MARTHA VÁZQUEZ, District Judge.
On July 8, 2019, this Court issued an Order of Reference referring this case to United States Magistrate Judge John F. Robbenhaar for a recommended disposition. Doc. 24. The Magistrate Judge filed a PFRD pursuant to the Order of Reference on August 26, 2019. Doc. 28. Acting under the Court's inherent authority to reconsider its previous ruling, the Magistrate Judge filed an Amended PFRD on October 2, 2019. Doc. 31. Defendant timely filed Objections to the Amended PFRD on October 16, 2019 (Doc. 32), to which Plaintiff responded on October 25, 2019 (Doc. 33). Defendant's Motion, the Amended PFRD, and Defendant's Objections are now before the Court.
When a party files timely written objections to a magistrate judge's recommendation on a dispositive matter, the district court must conduct a de novo review, and "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). De novo review requires the district judge to consider relevant evidence in the record and not merely to review the magistrate judge's recommendation. In re Griego, 64 F.3d 580, 583-84 (10th Cir. 1995). "[A] party's objections to the magistrate judge's [PFRD] must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review." One Parcel of Real Prop., With Bldgs., Appurtenances, Improvements, & Contents, 73 F.3d 1057 1060 (10th Cir. 1996).
In applying for Title II disability benefits, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning April 2, 2009, because of chronic back pain, right knee and neck pain, and right-hand impairment. Tr. 213. This is the second time that Plaintiff has appealed the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") determination before this Court. In the ALJ's partially favorable determination at issue here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was disabled since November 26, 2013, but not disabled from his alleged onset date through November 26, 2013 ("the relevant period of time"). Tr. 671-87. The parties do not dispute the ALJ's partially favorable finding.
In the Amended PFRD, the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), found that the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant period of time was not supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ did not apply the correct legal standards in making her determination. Doc. 31 at 10-19. Concluding that additional administrative proceedings would not serve any useful purpose and would delay the appropriate determination and award of benefits, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the case be remanded for an immediate award of damages. Id. at 19-25. In support of this recommendation, the Magistrate Judge found that the evidence upon which the Commissioner relied in deciding that Plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant period of time was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 22-23. The Magistrate Judge further found that all of the treating and examining source opinion evidence during the relevant period of time supported a finding of disability. Id. at 23-25.
Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendation, arguing that: (1) the Magistrate Judge improperly reweighed the evidence and made findings of fact, which is a role that Congress delegated to the Commissioner; (2) the record does not support a finding of disability as a matter of law with respect to the time period between April 2009 and November 2013; and (3) the equitable considerations at issue in the cases on which Plaintiff has relied are inapposite because Plaintiff was found disabled beginning in November 2013 and has been eligible for benefits on an ongoing basis. Doc. 32 at 2-5. Defendant requests that the Court reject the Magistrate Judge's Amended PFRD and instead remand this matter for additional administrative proceedings. Id. at 5.
The Court has considered Defendant's Objections and the relevant law, and, based on a de novo review of the record, finds that the Objections are without merit, and will adopt the Magistrate Judge's Amended PFRD in whole.
District courts have discretion to remand either for further administrative proceedings or for an immediate award of benefits. Ragland v. Shalala, 992 F.2d 1056, 1060 (10th Cir. 1993). In making this decision, courts should consider both "the length of time the matter has been pending and whether or not `given the available evidence, remand for additional fact-finding would serve [any] useful purpose [or] would merely delay the receipt of benefits.'" Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 626 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Harris v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 821 F.2d 541, 545 (10th Cir. 1987)). When the Commissioner has failed to satisfy his burden of proof, and when there has been a long delay as a result of his erroneous disposition of the proceedings, remand for an immediate award of benefits may be appropriate. Ragland, 992 F.2d at 1060 (remanding for an immediate award of benefits "[i]n light of the Secretary's patent failure to satisfy the burden of proof at step five, and the long delay that has already occurred as a result of the Secretary's erroneous disposition of the proceedings"). The Commissioner "is not entitled to adjudicate a case ad infinitum until he correctly applies the proper legal standard and gathers evidence to support his conclusion." Sisco v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 10 F.3d 739, 746 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Thaete v. Shalala, 826 F.Supp. 1250, 1252 (D. Colo. 1993)). The decision to direct an award of benefits should be made only when the administrative record has been fully developed and when substantial and uncontradicted evidence in the record as a whole indicates that the claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits. Gilliland v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 178, 184-85 (3d Cir. 1986).
