OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, C.J.:

On November 2, 2004, Nevada voters approved the Keep Our Doctors in Nevada (KODIN) ballot initiative. KODIN included the adoption of NRS 41A.045, which makes health-care provider defendants severally liable in professional negligence actions for economic and noneconomic damages. In this opinion, we address whether, in a health-care provider professional negligence action, NRS 41A.045 allows a defendant to argue the percentage of fault of settled defendants and to include those settled defendants' names on applicable jury verdict forms. Based on the plain language of the statute, we hold that the provision of several liability found in NRS 41A.045 entitles a defendant in a qualifying action to argue the percentage of fault of settled defendants and to include the settled defendants' names on the jury verdict form where the jury could conclude that the settled defendants' negligence caused some or all of the plaintiff's injury.

BACKGROUND

This petition arises out of a professional negligence action. Real parties in interest, Tiffani Hurst and Brian Abbington, jointly and on behalf of their infant daughter MayRose, filed a complaint against several health-care providers, alleging that the providers' professional negligence caused MayRose to suffer permanent brain damage. All defendants settled with Hurst and Abbington, except for petitioners Dr. Ali Piroozi and Dr. Martin Blahnik.

During pretrial proceedings below, Hurst and Abbington filed a motion in limine to bar petitioners from arguing the comparative fault of the settled defendants at trial and including those defendants' names on jury verdict forms. Relying on NRS 41.1411 and Banks ex rel. Banks v. Sunrise Hospital, 120 Nev. 822, 102 P.3d 52 (2004), which interprets NRS 41.141, the district court granted the motion. Petitioners now ask this court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to allow petitioners to argue the comparative fault of the settled defendants and to place those defendants' names on the jury verdict forms.

DISCUSSION

Consideration of the writ petition

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. NRS 34.160; Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008). This court exercises its discretion to consider a petition for a writ of mandamus only "when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law or there are either urgent circumstances or important legal issues that need clarification in order to promote judicial economy and administration." Cheung v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 867, 869, 124 P.3d 550, 552 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, an appeal from a final judgment or order is an adequate remedy precluding such writ relief. Int'l Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 197, 179 P.3d at 558.

We exercise our discretion to consider this writ petition in light of the important legal issues raised concerning whether NRS 41.141 or NRS 41A.045 applies and the corresponding effect on trials involving professional negligence by a health-care provider. We believe that consideration of this petition will promote judicial economy and administration in this case and other health-care provider professional negligence cases pending before the Nevada district courts because the resolution of the issues presented will promote settlements and reduce the time and expense of professional negligence trials involving comparative defense or other settling defendants. Accordingly, we conclude that this writ petition warrants our consideration.

Merits of the writ petition

Issues of statutory interpretation, even when raised in a writ petition, are reviewed de novo. Int'l Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 198, 179 P.3d at 559. Petitioners contend that the district court abused its discretion by relying on NRS 41.141(3), which prohibits a jury from considering the comparative negligence of settled defendants and the settlement amounts, when a remaining defendant asserts a comparative negligence defense. Petitioners argue that NRS 41.141 does not apply in professional negligence actions because it invalidates NRS 41A.045's abrogation of joint and several liability by preventing petitioners from arguing the liability of settled defendants. We must resolve the conflict created when these separate statutes are read together.

The district court began its analysis with NRS 41.141. Notwithstanding its other limitations, NRS 41.141 applies only to actions where a defendant asserts comparative negligence as a defense. NRS 41.141(1); see Café Moda, LLC v. Palma, 128 Nev. 78, 80-81, 272 P.3d 137, 139 (2012). When NRS 41.141 does apply, a settling defendant's comparative negligence cannot be admitted into evidence or considered by the jury. NRS 41.141(3). Here, although a comparative negligence defense asserted against minor plaintiff MayRose would not be a bona fide issue, see Buck by Buck v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 105 Nev. 756, 764, 783 P.2d 437, 442 (1989), petitioners' comparative negligence assertions against plaintiffs Hurst and Abbington are bona fide issues triggering the application of NRS 41.141. See NRS 41.141(1). Thus, initially, NRS 41.141(3) appears to apply to Hurst and Abbington's claims.

We now turn to the application of NRS 41A.045. NRS 41A.045 states:

We have repeatedly stated that if the plain language of a statute is clear on its face, we will not look beyond that language when construing the provision, "unless it is clear that this meaning was not intended." See Szydel v. Markman, 121 Nev. 453, 456-57, 117 P.3d 200, 202 (2005) (internal quotation omitted). NRS 41A.045(1) unequivocally provides that defendants in professional negligence actions are severally liable for economic and noneconomic damages. This means that an "injured person may recover only the severally liable person's comparative-responsibility share of the injured person's damages," Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liab. § 11 (2000), which is "the portion of the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence attributable to the defendant." NRS 41A.045(1). Therefore, pursuant to NRS 41A.045, we hold that an injured plaintiff in a health-care provider professional negligence action can recover only the defendant's share of the injured plaintiff's damages.

