LAURA FASHING, Magistrate Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on plaintiff Leroy Tsosie's Motion to Reverse and Remand to Agency for Rehearing with Supporting Memorandum (Doc. 17), which was fully briefed February 13, 2017. See Docs. 21, 22, 23. The parties consented to my entering final judgment in this case. Docs. 3, 6, 16. Having meticulously reviewed the entire record and being fully advised in the premises, I find that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") failed to properly weigh the March 25, 2014 medical opinion of treating physician Dr. Randolph L. Copeland. I therefore GRANT Mr. Tsosie's motion and remand this case to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The standard of review in a Social Security appeal is whether the Commissioner's final decision
"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118. A decision "is not based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or if there is a mere scintilla of evidence supporting it." Id. While the Court may not reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo, its examination of the record as a whole must include "anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ's findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has been met." Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 2005). "`The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the] findings from being supported by substantial evidence.'" Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zoltanski v. F.A.A., 372 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2004)).
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a).
When considering a disability application, the Commissioner is required to use a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). At the first four steps of the evaluation process, the claimant must show: (1) the claimant is not engaged in "substantial gainful activity;" (2) the claimant has a "severe medically determinable . . . impairment . . . or a combination of impairments" that has lasted or is expected to last for at least one year; and (3) the impairment(s) either meet or equal one of the Listings
Mr. Tsosie was born in 1962, earned his GED in 1993, and has past relevant work as a construction worker and construction framer. AR 20, 44, 219, 266-67.
The ALJ found that Mr. Tsosie met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2013. AR 12. At step one, the ALJ found that Mr. Tsosie had not engaged in substantial, gainful activity since January 1, 2011. Id. At step two, the ALJ found that Mr. Tsosie suffered from the following severe impairments: status-post left ankle fracture and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. Id. At step three, the ALJ found that neither of Mr. Tsosie's impairments, alone or in combination, met or medically equaled a Listing. AR 13. Because the ALJ found that Mr. Tsosie's impairments did not meet a Listing, the ALJ assessed Mr. Tsosie's RFC. AR 14-19. The ALJ found that Mr. Tsosie had the RFC to perform light work, except that he is limited to occasional climbing and crouching. AR 14.
At step four, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Tsosie was unable to perform his past relevant work as a construction worker or construction framer. AR 20. At step five, the ALJ found that Mr. Tsosie could perform unskilled, light jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy—such as hand cleaner/polisher, small products assembler, and laundry folder. AR 20-21. Consequently, the ALJ found Mr. Tsosie was not disabled. AR 21. On December 15, 2014,
Mr. Tsosie requested review of the ALJ's unfavorable decision by the Appeals Council. AR 6. On March 24, 2016, the Appeals Council denied the request for review. AR 1-5. Mr. Tsosie timely filed his appeal to this Court on May 31, 2016. Doc. 1.
Mr. Tsosie raises only one argument for reversing and remanding this case: (1) the ALJ committed legal error in failing to apply the treating physician rule to the opinion evidence from Rudolph L. Copeland, M.D. Doc. 17 at 7. The Commissioner argues in response that Mr. Tsosie is simply asking the Court to reweigh the evidence, and that because a reasonable person could agree with the ALJ's decision, the Court should affirm it. Doc. 21 at 1-2. Because I agree that the ALJ erred in analyzing the March 25, 2014 opinion of treating orthopedic surgeon Dr. Randolph Copeland, I grant Mr. Tsosie's motion to remand to give the ALJ an opportunity to remedy her errors.
In analyzing whether a treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ must perform a two-step process. "The initial determination the ALJ must make with respect to a treating physician's medical opinion is whether it is conclusive, i.e., is to be accorded `controlling weight,' on the matter to which it relates." Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir.2003)). In making this initial determination, the ALJ must consider whether the opinion "is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is consistent with the other substantial evidence in the record." Pisciotta v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 1074, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)); Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003). If the opinion meets both criteria, the ALJ must give the treating physician's opinion controlling weight. Id. To give anything less than controlling weight, the ALJ must demonstrate with substantial evidence that the opinion (1) is not "well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques," or (2) is "inconsistent with other substantial evidence" in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). "Under the regulations, the agency rulings, and our case law, an ALJ must `give good reasons in [the] notice of determination or decision' for the weight assigned to a treating [source's] opinion." Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) and citing SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5; Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 762 (10th Cir. 2003)).
