C. LeROY HANSEN, Senior District Judge.
While Defendant acknowledges that the Tenth Circuit explicitly held in United States v. Gay, 771 F.3d 681 (2014), that it is not empowered to consider a constitutional challenge to a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), he maintains that his sentence is in violation of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments and that this Court has authority to reduce his sentence under the new drug sentencing guidelines, pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). Defendant asserts that he makes these arguments pursuant to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), in order to preserve issues that have not yet been addressed explicitly by the Supreme Court: 1) whether USSG § 1B1.10 exceeds the powers delegated to the Sentencing Commission by Congress, thereby violating the separation of powers, and 2) whether a district court can entertain constitutional challenges to a sentence through a § 3582 pleading.
The United States opposes Defendant's position, noting that the circuit courts that have addressed whether § 1B1.10 is unconstitutional have found that § 3582(c)(2) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The government also contends that because Defendant is subject to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, he is ineligible for resentencing under § 3582(c)(2).
The Court finds the United States' positions well taken. In 2013, this Court granted Defendant's Motion for Reduction in Term of Imprisonment under the retroactive amendments to the crack cocaine sentencing guidelines, as promulgated by the Sentencing Commission under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ("FSA"), and reduced his sentence from 147 months to the statutory minimum sentence of 120 months, as required by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). Mem. Op. (ECF No. 75), May 1, 2013. As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held,
United States v. Lucero, 713 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 2013) (last alteration in original). Thus, because the sentence Defendant currently is serving is based on the statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, not upon a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the United States Sentencing Commission, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Defendant's current Motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Lacy, 332 F. App'x 453, 454 (10th Cir. 2010) ("While this case involves a different amendment to the Guidelines [than in United States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. 1997)], the same rule applies. [Defendant] was sentenced pursuant to a statutory minimum, and thus a change to the Guidelines does not provide the grounds to lower his sentence."); United States v. Trujeque, 100 F.3d 869, 871 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[Defendant's] sentence was not `based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,' see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). . . . Thus, the district court should have dismissed [defendant's] motion without considering its merits."); United States v. Novey, 78 F.3d 1483, 1486 (10th Cir.1996) (citing Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 290, 294 (1996)) ("[T]he Sentencing Commission does not have the authority to override or amend a statute."); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A) (Nov. 1, 2011) (". . . a reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and is not consistent with this policy statement if . . . an amendment listed in subsection (c) is applicable to the defendant but the amendment does not have the effect of lowering the defendant's applicable guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment)").
WHEREFORE,