Although the aforementioned approach places the risk of an insolvent or immune defendant on the plaintiff, several liability schemes are designed to protect individual defendants from liability exceeding the defendant's fault. See Sowinski v. Walker, 198 P.3d 1134, 1151 (Alaska 2008). That the voters of Nevada intended this meaning is evident not only by the plain language of NRS 41A.045, but also by the ballot initiative's explanation section, stating that the provision "imposes the risk of nonpayment to the injured party if a defendant is not able to pay his percentage of damages." Statewide Ballot Questions 2004, Question No. 3, Explanation.

Based on these conclusions, if defendants can be held responsible only for their share of an injured plaintiffs damages, it follows that defendants must be allowed to argue the comparative fault of the settled defendants and the jury verdict forms must account for the settled defendants' percentage of fault. See Le'Gall v. Lewis Cnty., 129 Idaho 182, 923 P.2d 427, 430 (1996) (explaining that "[i]f the jury could conclude, based on the evidence, that an actor negligently contributed to the plaintiffs injury, then the actor must be included on the special verdict form"); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liab. § B19 (2000).2

Consequently, NRS 41.141 and NRS 41A.045, when applied in cases where the comparative negligence defense is raised, conflict. NRS 41.141 precludes admitting a settling defendant's comparative negligence into evidence, whereas NRS 41A.045 presumes admission of evidence allocating damages based on proportionate liability. "Where a general and a special statute, each relating to the same subject, are in conflict and they cannot be read together, the special statute controls." Laird v. State Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 98 Nev. 42, 45, 639 P.2d 1171, 1173 (1982); see also State, Dep't of Taxation v. Masco Builder Cabinet Grp., 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 83, 312 P.3d 475, 478 (2013) ("A specific statute controls over a general statute." (internal quotation omitted)). Because NRS 41A.045 is a special statute focusing specifically on professional negligence of a provider of health care, it governs here.3 Thus, when applicable, NRS 41A.045 displaces NRS 41.141.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the district court was required to permit petitioners the opportunity to argue the comparative fault of the settled defendants and include those defendants' names and an assignment of their percentage of fault on the jury verdict forms. Thus, we grant the petition and order the clerk of this court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate the portion of its pretrial order that conflicts with this decision and to enter a new order holding that petitioners may argue to the jury that a portion of Hurst and Abbington's damages was caused by the settled defendants and include those defendants' names on the jury verdict form for the purpose of allocating liability among all defendants.4

We concur: PARRAGUIRRE, PICKERING and SAITTA, JJ.

DOUGLAS, J., with whom CHERRY and GIBBONS, JJ., agree, dissenting:

I respectfully disagree with the majority's analysis as to the application of NRS 41A.045. NRS 41A.045 is ambiguous and does not abrogate NRS 17.245's offset provision, making it improper to introduce any evidence of settlement into the proceedings.

Ambiguity

"A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood in two or more senses by reasonably informed persons or it does not otherwise speak to the issue before the court." Chanos v. Nev. Tax Comm'n, 124 Nev. 232, 240, 181 P.3d 675, 680-81 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

NRS 41A.045 states:

NRS 41A.045 contains at least two meaningful points of ambiguity. First, the use of "each defendant" could be read to either limit several liability to actions with multiple defendants or permit several liability, even when there is only one defendant. Second, when NRS 41A.045 applies, "each defendant is liable ... severally only ... for that portion of the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence attributable to the defendant." It is unclear whether the percentage of negligence attributable to the defendant for which she is liable is based only in relation to other defendants in the action, if there are any, or in relation to all persons at fault, including settled defendants. Based on these two points of ambiguity, it is necessary to consider legislative history, public policy, and reason in construing NRS 41A.045.

Single or multiple defendants

To determine the voter intent of a law that was enacted by a ballot initiative, this court has considered that ballot's explanation and argument sections.1 See Sustainable Growth Initiative Comm. v. Jumpers, LLC, 122 Nev. 53, 63, 65-66, 128 P.3d 452, 460-61 (2006); see also Guinn v. Legislature of State of Nev., 119 Nev. 460, 467, 76 P.3d 22, 26 (2003). The explanation section of the ballot questionnaire relevant to NRS 41A.045 states that "[c]urrent law provides that each one of multiple defendants in medical malpractice actions is severally, but not jointly liable for noneconomic damages," and that the proposed law would extend several liability to economic damages. Statewide Ballot Questions 2004, Question No. 3, Explanation. Thus, voters understood that the then current law, NRS 41A.041,2 applied only to actions with multiple defendants, and that NRS 41A.045 did not propose to change this aspect of the law. Accordingly, this court can reasonably conclude that Nevada voters intended NRS 41A.045 to apply only to medical malpractice actions with multiple defendants. As evident in the next subsection, such an interpretation comports with canons of statutory construction, public policy, and reason.