SSR 96-2P (S.S.A. July 2, 1996), 1996 WL 374188, at *2.
If the ALJ does not assign a treating source's opinion controlling weight, step two of the analysis requires the ALJ to apply the six factors listed in the regulations to determine whether a treating source's opinion should be rejected altogether or assigned some lesser weight:
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(6), 416.927(c)(1)-(6); see also Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007); Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301. As the first two factors make clear, even if an ALJ determines that a treating source opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the opinion still is entitled to deference. SSR 96 2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *4 (July 2, 1996); see also Watkins 350 F.3d at 1300.
The ALJ need not explicitly consider and apply each and every factor to each opinion. Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1258. "[N]ot every factor for weighing opinion evidence will apply in every case." Id. (quoting SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *5 (Aug. 9, 2006)). However, "the record must reflect that the ALJ considered every factor in the weight calculation." Andersen v. Astrue, 319 F. App'x 712, 718 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished). In addition, the ALJ must "make clear how much weight the opinion is being given (including whether it is being rejected outright) and give good reasons, tied to the factors specified in the cited regulations for this particular purpose, for the weight assigned." Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300-01).
"Explicit findings properly tied to each step of the prescribed analysis facili tate meaningful judicial review" and are required to avoid remand. Chrismon v. Colvin, 531 F. App'x 893, 901 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished); see also Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding error where "[a]lthough it [was] obvious from the ALJ's decision that he did not give [the treating source's] opinion controlling weight, the ALJ never expressly stated that he was not affording it controlling weight, nor did he articulate a legitimate reason for not doing so.").
Dr. Copeland treated Mr. Tsosie for nearly four years. See AR 328 (first visit on July 19, 2011), 490 (most recent documented visit on May 22, 2015). During this time, Mr. Tsosie's diagnoses and impairments evolved, as did his complaints of pain. Mr. Tsosie first saw Dr. Copeland on July 19, 2011 for a left ankle fracture. AR 328-29. Dr. Copeland saw Mr. Tsosie in the orthopedic clinic for follow up on July 22, 2011, and placed him in a non-weight-bearing short leg cast for six weeks. AR 319. After the cast was removed, Dr. Copeland gave Mr. Tsosie an air cast splint. AR 305, 307. Mr. Tsosie initially reported that his pain was improving, AR 314, but he also reported that "after a day on his feet or excessive walking, his left ankle [would] swell and become painful," AR 302. On October 31, 2011, Gray P. Shaneberger, a physician's assistant working for Dr. Copeland, stated that Mr. Tsosie could "resume normal work activities without restrictions." AR 352.
On April 18, 2012, however, Dr. Copeland diagnosed Mr. Tsosie with tenosynovitis of the left ankle.
On July 10, 2012, state agency medical consultant Eileen Brady, M.D. evaluated Mr. Tsosie's claims on reconsideration. AR 62-70, 71-79. The only medically determinable impairment Dr. Brady considered was Mr. Tsosie's left ankle fracture. AR 65, 74. Dr. Brady reviewed Mr. Tsosie's medical records through the April 18, 2012 appointment with Dr. Copeland. AR 64, 73. Based only on the limitations caused by his left ankle, and only on the medical treatment/opinions through April 18, 2012, Dr. Brady found that Mr. Tsosie had the following exertional physical RFC: the ability to occasionally lift and/or carry up to 20 pounds, frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds, stand/walk (with normal breaks) 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and sit (with normal breaks) 6 hours in an 8 hour workday. AR 66-67, 75-76. Dr. Brady's exertional RFC is compatible with the regulatory physical exertion requirements for light work.
On January 18, 2013, Mr. Tsosie returned to Dr. Copeland, this time complaining of lumbar spine pain, which he described as extending to both sides in both the upper lumbar and lower thoracic region, at a pain level of 5 out of 10. AR 453. Dr. Copeland physically examined Mr. Tsosie and observed that he stood stooped forward, and that he had both midline and paraspinous tenderness. Id. Dr. Copeland noted that Mr. Tsosie had no palpable defects, normal motor strength, and no loss of touch sensation. Id. He noted that "[s]traight leg raise testing [was] negative bilateral for any lower limb pain although back pain is produced at approximately 70 [degrees] flexion bilateral." Id.
