New Mexico, have Jane Doe 2's diary, in which she states that her uncle's son sexually assaulted her, and that Yazzie's wife has asked for the diary so Yazzie can use it in his case. See Motion to Reconsider at 1. According to Yazzie, Mr. Loonam also convinced him that he would lose at trial because of the statements he made to the FBI regarding Jane Doe 1. See Motion to Reconsider at 1. Yazzie asserts that he did not understand how Miranda v. Arizona works, and Mr. Loonam told him that they could not suppress the statement he made to the FBI, but that he does not think Miranda v. Arizona applies to him, because "there was no formal arrest." Motion to Reconsider at 1. Further, he contends that the FBI forced him to say that he penetrated Jane Doe 1, but that she has never stated that he penetrated her. See Motion to Reconsider at 1. Yazzie states:
Motion to Reconsider at 1. Yazzie argues again that he did not use force and that establishing the victims' ages does not establish that he used force. See Motion to Reconsider. Yazzie asks the Court to reconsider its decision to deny the 1st Motion and 2nd Motion, and to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea; he says that he should be found guilty on a lesser charge, because "the plea was not knowing[] when I took it." Motion to Reconsider.
On July 26, 2013, Yazzie's counsel, Ms. Middlebrooks, requested permission from the Court to withdraw from representing Yazzie "after his sentencing is complete on August 8, 2013 or whatever date his sentencing may be complete." Motion to Withdraw and for Appointment of Appellate Counsel, filed July 26, 2013 (Doc. 111)(Motion to Withdraw). Ms. Middlebrooks states as grounds that she is retiring from the practice of law, and "Yazzie intends to appeal this matter and will need counsel appointed to perfect the appeal." Motion to Withdraw at 1.
On August 13, 2013, Yazzie, through his attorney Ms. Middlebrooks, supplemented his pro se Motion for Reconsideration, explaining that the basis of his Motion for Reconsideration is that "he was not apprised of the law regarding his options for a motion to suppress his statement to the FBI and had he known the law and his options, he would have requested his lawyer to file a suppression motion instead of entering into a plea." Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration of Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty at 1, filed August 13, 2013 (Doc. 114)("Supplement"). Further, "Yazzie contends that had he taken his case to trial, he may only have been convicted on lesser charges and thereby,
Regarding Yazzie's new argument — "that he was `forced' to take a plea because his lawyer withheld case law from him on suppression matters" — Ms. Middlebrooks says that there is evidence that Yazzie was concerned about the statements he made to the FBI before he entered his plea, but that Mr. Loonam "did not discuss the issue of custodial statements with Yazzie until after the plea hearing," and that "[i]t is unclear whether Mr. Loonam discussed any other basis for suppression of statements such as force or coercion, prior to the plea." Supplement at 4. Ms. Middlebrooks states that, while "a plea may be involuntary if counsel informs the defendant that he has no choice" but to plead guilty, a lawyer's role is to "assimilate and synthesize information" to help a client make the best choice, and "`[a]dvice — even strong urging by counsel does not invalidate a guilty plea.'" Supplement at 5 (quoting Fields v. Gibson, 277 F.3d 1203, 1214 (10th Cir.2002)). Ms. Middlebrooks states that she does not know what Mr. Loonam considered, such as suppression issues in light of "the overwhelming evidence against Yazzie, including Yazzie's own multiple admissions of guilt to the Court," and whether Yazzie could be convicted of a lesser offense, such as criminal sexual contact. Supplement at 5. Ms. Middlebrooks notes that, although Yazzie says "that he was strong-armed by Mr. Loonam to take the plea," Mr. Loonam's "`strong urging' ... may not invalidate a plea unless Yazzie clearly was not advised of all potential defenses and allowed to make a meaningful and knowledgeable decision whether to plead." Supplement at 5 (quoting Fields v. Gibson, 277 F.3d at 1214). Ms. Middlebrooks expresses concern that, if Yazzie withdraws his guilty plea, he may be "found guilty by a jury of the offenses for which he is indicted and receive a
Yazzie filed the Unopposed Motion to Continue Sentencing, filed August 14, 2013 (Doc. 115)("Motion to Continue"), requesting the Court to vacate the sentencing set for August 16, 2013, and to continue the sentencing to a later date; as grounds, Ms. Middlebrooks states that she "has had discussions with Yazzie's previous counsel, Jim Loonam, which contradict and impact the supplement filed on Yazzie's behalf." Motion to Continue ¶ 2, at 1.
Motion to Continue ¶ 3, at 1. The Court granted the Motion to Continue on August 16, 2013. See Order Granting Motion to Continue August 16, 2013 Sentencing Hearing, filed August 16, 2013 (Doc. 116).
In the Second Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration of Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty, filed August 19, 2013 (Doc. 117)("Second Supplement"), Yazzie, through his counsel, reasserts his position that the Court did not "have a sufficient understanding of his position pertaining to his request to withdraw his guilty plea," and that Mr. Loonam "did not sufficiently advise him of his legal defenses in order to allow him to make an informed decision as to whether to enter into a guilty plea," essentially forcing him to enter the plea. Second Supplement at 1. Yazzie explains that he "personally believes Mr. Loonam withheld relevant case law from him," but "concedes that he does not have evidence that Mr. Loonam intentionally withheld case law from him in order to coerce him to take a plea." Second Supplement at 1-2. Nonetheless, Yazzie argues that "he was forced to take a plea by actions of his attorney and by his lack of knowledge of law he believes supports a suppression of his statement to the FBI as well as suppression of other evidence." Second Supplement at 2.
Yazzie concedes several issues regarding his interactions with Mr. Loonam, and waives at least some attorney-client privilege related to these discussions:
Second Supplement at 2. Yazzie argues that Mr. Loonam did not request the Court to continue the trial date to allow Yazzie further time to consider the plea and did not discuss with him the merits of suppressing the plea under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c), which excludes a confession that was made more than six hours after arrest but before arraignment, when the delay between arrest and arraignment is unreasonable, even if the confession was voluntary. See Second Supplement at 2-3.
Second Supplement at 3 n. 3. Yazzie contends that he was "arrested" when a federal hold was placed on him and that his confession must be suppressed due to unreasonable delay. Second Supplement at 3 n. 3. Further, Yazzie contends that Mr. Loonam stressed the damaging connection between Yazzie's medical records, which revealed he had been treated for an STD years earlier, and that Jane Doe 2 allegedly had an STD, but that Mr. Loonam did not discuss suppressing Yazzie's medical records, "which were received in violation of [the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-191, 110 Stat.1936 ("HIPAA")] ... [and] obtained without Yazzie's consent or waiver of his privacy interests and in violation of his Constitutional rights to privacy," although the law provides remedies to suppress medical records that were obtained by compelled disclosure. Second Supplement at 3. Yazzie argues that "confidential medical information is entitled to constitutional privacy protection," and that "[t]he HIPPA [sic] laws further forbid disclosure of a patient's medical records or discussion of those records unless that privileged care is waived by the patient." Second Supplement at 3-4 n. 3 (citations omitted). Yazzie asserts that he took the plea "based on his lack of knowledge of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) and the fact Mr. Loonam felt Yazzie's medical records containing a reference to an STD would result in a conviction"; it was only after the plea that Mr. Loonam discussed and researched 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) for Yazzie, but "Yazzie had no knowledge to this day of his rights under HIPPA [sic] and that matter was never discussed." Second Supplement at 4.
Ms. Middlebrooks explains that she communicated with Mr. Loonam via electronic mail on August 14, 2013, and that Mr. Loonam said he discussed suppression issues with Yazzie before the plea, although he did not specifically discuss 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) with Yazzie until after the plea; Mr. Loonam said that his and a colleague's assessment was that "there was no viable suppression of Yazzie's statement," but he would have argued for suppression had Yazzie chosen trial. Second Suppression at 4. Yazzie argues that, although he does not have evidence that "Loonam intentionally withheld law from him," the Court should allow him to withdraw his guilty plea, because "he did not know the law of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) prior to his plea and because he erroneously believed he would be faced with his medical records containing reference to an STD," and thus, "he was `forced' to take a plea." Second Supplement at 4.
The Court held a hearing on September 13, 2013; Ms. Middlebrooks, on behalf of Yazzie, began by explaining that the Motion to Reconsider raises issues that Yazzie believes were not adequately before the Court at the February 4, 2012 hearing; although he concedes that the Court considered his argument that he was not informed of his options regarding suppressing his statements, he argues that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made, and that the Court focused its analysis on whether he understood the plea and its consequences rather than whether he understood
Sept. 13 Tr. at 7:4-11 (Middlebrooks). She explained that she did not realize that Yazzie's argument was opposite of what she had argued at the initial hearing until she spoke with Yazzie in preparation for sentencing. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 7:15-25 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks said that Yazzie has waived his attorney-client privilege related to the conversations he had with Mr. Loonam before he entered his plea, and that Yazzie has been "very candid" with her regarding his discussions with Mr. Loonam; Yazzie concedes that Mr. Loonam discussed suppressing forced and coerced statements, and that Mr. Loonam's colleague reviewed the issue and came to the same conclusion that they could not suppress the statements, but Yazzie says Mr. Loonam did not discuss suppressing statements under 18 U.S.C. § 3501. Sept. 13 Tr. at 8:7-25 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks explained that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 permits a court to suppress a statement that, although made voluntarily, was made more than six hours after the time of arrest when the time between the arrest and arraignment is unreasonable. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 9:1-7 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks said that Mr. Loonam did not discuss this provision with Yazzie until after the plea hearing, when Yazzie raised the issue with Mr. Loonam; Yazzie did not initially have library access at the Torrance County detention center, but when he gained access, he made a "conscious effort to ... try to understand what was going on with his case legally." Sept. 13 Tr. at 9:10-24 (Middlebrooks). After Yazzie raised the issue with Mr. Loonam, Mr. Loonam concluded that "there was a reasonable delay in this case" and that, therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 would not apply to suppress Yazzie's statements. Sept. 13 Tr. at 9:22-24 (Middlebrooks).