Several liability in relation to whom

Requiring multiple defendants for NRS 41A.045 to apply allows the court to resolve the second ambiguity with a canon of statutory interpretation. Specifically, "[w]hen a legislature adopts language that has a particular meaning or history, rules of statutory construction ... indicate that a court may presume that the legislature intended the language to have meaning consistent with previous interpretations of the language." Beazer Homes Nev., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 575, 580-81, 97 P.3d 1132, 1135-36 (2004). To the extent that this court applies this canon to voters adopting language that has a particular meaning, NRS 41A.045 arguably imposes several liability only in relation to remaining defendants, and not settled defendants.

As to settled defendants, one must harmonize NRS 17.245 (effects of release or covenant not to sue) with NRS 41A.045. Allowing for several liability as between all tortfeasors, including settled defendants, would be discordant with NRS 17.245(1)(a), which requires a district court to reduce any judgment against tortfeasors by all amounts paid by settled defendants that were liable in tort for the same injury or wrongful death. Specifically, if a defendant could argue a theory of comparative negligence as to settled defendants, then she would only be liable for her proportional fault in relation to them. Because the judgment issued against this defendant would amount to her exact liability, she would then receive a windfall when NRS 17.245(1)(a) reduced that judgment by all settlement amounts. Such an interpretation should be avoided because it would conflict with NRS 17.245(1)(a)'s function and lead to absurd results. See Szydel v. Markman, 121 Nev. 453, 457, 117 P.3d 200, 202-03 (2005) (explaining that when two statutes conflict, this court will attempt to read the conflicting provisions in harmony to the extent that it does not violate legislative intent); Gallagher v. City of Las Vegas, 114 Nev. 595, 599-600, 959 P.2d 519, 521 (1998) (stating that statutory interpretation should avoid absurd results).3

NRS 41A.041 and NRS 41A.045's legislative history also supports this interpretation. NRS 41A.041's legislative history warrants consideration because NRS 41A.045 was written in response to and borrowed language from NRS 41A.041. NRS 41A.041's legislative history indicates that the Legislature did not intend for the statute to displace NRS 17.245(1)(a)'s provision for offsetting a judgment against a defendant by any settlement amounts from joint tortfeasors. NRS 41A.041's legislative history also suggests that its purpose was to allow for the same several liability found in NRS 41.141(4) in all medical malpractice actions, regardless of whether comparative negligence was asserted as a defense.4 Given NRS 41A.045's narrow purpose of extending existing law5 to include several liability for economic damages, any legislative intent behind NRS 41A.041 unrelated to that purpose arguably transfers into the new statute.6

Based on the foregoing, it should be construed that NRS 41A.045 prohibits a defendant from arguing the comparative negligence of settled defendants. That interpretation, would not preclude a defendant from arguing that a settled defendant was 100 percent at fault.7 Banks ex rel. Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 120 Nev. 822, 844-45, 102 P.3d 52, 67 (2004). With this in mind, I submit that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its order granting the Hursts' motion in limine.

NRS 17.245

As to NRS 17.245 (effects of release or covenant not to sue), it states:

In association with NRS 17.245(1)(a), this court has stated that "to prevent improper speculation by the jury, the parties may not inform the jury as to either the existence of a settlement or the sum paid." Banks ex rel. Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 120 Nev. at 843-44, 102 P.3d at 67 (citing Moore v. Bannen, 106 Nev. 679, 680-81, 799 P.2d 564, 565 (1990)).8 NRS 41A.045 does not allow for comparative fault theories as to settled defendants and has no effect on NRS 17.245, thus, the district court properly applied the law and did not abuse its discretion by forbidding any discussion as to a settlement occurring and the settlement amount.9

Defendants' names on jury verdict forms

Lastly, "[t]his court reviews a district court's decision to give a jury instruction for abuse of discretion." See FGA, Inc. v. Giglio, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 26, 278 P.3d 490, 496 (2012).10 Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to place settled defendants' names on the jury verdict forms because that decision is consistent with the law that the jury may not be informed of settlement or the sum paid. Moore, 106 Nev. at 681-82, 799 P.2d. at 566.

Therefore, I would sustain the district court as to the non-inclusion of settled defendants.

We concur: CHERRY and GIBBONS, JJ.