On April 23, 2013, Mr. Tsosie saw Dr. Copeland for both his foot pain and his lower back pain, reporting a pain level of 6 out of 10. AR 446. Dr. Copeland physically examined Mr. Tsosie, and his exam findings were nearly identical to those of his January 18, 2013 exam, with the exception of the straight leg raise testing producing back pain at 80 degrees of flexion and only on the left during this exam. AR 446. Dr. Copeland's medical interventions included observation, bracing, and physical therapy. AR 445. Dr. Copeland limited Mr. Tsosie to "[l]ight duty" and advised him to "[l]imit lifting." Id.
On June 14, 2013, Mr. Tsosie was treated in the emergency room of Gallup Indian Medical Center, after being found unconscious and intoxicated, with a laceration to the back of his head. AR 430-43.
On July 23, 2013, Mr. Tsosie saw Dr. Copeland for follow up on his back pain, which he stated was constant and was 5 out of 10 on the pain scale. AR 426. Dr. Copeland physically examined Mr. Tsosie, and his exam findings were similar to his previous exams, with the exception of the straight leg test producing back pain at 90 degrees of flexion bilaterally. AR 427. Dr. Copeland, however, entered new medical interventions: "Symptomatic management with muscle relaxants and analgesics. PT consults for brace and also spinal exercises re-written." AR 425. Dr. Copeland prescribed Mr. Tsosie diazepam and acetaminophen with codeine. Id. Dr. Copeland referred Mr. Tsosie to see a physical therapist, who fitted him with a lumbosacral brace to address his assessed "difficulty in walking." AR 423.
On October 15, 2013, Mr. Tsosie saw Dr. Copeland for follow up on his lower back pain, and bilateral pain in his shoulders. AR 412. He reported a pain level of 7 out of 10. Id. Dr. Copeland conducted a physical exam and noted that Mr. Tsosie had "tenderness in the superior trapezius muscles bilaterally which is aggravated some by neck ROM but not radicular into the upper limbs. Strength seems normal in the upper limbs and no[ ] loss of sensation." AR 412. The rest of Dr. Copeland's exam findings were identical to his July 23, 2013 findings. Id.
On March 25, 2014, Mr. Tsosie saw Dr. Copeland for chronic lower back pain and muscle spasms, and for "pain in his posterior lower neck area which radiates out into the trapezius muscle," which he reported had recently worsened. AR 467. Dr. Copeland conducted a physical exam and noted tenderness and muscle spasm in the lumbosacral region bilaterally which extends
AR 467. At this visit, Dr. Copeland prescribed a lumbosacral orthosis, described as "a high brace extending up to proximally the mid thoracic area down to the sacrum." AR 470; see also AR 463. After this visit, Dr. Copeland noted that Mr. Tsosie had the following limitations:
AR 464.
Dr. Copeland continued to treat Mr. Tsosie after the ALJ issued her decision on October 31, 2014, and his condition continued to deteriorate. Cervical spine x-rays on April 24, 2014 showed
AR 504. In an assessment dated May 22, 2015, Dr. Copeland diagnosed Mr. Tsosie with the following: degeneration of the intervertebral disc, cervical spine; osteoarthritis of the spine, both lumbar and cervical; bilateral trochanteric bursitis and chronic hip extensor strain; degeneration of the intervertebral disc, lumbar; and symptomatic kyphosis of the thoracic spine. AR 492. Dr. Copeland stated that Mr. Tsosie has "moderately severe spinal disease complicated by limited coping mechanisms." AR 492. Dr. Copeland also reiterated on March 26, 2015 that Mr. Tsosie was "[o]nly suited for very light activity due to back and neck pain." AR 509.
Here, the ALJ committed legal error in the first step of the treating physician analysis— determining "whether it is conclusive, i.e., is to be accorded `controlling weight,' on the matter to which it relates." Krauser, 638 F.3d at 1330. The ALJ did not analyze whether Dr. Copeland's April 23, 2013 opinion limiting Mr. Tsosie to "light duty" with limited lifting was entitled to controlling weight. Nor did the ALJ analyze whether Dr. Copeland's March 25, 2014 opinion limiting Mr. Tsosie to "very light work" due to back and neck pain was entitled to controlling weight. Indeed, there is no indication that the ALJ applied the treating physician rule to either of Dr. Copeland's opinions. This is legal error.