Ms. Middlebrooks admitted that she has "looked into the issue very peripherally," but that the evidence she has seen is unclear regarding when Yazzie was arrested: he was initially arrested on a DWI, and while the DWI proceedings were pending in the tribal court, there were also pending proceedings regarding custody of the children and whether they would be taken out of the home and placed elsewhere. Sept. 13 Tr. at 9:25-11:9 (Middlebrooks). She said that she believes Yazzie was arrested on May 4 or 5, 2010, went to tribal court on either May 4 or 5, 2010, and was supposed to be released, but "it was announced that there was a fee hold on him for these charges," and so he was held in custody and the FBI interviewed him. Sept. 13 Tr. at 10:10-17 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks stated that she did not know if it was a "true hold," but that charges were filed on May 10 or 11, 2010. Sept. 13 Tr. at 10:18-25 (Court, Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks said that the documents which she has reviewed "are very confusing to read," because they are dated 2006 and 2007, but refer to events in 2010, and that she would need to see the documentation from tribal court "and then
Ms. Middlebrooks explained that the other issue Yazzie wishes the Court to consider relates to the connection between his medical records, revealing that he had an STD, and that Jane Doe 2 allegedly had an STD, and that Mr. Loonam never discussed with Yazzie the possibility of suppressing his medical records. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 15:15-16:6 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks said that the United States subpoenaed the medical records and obtained them in violation of HIPAA, and that Yazzie never waived his privilege regarding those records. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 16:7-17 (Court, Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks asserted that HIPAA provides six specific exceptions for law enforcement to obtain medical records, but none of those exceptions would apply in Yazzie's case; further, there may have been other arguments that the way the United States obtained Yazzie's medical records violated his constitutional rights and rights to medical privacy. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 16:17-17:9 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks explained that, while she was uncertain whether Yazzie's statement could have been suppressed under 18 U.S.C. § 3501, she is more confident that the medical records could have been suppressed. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 17:10-17 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks conceded that, even if the Court had suppressed the medical records, there would have been "other factors and other issues in the discovery that [Yazzie] would have to overcome at trial"; she explained that Yazzie's concern is that he did not have an understanding of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) or his HIPAA rights until after he pled guilty, and that, because he did not understand his alternatives and
The Court asked the parties about the Sentencing Guidelines range for Yazzie; Ms. Middlebrooks said the latest addendum to the PSR — the Fifth Addendum — set the offense level at 40, criminal history category I, resulting in a sentencing guidelines range of 292 to 365 months. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 19:12-20:2 (Court, Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks said that the Plea Agreement has a proposed range of 15 to 19 years, and that the United States is asking for 19 years, but Yazzie is asking for 15 years. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 20:3-10 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks explained that the 15 to 19 year range is favorable if he were convicted on the statute to which he pled guilty, but that Yazzie is arguing that the most appropriate offense is abusive sexual contact, because, although he is not asserting outright innocence, he says that he never penetrated Jane Doe 1 with his finger. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 20:11-21:4 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks asserted that Yazzie understands his situation that, if he were to go to trial, he could be convicted and sentenced to a substantial amount of time, but he also believes he could be convicted of a lesser statute that carries a penalty of ten years or less. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 21:7-19 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks said that, if the Court were to sustain all of Yazzie's objections to the PSR and addendums, the sentence would be 15 years, consistent with the low end of the 11(c)(1)(C) agreement. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 21:20-23:8 (Court, Middlebrooks).
Ms. Middlebrooks said this case has been a difficult one for her to present from a sentencing standpoint, because on one hand, Yazzie pled guilty to the facts stated in the Plea Agreement, but on the other hand, Yazzie denies the factual basis, saying that penetration never occurred and that he, at most, committed sexual contact, not a sexual act. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 27:22-28:4 (Middlebrooks).
Sept. 13 Tr. at 28:20-25 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks stated that she is concerned that the United States Attorney's Office could withdraw the Plea Agreement, and although Yazzie would prefer that action, she is concerned about the amount of time Yazzie could serve if he were to be convicted at trial; he was originally indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) for a sexual act involving minors, which carries a mandatory minimum of thirty years to life in prison, but he pled to 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a), which does not have a mandatory minimum but can carry a life sentence. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 29:1-15 (Middlebrooks). Yazzie contends that he should have pled to 18 U.S.C. § 2244, abusive sexual contact, and that the penalty for that crime is up to ten years. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 29:16-23 (Middlebrooks). "[H]e understands if he were to go to trial he could be convicted and face a mandatory minimum of 30 years, but he also believes it's possible a jury could convict him of a lesser statute, in which case he may be looking at less time...." Sept. 13 Tr. at 29:19-23 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks acknowledged that the Court said in its MOO that it did not want to play a guessing game and that it has no way to determine what would happen at trial. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 29:24-31:4 (Middlebrooks).
The Court noted that, if it sustains the objections to the PSR, then it will be working with a Sentencing Guidelines range that is roughly equal to the plea deal, and that, when it denied the request to withdraw the plea, it was considering a much higher range of 360 months to life; the Court said it would likely need to resolve the objections to the PSR to determine what the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range would be. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 31:12-25 (Court). The Court asked whether the United States could prove the United States Probation Office's enhancements by the preponderance of the evidence; based on the relaxed rules of evidence and relaxed standard, the United States asserted it could prove the enhancements by a preponderance of the evidence, placing Yazzie at an offense level of 40. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 32:4-14 (Court, Wishard). The United States said that, if Yazzie objected, the Court could ascribe whatever weight it felt Yazzie's current testimony deserves versus what he said in the past, and could also consider what the victims said shortly after the alleged incidents. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 32:15-33:4 (Court, Wishard). The United States said that it probably would not include the victims' testimony at trial, and that the change in the victims' testimony weighs against allowing Yazzie to withdraw, because the United States would have difficulty proving its case now that time has elapsed. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 33:2-16 (Wishard, Court). The United States argued that, at the appellate level, the Motion to Reconsider would have been filed as an Anders brief,
The United States asked the Court to find that the PSR is correctly calculated or, if the Court sustains Yazzie's objections, to sentence Yazzie within the guideline range, to grant Ms. Middlebrooks' Motion to Withdraw after sentencing, and to "allow the appellate attorney to start to tease some of these issues out in a way that we can litigate in a linear and rational form." Sept. 13 Tr. at 34:22-35:3 (Wishard). The Court noted that it would be best to calculate the sentencing range, but that is difficult because it is such a large range, and, if Yazzie were to go to trial, the United States might recharge him or seek other counts rather than those to which he pled. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 35:10-36:3 (Court). The Court asked, if it were to hold a hearing on the factual statements in the PSR, what Yazzie would do to put the statements in issue. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 36:8-12 (Court). Ms. Middlebrooks said that, in the discovery, the victims "have never made any admission whatsoever of the penetration of the finger. That statement came from Mr. Yazzie in his interview with the FBI, which, of course, Mr. Yazzie's position is that he was forced and coerced to say these things...." Sept. 13 Tr. at 36:13-17 (Middlebrooks). She said that, during the interview, Yazzie repeatedly denied penetration, and after some length of time, the FBI asked something to the effect of "`well, don't you think you may have penetrated her slightly?' or something along those lines and he said basic[al]ly `if you say so,' which at this point he's made an admission that he penetrated her with his finger." Sept. 13 Tr. at 36:20-37:1 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks asserted that Yazzie would testify at an evidentiary hearing, stating his version of the events, and that she does not know to what the victims would testify; they have not heretofore said that he penetrated them with his finger, and they sent vague letters denying some of their previous allegations. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 37:5-9 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks said Jones, Yazzie's counsel before her, hired investigators to contact the victims and find out what allegations they deny, but they did not respond; Ms. Middlebrooks said that she assumes that, if they came to court, they would not say that there was any penetration. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 37:10-18 (Middlebrooks). In Ms. Middlebrooks' view, she is not making an Anders motion, because she believes the arguments she presented have merit. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 37:19-38:2 (Court, Middlebrooks). She said she shares the Court's concern that, if Yazzie withdraws his plea, he could be hit with the mandatory minimum of thirty years. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 38:3-12. Although "it may go the other way" and Yazzie may get convicted under a different statute with a ten-year sentence, she said that she is not sure, if she were making the call, that she would risk the possible thirty years when the difference between the Plea Agreement and the lesser conviction is five years. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 38:3-17 (Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks noted that the Plea Agreement would likely come into evidence at trial and it would take a lot of explanation why Yazzie admitted these facts and now denies them. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 38:18-23
Apparently without the assistance of counsel, Yazzie handwrote the Addendum to the Motion for Reconsideration of Withdrawl [sic] of Plea, filed October 29, 2013 (Doc. 121)("Addendum"), and argues that the affidavit for his arrest warrant lacks probable cause and renders "official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Addendum at 1 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)). He argues that the first paragraph in the affidavit does not "state the names of the FBI and CI for the Navajo Nation Police Department and the location of the crime and the Police Department"; that the second paragraph does not
Addendum at 1. Yazzie argues that paragraphs three through thirteen do not "have attachment for evidence that we all get interview [sic] and by who." Addendum at 1. For paragraphs fifteen and sixteen, Yazzie argues that the FBI did not state that it had "belief or knowledge of the offense" or that they had probable cause for the search or arrest. Addendum at 1-2. Yazzie contends that there was no probable cause for the search or his arrest. See Addendum at 2.
Yazzie, through his counsel Ms. Middlebrooks, clarifies that he is not asking the Court "to issue an advisory opinion on his Addendum," but that he submitted the Addendum "for the Court to consider as a possible issue he could have raised pre-plea." Supplement to Defendant's Pro Se Addendum to Motion for Reconsideration
Addendum Supplement ¶ 4, at 2. Ms. Middlebrooks further explains that on May 5, 2010, Margaret Harjo, Jane Doe 1's and Jane Doe 2's mother and Yazzie's wife, told Shiprock Police that "Yazzie admitted to her allegations of sexual abuse." Addendum Supplement ¶ 4, at 2. On April 30, 2010, the Navajo Nation Medical Center interviewed the alleged victims regarding the sexual assault allegations, but Germaine did not request this information until May 10, 2010. See Addendum Supplement at ¶ 4, at 2-3.
