GREGORY J. FOURATT, Magistrate Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon "Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" [ECF 45] ("Motion"). The Motion is fully briefed. See ECFs 50 (Plaintiff's Response), 58 (Defendant's Reply). For the reasons articulated below, the Court will
In December 2017, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court against Defendant Board of Education of Las Cruces Public School ("LCPS"). Compl., ECF 1. Plaintiff's Complaint consists of two parts. First, it alleges that LCPS denied Plaintiff's son L.B. a free, appropriate public education ("FAPE"). Id. at 1, 4-10.
In November 2018, Plaintiff advanced his IDEA claim through his "IDEA Brief in Chief" ("IDEA Motion"), which presented this Court with evidence and supporting arguments for its review. See ECF 31. Consistent with Plaintiff's Complaint, this IDEA Motion also asked this Court to find that LCPS denied L.B. a FAPE and to thus reverse the hearing officer's decision and award an equitable remedy. ECF 31 at 11, 27; Compl. at 12 (requesting same forms of relief).
In adjudicating this IDEA Motion, the Court made various factual findings and legal conclusions. Id. at 15-27. In relevant part, the Court found that LCPS had "no reason [during the timeframe alleged by Plaintiff] to suspect a disability"—and that LCPS thus "did not deny L.B. a FAPE by not pursuing a psychological evaluation [sooner]." Id. at 20. In addition, the Court concluded that "LCPS's formation of an [Individualized Education Program ("IEP") related to the conditions of emotional disturbance and ADHD] in early May 2017, as opposed to earlier in the school year, did not deny L.B. a FAPE." Id. at 5, 23.
The Court also addressed Plaintiff's argument that LCPS should not have placed L.B. on long-term suspension after a rock-throwing incident. Id. at 23-25. In doing so, the Court examined Plaintiff's assertion that L.B.'s rock throwing at other students might not have been intentional but rather merely a manifestation of a disability, specifically Tourette syndrome ("TS"). Id. at 23. After reviewing the evidence, the Court affirmed the previous administrative findings that L.B.'s actions were "intentional"—and "not a manifestation of [L.B.'s] disabilities"—and it therefore concluded that the long-term suspension also did not deny L.B. a FAPE:
Id. at 24-25 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982); Garcia v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 520 F.3d 1116, 1125 (10th Cir. 2008); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(C); Administrative Record ("AR") 25-6 at 96-99) (citing Pl.'s Mot. 25, ECF 31; AR 25-1 at 77; AR 25-5 at 447, 468-69; AR 25-6 at 160, 312) (footnotes omitted).
In light of its holding that LCPS did not deny L.B. a FAPE, the Court concluded its adjudication of Plaintiff's IDEA claim by affirming the hearing officer's decision and denying Plaintiff's IDEA Motion. Id. at 15-25, 27.
Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim was not formally advanced through his IDEA Motion and was therefore not explicitly adjudicated by this Court. See ECFs 1, 31, 62. This discrimination claim alleges that, as of April 20, 2017, the day L.B. was suspended from school for rock throwing, LCPS had engaged in "past and ongoing discrimination on the basis of disability." Compl. 1, 10. Plaintiff alleges that such discrimination occurred because LCPS was "deliberately indifferent," "did not want to understand or accommodate" L.B.'s disability-related needs, and "lack[ed] professional knowledge" for supporting students with TS. Id. at 1, 10-12. This claim then asserts that, during L.B.'s long term-suspension, which included his attendance at the "CrossRoads program" for approximately half of his seventh-grade year, L.B. suffered "an inferior education and environment" and "shame and suffering." Id. at 11-12.
In his Response to Defendant's current Motion, Plaintiff clarifies that he is specifically alleging that "LCPS discriminated against L.B. on the basis of disability [1] through its lack of professional knowledge about TS and [2] by disciplining [L.B.] through long term suspension and removal from school." Resp. 9. Plaintiff also clarifies that—while he claims that certain "harm or consequences" of this discrimination "continued" during the long-term suspension and beyond—he is not alleging new or separate claims or "seeking an IDEA remedy." Id. at 9-12. Instead, Plaintiff states that "it is all the same claim"—which he summarizes as LCPS's failure to "apply professional knowledge about TS to the delivery of L.B.'s education and as a result fails to provide appropriate . . . delivery of education to him." Id. at 11. This failure, Plaintiff claims, caused L.B.'s long-term suspension and "continues to cause similar discriminatory discipline and deprivation of educational benefit." Id. at 10.
LCPS now asks this Court to grant summary judgment in its favor on (1) Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim and (2) any claims that might have arisen after July 31, 2017, the date Plaintiff filed his IDEA administrative complaint. Mot. 1, 4-12; ECF 25-5 at 27. LCPS first argues that because the Court has already upheld the hearing officer's decision—including his factual findings that directly contradict the factual assertions of Plaintiff's discrimination claim— LCPS is entitled to summary judgment on the disability discrimination claim. Id. at 6. Second, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting claims that have arisen after July 31, 2017, LCPS argues that any such claims would either not be ripe for review or still require Plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. at 12.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A `judge's function' in evaluating a motion for summary judgment is not `to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S.Ct. 1277, 1280 (2017) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)); see also First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968) (the question at summary judgment is whether a jury should "resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial"). In evaluating such a motion, the Court must "view the facts and draw reasonable inferences `in the light most favorable to the party opposing the . . . motion.'" Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA "involve the same substantive standards" and are thus "analyze[d] . . . together." Miller v. Bd. of Educ., 565 F.3d 1232, 1245 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Urban ex rel. Urban v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 728 (10th Cir. 1996)). Specifically, courts "analyze [a plaintiff's] ADA claim by reference to section 504's standards." Urban, 89 F.3d 720 at 728. Section 504 states that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination" by any program that receives federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added).
