GREGORY J. FOURATT, Magistrate Judge.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's "Motion to Reverse and Remand for a Rehearing With Supporting Memorandum" ("Motion"), filed on January 12, 2017. ECF No. 15. The Commissioner responded on April 3, 2017. ECF No. 19. Plaintiff replied on April 24, 2017. ECF No. 20. Having meticulously reviewed the briefing and the entire record, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion is well taken and that the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ's") ruling should be
Plaintiff was born on September 30, 1969, in San Leandro, California. Administrative R. ("AR") 495. She received high marks in high school, but dropped out her senior year. AR 495. Plaintiff later earned her general equivalency diploma ("GED") and went on to serve six years in the Air National Guard. AR 495. Plaintiff also accrued a significant body of past relevant work, including positions as a technical writer, editor of technical publications, systems analyst, environmental compliance manager, training specialist, and residential aide. AR 32.
Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") on June 26, 2014. AR 76. Plaintiff claimed disability beginning on May 6, 2013, based on bipolar disorder, major depression, severe anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), subluxation of the neck and brain, chronic pain, insomnia, chronic fatigue, cholesterol, and allergies. AR 78, 207. Plaintiff had previously filed a DIB claim in 2013 that was denied. AR 78. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied Plaintiff's 2014 application initially on January 2, 2015 [AR 95], and upon reconsideration on April 15, 2015. AR 113. At her request, Plaintiff received a de novo hearing before ALJ Lillian Richter on December 9, 2015, at which Plaintiff, her attorney, and a vocational expert ("VE") appeared. AR 41-75. On January 13, 2016, the ALJ issued her decision, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act ("the Act"). AR 21-33. Plaintiff appealed to the SSA Appeals Council, but it declined review on April 18, 2016. AR 1-3. As a consequence, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a) (2017).
Plaintiff timely filed her appeal with this Court on June 21, 2016. ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff advances four grounds for relief. First, she argues that the ALJ committed legal error in her analysis of the opinion of Plaintiff's treating psychologist, Dr. Louis Wynne, Ph.D. Pl.'s Mot. 13-16, ECF No. 15. Next, she contends that remand is warranted under Sentence Six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012) for consideration of new and material evidence. Id. at 16-19. Lastly, Plaintiff's third and fourth claims allege that the ALJ failed to resolve conflicts between the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") and the VE's testimony regarding sit/stand options and reaching limitations. Id. at 19-24.
When the Appeals Council denies a claimant's request for review, the ALJ's decision becomes the final decision of the agency.
Factual findings at the administrative level are conclusive "if supported by substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2004); Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004); Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003). An ALJ's decision "is not based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or if there is a mere scintilla of evidence supporting it." Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118; Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1214. Substantial evidence does not, however, require a preponderance of the evidence. See Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Zoltanski v. F.A.A., 372 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2004)). A court should meticulously review the entire record but should neither re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118; Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1214.
As for the review of the ALJ's legal decisions, the Court examines "whether the ALJ followed the specific rules of law that must be followed in weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases." Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084. The Court may reverse and remand if the ALJ failed "to apply the correct legal standards, or to show . . . that she has done so." Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1019 (10th Cir. 1996).
Ultimately, if substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings and the correct legal standards were applied, the Commissioner's decision stands and the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118; Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1214, Doyal, 331 F.3d at 760.
The SSA has devised a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine disability. See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4) (2017). At the first three steps, the ALJ considers the claimant's current work activity, the medical severity of the claimant's impairments, and the requirements of the Listing of Impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4), & Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If a claimant's impairments are not equal to one of those in the Listing of Impairments, then the ALJ proceeds to the first of three phases of step four and determines the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). See Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1023; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). In phase two, the ALJ determines the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past relevant work, and in the third phase, compares the claimant's RFC with the functional requirements of her past relevant work to determine if the claimant is still capable of performing her past work. See Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1023; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If a claimant is not prevented from performing her past work, then she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). [Plaintiff] bears the burden of proof on the question of disability for the first four steps, and then the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987); Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 1987).