Addendum Supplement ¶ 4, at 3. Ms. Middlebrooks notes that, "even if Yazzie is successful in challenging these issues at some later date, it is not clear to what extent these possible victories would advance his case toward an acquittal or lesser sentence." Addendum Supplement ¶ 6, at 3. Ms. Middlebrooks states that "Yazzie has already inundated this Court with multiple admissions via letter format," and that the letters and the plea "would more than likely be proper evidence before the jury," in which case Yazzie would "be in the difficult position of trying to explain too much instead of trying to establish reasonable doubt." Addendum Supplement
Ms. Middlebrooks submitted the Second Motion to Withdraw, filed November 21, 2013 (Doc. 125), stating that she initially asked to withdraw as Yazzie's counsel at the conclusion of his sentencing, which was scheduled to be in August, 2013, but that Yazzie has since renewed motions with the Court to withdraw his guilty plea. Second Motion to Withdraw at 1. "This matter is far from resolution given Yazzie's continuing practice of filing motions. Additionally, if this Court allows Yazzie to withdraw his plea of guilty, Yazzie will proceed with a lengthy series of suppression motions and then trial." Second Motion to Withdraw at 1. Ms. Middlebrooks explains that she retired in July, 2013, and only remained on this case because she believed the Court would sentence Yazzie in August, 2013; thus, she requests to withdraw as counsel and asks the Court to appoint new CJA counsel on Yazzie's behalf. Second Motion to Withdraw at 1-2. Yazzie opposes Ms. Middlebrooks' Second Motion to Withdraw. See Supplement to Second Motion to Withdraw, filed December 3, 2013 (Doc. 128).
Rule 11(d)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before the imposition of a sentence, and provides that a defendant may withdraw a plea if "the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(B). Defendants do not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. See United States v. Siedlik, 231 F.3d 744, 748 (10th Cir.2000). District courts, however, have broad discretion in determining whether to grant motions to withdraw pleas. See United States v. Wright, 392 Fed.Appx. 623, 627 (10th Cir.2010)(unpublished)
United States v. Yazzie, 407 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir.2005). While treated sometimes as an eighth factor, a district court may properly consider "the likelihood of conviction" when assessing whether to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea. United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 421 n. 5 (10th Cir.1996)(recognizing that the Tenth Circuit has "suggested an additional factor to consider: the likelihood of conviction" (citing United States v. Glover, 911 F.2d 419, 421 (10th Cir.1990))). Accord United States v. Begaye, 2012 WL 119602, at *10 ("The Court believes the consideration of likelihood of conviction is relevant here, either in the context of the two factors of whether withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the Court or waste judicial resources, or as an additional factor.").
The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating a "fair and just reason" for withdrawal of the plea. United States v. Griffin, 191 Fed.Appx. 699, 701 (10th Cir.2006)(unpublished). In assessing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, courts should give particular weight to knowing and voluntary statements that the defendant made under oath at the plea hearing. See United States v. Messino, 55 F.3d 1241, 1248 (7th Cir.1995). In reaching their decisions, courts should also remember that "[t]he plea of guilty is a solemn act not to be disregarded because of belated misgivings about [its] wisdom." United States v. Morrison, 967 F.2d 264, 268 (8th Cir.1992). While the right to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, therefore, is not absolute, the court should allow relief when the defendant can show a fair and just reason for withdrawal. See United States v. Jim, 2011 WL 6013093, at *6-7.
In United States v. Harmon, 871 F.Supp.2d 1125 (D.N.M.2012)(Browning, J.), the Court determined that a defendant had not shown a fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. The defendant did not assert his innocence, but, rather, asserted that the Court should suppress the evidence against him. The defendant requested that the Court reconsider its previous decision to not suppress evidence against him. The Court denied the request for reconsideration, and determined, therefore, that the defendant had not presented a fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea, as the United States possessed the same evidence to convict him as it did when the defendant pleaded guilty. See 871 F.Supp.2d at 1171-75. In United States v. Begaye, the Court applied the seven factors in United States v. Yazzie, and determined that the defendant failed to present a fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. See United States v. Begaye, 2012 WL 119602, at **8-12. The defendant asserted that he may have a self-defense defense, but the Court found that he had not made a credible claim of innocence, and determined that a slim possibility of acquittal was not a fair and just reason for allowing the defendant to withdraw his plea. See 2012 WL 119602, at **8-9, 11-12. In United States v. Jim, the Court permitted a defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty, because the defendant expressed that he did not understand that he waived his right to proceed to trial by entering into a plea agreement,
The general rule is that evidence of a guilty plea or statements made in plea negotiations are inadmissible evidence. See Fed.R.Evid. 410. Accord United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997, 1002 (10th Cir.2011)("As a general matter, evidence of a guilty plea or statements made in plea negotiations are inadmissible."). Rule 410 provides:
Fed.R.Evid. 410.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 115 S.Ct. 797, 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995), addressed a challenge to a waiver that allowed the United States to use the defendant's statements during plea negotiations to impeach any contradictory testimony that could arise if the case proceeded to trial. See 513 U.S. at 198, 115 S.Ct. 797. The Supreme Court held that, "absent some affirmative indication that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of the plea-statement Rules is valid and enforceable." 513 U.S. at 210, 115 S.Ct. 797. The Supreme Court stated that, while there "may be some evidentiary provisions that are so fundamental to the reliability of the factfinding process that they may never be waived without irreparably `discrediting the federal courts[,]' ... enforcement of agreements like respondent's plainly will not have that effect." United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204, 115 S.Ct. 797 (internal brackets omitted). Instead, the Supreme Court noted that admitting the plea statements for impeachment purposes enhanced the truth-seeking function of trials and would result in more accurate verdicts. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204, 115 S.Ct. 797 (Thomas, J.)("The admission of plea statements for impeachment purposes enhances the truth-seeking function of trials and will result in more accurate verdicts." (emphasis in original)). In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the following arguments that rule 410 should be unwaivable: (i) that rule 410 must be enforced to guarantee a fair procedure; (ii) that waivability would undermine the goal of voluntary settlement; and (iii) that waivability would invite prosecutorial reaching and abuse. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204-10, 115 S.Ct. 797. A three-justice concurrence advocated that courts should narrowly construe the holding's scope and emphasized that the case dealt only with an impeachment waiver. See United States v. Mezzanatto,
In United States v. Mitchell, however, the Tenth Circuit extended the Supreme Court's reasoning in United States v. Mezzanatto to case-in-chief waivers. There the Tenth Circuit upheld the following provision, in which the defendant agreed:
United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 999. The Tenth Circuit commented: "We see no analytical distinction between Rule 410's application to impeachment waivers and case-in-chief waivers. The same reasoning for the former compels the latter." United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1004. It further explained its decision and stated: "Even if the district court determines a guilty plea should be withdrawn, a waiver of Rule 410 only means a trial will contain more evidence — both the evidence of the original guilty plea and evidence the plea was withdrawn." United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1005 (emphasis added). The Tenth Circuit noted that its conclusion was in line with the other circuits who have considered expanding the rationale of United States v. Mezzanatto. See 633 F.3d at 1006 (citing United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir.2009); United States v. Young, 223 F.3d 905, 910-11 (8th Cir.2000); United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1321 (D.C.Cir.1998)). The Tenth Circuit also stated that the facts of United States v. Mezzanatto supported its decision, because the defendant in that case received only an opportunity to discuss cooperation with the United States, while the United States made promises to Mitchell in the plea agreement. See United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1006. Before reaching the rule 410 question, the Tenth Circuit determined that the defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1001. Although the district court noted that the defendant's counsel may have exerted undue influence, the Tenth Circuit concluded that his counsel's influence did not render the plea involuntary. See United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1002.
The Tenth Circuit's analysis in United States v. Mitchell began with its determination that the plea agreement was enforceable. See 633 F.3d at 1002. Although the Tenth Circuit stated at the outset that it was considering whether the rule 410 waiver was knowing and voluntary, it analyzed the plea as a whole. See United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1002 ("Based on a careful review of the record, we agree with the district court that Mitchell's plea was knowing and voluntary."). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit similarly analyzed the validity of the rule 410 waiver in the context of the validity of the plea as whole. See United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d at 1322. The D.C. Circuit commented:
United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d at 1322 n. 5.
In United States v. Jim, 839 F.Supp.2d 1157 (D.N.M.2012)(Browning, J.), the Court, after allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, denied the defendant's motion to exclude statements he made in the plea agreement and during the plea colloquy, because the defendant waived his rights under rule 410 when he entered the plea agreement. 839 F.Supp.2d at 1158. The plea agreement stated:
839 F.Supp.2d at 1172. The defendant argued that the waiver of his rights under rule 410 was unconstitutional, but the Court disagreed, noting the similarity of the defendant's waiver with the waiver that the Tenth Circuit upheld in United States v. Mitchell. See 839 F.Supp.2d at 1172. The defendant then argued that, because his attorney at the time he pled guilty was missing half of the photographs taken at the scene, he did not have all the evidence and pled guilty involuntarily; although he raised the issue in terms of voluntariness, the Court explained that voluntariness "ordinarily deals with claims that the plea was coerced," which the defendant did not allege. 839 F.Supp.2d at 1178. The Court instead analyzed the defendant's argument in terms of whether he knowingly pled guilty; the Court noted that the defendant did not argue that the lack of evidence affected his understanding of "`what the plea connotes and of its consequence,' the understanding necessary to enter a knowing plea." 839 F.Supp.2d at 1179 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709). The Court reviewed its reasons for previously allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, including a defect in the plea colloquy in which the magistrate judge "never mentioned the word `trial,'" and the defendant said he did not know he was waiving his right to proceed to trial; this defect cast doubts on whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty and led the Court to find a "fair and just reason" to permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. 839 F.Supp.2d at 1180. The Court concluded, however, that "the evidence in favor of a knowing and voluntary plea outweighs considerably the evidence of an unknowing plea, and is more weighty and more credible. In other words, [the defendant] has not met his burden of presenting an `affirmative indication' that the plea was not knowing and voluntary." 839 F.Supp.2d at 1181. Further, the defendant did not raise these arguments in his motion to exclude statements from the plea agreement and plea colloquy: "In the absence of argument on this issue and with the burden resting on [the defendant], the Court will not invalidate the rule 410 waiver and exclude [the defendant's] statements on this ground." 839 F.Supp.2d at 1185. As to the waiver's scope, the Court determined that, because the waiver to which the defendant stipulated permitted
A defendant's guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Libretti, 38 F.3d 523, 529 (10th Cir.1994). To enter a plea that is knowing and voluntary, a defendant must have "a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). A defendant must only understand the "direct consequences" of his plea, United States v. Hurlich, 293 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir.2002), and whether the plea carries a risk of deportation, see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010). If a guilty plea is not knowing and voluntary, it is void, and any additional waivers in the plea agreement generally are unenforceable. See United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1001 (citing United States v. Gigley, 213 F.3d 509, 516 (10th Cir.2000)). The Tenth Circuit has had more frequent opportunities to analyze the knowing and voluntary nature of a waiver of rights in the context of a waiver of appellate rights. See United States v. Sandoval, 427 Fed.Appx. 621, 623 (10th Cir.2011)(unpublished); United States v. Vidal, 561 F.3d 1113, 1118 (10th Cir.2009); United States v. Wilken, 498 F.3d 1160, 1167 (10th Cir.2007).