Defendant first argues that in recommending an immediate award of benefits on remand, the Magistrate Judge reweighed the evidence and made findings of fact, which are tasks that Congress delegated to the Commissioner. Doc. 32 at 2. Specifically, Defendant contends that the Magistrate Judge engaged in improper reweighing of the evidence to conclude that "when the treating physician opinion evidence is properly evaluated and weighed, there is no reasonable probability that Mr. Rodriguez would be denied benefits." Id. at 4. Defendant cites Miller v. Chater, 99 F.3d 972, 978 (10th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that the Court should have declined to reweigh the evidence and instead allow the "agency to act in its congressionally-delegated role to weigh the conflicting evidence and make findings of fact."
Under Tenth Circuit law, a reviewing court should not reweigh evidence but rather should review the ALJ's decision for the sole purpose of determining whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Branum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 2004). Id. While it is not the reviewing court's job to reweigh the evidence, the reviewing court nonetheless has a duty to meticulously examine the record and make its determination on the record as a whole. Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 414 (10th Cir. 1983). Reweighing evidence occurs when the reviewing court chooses to substitute its judgment for that of the agency to reach a different conclusion where the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and the ALJ's determination was supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 F.3d 1067, 1071 (10th Cir. 2007) (declining to reweigh evidence where claimant asked court to consider effects of her fibromyalgia in combination with her other impairments, but where record reflected that ALJ adequately considered claimant's impairments in combination); White v. Barnhart, 298 F.3d 903, 907-08 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that had Court been factfinder it may have reached a different conclusion, but that ALJ had articulated adequate reasons for disregarding opinion evidence that were supported by substantial evidence, and to disregard ALJ's decision would be to reweigh evidence); Hamilton v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1500 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that claimant's arguments that strength of evidence favored disability improperly asked court to reweigh evidence where ALJ's determination was supported by substantial evidence); Lee v. Berryhill, 669 F. App'x 589, 591-92 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (declining to reweigh evidence where claimant pointed to evidence demonstrating that she needed additional breaks to attend to her insulin pump, but where substantial evidence supported ALJ's determination that normal breaks were adequate); Garrison v. Colvin, 564 F. App'x 374, 379 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (finding that claimant's arguments that ALJ failed to consider his lay witness testimony and overemphasized his activities of daily living asked court to reweigh evidence to claimant's benefit where ALJ had adequately considered lay-witness statements and had not presumptively indicated claimant's daily activities supported substantial gainful activity).
Here, the Magistrate Judge did not reweigh the evidence in recommending that Plaintiff's case be remanded. Rather, in reviewing the ALJ's determination pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Magistrate Judge specifically found that the ALJ failed to either apply the correct legal standards or provide legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for the weight she accorded to the medical source opinion evidence. Doc. 31 at 10-19. Defendant does not dispute this finding. Accordingly, this is not a situation where the Magistrate Judge improperly substituted his judgment for that of the agency to reach a different conclusion.
Further, having thoroughly examined the entirety of the record as he was required to do, the Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ erred in her evaluation of the medical source evidence. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found that the treating and examining physician opinion evidence during the relevant time was, in fact, generally consistent,
Lastly, although Defendant argues that the agency should be allowed to act in its role to "weigh the conflicting evidence," Defendant does not present any conflicting evidence in its Objections for the Court to consider.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules the Commissioner's objection to the Amended PFRD on the basis that the Magistrate Judge improperly reweighed evidence and resolved conflicts in the record.