If the claimant cannot return to her past work, then the Commissioner bears the burden at the fifth step of showing that the claimant is nonetheless capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See Thomas, 540 U.S. at 24-25; see also Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing the five-step sequential evaluation process in detail).
The ALJ issued her decision on January 13, 2016. AR 18. At step one, she found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date of May 6, 2013. AR 23. At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff to suffer from numerous severe impairments, including: (1) dysthymic disorder; (2) alcohol use disorder, in remission; (3) degenerative changes in the cervical spine; (4) bipolar disorder; (5) cervical spondylosis with disc osteophyte complexes at C5-C6 and C6-C7; (6) cervical facet syndrome; (7) enthesopathy of right hip region; (8) degenerative joint disease of the thoracic spine; (9) degenerative joint disease of the lumbar spine L4-L5 and L5-Sl; (10) osteoarthritis of the hips and sacroiliac ("SI") joint; and (11) PTSD. AR 23.
At step three, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff's impairments, alone or in combination, met or medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 24-26. This finding included an analysis of Plaintiff's mental impairments, which the ALJ found did not meet or medically equal the criteria of Listing Sections 12.04 (affective disorders) or 12.06 (anxiety-related disorders). AR 24-26.
The ALJ found that the paragraph B criteria of Listings 12.04 and 12.06
As to social functioning, the ALJ found Plaintiff to suffer moderate difficulties. The ALJ noted that the evidence showed Plaintiff could "interact appropriately and effectively with other individuals on a sustained basis," but that Plaintiff was nonetheless "a recovering alcoholic." AR 25. Similarly, the ALJ detailed the various methods by which Plaintiff assists others through Alcoholics Anonymous, but also considered Plaintiff's continuing difficulty with securing employment and with venturing out in public, even when she had traveled to another state to visit a friend. AR 25.
Next, the ALJ turned to Plaintiff's ability to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace, and again found Plaintiff to have moderate difficulties. The ALJ observed that "[t]he evidence shows [Plaintiff] has some problems with detailed or complex tasks," but nonetheless "is able to sustain concentration and attention long enough to perform simple, routine tasks in a timely and efficient manner." AR 25. She likewise recounted that while Plaintiff "reportedly has problems with her memory," she is still "able to manage her appointments, medications, and other social events without any help." AR 25.
The ALJ concluded her paragraph B discussion by finding that Plaintiff "has experienced no episodes of decompensation, which have been of extended duration." AR 18. This same finding also supported the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff had failed to establish the `paragraph C' criteria."
Because none of Plaintiff's impairments satisfied an applicable Listing, the ALJ moved on to step four and assessed Plaintiff's RFC. AR 26-32. "After careful consideration of the entire record," the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform a range of light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), with the following limitations:
AR 26.
To develop Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ relied on two principal grounds. First, the ALJ "considered the factors . . . applicable to the credibility of [Plaintiff]," and rendered an adverse credibility finding. AR 31. In finding her allegations "less than fully credible," the ALJ first recounted that Plaintiff "stopped working due to a layoff, not because of physical or mental health conditions." AR 31. Although she found it "highly commendable" that Plaintiff "maintained her sobriety for seven years," the ALJ found it more remarkable that Plaintiff is able "to force herself to get up and out of bed and goes to the gym for exercise and socialization at the recommendation of her treating providers." AR 31. The ALJ reasoned that "[t]his validates her commitment to improving her mental and physical well-being so that she can get back into the workforce." AR 31. In sum, the ALJ concluded "[t]here is no evidence showing that [Plaintiff] would not be able to improve her condition with time and adherence to her treatment recommendations." AR 31.
Along with Plaintiff's adverse credibility finding, the ALJ relied on at least six medical opinions and one lay witness statement (aside from Plaintiff's) to determine Plaintiff's RFC. The ALJ's analysis of the relevant medical opinions, in descending order of significance, follows below.