The defendant in United States v. Mitchell argued that the district court's statements that his counsel may have exerted "undue influence" over him rendered his plea involuntary. 633 F.3d at 1001. The Tenth Circuit held that the fact that his counsel used "colorful language" — telling the defendant "`you would be a fool not to take this plea offer!'" — did not approach a constitutionally suspect level of coercion. 633 F.3d at 1002. The Tenth Circuit stated that, even when pressure from counsel may be "palpable," and a defendant alleged he was "hounded, browbeaten, and yelled at," such pressures do not "vitiate the voluntariness of his plea." 633 F.3d at 1002 (citing United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 417 (10th Cir.1996)(analyzing voluntariness where counsel called the defendant "stupid" and "a f* * *ing idiot")). The defendant in United States v. Mitchell also pointed to the breakdown in communication between himself and his attorney to establish that his plea was not knowing and involuntary. See 633 F.3d at 1001. The Tenth Circuit found this argument similarly unavailing, and held that the guilty plea and accompanying plea agreement were knowing and voluntary. See 633 F.3d at 1002.
In the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, if a defendant consents to plead guilty before a United States Magistrate Judge, then the Magistrate Judge will conduct the plea colloquy and accept the plea. See United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1249-50 (10th Cir.1996). "With a defendant's express consent, the broad residuary `additional duties' clause of the Magistrate Act authorizes a magistrate judge to conduct a Rule 11 felony plea proceeding, and such does not violate the defendant's constitutional rights." United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d at 1251. In other words, the Magistrate Judge routinely accepts the guilty plea, because he or she is the one who can visually and audibly determine whether the plea is voluntary, but the Magistrate Judge does not accept the plea agreement, if any. See United States v. Salas-Garcia, 698 F.3d 1242, 1253 (10th Cir.2012)(stating that "Magistrate judges have the authority to conduct plea hearings and accept guilty pleas," and that,
Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not specifically provide for motions to reconsider, such motions are proper in criminal cases. See United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 539 (10th Cir.2014). See United States v. Christy, 810 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1249 (D.N.M.2011)(Browning, J.)(stating that in the criminal context, "courts ordinarily apply the same standards as those used in civil cases" for motions to reconsider), aff'd, 739 F.3d 534 (10th Cir.2014).
United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d at 539 (quoting Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir.2000)). It is within a court's discretion to grant or to deny a motion to reconsider. See United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d at 539 ("A district court should have the opportunity to correct alleged errors in its dispositions."); United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1207-08 (10th Cir.1999); Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir.1997). A motion to reconsider is not an opportunity to rehash arguments previously addressed or to advance new arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing. See United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d at 534 ("A motion to reconsider should not be used to revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have been raised earlier.").
Notably, neither rule 59 nor rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to interlocutory orders a district court reconsiders before entry of final judgment. Rule 59(e) states: "A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) (emphasis added). Accord Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir.1991) ("In this case, plaintiffs' motion to reconsider was not served within ten days of the district court's judgment."); 12 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 59.11[1][a], at 59-26 (3d ed.2013)("A motion for a new trial must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment, regardless of when or whether the parties received notice of the entry of the judgment." (citations omitted)). As the note to the 1946 amendment to rule 60 emphasizes in a discussion of the choice to add the word "final" within rule 60(b):
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 note to 1946 amendment. Accord 12 J. Moore, supra, § 60.23, at 60-82 ("Rule 60(b) does not govern relief from
In United States v. Christy, the Court initially granted the defendant's motion to suppress, see 785 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1054 (D.N.M.2011); the United States filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the evidence was admissible under the inevitable-discovery doctrine, see 810 F.Supp.2d at 1222-23. The Court reconsidered its prior ruling, agreed with the United States, and denied the defendant's motion to suppress. See 810 F.Supp.2d at 1282. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Court's decision to reconsider its prior ruling; although the United States had raised inevitable-discovery theories briefly and without much emphasis during the initial suppression briefings and hearings, the Court had not ruled on the inevitable-discovery issue when it first granted the suppression motion, and, thus, "the district court acted well within its discretion in granting the motion to reconsider (at least as to inevitable discovery) in order to rule on an issue it mistakenly overlooked." 739 F.3d at 539. The Tenth Circuit then addressed the merits of the United States' argument regarding inevitable discovery and affirmed the Court's conclusion that the evidence "would have been discovered legally, had the illegal search not discovered it first." 739 F.3d at 543-44.
Under the common law, an arresting officer was required to "bring his prisoner before a magistrate as soon as he reasonably could. This `presentment' requirement tended to prevent secret detention and served to inform a suspect of the charges against him...." Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 306, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009). In McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943), superseded by statute, Act of June 19, 1968, Pub.L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 210 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501), as recognized in Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009), the Supreme Court addressed the proper remedy under federal statutes codifying the presentment rule; in that case, the defendants' murder convictions rested primarily on confessions the defendants made after they were arrested and subjected to several days of questioning, but before they appeared before a United States Commissioner
After the Supreme Court decided McNabb v. United States, "the Judicial Conference of the United States and Congress produced Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), which pulled the several statutory presentment provisions together in one place." Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. at 307, 129 S.Ct. 1558. Rule 5(a) as enacted in 1946 was very similar to the current rule 5(a); the current rule provides that "[a] person making an arrest within the United States must take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge...." Fed. R.Crim.P. 5(a)(1)(A). See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. at 308, 129 S.Ct. 1558 (analyzing rule 5(a) from 1946 and stating that "[t]he rule remains much the same today"). A preliminary draft of rule 5 codified McNabb v. United States' exclusionary rule, providing that "[n]o statement made by a defendant in response to interrogation by an officer or agent of the government shall be admissible in evidence against him if the interrogation occurs while the defendant is held in custody in violation of this rule." 1 Wright & Leipold, supra, § 72, at 161 n. 3. The final version omitted this controversial exclusionary rule, 1 Wright & Leipold, supra, § 72, at 161-162.
The Supreme Court in two subsequent cases explained the interaction between McNabb v. United States and rule 5(a): in Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 100 (1948), the Supreme Court "emphasized that even voluntary confessions are inadmissible if given after an unreasonable delay in presentment." Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. at 308, 129 S.Ct. 1558 (citing Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. at 413, 69 S.Ct. 170). In Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957), superseded by statute, Act of June 19, 1968, Pub.L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 210 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501), as recognized in Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009), the Supreme Court excluded a confession made seven hours after arrest, because the police questioned the suspect for hours "within the vicinity of numerous committing magistrates." Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. at 308, 129 S.Ct. 1558 (quoting Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. at 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356). "Thus, the rule known simply as McNabb-Mallory `generally renders inadmissible confessions made during periods of detention that violate the prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(a).'" Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. at 309, 129 S.Ct. 1558 (internal
In 1968, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501; it enacted sections (a) and (b) in an attempt to eliminate Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), which attempt the Supreme Court rejected in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000), and it enacted section (c) in response to "the application of McNabb-Mallory in some federal courts." Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. at 309, 129 S.Ct. 1558.
Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. at 309-10, 129 S.Ct. 1558 (alteration in original)(footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
556 U.S. at 322, 129 S.Ct. 1558 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court remanded the case for the Third Circuit to consider, as the district court had, whether the defendant's confession should be treated as having been made within six hours of arrest. See 556 U.S. at 323, 129 S.Ct. 1558.
While Miranda v. Arizona is a "more robust doctrine for regulating confessions" than the presentment rule from rule 5(a), "[m]otions to suppress based on Rule 5(a) prompt appearance requirement are still made from time to time," although most courts "have interpreted the rule in a manner that gives it little independent force." 1 Wright & Leipold, supra, § 72, at 166-167. For example, if a defendant confesses before there is a delay, or if there is no interrogation, the defendant may not be able to suppress the confession under rule 5(a). See 1 Wright & Leipold, supra, § 72, at 168. Further, the time limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3501 do not apply until the defendant is arrested for a federal offense. See 1 Wright & Leipold, supra, § 72, at 171.
In United States v. Smith, 606 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir.2010), the defendant was arrested on Navajo tribal code charges, taken to a local jail, "advised of his rights and questioned by law enforcement officials, including a member of the FBI." 606 F.3d at 1274. He confessed to sexually assaulting a victim at a party approximately five hours after he was arrested, and after additional investigation, officials obtained a federal arrest warrant and transferred the defendant into federal custody. See 606 F.3d at 1275. The defendant sought to suppress the confession, because he was not presented to a federal magistrate within six hours of his arrest. See 606 F.3d at 1277. The district court ruled that the defendant's motion failed as a matter of law, and the Tenth Circuit agreed; the defendant's confession fell within 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c)'s six-hour safe harbor requirements, and further, because the defendant was not arrested for a federal offense when he confessed, the prompt-presentment rule did not apply. See 606 F.3d at 1278. "Where a person is under arrest on solely non-federal charges, neither the prompt-presentment rule nor the safe-harbor period are relevant even when the arresting officers believe the person also may have violated federal law or the person makes an inculpatory statement to federal agents." 606 F.3d at 1278 (citing United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 358, 114 S.Ct. 1599, 128 L.Ed.2d 319 (1994)).