First, the ALJ did not analyze whether Dr. Copeland's April 23, 2013 opinion was entitled to controlling weight. Instead, the ALJ merely stated that she gave Dr. Copeland's April 23, 2013 opinion—which released claimant to light duty with limited lifting—significant weight "since it is consistent with the record as a whole, including the objective medical findings and the claimant's medical treatment." AR 16-17. The ALJ appears to have weighed the July 10, 2012 opinion of Dr. Brady—a non-treating/non-examining consultant, see AR 62-79—in the same manner. The ALJ gave Dr. Brady's opinion "significant weight" because it was "consistent with the record as a whole, including the claimant's treatment records and his medical treatment." AR 15. There is nothing in the ALJ's opinion indicating that she analyzed Dr. Copeland's April 23, 2013 opinion under the treating physician rule, or whether it was entitled to controlling weight. Instead, the ALJ weighed Dr. Copeland's April 23, 2013 opinion using the same rubric she applied to the other medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(6), 416.927(c)(1)-(6) (listing supportability and consistency as factors used to analyze all medical opinions). Plaintiff does not argue that the ALJ erred in weighing Dr. Copeland's April 23, 2013 opinion, and this error is likely harmless. The Court only notes the ALJ's failure to apply the treating physician rule to this opinion to illustrate that the ALJ failed to apply the treating physician rule to any of Dr. Copeland's opinions.
Second, and more importantly, the ALJ failed to analyze whether Dr. Copeland's March 25, 2014 opinion was entitled to controlling weight. In assessing Dr. Copeland's March 25, 2014 opinion, the ALJ stated the following:
I give Dr. Copeland's assessment of a 20-pound lifting, pushing, and pulling limitation, significant weight, since it is consistent with the record as a whole, including the objective medical findings, the prior opinions of Dr. Copeland and the State agency medical consultant, and the claimant's medical treatment. However, I give limited weight to his conclusions that the claimant can perform no prolonged standing or walking; no climbing, squatting, crawling, or twisting; and no overhead reaching. I determine that the claimant's limitation on standing and walking can be accommodated within the normal breaks (morning, lunch, and afternoon) in an eight-hour workday. Dr. Copeland's opinion is inconsistent with his earlier opinion that the claimant can perform "light duty" with limitations only on lifting (Exhibit 12-F p.37). In addition, his opinion is inconsistent with findings of negative straight-leg raising and normal sensory and motor function. Moreover, Mr. Tsosie has not consistently been compliant with medications, physical therapy, or use of his back brace.
AR 18.
The Commissioner argues that it was enough for the ALJ to "implicitly" decline to give Dr. Copeland's March 25, 2014 opinion controlling weight. Doc. 21 at 8. I disagree. Unlike the case on which the Commissioner relies, the Court cannot "tell from the decision that the ALJ declined to give controlling weight to [the treating physician's] opinion." Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 575 (2014). While the ALJ did discuss the consistency of Dr. Copeland's March 25, 2014 opinion, consistency is a factor used to weigh all medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4). Even if the Court were to agree that the ALJ implicitly declined to give Dr. Copeland's March 25, 2014 opinion controlling weight, there is no indication that the ALJ then applied the factors listed in the regulations to determine whether Dr. Copeland's opinion should be rejected altogether or assigned some lesser weight. The Court simply does not know whether the ALJ considered the lengthy examining and treating relationship between Mr. Tsosie and Dr. Copeland, the supportability of Dr. Copeland's opinions, or Dr. Copeland's specialty, among other factors, in deciding to give "limited weight" to aspects of Dr. Copeland's March 25, 2014 opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(6), 416.927(c)(1)-(6). Because the ALJ did not explicitly conduct a treating physician analysis, it is simply unclear from the ALJ's decision that she applied the treating physician rule at all. "Explicit findings properly tied to each step of the prescribed analysis facilitate meaningful judicial review" and are required to avoid remand. Chrismon v. Colvin, 531 F. App'x at 901 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). Remand is therefore appropriate.
Even if the Court could determine that the ALJ implicitly declined to give Dr. Copeland's March 25, 2014 opinion less than controlling weight, remand still is required because the ALJ failed to support her decision with substantial evidence. To give Dr. Copeland's opinion anything less than controlling weight, the ALJ was required to demonstrate with substantial evidence that the opinion (1) is not "well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques," or (2) is "inconsistent with other substantial evidence" in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). The Commissioner argues that the ALJ rejected Dr. Copeland's March 25, 2014 opinion because it was not well supported and was inconsistent with the objective evidence. Doc. 21 at 9. I disagree. The ALJ did not analyze whether Dr. Copeland's March 25, 2014 opinion was well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. The ALJ noted only the following purported inconsistencies:
AR 18. However, for the reasons discussed below, these purported inconsistencies do not constitute substantial evidence.