On December 3, 2015, clinical psychologist Louis Wynne, Ph.D., completed a "Medical Source Statement" evaluating Plaintiff's mental limitations based upon at least thirty-four (34) psychotherapy sessions. Pl.'s Mot. 7, AR 708-13. Dr. Wynne described Plaintiff's course of therapy as "intensive," but notwithstanding the fact she did her "assigned homework," he found Plaintiff's progress to be "minimal." AR 709. He further opined that while Plaintiff "appears cognitively intact," her "severe depression [and] pervasive sense of worthlessness interfere[ ] with ordinary work demands." AR 709, 711. Ultimately, Dr. Wynne assessed Plaintiff's "mental abilities and aptitudes needed to do unskilled work" as being "seriously limited, but not precluded" in the following two categories: (1) completing a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; and (2) performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. AR 711-12. He similarly assessed Plaintiff as being "seriously limited, but not precluded" in her ability to perform the following three aspects of semiskilled work: (1) understanding and remembering detailed instructions; (2) carrying out detailed instructions; and (3) dealing with the stress of semiskilled and skilled work. AR 712. These assessments, in the aggregate, led to Dr. Wynne to conclude that Plaintiff's impairments would cause her to be absent from work more than four days per month. AR 713.
The ALJ accorded "limited weight" to Dr. Wynne's opinion. AR 30. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had been a patient of Dr. Wynne's from January 21, 2015, through August 19, 2015, but focused her analysis on Dr. Wynne's note of July 1, 2015, which memorialized that Plaintiff "indicated her case manager recommended she quit her job." AR 30 (citing AR 623). The ALJ stressed that "Dr. Wynne discouraged this." AR 30. In fact, despite Dr. Wynne's finding that Plaintiff "has some serious symptoms and limitations with respect to concentration, persistence, and pace," the ALJ felt compelled "to emphasize [that Dr. Wynne] discouraged her from quitting" her job. AR 30. This perceived discrepancy led the ALJ to discount Dr. Wynne's evaluation, as she found it to be inconsistent with his own treatment records. AR 30.
Consultative psychologist Thomas P. Dhanens, Ph.D., examined Plaintiff on November 18, 2014, at the request of New Mexico Disability Determination Services. AR 394-98. Dr. Dhanens observed that Plaintiff "presented a normal appearance," but her "[a]ffect was variable." AR 396. At times, Plaintiff presented as "flat [and] blunted," while at "[o]ther times she was labile." AR 396. He opined that Plaintiff "appears to have significant characterological and mood disorder." AR 397. Nonetheless, because Plaintiff reported that she was more stable and less symptomatic on medication, Dr. Dhanens explained that "this would seem to suggest she should be more — rather than less — able to cope with employment." AR 397.
The ALJ assigned "limited weight" to Dr. Dhanens's report, as she felt it communicated only observations, rather than limitations. AR 29.
Plaintiff underwent a second psychological evaluation on June 16, 2015, at the University of New Mexico Health Sciences Center. AR 598. On that occasion, Dr. Lundy administered a battery of psychological tests and diagnosed Plaintiff with four conditions: (1) major depressive disorder; (2) persistent depressive disorder; (3) personality disorder with mixed personality features; and (4) alcohol use disorder, in remission. AR 605. Dr. Lundy observed that Plaintiff "appears to be experiencing — and has been experiencing for most of her life — significant emotional distress which has a negative effect on her ability to function cognitively to her potential." AR 605. She explained that Plaintiff "likely developed maladaptive coping and interpersonal skills during her traumatic childhood and adolescence, which further prevent her from engaging in enjoyable and beneficial activities and relationships currently." AR 605. Although Dr. Lundy concluded that Plaintiff "cannot be considered disabled by reason of cognitive deficit," she nevertheless opined that Plaintiff suffered from "severe psychiatric disorders which are negatively impacting her ability to perform expected occupational and social duties." AR 606. In fact, Dr. Lundy "encouraged [Plaintiff] to work with her attorney to re-apply for Social Security Disability benefits," and "strongly recommended" to reviewing authorities "that her application be seriously considered." AR 606.