The Fourth Amendment states:
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant for there to be a valid search and seizure. See Kerns v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 888 F.Supp.2d 1176, 1198 (D.N.M.2012)(Browning, J.). A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. See United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268, 1270 n. 3 (1988)("Police violate the Fourth Amendment
A Fourth Amendment search occurs either where the government, to obtain information, trespasses on a person's property or where the government violates a person's subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable to collect information. See United States v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 945, 952, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) (Scalia, J.)("[T]he Katz
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1414 (2013).
The Court has noted that, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Florida v. Jardines and United States v. Jones, both of which Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, and both of which analyze whether government conduct constituted a Fourth Amendment search using the trespass-based approach, "the question arises whether the Katz v. United States reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test is still good law." United States v. Alabi, 943 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.N.M.2013) (Browning, J.)(citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97-98, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998) (Scalia, J. concurring)). Although the Court concluded in United States v. Alabi that, "as the Supreme Court now stands, Justices Alito, Breyer, Kagan, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor still adhere to application of the Katz v. United States reasonable-expectation-of-privacy Fourth Amendment analysis, at least as a possible approach alongside of the trespass-based approach," 943 F.Supp.2d at 1243, these two Supreme Court decisions may also raise the question whether a search's reasonableness still hinges on balancing the government's interest in the search against the subject's reasonable privacy expectations. In June, 2013, however, after having written the majority opinion in Florida v. Jardines, and United States v. Jones, Justice Scalia dissented from the Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. King, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 186 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013), in which the Supreme Court held that "DNA identification of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure," 133 S.Ct. at 1980. Justice Scalia criticized the majority's opinion for analogizing DNA testing to taking an arrestee's photograph by citing to Katz v. United States and pointing out that "we have never held that merely taking a person's photograph invades any recognized `expectation of privacy.'" Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. at 1986 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also pointed out that a person's "privacy-related concerns" in their body are weighty:
Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. at 1982 (Scalia J., dissenting)(emphasis in original). Justice Scalia also suggested that the Founders would have shared these privacy related concerns:
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001), the Supreme Court considered whether the special-needs exception
Regarding the warrantless seizure of medical records, the Tenth Circuit has stated that a Fourth Amendment violation might occur when a government employer seizes an employee's medical records without a warrant. See Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 480 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1994). The Tenth Circuit in Lankford v. City of Hobart seemed to suggest that such a finding is possible without deciding the issue. See 27 F.3d at 480 n. 2 ("It is possible that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when ... [the defendant] `seized' [the plaintiff's] medical files without a warrant.... [The plaintiff] has failed adequately to address the Fourth Amendment implications of [the defendant's] actions on appeal. Therefore, we do not address this issue."). Instead of resting on Fourth-Amendment grounds, the Lankford v. City of Hobart holding is rooted in the right to privacy. In Lankford v. City of Hobart, female former-dispatchers brought an action against a police chief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 27 F.3d at 478. Among other things, the plaintiffs alleged that the police chief sexually harassed them and used his authority as police chief to obtain the private medical records of one of the plaintiffs to prove that she was a lesbian. See 27 F.3d at 478. The Tenth Circuit held that, if true, the police chief's actions amounted to a clear privacy violation. See 27 F.3d at 479.
In Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996), the Supreme Court held "confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence." 518 U.S. at 15, 116 S.Ct. 1923. While announcing the privilege in the context of that § 1983 action, the Supreme Court found it "neither
In Chavez v. Martinez, No. CIV 07-1250 JB/LFG, 2008 WL 6045509 (D.N.M. Oct. 20, 2008)(Browning, J.), the Court considered whether the defendant, an officer, violated the plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when the defendant went to the plaintiff's doctor's office to verify the dates on the plaintiff's doctor's note. See 2008 WL 6045509, at *1-2. In that case, the defendant suspected that the plaintiff had altered his doctor's note, so the defendant followed up with the doctor's office. See 2008 WL 6045509, at *1. The defendant did not request or receive the plaintiff's medical records; he received only oral information from the receptionist. See 2008 WL 6045509, at *2. The United States Department of Health and Human Services also performed an investigation, and found that the disclosure of the plaintiff's medical information to the defendant "could reflect a violation of the general uses and disclosures provision at 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)." 2008 WL 6045509, at *3. In Chavez v. Martinez, the Court stated:
2008 WL 6045509, at *11.
In Kerns v. Board of Comm'rs, 707 F.Supp.2d 1190 (D.N.M.2010)(Browning, J.), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011), the plaintiff alleged that the sheriff violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when the sheriff requested the plaintiff's private medical records from the Veterans Hospital. See 707 F.Supp.2d at 1253. The sheriff argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity — he did not violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights and, even if he did, the constitutional right was not clearly established at the time. See 707 F.Supp.2d at 1254. Looking to the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court noted that the sheriff did not seek a warrant or a subpoena for the medical records, nor did he seek the plaintiff's consent. See 707 F.Supp.2d at 1262. The Court concluded that, because the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
The Tenth Circuit reversed the Court in part and vacated the Court in part in Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011). The Tenth Circuit did not agree with the Court that the plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were clearly established, and so reversed the Court without analyzing whether the sheriff had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights:
663 F.3d at 1183-84. The Tenth Circuit majority explained that the "scope of the Constitution's protection for a patient's hospital records can be adequately decided in future cases where the qualified immunity overlay, isn't in play (e.g., through motions to suppress wrongly seized records or claims for injunctive or declaratory relief)." 663 F.3d at 1187 n. 5.
On the Fourth Amendment claim, the Tenth Circuit majority framed the issue as
663 F.3d at 1184. The Tenth Circuit majority rejected the Court's and the plaintiff's reliance on Lankford v. City of Hobart, because "its language hardly announced `clearly established law.' At best, Lankford's equivocation declined to foreclose the possibility of a Fourth Amendment violation." 663 F.3d at 1185 n. 2 (emphasis in original). The Tenth Circuit majority concluded that there was
The Honorable William J. Holloway, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit, dissented; he found it "unwise" for the majority to avoid the first question of qualified immunity — whether the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. 663 F.3d at 1195 (Holloway, J., dissenting). Judge Holloway said the majority's approach made it seem that the sheriff's conduct may have been lawful, when, in Judge Holloway's view, the "case is crystal clear." 663 F.3d at 1196 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
663 F.3d at 1197 (Holloway, J., dissenting). On the question whether the law was clearly established, Judge Holloway said it was; although there were no cases directly on point, Judge Holloway said "the precedents that do exist are easily close enough on point that any reasonable law enforcement officer would have known that constitutionally protected medical records cannot be obtained simply because a possibility exists that the information would be helpful." 663 F.3d at 1198 (Holloway, J., dissenting). Judge Holloway explained that the plaintiff "enjoyed a due process right to the non-disclosure of his personal medical information" and that "the infringement of that right implicates the Fourth Amendment." 663 F.3d at 1200 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of privacy. See Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1570 n. 15 (10th Cir.1989); Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir.1986). The Tenth Circuit has recognized that the right to privacy protects government employees from their employers improperly attempting to obtain the private medical history or records. See Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d at 479. Although the Tenth Circuit in Lankford v. City of Hobart found a violation of the right of privacy under the facts in that case, it did not discuss the manner in which a court should determine generally when a violation of the privacy right occurs. See 27 F.3d at 479-80. Flanagan v. Munger provides some instruction on this point. In Flanagan v. Munger, the Tenth Circuit employed a balancing test to determine when disclosure by the government of private information amounts to violation of the right to privacy. See Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d at 1570. Specifically, a court must inquire: "(1) if the party asserting the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy; (2) if disclosure serves a compelling state interest; and (3) if disclosure can be made in the least intrusive manner." 890 F.2d at 1570. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs, police officers who owned an adult video store, did not suffer a violation of their privacy rights when their ownership was disclosed, noting that "only highly personal information is protected." 890 F.2d at 1570. See Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d at 839 ("The legitimacy of an individual's expectations depends, at least in part, upon the intimate
In Kerns v. Board of Comm'rs, the Court used the Tenth Circuit's balancing test from Flanagan v. Munger to determine whether a sheriff who obtained the plaintiff's medical records violated the plaintiff's privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment, finding that (i) the plaintiff had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his medical and psychiatric records, because he believed that the medical and mental health records were confidential and private; (ii) the sheriff's department had a compelling state interest in the records, because of its interest in enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which makes it unlawful for a person who has been "adjudicated as a mental defective" or who has been "committed to a mental institution" to possess firearms, and ensuring that the plaintiff did not fit that category; and (iii) the state could have achieved its objectives in a less intrusive manner by making a more particularized request for records, rather than requesting to "review all records." 707 F.Supp.2d at 1256-57. Balancing these factors, the Court concluded that the plaintiff met its burden on summary judgment to demonstrate that the sheriff violated his constitutionally protected right to privacy. See 707 F.Supp.2d at 1257. The Court noted that the sheriff had not relied on HIPAA when he requested the records; the law-enforcement exception in HIPAA allows HIPAA-covered entities to disclose protected healthcare information in six circumstances:
707 F.Supp.2d at 1259 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.512). The Court said that "HIPAA restrains the `health plan, health care clearinghouse, or healthcare provider' from disclosing protected medical information,
The majority in the Tenth Circuit did not agree with the Court that the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights were clearly established and reversed the Court without analyzing whether the sheriff had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d at 1183-84. Although the plaintiff cited several cases in which the Tenth Circuit "held that government officials violated plaintiffs' substantive due process privacy rights by accessing their records without public disclosure," the Tenth Circuit explained that those cases "involved another element not present here: the government officials involved accessed the plaintiffs' confidential information as part of an unlawful campaign of sexual harassment." 663 F.3d at 1186. The Tenth Circuit ordered the Court to enter summary judgment in favor of the sheriff, "only because [the plaintiff] has failed to identify clearly established law rendering beyond debate that the Sheriff's conduct was unlawful as of 2005." 663 F.3d at 1187. Judge Holloway dissented, agreeing instead with the Court that the officer violated the plaintiff's "clearly established right to have his highly personal medical information protected from a law enforcement officer whose access to that information was supported only by a generalized interest in whether a crime might have occurred." 663 F.3d at 1197-98 (Holloway, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original).