Defendant next argues that the "evidence must overwhelmingly demonstrate" disability in order for a reviewing court to exercise its discretion to award immediate benefits,
Under Tenth Circuit precedent, whether to award benefits on remand is within the court's discretion. Salazar, 468 F.3d at 626 (citing Ragland, 992 F.2d at 1060). In making this determination, the court considers factors including the length of time that the matter has been pending and whether, "given the available evidence, remand for additional fact-finding would serve [any] useful purpose [or] would merely delay the receipt of benefits." Id. (citing Sisco, 10 F.3d at 746; and quoting Harris, 821 F.2d at 545). Tenth Circuit precedent thus does not support Defendant's argument that cases may only be remanded for an immediate award of benefits in the face of "overwhelming evidence" that supports a finding of disability "as a matter of law."
To be sure, in some cases, courts have remanded for an immediate award of benefits after determining that a claimant is disabled "as a matter of law." See Sorenson v. Bowen, 888 F.2d 706, 713 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that treating source opinion that claimant had severe physical and mental impairments, although rejected by Appeals Council, was supported by substantial evidence, and because claimant was also found to be illiterate, directing a finding of disability as a matter of law based on Medical-Vocational Guidelines); Dollar v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 530, 533-36 (finding that ALJ erroneously rejected claimant's treating physician reports and improperly relied on a state agency medical consultant to find that claimant could perform a full range of light work, because Medical-Vocational Guidelines directed a finding of disability where claimant was also illiterate and Secretary had failed to come forward with substantial evidence of skill transferability).
In most cases, however, courts apply the relevant factors identified above in remanding for an immediate award of benefits. See, e.g., Salazar, 468 F.3d at 626 (remanding for immediate award of benefits where ALJ failed to explain weight given to certain opinions and disregarded others, and where Court found it difficult to imagine that any medical or psychological professional would be able to prepare a retrospective analysis of mental impairments or effect of drug and alcohol addiction and where there was a lack of evidence that claimant would not be disabled in absence of drug and alcohol addiction); Ragland, 992 F.2d at 1060 (remanding for immediate award of benefits where Secretary failed to satisfy burden of proof at step five and a long delay had already occurred as result of Secretary's erroneous disposition of proceedings); Groberg v. Astrue, 415 F. App'x 65, 73 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (remanding for immediate award of benefits where it had been five years since claimant applied for benefits and where "[g]iven a proper analysis and evaluation of [claimant's] mental impairments, there [was] no reasonable probability that [claimant] would be denied benefits"); Madron v. Astrue, 311 F. App'x 170, 182 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (remanding for immediate award of benefits where reviewing court determined that ALJ erred in his credibility assessment and erred in finding that claimant could return to her past relevant work, and holding that once a proper RFC assessment was done and due consideration was given to claimant's back pain, there was no reasonable probability that claimant would be denied benefits); Huffman v. Astrue, 290 F. App'x 87, 89-90 (10th Cir 2008) (unpublished) (remanding for award of immediate benefits where ALJ's bare conclusion that claimant's impairments did not meet or equal a listing was beyond meaningful judicial review and where a lengthy delay had occurred from Commissioner's erroneous disposition of matter); Bibbs v. Apfel, 3 F. App'x 759 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (remanding for immediate award of benefits where ALJ improperly rejected examining physician opinion regarding restrictions that were supported by substantial evidence and where VE could not identify a job that claimant could perform with those restrictions); Armer v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 1086, at *4 (10th Cir. 2000) (remanding for immediate award of benefits where ALJ erred in rejecting claimant's treating source evidence regarding claimant's capacity for sitting and holding that ALJ would be unable to sustain his step-five burden of identifying sedentary jobs that claimant could perform if case were remanded); Railey v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 383 at *4 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (exercising discretion to remand for immediate award of benefits given claimant's advanced age, evidence of severe medically determinable impairments, and Commissioner's inability to produce an affirmable decision after four administrative hearings); Pennington v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1246, at *5 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished) (remanding for an immediate award of benefits where ALJ's credibility determination was found to be insufficient and where VE testified that if claimant's testimony were credible he would not be able to work); Harris v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 986 F.2d 1427, at *4 (10th Cir. 1992) (unpublished) (remanding for immediate award of benefits after concluding that if medical reports of treating physicians were given their proper weight, there was substantial objective evidence that claimant was disabled by pain, and where, based on ALJ's hypotheticals, only evidence presented through VE was that there were no jobs in national economy that claimant could perform).