The ALJ gave "some weight" to Dr. Lundy's opinion, and advanced several bases for doing so. AR 30. First, the ALJ stressed that Dr. Lundy believed Plaintiff "could return to work once her psychiatric functioning is improved." AR 30. Additionally, the ALJ explained that she could not "ignore the fact that Dr. Lundy believed [Plaintiff] may have exaggerated her symptoms." AR 30. Lastly, the ALJ reduced the weight she accorded the opinion as it "[did] not give a good detailed functional assessment." AR 30.
On December 16, 2014, Sylvia Ramos, M.D., performed a consultative physical examination of Plaintiff. AR 426-29. Dr. Ramos probed each of Plaintiff's major body systems, and concluded that "[s]he has complaints of joint pains of unclear etiology, but most likely degenerative disease." AR 429. Additionally, she recommended numerous laboratory and radiological examinations. AR 429. Based on what she observed, Dr. Ramos opined that Plaintiff could "sit, stand, walk, lift, carry, handle small objects, hear, speak[,] and travel except as limited by pain." AR 429.
The ALJ ascribed "some weight" to Dr. Ramos's evaluation, as she found the examination to be "consistent with other objective evidence." AR 28. She also explained that no further weight could be given to the opinion, as Dr. Ramos "merely indicate[d]" what activities Plaintiff could perform, rather than quantifying limitations. AR 28.
Lastly, the ALJ evaluated the opinions of the non-examining consultative psychologists who reviewed Plaintiff's records at the initial and reconsideration stages. State agency psychologist Kevin Santulli, Ph.D., reviewed Plaintiff's medical records at the initial stage and opined that she would have moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace but was capable of work where: (1) interpersonal contact was routine but superficial; (2) the complexity of tasks was learned by experience, there were only several variables, and she was only called to exercise judgment within limits; and (3) the supervision required was minimal for routine tasks but detailed for non-routine tasks. AR 92. Dr. Santulli classified this as semi-skilled work. AR 92. At reconsideration, M. Bongiovani, Ph.D., concurred in Dr. Santulli's assessment. AR 109-11. The ALJ considered these opinions, but accorded them "little weight," as she found that the opinions were "not consistent with the mental health treatment records," and neither Dr. Santulli nor Dr. Bongiovani had the opportunity to examine Plaintiff. AR 31.
The ALJ concluded, based on Plaintiff's adverse credibility finding and these medical opinions, that Plaintiff's "residual functional capacity assessment is supported by the evidence as a whole when viewed in its entirety." AR 31. Therefore, the ALJ proceeded to the second phase of step four and found that Plaintiff had past relevant work as a technical writer, an editor of technical publications, a systems analyst, an environmental compliance manager, a training specialist, and a residential aide. AR 32. In the third phase of step four, the VE testified that an individual with Plaintiff's RFC would be incapable of performing any of Plaintiff's past relevant work. As a consequence, the ALJ proceeded to step five.
At step five, the ALJ relied on the testimony of the VE to determine what jobs, if any, Plaintiff could still perform. The VE testified that an individual with Plaintiff's RFC could perform the jobs of shipping and receiving weigher, DOT #222.387-074, routing clerk, DOT #222.687-022, and marker, DOT #209.587-034. AR 33. Based on that testimony, the ALJ concluded that "considering [Plaintiff's] age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, [Plaintiff] is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy." AR 33. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Act, during the relevant time period and denied her claim. AR 33.
Plaintiff's Motion advances four allegations of error, but the Court need only address the first. There, Plaintiff advances a meritorious challenge, in that the ALJ's analysis of Dr. Wynne's opinion is simultaneously fraught with legal error and unsupported by substantial evidence. As a result, this Court must remand and reverse the ALJ's decision for both proper analysis and support.