The Court will grant the Motion to Reconsider in part and to the extent that the Court may have misapprehended Yazzie's position in the 1st Motion and 2nd Motion. See United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d at 539 (stating that "[a] motion to reconsider may be granted when the court has misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the law"). "A district court should have the opportunity to correct alleged errors in its disposition." United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d at 539. See Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d at 1251 (stating that district courts are generally free to reconsider earlier interlocutory orders). By granting the Motion to Reconsider in part, the Court will revisit its analysis of Yazzie's 1st Motion and 2nd Motion in light of the arguments he has made subsequent to the MOO, namely, that he was "forced" to plead guilty through his lack of knowledge of the law, and that, had he been adequately informed of his options to suppress the statement he made to the FBI and the medical records showing his history of an STD, he would not have pled guilty.
After carefully reconsidering its prior decision, however, the Court will deny the Motion to Reconsider to the extent it asks the Court to grant the 1st Motion and 2nd Motion. Although the Court's analysis has slightly changed, so that at least one factor weighs in favor of allowing Yazzie to withdraw his guilty plea, the overall weight of the factors prompts the Court to continue to deny the 1st Motion and 2nd Motion. Rule 11(d)(2)(B) provides that a defendant may withdraw a plea if "the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(B). Defendants do not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. See United States v. Siedlik, 231 F.3d at 748. District courts, however, have broad discretion in determining whether to grant motions to withdraw pleas. See United States v. Wright, 392 Fed.Appx. at 627. The Tenth
United States v. Yazzie, 407 F.3d at 1142. While treated sometimes as an eighth factor, a district court may properly consider "the likelihood of conviction" when assessing whether to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea. United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d at 421 n. 5. The Tenth Circuit has explained that the "primary considerations for determining whether a fair and just reason exists are whether the defendant (1) knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty, (2) had assistance of counsel relating to the decision to plead guilty, and (3) has asserted his innocence." United States v. Lee, 535 Fed.Appx. 677, 680 (10th Cir.2013) (unpublished). These are the factors that "`speak to ... the defendant's reason for withdrawal.'" United States v. Lee, 535 Fed.Appx. at 680 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 510 F.3d at 1217). "If the defendant demonstrates a fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea, the court may also consider systemic burdens" — the other four United States v. Yazzie factors, including "prejudice to the government, timing of the motion, inconvenience to the court, and waste of judicial resources." United States v. Lee, 535 Fed.Appx. at 680 & n. 3 (citing United States v. Hamilton, 510 F.3d at 1214).
In the MOO, the Court concluded that the first primary consideration — whether Yazzie knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty — weighed against allowing Yazzie to withdraw his plea, because he "demonstrated through his letters to the Court that he understands the consequences of pleading guilty to the specific offence charged in the Information." MOO at 35. The Court characterized Yazzie's assertion that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily given as "conclusory," noting that Yazzie's main concern at the hearing was that he thought he deserved a lesser sentence and thought his wife would receive custody of their children. MOO at 33. The Court also addressed Judge Puglisi's reference to a "more probable than not standard," ultimately concluding that Judge Puglisi did not misstate the United States' burden of proof and that "Yazzie affirmed that he was pleading guilty because he is `in fact guilty.'" MOO at 34.
Yazzie contends that the Court did not adequately understand his argument, and that he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, "[be]cause [Mr. Loonam] ha[d] knowledge of the law and I did not." Motion to Reconsider at 1. Yazzie explains that, if he had known of the possibility to suppress his medical records and the statement he made to the FBI, he would not have pled guilty, and that, because he was not fully aware of those options, Mr. Loonam essentially forced him to plead guilty. As Ms. Middlebrooks notes, however, a plea is not involuntary simply because the attorney strongly urges the defendant to accept a guilty plea — counsel must inform the client that he has no choice but to plead guilty to render a guilty plea involuntary. See Supplement at 5 (citing Fields v. Gibson, 277 F.3d at 1213). In Fields v. Gibson, the
Yazzie argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, because he was not fully aware of the potential to suppress his confession and his medical records. Ms. Middlebrooks asserts that, while she is unsure about the merit of Yazzie's argument to suppress the statements he made to the FBI, there is merit to the argument that the Court should suppress his medical records. Although Mr. Loonam addressed some aspects of suppressing Yazzie's statements to the FBI, Mr. Loonam did not address the 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) arguments until after Yazzie pled guilty; further, Mr. Loonam did not ever address suppressing the medical records. Even if correct, however, these arguments misapprehend the relevant inquiry regarding a knowing and voluntary plea: the Court must consider whether Yazzie understood the consequences of his plea, and whether he understood the proceedings — and it is clear from the record that Yazzie understood the consequences of pleading guilty. "To enter a plea that is knowing and voluntary, the defendant must have `a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.'" United States v. Hurlich, 293 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)). "The defendant need not understand every collateral consequence of the plea, but need only understand its direct consequences," United States v. Hurlich, 293 F.3d at 1230-31 (quoting Wall v. United States, 500 F.2d 38, 39 (10th Cir.1974)(per curiam)), and whether the plea carries a risk of deportation, see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. at 374, 130 S.Ct. 1473. "Consequences of a guilty plea unrelated to the length and nature of the federal sentence are not direct consequences." United States v. Hurlich, 293 F.3d at 1231 (citations omitted). "[T]he `knowing and voluntary' inquiry focuses on whether [a defendant] in fact did understand the proceedings." Allen v. Mullin, 368 F.3d 1220, 1240 (10th Cir.2004). Yazzie's statements at the hearing indicate that he understood the proceedings, understood that he was giving up the right to a trial, and understood that he was accepting a sentence between 15 and 19 years; he has not since contested that he misunderstood what took place at the plea hearing.
Some circuit courts have held that, to be knowing and voluntary, a defendant should be made aware of his possible defenses and understand that he is giving up those possible defenses by pleading guilty. See, e.g., United States v. Ranum, 96 F.3d 1020, 1024 (7th Cir.1996)("The defendant
In this case, it appears that, in accordance with rule 11, Yazzie understood his right to a jury trial and that he was waiving this right by pleading guilty. The Plea Agreement lists Yazzie's rights — "to plead not guilty" and "to have a trial by jury," and, at trial, "to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses," "to be protected from compelled self-incrimination," "to testify and present evidence on [his] own behalf," and "to compel the attendance of witnesses for the defense" — and that he agrees to waive those rights and plead guilty. Plea Agreement ¶¶ 2-3, at
Regarding whether Yazzie had close assistance of counsel before and during the plea hearing, the Court previously concluded that, "[a]lthough Yazzie's relationship with Mr. Loonam broke down after the plea hearing, that subsequent break down does not appear to have affected the Plea Agreement or plea negotiations." MOO at 31. The Court noted that, although Yazzie later asserted that he did not penetrate Jane Doe 1, he did not raise the issue at the plea hearing, and "he ultimately admitted that the United States could prove its charges against him." MOO at 31. Yazzie also represented at the plea hearing that "he had been satisfied with Mr. Loonam `in all respects' in his representation." MOO at 32. The Court said that Mr. Loonam secured a favorable Plea Agreement for Yazzie, and although Yazzie expressed discontentment with the charge, the Court concluded that the factor "may be neutral ... or weigh against withdrawal. Mr. Loonam might have focused his professional attention on the bottom line — the length of Yazzie's
The Tenth Circuit has recognized that the question whether the defendant had assistance of counsel may require the same analysis as ineffective assistance-of-counsel claims. See United States v. Lee, 535 Fed.Appx. at 680 n. 2 ("[D]espite the differences between the two issues, we have analyzed challenges to the assistance of counsel made in th[e] context [of motions to withdraw guilty pleas] under the cause-and-prejudice standard applicable to Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims."); United States v. Hamilton, 510 F.3d at 1216. "To demonstrate ineffectiveness, [Yazzie] `must show both (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that his deficiency prejudiced his defense.'" United States v. Lee, 535 Fed.Appx. at 681 (emphasis in original)(quoting United States v. Hamilton, 510 F.3d at 1216). "Counsel's performance is deficient when it falls `outside the wide range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'" United States v. Lee, 535 Fed.Appx. at 681 (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 510 F.3d at 1216). "In particular, counsel's performance is deficient if he `materially misinform[s] the defendant of the consequences of the plea.'" United States v. Lee, 535 Fed.Appx. at 681 (emphasis in original)(quoting United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413 (10th Cir.1996)). "To demonstrate prejudice, [Yazzie] must show a `reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" United States v. Lee, 535 Fed.Appx. at 681 (emphasis in original)(quoting United States v. Hamilton, 510 F.3d at 1216). "[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance"; Yazzie must show that Mr. Loonam's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Yazzie takes issue with Mr. Loonam's assistance in three ways: (i) negotiating a charge for sexual abuse rather than sexual contact; (ii) not informing Yazzie of the potential to suppress his statements to the FBI under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c); and (iii) not informing Yazzie of the potential to suppress his medical records.
As of the Fifth Addendum to the PSR, the USPO calculates that Yazzie's total offense level is 40. See Fifth Addendum at 1. This calculation is based on: (i) a base offense level of 30; (ii) a 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(1) based on conduct that violates 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a); (iii) a 2-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(2)(B), because the victim was between twelve and sixteen years old; (iv) a 2-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(3), because the victim was in Yazzie's custody, care, or supervisory control; (v) a 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) as a repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors; (vi) a 2-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for accepting responsibility; and (vii) a 1-level reduction based on an expected motion from the United States based on Yazzie's acceptance of responsibility. See PSR ¶¶ 31-40, at 10-11; Fifth Addendum at 1. This calculation results in a sentencing guidelines range of 292 to 365 months, which is well above the 180 to 228 months to which the parties agreed in the Plea Agreement. See Plea Agreement ¶ 10(a), at 4.
