MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

JAMES O. BROWNING, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, filed July 24, 2019 (Doc. 22) ("PFRD"). The PFRD notifies the parties of their ability to file objections within fourteen days and that the failure to file objections within that timeframe waives appellate review. See PFRD at 19. The parties had until August 12, 2019, at the latest, to file any objections to the PFRD.1 See PFRD at 19. To date, the parties have not filed any objections.

LAW REGARDING OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

District courts may refer dispositive motions to a Magistrate Judge for a recommended disposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1) ("A magistrate judge must promptly conduct the required proceedings when assigned, without the parties' consent, to hear a pretrial matter dispositive of a claim or defense or a prisoner petition challenging the conditions of confinement."). Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs objections: "Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Finally, when resolving objections to a Magistrate Judge's proposal, "[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 636 provides:

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

"The filing of objections to a magistrate's report enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues — factual and legal — that are at the heart of the parties' dispute." United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, With Buildings, Appurtenances, Improvements, and Contents, Known As: 2121 East 30th Street, Tulsa Okla., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996) ("One Parcel") (quoting Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985)). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has noted, "the filing of objections advances the interests that underlie the Magistrate's Act,2 including judicial efficiency." One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1059 (citing Niehaus v. Kansas Bar Ass'n, 793 F.2d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 950 (6th Cir. 1981)).

The Tenth Circuit has held "that a party's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review." One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060. "To further advance the policies behind the Magistrate's Act, [the Tenth Circuit], like numerous other circuits, ha[s] adopted `a firm waiver rule' that `provides that the failure to make timely objections to the magistrate's findings or recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.'" One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1059 (quoting Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991)). "[O]nly an objection that is sufficiently specific to focus the district court's attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in dispute will advance the policies behind the Magistrate's Act." One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060. In addition to requiring specificity in objections, the Tenth Circuit has stated that "[i]ssues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived." Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996); see United States v. Garfinkle, 261 F.3d 1030, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 2001) ("In this circuit, theories raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's report are deemed waived."). In an unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit has stated that "the district court correctly held that [a petitioner] had waived [an] argument by failing to raise it before the magistrate." Pevehouse v. Scibana, 229 F. App'x 795, 796 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).3

In One Parcel, the Tenth Circuit, in accord with other Courts of Appeals, expanded the waiver rule to cover objections that are timely but too general. See One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060. The Supreme Court of the United States of America — in the course of approving the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's use of the waiver rule — has noted:

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. at 150-52, 106 S.Ct. 466 (footnotes omitted).

The Tenth Circuit also has noted, "however, that `[t]he waiver rule as a procedural bar need not be applied when the interests of justice so dictate.'" One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060 (quoting Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d at 659) ("We join those circuits that have declined to apply the waiver rule to a pro se litigant's failure to object when the magistrate's order does not apprise the pro se litigant of the consequences of a failure to object to findings and recommendations.") (citations omitted). Cf. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. at 154, 106 S.Ct. 466 ("Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask. [A failure to object] does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard."). In One Parcel, the Tenth Circuit noted that the district judge had decided sua sponte to conduct a de novo review despite the lack of specificity in the objections, but the Tenth Circuit held that it would deem the issues waived on appeal because that would advance the interests underlying the waiver rule. See 73 F.3d at 1060-61 (citing cases from other courts of appeals where district courts elected to address merits despite potential application of waiver rule, but courts of appeals opted to enforce waiver rule).

Where a party files timely and specific objections to the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings and recommendation, "on [] dispositive motions, the statute calls for a de novo determination, not a de novo hearing." United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). The Tenth Circuit has stated that a de novo determination, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), "requires the district court to consider relevant evidence of record and not merely review the magistrate judge's recommendation." Griego v. Padilla (In re Griego), 64 F.3d 580, 583-84 (10th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has noted that, although a district court must make a de novo determination of the objections to recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the district court is not precluded from relying on the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings and recommendations. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406 ("[I]n providing for a `de novo determination' rather than de novo hearing, Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations.") (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)); see Bratcher v. Bray-Doyle Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 42 of Stephens Cty., 8 F.3d 722, 724-25 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the district court's adoption of the Magistrate Judge's "particular reasonable-hour estimates" is consistent with a de novo determination, because "the district court `may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate,'... [as] `Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations'") (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406) (emphasis omitted).

Where no party objects to the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings and recommended disposition, the Court has, as a matter of course in the past and in the interests of justice, reviewed the Magistrate Judge's recommendations. In Workheiser v. City of Clovis, No. CIV 12-0485 JB/GBW, 2012 WL 6846401 (D.N.M. Dec. 28, 2012) (Browning, J.), where the plaintiff failed to respond to the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings and recommended disposition, although the Court determined that the plaintiff "has waived his opportunity for the Court to conduct review of the factual and legal findings in the PFRD," the Court nevertheless conducted such a review. 2012 WL 6846401, at *3. The Court generally does not review the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings and recommended disposition de novo where there is no objection, and determine independently necessarily what it would do if the issues had come before the Court first, but rather adopts the proposed findings and recommended disposition where "[t]he Court cannot say that the Magistrate Judge's recommendation ... is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, [obviously]4 contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion." Workheiser v. City of Clovis, 2012 WL 6846401, at *3. This review, which is deferential to the Magistrate Judge's work when there is no objection, nonetheless provides some review in the interest of justice, and seems more consistent with the intent of the waiver rule than no review at all or a full-fledged review. Accordingly, the Court considers this standard of review appropriate. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. at 151, 106 S.Ct. 466 ("There is nothing in those Reports, however, that demonstrates an intent to require the district court to give any more consideration to the magistrate's report than the court considers appropriate."). The Court is reluctant to have no review at all when its name will be at the bottom of an order adopting the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings and recommendations.

ANALYSIS

The Court carefully reviewed the PFRD, and the relevant briefs, including Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, filed December 21, 2018 (Doc. 5) ("MTD"), and the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss without Prejudice or, in the Alternative, to Transfer Plaintiff's Case to State District Court, filed June 14, 2019 (Doc. 18) ("Moody's MTD"). The Court did not review the PFRD de novo, because the parties have not objected to it, but rather reviewed the PFRD of the Honorable Kirtan Khalsa, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of New Mexico, to determine if it is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion. The Court determines that the PFRD is not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the PFRD.

In addition, the Court will deny the request for an award of attorneys' fees and costs that Defendant Dollar Tree Store No. 2967 makes in its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, as well as in its reply in support of the motion.5 See MTD at 11; PFRD at 3. Dollar Tree offers no basis or reason for such an award beyond the bare request, and it would be improper for the Court to speculate on these points.

IT IS ORDERED that: (i) the Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, filed July 24, 2019 (Doc. 22), is adopted; (ii) the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, filed December 21, 2018 (Doc. 5) ("MTD"), is granted in part and denied in part as follows: (a) Plaintiff Lyle Moody's claim under the New Mexico Human Rights Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-1-1 to -15 ("NMHRA") is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; if Moody can plausibly and in good faith allege that he complied with the NMHRA's grievance procedures with respect to this claim or that he is entitled to a waiver of the jurisdictional requirement that he exhaust his administrative procedures, he may refile it;6 (b) Moody's prima facie tort claims are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure; (c) Moody's claim under the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-12-1 to -26 is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (d) Defendant Dollar Tree Store No. 2967's request for an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing its MTD is denied; and (iii) Moody's Motion to Dismiss without Prejudice or, in the Alternative, to Transfer Plaintiff's Case to State District Court, filed June 14, 2019 (Doc. 18), is denied as moot.