Plaintiff initiates her challenge by explaining that Dr. Wynne, her treating psychologist, assessed her mental impairments as being so severe that she would likely miss four or more days of work per month. See Pl.'s Mot. 14-15. She emphasizes that the VE testified that such poor attendance would preclude her from competitive employment. Id. at 15. She then turns to the ALJ's stated rationale for discounting Dr. Wynne's opinion, which in relevant part, read as follows:
AR 30. Plaintiff takes exception with the ALJ's finding "that [Dr. Wynne's] December 3, 2015[,] assessment is not consistent with [his] own treatment records," and argues that the ALJ "fails to explain sufficiently where the inconsistency exists." Pl.'s Mot. 14. Put another way, she contends the ALJ "erred by failing to provide specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting" Dr. Wynne's opinion despite Plaintiff's thirty-four (34) visits to his office. Id. at 15.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ has mischaracterized Dr. Wynne's treatment notes. She refers to the notes themselves, which reflect that "after [Plaintiff] took a battery of neuropsychological tests administered by another psychologist," the other psychologist
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly "considered Dr. Wynne's opinion that Plaintiff had serious limitations in five areas of mental work-related and would miss more than four days of work per month." Def.'s Resp. 10. She challenges Plaintiff's position, and argues in the obverse that the ALJ found Dr. Wynne's "opinion was inconsistent with the record — including Dr. Wynne's own treatment notes — and reasonably gave it limited weight." Id. The Commissioner argues that, by discouraging Plaintiff from quitting her job, "Dr. Wynne did not believe that [Plaintiff] was incapable of all work, much less the limited range of work assessed by the ALJ." Id. "While Plaintiff may disagree with the reasons given by the ALJ for giving Dr. Wynne's limited weight and his [sic] decision to do so," the Commissioner nonetheless maintains that "the ALJ's reasons were sufficiently articulated and supported by substantial evidence in the record." Id.
Under the treating physician rule, "the Commissioner will generally give greater weight to the opinions of sources of information who have treated the claimant than of those who have not." Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Langley, 373 F.3d at 1119). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (2016) (defining how the SSA uses medical source opinions, including treating sources, but reserving the final decision on residual functional capacity to the Commissioner); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (2016) (same). In analyzing whether a treating source opinion is entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ must perform a two-step process. First, the ALJ considers whether the opinion: (1) is supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and (2) is consistent with the other substantial evidence in the record. Pisciotta v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 1074, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) and Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003)). "If the answer to both these questions is `yes,' [the ALJ] must give the opinion controlling weight." Id. (citation omitted). If the opinion is deficient in either of these respects, however, it is not to be given controlling weight. Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 2011).
If the opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, "the ALJ must then consider whether the opinion should be rejected altogether or assigned some lesser weight." Pisciotta, 500 F.3d at 1077. This inquiry is governed by its own set of factors, which include:
Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301 (quotation omitted). While an ALJ must consider these factors, she need not expressly discuss each of them in her opinion. Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1258; SSR 06-3p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *5 (Aug. 9, 2006) ("Not every factor for weighing opinion evidence will apply in every case."). Rather, "the ALJ must make clear how much weight the opinion is being given (including whether it is being rejected outright) and give good reasons, tied to the factors specified in the cited regulations for this particular purpose, for the weight assigned." Krauser, 638 F.3d at 1330 (citing Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300-01). Furthermore, the ALJ's decision must be "sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight." Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1258. If this is not done, a remand is required. Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300.
In this case, the ALJ observed that Dr. Wynne treated Plaintiff for approximately eight months. AR 30. She noted that Dr. Wynne took notes regarding Plaintiff's sessions, but offered no commentary on their content beyond the singular finding highlighted below. AR 30; see AR 615-43 (Dr. Wynne's treatment records). She also briefly described Dr. Wynne's opinions about Plaintiff's functional limitations. AR 30. Most strikingly, the ALJ reduced the entirety of her findings on Dr. Wynne's opinion to the following passage:
Id. There is no other portion of the ALJ's decision that could be interpreted as findings on Dr. Wynne's opinions. See AR 21-33. These sixteen (16) words are the sum total.
Although neither party tailors their briefing toward this infirmity, the transparent legal error that infects the ALJ's opinion nonetheless mandates remand. In any evaluation of a treating physician opinion, regulations assign immutable responsibilities to the ALJ. First among these is the requirement that the ALJ make a finding as to whether the opinion: (1) is supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and (2) is consistent with the other substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Pisciotta, 500 F.3d at 1077. Here, the ALJ made neither finding, relying instead on the singular statement that Dr. Wynne's "assessment is not consistent with his own treatment records." AR 30. Although the Commissioner alleges that this statement represents a finding that Dr. Wynne's opinion "was inconsistent with the record," this Court is unpersuaded.