Yazzie objects to the USPO's enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2A3.1(b)(1) and
Looking first to Yazzie's objection to the 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(1), Yazzie argues that the conduct described in the PSR for this enhancement does not constitute a sexual act as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) and (b).
PSR ¶ 31, at 10. 18 U.S.C. § 2246 provides four alternative definitions for "sexual act":
18 U.S.C. § 2246(2). Yazzie is correct that the additional conduct that the PSR describes does not constitute a sexual act as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246, but he cannot avoid the 4-level enhancement, because the crime to which he pled guilty is 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a), meaning that "the offense involved conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)." U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(1). Ms. Middlebrooks explained at the Sept. 13, 2013 hearing that, although Yazzie pled guilty to the facts in the Plea Agreement, he now denies the factual basis, asserting instead that at most, he committed sexual contact and not a sexual act. At this point, with the Plea Agreement still standing, Yazzie is subject to the 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(1); if the Court permits him to withdraw his guilty plea and he is convicted at trial for the same offense, he would likewise be subject to the 4-level enhancement.
Yazzie also objects to the 5-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1), which applies when the "defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b). He argues that the prohibited sexual conduct refers to a prior sex offense conviction, and, because he does not have any prior sex offense convictions, he contends the 5-level enhancement should not apply. The Court agrees with the USPO's response to this argument in the Fourth
Yazzie's problem with Mr. Loonam is not only that Mr. Loonam secured an unfavorable plea agreement based on the offense to which he pled guilty, but that he should not have pled guilty to that offense at all. Yazzie argues now that he is guilty of sexual contact and not of a sexual act, and that Mr. Loonam should have obtained a plea deal under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(1), which would have capped his sentence at 10 years. Although Yazzie asserts that he committed sexual contact, because he disputes that he penetrated Jane Doe 1 and that he touched her under her clothes, Yazzie did not dispute that he committed a sexual act at the plea hearing when he discussed the facts to which he was pleading guilty. He rather contested that he used force and so demonstrated that he was not afraid to correct the record; yet he remained silent regarding the allegation that he penetrated Jane Doe 1. Further, the United States initially charged Yazzie under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c), which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). The Court cannot say that Mr. Loonam's performance in representing Yazzie was deficient when he helped Yazzie avoid a much harsher sentence than what the United States initially charged, especially when Yazzie did not make clear until after he pled guilty that he disputes committing a sexual act.
As to the first complaint of Mr. Loonam's assistance, even if Yazzie is correct that he should not have pled guilty to
Yazzie argues that Mr. Loonam should have informed him of the possibility of suppressing his confession to the FBI under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c). This section does not provide the remedy Yazzie is seeking, but 18 U.S.C. § 3501 in conjunction with rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the McNabb-Mallory rule may: rule 5(a) mandates that "a person making an arrest within the United States must take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge," Fed.R.Crim.P. 5(a)(1)(A), and if the time between arrest and presentment is more than the six-hour safe harbor in 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c), then a court must determine whether the delay is reasonable, see 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c). If the delay is unreasonable, the McNabb-Mallory rule describes the proper remedy under rule 5(a), which is to exclude from evidence the confession, even if the confession was voluntary. Although the issue is not before the Court in a motion to suppress, the Court will consider to some extent the merit of Yazzie's argument, because it impacts the Court's analysis of Mr. Loonam's assistance of counsel.
The important facts and dates include (i) when Yazzie was arrested on the federal charge; (ii) when Yazzie confessed; and (iii) when Yazzie appeared before a Magistrate Judge for initial presentment. The Court does not have independent access to the discovery in this case, and so must rely on the information the parties and the USPO have provided, which does not result in clear answers for when these events took place.
The PSR explains that, "[o]n May 11, 2010, FBI agents made a probable cause arrest of Willis Yazzie for the instant offense, Aggravated Sexual Abuse. On that day he had been released from tribal jail for unrelated charges and was transferred to San Juan County Detention Center in Farmington, New Mexico." PSR ¶ 8, at 4. The PSR also states that, on "May 10, 2010, the Navajo Tribal Police Department interviewed Willis Yazzie concerning the allegations made by both victims" and that Yazzie confessed that day. PSR ¶ 15, at 6.
Yazzie provides a number of different dates and arguments for when he was arrested for a federal offense and when he confessed. For example, in the May 15, 2011 Letter, Yazzie said he was
May 15, 2011 Letter at 1. In the Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice on Constitutional Grounds, filed May 25, 2011 (Doc. 47)("Motion to Dismiss"),
Motion to Dismiss at 1. Ms. Middlebrooks explained at the September 13, 2013, hearing that she is unsure about the actual dates: after conferring with Yazzie, she stated that Yazzie was initially arrested for a DWI on May 7, 2010, he went to tribal court on May 8, 2010, remained in custody based on a federal hold, confessed and was transferred into federal custody on May 10, 2010, and was charged and made the initial appearance on May 11, 2010. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 30:13-31:5 (Middlebrooks, Court). After the hearing, Ms. Middlebrooks further explained some of the confusion about dates:
Addendum Supplement ¶ 4, at 2. The conflicting dates show that Yazzie may have been arrested for a federal offense as early as May 7, 2010 or as late as May 11, 2010. It is unclear whether he confessed on May 8, 2010, or May 10, 2010. It appears that Yazzie's initial appearance was May 12, 2010, at 9:53 a.m. in Albuquerque. See Clerk's Minutes of Hearing before U.S. Magistrate Judge W. Daniel Schneider, Initial Presentment, filed May 12, 2010 (Doc. 6).
Yazzie also argues that he was "arrested" as soon as a federal hold was placed on him:
Second Supplement at 3 n. 2.
Ms. Middlebrooks explained that, based on her conversations with Mr. Loonam, Mr. Loonam believed there was reasonable delay between Yazzie's arrest and his initial presentment; he believed Yazzie was not arrested for federal charges until May 10 or 11, and that the time needed to transport Yazzie from Shiprock to Albuquerque explained the delay between the arrest and initial presentment. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 14:2-11 (Middlebrooks).
If the facts that the USPO presented in the PSR are accurate, then the Tenth Circuit's analysis in United States v. Smith resolves the dispute; as the Tenth Circuit explained, the prompt-presentment rule does not apply until a defendant is arrested for a federal offense. See 606 F.3d at 1278. If Yazzie was arrested for a federal offense before he confessed, then Yazzie may have a stronger argument, and the Court would need to determine if the delay between the arrest and presentment was reasonable. If, for example, Yazzie confessed before there was unreasonable delay, the presentment rule may not require its exclusion. See 1 Wright & Leipold, supra, § 72, at 168 ("Exclusion of a confession is not required if the confession came before there had been delay; a confession given promptly upon arrest is admissible even though thereafter there is improper delay in taking the defendant before a magistrate judge."). Without more definite information, the Court cannot say whether Yazzie's argument for suppressing his confession has any merit.
Even if Yazzie's suppression argument has merit, however, the prospect of a potential suppression motion is not enough to show that Mr. Loonam's performance was deficient — Yazzie must show that Mr. Loonam's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. See United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1570 (10th Cir.1993). The Supreme Court has addressed a similar situation in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), when it dealt with
397 U.S. at 767-68, 90 S.Ct. 1441. The Supreme Court discussed the situation where a defendant decided to plead guilty based on his belief that the law would allow his confession to be used against him, later learns that he may have been able to suppress his confession, and then petitions the court for collateral relief, arguing that "his plea was an unintelligent and voidable act." 397 U.S. at 769, 90 S.Ct. 1441. The Supreme Court rejected this attack:
397 U.S. at 769-70, 90 S.Ct. 1441. The Supreme Court went on to explain that, when a defendant attacks whether his plea was knowing and voluntary based on the advice his counsel offered, a court should not simply consider whether the counsel's advice was right or wrong, but whether the advice was "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 397 U.S. at 770-71, 90 S.Ct. 1441.
The Court concludes that Yazzie has not shown that Mr. Loonam's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; even though Yazzie may have been able to suppress his confession under rule 5 and the McNabb-Mallory rule, that is not entirely clear, and, at most, it appears that Mr. Loonam may have misjudged the admissibility of the evidence. Misjudgment is not enough to show that Mr. Loonam's advice was outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Mr. Loonam shared with Yazzie his impression that they could not suppress the statements Yazzie made to the FBI based on the FBI forcing or coercing Yazzie to make the statements; although Mr. Loonam did not discuss or address 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) until after Yazzie pled guilty, his conclusion regarding the admissibility of the statements remained the same. Ms. Middlebrooks has candidly informed the Court that she is uncertain as to the merit of Yazzie's suppression argument under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c). The Court does not have enough information to analyze the strength of this argument; more importantly, the Court does not need to decide this issue to determine whether Yazzie had close assistance of counsel or whether he knowingly pled guilty. Yazzie has not met his burden to show that Mr. Loonam's advice fell outside the range of acceptable performance, and, thus, Yazzie's contentions that he would have not pled guilty had he known about the possibility of suppressing his confession to the FBI is irrelevant.
Yazzie asserts that part of the reason he pled guilty was because Mr. Loonam advised
Because the medical records pertain to Jane Doe 2 and Yazzie pled guilty to the charge against him regarding Jane Doe 1, the Court is unsure how the medical records influenced him to plead guilty, and he has not explained this problem except to say that Mr. Loonam advised that the medical records, with the confession, would likely lead to a conviction. Perhaps the United States would have charged Yazzie for offenses relating to both Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 if Yazzie proceeded to trial, whereas it was willing to drop the charges against Yazzie for Jane Doe 2 if he pled guilty for Jane Doe 1. The Court does not understand why the medical records made such an impact on Yazzie pleading guilty to the charges against him for Jane Doe 1, but the Court will consider whether Mr. Loonam should have raised the possibility of suppressing the records with Yazzie, and more importantly, whether failing to do so fell outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
Ms. Middlebrooks indicated that the FBI subpoenaed Yazzie's medical records and obtained them in violation of HIPAA, and that Yazzie never waived his privilege regarding those records. See Sept. 13 Tr. at 16:7-17 (Court, Middlebrooks). Ms. Middlebrooks seems to be arguing that, under HIPAA, Yazzie may have been able to suppress the medical records, because she contends that none of the HIPAA law enforcement exceptions apply. She also mentioned that the FBI subpoenaed the records, but she did not indicate whether the exception, pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e), for judicial and administrative proceedings would apply. That exception permits disclosure in the course of a judicial or administrative proceeding "in response to a subpoena" if the "covered entity receives satisfactory assurance ... from the party seeking the information that reasonable efforts have been made by such party" that either the subject of the protected health information has been given notice, or that the party seeking the information has made reasonable efforts to secure a qualified protective order. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii). The qualified protective order would "[p]rohibit[] the parties from using or disclosing the protected health information for any purpose other than the litigation or proceeding for which such information was requested," and "[r]equire[] the return to the covered entity or destruction of the protected health information (including all copies made) at the end of the litigation or proceeding." 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(v). The Court does not know the circumstances in which the FBI obtained the medical records or whether the FBI provided the covered medical entity with the adequate assurances required under HIPAA; assuming, however, that the covered medical entity provided the records in violation of HIPAA, without an applicable exception covering its conduct, the Court does not believe that suppressing the records would be the proper remedy.