Here, having found that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards or provide legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for the weight that she accorded the medical source evidence, the Magistrate Judge concluded that, given the available evidence, further administrative proceedings would not serve any useful purpose but rather would delay the appropriate determination and award of benefits. This is a relevant factor for the reviewing court to consider when remanding for an immediate award of benefits. Salazar, 468 F.3d at 626. Moreover, the case law does not support Defendant's argument that the Magistrate Judge applied an improper legal standard when he recommended remanding this case for an immediate award of benefits.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules Defendant's objection to the Amended PFRD on the basis that, in order to remand for an immediate award of benefits, the Magistrate Judge was required to find that "overwhelming evidence" supported a finding of disability "as a matter of law."
Lastly, Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge's findings on the basis that the equitable considerations at issue in this case are unlike "the multiple cases that Plaintiff relies on" and is distinguishable from the case that the "Magistrate Judge relies on in support of suggesting that equities favor Plaintiff." Doc. 32 at 4-5. Defendant argues that the equitable considerations in this case favor remand for additional administrative proceedings because Plaintiff has already received a partially favorable determination and remains entitled to those benefits, and because the issue here involves a closed time period where the "possibilities [for relief] are [not] endless upon remand." Id.
As noted above, the decision to award benefits on remand is within the court's discretion. Salazar, 468 F.3d at 626 (citing Ragland, 992 F.2d at 1060). One of the relevant factors the Court may consider is the length of time that the matter has been pending. Id. This case has been pending since 2012 and has been through two administrative hearings and two ALJ decisions. Accordingly, the length of time that the matter has been pending weighs in favor of awarding benefits. Nonetheless, the ultimate basis for the Magistrate Judge's recommendation was that, given the available evidence, further administrative proceedings would not serve any useful purpose but rather would delay the appropriate determination and award of benefits. Thus, contrary to Defendant's argument, the Magistrate Judge did not rely on Sisco "in support of suggesting that the equities favor Plaintiff."
Setting aside Defendant's unsupported representations and considering Defendant's argument, the Court is not persuaded that equitable considerations favor remand for additional administrative proceedings simply because the two cases that Plaintiff cited are distinguishable in certain respects from this case. More importantly, the Court is not persuaded that the equitable considerations that Defendant raises favor remand for additional administrative proceedings where the record supports a finding of disability for the relevant period of time. Salazar, 468 F.3d at 626; see also Strauss v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec'y, 635 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that required analysis for remand for an immediate award of benefits centers on what record evidence shows about existence of a disability and not on how egregious ALJ's errors may be); Bowman, 221 F.3d 1351, at *2-4 (exercising discretion and remanding for immediate award of benefits for closed period of time from claimant's alleged onset date through date claimant was awarded benefits following a second application where ALJ, inter alia, did not apply correct legal standards in considering and assessing treating physician's opinion regarding severity of claimant's mental impairments during relevant period of time, and where reviewing court determined that treating source's opinion should have been given substantial weight because it was consistent with other medical source evidence in record).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules Defendant's objection to the Amended PFRD on the basis that the equitable considerations favor remanding this case for additional administrative proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons, and for the additional reasons stated in the Amended PFRD, the Court finds that Defendant's Objections are without merit, and that the Amended PFRD should be adopted in whole.