Plaintiff accurately contends that the ALJ "erred by failing to provide specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting" Dr. Wynne's opinion, but general imprecision is not the opinion's failing. See Pl.'s Mot. 14. The true error here is the ALJ's failure to follow the treating physician rule to explain why Dr. Wynne's opinion did not merit controlling weight. The further error is the ALJ's failure to apply the Watkins factors to determine, in the absence of controlling weight, how much weight the opinion deserved.
Even if the Court were persuaded by the Commissioner's arguments, there is still no explanation for how the ALJ's sixteen-word finding in this case could account for the required, distinct step-one and step-two determinations. See Krauser, 638 F.3d at 1330 (reiterating that "[o]ur case law, the applicable regulations, and the Commissioner's pertinent Social Security Ruling . . . all make clear that in evaluating the medical opinions of a claimant's treating physician, the ALJ must complete a sequential two-step inquiry, each step of which is analytically distinct[,]" and thus, reversing and remanding where "the ALJ simply stopped after the first step[.]"); Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300-01 (holding that the treating physician analysis "is sequential," and reversing and remanding where the ALJ failed to complete both steps, and where therefore, meaningful review was not possible); Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *4 (July 2, 1996) (explaining the two distinct steps of the treating physician analysis). There is similarly no persuasive argument to be made that the ALJ gave good reasons, tied to the factors specified in the regulations, for the limited weight she assigned. See Krauser, 638 F.3d at 1330. To the contrary, the ALJ here committed legal error by failing to apply the mandatory two-step analysis in evaluating Dr. Wynne's opinion.
The ALJ's finding that Dr. Wynne's opinion was inconsistent with his own treatment records also lacks support from substantial evidence. See AR 30. The Commissioner correctly relates that "the ALJ pointed out that Dr. Wynne's own treatment notes indicated that he discouraged Plaintiff from quitting her job." Def.'s Resp. 10. Yet, the Commissioner errs by inferring from that notation that Dr. Wynne "indicat[ed] that [he] did not believe [Plaintiff] was incapable of all work, much less the limited range of work assessed by the ALJ." Id. Indeed, the inference itself reveals the inadequacy of the ALJ's finding, in that it necessarily must be reinforced by supposition.
A close reading of Dr. Wynne's notation demonstrates that he was concerned about Plaintiff's depression, and that he considered it to be the "fundamental issue that she must address." AR 623. He expressed concern that Plaintiff resigning her employment at that time might not assist in addressing that issue. AR 623. He said nothing more on the subject, and yet that statement formed the lone basis the ALJ's discounting his opinion, as she felt the notation contradicted the various workplace restrictions later recommended by Dr. Wynne. On its face, this notation did not create the inconsistency discerned by both the ALJ and the Commissioner. This is not to say that with a proper treating physician analysis, supported by good reasons tied to the regulations, the ALJ could not have explained exactly how she made the inferential leap from that notation to the inconsistency she alleged. But such is not the case here. The ALJ made no such effort to comply with the treating physician rule, and the mere scintilla of evidence embodied by this perceived inconsistency falls well short of the substantial evidence required by law to affirm the ALJ's decision. As a consequence, the Court must reverse and remand the ALJ's decision for a legally proper and adequately supported evaluation.
For the reasons articulated above, the Court cannot find that the ALJ's analysis of Dr. Wynne's opinion was supported by substantial evidence or that the ALJ correctly applied the proper legal standards. Because proper consideration of Dr. Wynne's opinion may render moot the other errors alleged by Plaintiff, the Court need not address them at this time.
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Part A1, §§ 12.04(B), 12.06(B) (2014). On March 27, 2017, the SSA significantly altered the language of these listings.
Id. §§ 12.04(C), 12.06(C).