HIPAA prohibits a "covered entity" from using or disclosing protected health information. 45 C.F.R.
Ms. Middlebrooks has not explained how the FBI obtained the medical records, other than to say that the FBI subpoenaed the records. The Court is not aware that the FBI has any subpoena powers,
The factor analyzing whether Yazzie had close assistance of counsel weighs against allowing Yazzie to withdraw his plea; although Mr. Loonam may not have provided Yazzie with every potential argument, and the Court has reservations regarding Mr. Loonam's communication, Yazzie has not shown that Mr. Loonam's advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The Court has considered whether Yazzie's potential suppression motions have merit, but cannot say definitively that either would succeed.
The final factor that can show a fair and just reason to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea is if the defendant asserts his innocence. In the MOO, the Court concluded that this factor "is either neutral, as Yazzie asserts he is guilty of a lesser offense than the Information charges, or weighs against allowing him to withdraw his plea, because he has repeatedly admitted that he did wrong." MOO at 28. The Court noted that Yazzie contested "some of the factual basis underlying his statement in the Plea Agreement," including whether he used force and whether he touched Jane Doe 1 under her clothing; further, he included affidavits from Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 in which they vacillate from their prior positions. MOO at 27. The Court stated, however, that Yazzie did not contest at the plea hearing that a jury would find him guilty of sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) and observed that he has continued to admit that he has done wrong. See MOO at 27.
This factor requires the defendant to assert either legal or factual innocence, but a defendant "must offer evidence to support conclusory statements of innocence." United States v. Coates, 483 Fed. Appx. 488, 493 (10th Cir.2012). The Court previously noted that Yazzie "has not clearly asserted that he is innocent of the charged offense," MOO at 26, and that "Yazzie continues to admit that he committed a sexual act with a minor," MOO at 27. After further consideration, and with Yazzie's subsequent arguments, the Court believes that Yazzie is asserting actual innocence from 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a), the offense to which he pled guilty, because he says he did not commit a sexual act under the definitions of 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2). Instead, he argues that he has committed "sexual contact," because he did not touch Jane Doe 1 or Jane Doe 2 under their clothing, and did not penetrate Jane Doe 1 with his finger. The Information to which Yazzie pled guilty cites 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(C) to define "sexual act" as "the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(C). 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) provides four definitions of "sexual act":
18 U.S.C. § 2246(2). Because Yazzie argues that he did not touch either Jane Doe 1 or Jane Doe 2 under their clothing, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(D), and did not penetrate Jane Doe 1, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(C), he is asserting his innocence from 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a), which requires a sexual act. Instead, Yazzie argues that he committed a sexual contact, under 18 U.S.C. § 2244, and that "sexual contact" means "the intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3). Yazzie is not asserting that he is wholly innocent from any wrongdoing, but he is asserting that he is innocent of the crime to which he pled. This factor weighs in favor of allowing Yazzie to withdraw his guilty plea.
After reanalyzing the three factors that could justify allowing Yazzie to withdraw his guilty plea, the Court finds that only one weighs in his favor — that Yazzie asserts his innocence. The Court's analysis became slightly more favorable to Yazzie regarding the close assistance of counsel, but that factor still weighs slightly against allowing withdrawal. The Court has not changed its position that Yazzie knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty, weighing against allowing Yazzie to withdraw his plea. The Court will next review the systemic burdens: "prejudice to the government, timing of the motion, inconvenience to the court, and waste of judicial resources." United States v. Lee, 535 Fed. Appx. at 680 n. 3.
The analysis for the prejudice to the United States remains the same as in the Court's MOO and weighs against allowing Yazzie to withdraw his plea. In fact, the prejudice has gotten worse and more severe, because the victims now state a desire to change their previous statements alleging that Yazzie sexually abused them. See Affidavit of Jane Doe 1 ("I think it was very hard for me to accept a new parent in my life. Well all I could say is that most of those reports were not true and he did not do all of those things to me, and my family."); Affidavit of Jane Doe 2 ("I ... have a different point of view since now that I'm older."). On one hand, perhaps a victim recanting prior testimony is not prejudice to the government in the same way that the death of witness would be, because it may be an improvement on the quality of evidence if the witness was not telling the truth at first. On the other hand, the victims have not clearly recanted, declared Yazzie's innocence, or explained which of their previous statements were true and which were false — rather, they seem to be more concerned about losing a member of their household and are rethinking their desire to testify against Yazzie. As the Court noted in its MOO, the United States' evidence has diminished with the passage of time, and
The Tenth Circuit has recognized that requiring the United States to try a case it would not otherwise have to try, particularly when preparation for the trial will be difficult, results in prejudice to the United States. See United States v. Jones, 168 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.1999)(finding that allowing the defendant to withdraw his plea "could also prejudice the government," because the "government will face the presumably difficult task of locating confidential informants"). Although the United States maintains that it can prosecute this case, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of not permitting Yazzie to withdraw his guilty plea.
The analysis regarding the timing of the motions also remains the same; although the Court notes that Yazzie promptly filed the Motion to Reconsider after the Court filed its MOO, Yazzie did not file his 1 st Motion until approximately nine months after the plea hearing, which is a significant portion of time. The delay is somewhat excusable, because of Yazzie's difficulties with counsel, but Yazzie wrote to the Court on multiple occasions without the assistance of counsel, and he could have done the same to request to withdraw his guilty plea. See United States v. Kramer, 168 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir.1999)(recognizing that an eight-month delay and a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed on "the eve of sentencing" constituted delay). This factor, thus, weighs slightly against permitting Yazzie to withdraw his plea.
The Court previously noted that the other two systemic factors — whether the withdrawal will substantially inconvenience the Court or waste judicial resources — weigh against withdrawal. The Court stated that there will almost always be some inconvenience to the Court, and in this case, allowing Yazzie to withdraw his plea will mean suppression hearings and proceeding to trial, which would create a lot of judicial work in this busy district. As the Court stated, however, it is "in the justice business, not trying to avoid work. If justice requires a trial, so be it." MOO at 29. The Motion to Reconsider suggests that there may be even more work — two suppression hearings. The Court's thoughts remain the same, however. The Court wants to do right by Yazzie and not just get out of work. If allowing withdrawal requires a lot of work to do justice to Yazzie, that work will be done. It is unclear, however, whether doing more work on this case will be justice. The Court was persuaded that this factor
These factors still weigh against allowing Yazzie to withdraw his guilty plea, and the analysis remains largely unaffected by Yazzie's current arguments, but the Court notes that, if Yazzie is convicted of the same statute to which he pled, and if the Court sustains Yazzie's objections to the PSR, Yazzie's sentence will likely be lower than to what agreed in the Plea Agreement. The Court cannot know precisely what will happen at trial and at a sentencing hearing, but notes that Yazzie will likely still be convicted, although he may be in a better sentencing position after a trial than to what he agreed in the Plea Agreement. The Court notes, however, that Yazzie would also be exposed to a potential life sentence with a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a), and that the United States may be able to pursue the original charge under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c), which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years. The Court concludes that these factors weigh against allowing Yazzie to withdraw his plea.
The Court concluded in the MOO that Yazzie did not give the Court a just and fair reason to allow withdrawal. See MOO at 36. After reconsidering the 1st Motion, 2nd Motion, and Yazzie's current arguments, the Court has slightly changed its position, finding that Yazzie has asserted his innocence to the specific charge to which he pled, which weighs in favor of allowing Yazzie to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court has also expressed reservations about the assistance-of-counsel factor, although still concluding that it weighs against withdrawal, if only slightly. The other factors, however, weigh against allowing Yazzie to withdraw his guilty plea, including that he entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily. "The plea of guilty is a solemn act not to be disregarded because of belated misgivings about [its] wisdom." United States v. Morrison, 967 F.2d at 268. The Court, thus, will not permit Yazzie to withdraw his guilty plea.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
United States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir.2005) (citations omitted). The Court finds that United States v. Wright, United States v. Griffin, 191 Fed.Appx. 699 (10th Cir.2006) (unpublished), United States v. Sandoval, 427 Fed.Appx. 621, 623 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished), United States v. Lee, 535 Fed. Appx. 677, 680 (10th Cir.2013) (unpublished), United States v. Wright, 392 Fed.Appx. 623, 628 (10th Cir.2010) (unpublished), United States v. Burciaga, 66 Fed.Appx. 812, 814 n. 2 (10th Cir.2003) (unpublished), and United States v. Alvarado-Benjume, 251 Fed.Appx. 586, at 589 (10th Cir.2007) (unpublished), have persuasive value with respect to material issues, and will assist the Court in its disposition of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (emphasis in original).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. at 32-33, 121 S.Ct. 2038. The Supreme Court thus articulated the Katz v. United States rule — which Professor Wayne R. LaFave has noted is "somewhat inaccurately stated as the `reasonable expectation of privacy' test," Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.1(b), at 435 (4th ed., 2004) — which posits: "[A] Fourth Amendment search does not occur ... unless `the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search,' and `society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.'" Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. at 33, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (emphasis in original)(quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986)).
United States v. Ferrel, 603 F.3d 758, 763 (10th Cir.2010) (citations omitted).