The Tenth Circuit has held that "complying with the IDEA is sufficient to disprove educational discrimination." Miller, 565 F.3d 1232 at 1246 (emphasis in original) (citing Urban, 89 F.3d at 728); see also id. (noting that the "provision of FAPE is [a] per se provision of education free from disability discrimination"); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1017 (1984) (noting that the "substantive requirements [of the IDEA and section 504] . . . have been interpreted to be strikingly similar"). Thus, "[w]hen the process mandated by the IDEA produces an administrative decision that is upheld on judicial review, `principles of issue and claim preclusion may properly be applied to short-circuit redundant claims under other laws' such as the ADA and Section 504." Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ., 455 F.Supp.2d 1286, 1312-13 (D.N.M. 2006) (quoting Independent Sch. Dist. No. 283 v. S.D., 88 F.3d 556, 562 (8th Cir. 1996)) (citing Urban, 89 F.3d at 727-28; Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Dist., 403 F.3d 272, 290-97 (5th Cir. 2005) (en banc)), aff'd, 565 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2009).
"In order for a claim to be justiciable under Article III, it must present a live controversy, ripe for determination, advanced in a `clean-cut and concrete form.'" Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1116 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 322 (1991)). Even if a claim would otherwise be ripe for determination, the IDEA nevertheless requires plaintiffs to "exhaust the IDEA's procedures before filing an action under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act [section 504], or similar laws" whenever such suits "seek relief for the denial of a FAPE." Fry v. Napoleon Comm. Sch., 137 S.Ct. 743, 752 (2017) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1)). Such a requirement "is not merely a pleading hurdle" but rather "requires exhaustion when the gravamen of a complaint seeks redress for a school's failure to provide a FAPE, even if not phrased or framed in precisely that way." Id. at 755.
In assessing "the substance, or gravamen, of the plaintiff's complaint," a court should consider that the IDEA "protects only `children' . . . and concerns only their schooling"—while section 504 (and the ADA) "cover people with disabilities of all ages, and do so both inside and outside schools." Id. at 752, 755-56 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A)); see also id. at 756 (stating that "[i]n short, the IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services, while [section 504 and the ADA] promise non-discriminatory access to public institutions"). Thus, a court may ask whether "essentially the same claim" could only belong to "a child in the school setting (not an adult in that setting or a child in some other)." Id.
Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim asserts that LCPS's "lack of professional knowledge about TS" caused L.B. to be denied an appropriate "delivery of education"— particularly by being disciplined "through long term suspension." Resp. 9, 11; Compl. 10-12.
As mentioned, this Court—in fully adjudicating Plaintiff's IDEA claim—has already held that "LCPS did not deny L.B. a free, appropriate public education." ECF 62 at 27 (emphasis added). In reaching this holding, the Court explicitly found that L.B. was suspended long-term because he "intentionally" threw rocks at other students—not due to a "manifestation of his disabilities"—and that LCPS "was [thus] permitted to apply the same `relevant disciplinary procedures' it would have applied to any other rock-throwing child without a disability." Id. at 24-25 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(C)). Therefore, in light of this Court's findings that L.B. was not suspended long-term because of his disability or otherwise denied a FAPE, Plaintiff cannot successfully claim that essentially the opposite occurred—i.e., that L.B. was in fact suspended long-term "solely by reason of . . . his disability" and otherwise denied an appropriate education.
Given the preclusive effect of this Court's adjudication of Plaintiff's IDEA claim on the instant disability discrimination claim, see Miller ex rel. S.M, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1313, there can be no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding this claim because the "provision of FAPE is [a] per se provision of education free from disability discrimination." Miller, 565 F.3d 1232 at 1246. Consequently, regarding the portion of Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim relating to the period on or before July 31, 2017—i.e., the timeframe considered by the hearing officer and then this Court in its adjudication of Plaintiff's IDEA claim—the Court holds that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiff's Complaint also asserts that there is "ongoing discrimination on the basis of disability"—i.e., that LCPS's disability discrimination against L.B. continues beyond July 31, 2017. Compl. 1 (emphasis added). Plaintiff, however, does not state in his Complaint or his Response what LCPS is specifically still doing (or failing to do) that discriminates against L.B. by reason of his disability. See id. at 10-13; Resp. at 9-12. Instead, Plaintiff merely asserts that LCPS continues to fail to "apply professional knowledge about TS to the delivery of L.B.'s education." Id. at 11. As a result, Plaintiff claims that L.B. continues to suffer "discriminatory discipline" and to be deprived of an "appropriate . . . delivery of education" or "educational benefit." Id. at 10-11.
Although this claim of ongoing discrimination gives the Court pause,
In conclusion, Plaintiff's claim of ongoing disability discrimination seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE, but that claim has not satisfied IDEA's exhaustion requirement. There being no genuine issue that Plaintiff has not exhausted the portion of his claim that alleges disability discrimination extending beyond July 31, 2017, the Court holds that Defendant is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to that portion of the complaint.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendant's Motion. Furthermore, as the Court has already adjudicated Plaintiff's IDEA claim, and as there are no remaining claims before the Court in this matter, the Court will DISMISS this case WITH PREJUDICE.