Although the ALJ discounted Dr. Copeland's March 25, 2013 opinion on the basis that the opinion is inconsistent with his earlier April 23, 2013 opinion, substantial evidence does not support this assertion. The ALJ relied on the opinion of Dr. Brady and on Dr. Copeland's April 23, 2013 opinion in determining that Mr. Tsosie had the RFC to "perform light work, except that he is limited to occasional climbing and crouching." AR 16. The RFC the ALJ adopted is identical to Dr. Brady's RFC assessment of July 10, 2012. Dr. Brady, however, only addressed the limitations caused by Mr. Tsosie's ankle injury; she completed her assessment before Mr. Tsosie was diagnosed with degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. In contrast, the ALJ found at step two that Mr. Tsosie had two medically determinable impairments—status-post left ankle fracture and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine—and "in assessing the claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant's medically determinable impairments, whether severe or not severe." Wells v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2)).
Further, the ALJ's assertion that Dr. Copeland's March 25, 2014 assessment is "inconsistent" with his April 23, 2013 assessment is an argument based on the logical fallacy of false equivalence. Mr. Tsosie's condition was not static, and his pain level and medical diagnoses changed throughout the course of his treatment. Dr. Copeland issued his April 23, 2013 assessment, to which the ALJ gave significant weight, only three months after Mr. Tsosie first complained of lower back pain, and well before he developed chronic neck and shoulder pain, and muscle spasms. See AR 412, 464-69. In relying on Dr. Brady's July 10, 2012 assessment and Dr. Copeland's April 23, 2013 assessment, the ALJ failed to consider the progression of Mr. Tsosie's diagnoses and treatment. See Harris v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 821 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding "[t]he ALJ was not justified in discounting the views of the treating physician as to the claimant's deteriorating condition and instead relying on the treating physician's earlier expectation that the claimant would be able to return to work that did not require heavy lifting.")
Dr. Copeland issued his March 25, 2014 assessment after treating Mr. Tsosie's chronic lower back pain for approximately 14 months, and after Mr. Tsosie developed neck and shoulder pain with muscle spasms. In fact, Dr. Copeland stated in his March 25, 2014 assessment that Mr. Tsosie was "only suited for very light work
The other reason the ALJ gave for finding Dr. Copeland's March 25, 2014 opinion inconsistent—that "his opinion is inconsistent with findings of negative straight-leg raising and normal sensory and motor function," AR 18—also does not constitute substantial evidence. Mr. Tsosie argues that, in making this statement, the ALJ impermissibly rendered "her own medical analysis" and "failed to recognize that Dr. Copeland knew this information when he provided his assessment." Doc. 17 at 9-10 (citing Kemp v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1987)). I agree.
Although Dr. Copeland consistently noted that, while Mr. Tsosie did not experience lower limb pain during the straight leg raise tests, he did experience back pain during the tests. See AR 412, 427, 446, 453, 467, 507; see also n.8, supra. Dr. Copeland limited Mr. Tsosie to very light work due to back and neck pain, not lower limb pain. See AR 464. "While the ALJ is authorized to make a final decision concerning disability, [s]he cannot interpose [her] own `medical expertise' over that of a physician, especially when that physician is the regular treating doctor for the disability applicant." Kemp, 816 F.2d at 1476 (internal citations omitted). In addition, "[i]n choosing to reject the treating physician's assessment, an ALJ may not make speculative inferences from medical reports and may reject a treating physician's opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence and not due to his or her own credibility judgments, speculation or lay opinion." McGoffin v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
The Court finds the reasons the ALJ proffered for finding Dr. Copeland's March 25, 2014 opinion inconsistent do not constitute substantial evidence. Thus, the ALJ's decision to reject Dr. Copeland's more recent treating physician opinion is not supported by substantial evidence. On remand, the ALJ must consider the progression of Mr. Tsosie's disease and symptoms in assessing Dr. Copeland's opinions and ultimately in determining Mr. Tsosie's RFC.
The ALJ erred by failing to apply the treating physician rule, and by failing to support her findings of inconsistency with substantial evidence. The Court remands so that the ALJ can remedy these errors.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse and Remand for a Rehearing (Doc. 17) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commissioner's final decision is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b).
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2).
