MIKE K. NAKAGAWA, Bankruptcy Judge.
On August 19, 2016, the court entered its Order on Debtor's Renewed Motion to Hold Creditor Nationstar Mortgage in Contempt and For Sanctions for Violation of the Discharge Injunction 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) ("Sanctions Order"). (ECF No. 174). That order directed counsel for Kim Michele Vanamann ("Debtor") to file an itemized billing state in support of its request for professional fees and costs.
On September 2, 2016, counsel for the Debtor filed an itemized billing statement for the period August 18, 2015 through June 17, 2016, as an attachment to its Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs ("Fee Motion"). (ECF No. 179).
On September 16, 2016, respondent Nationstar Mortgage LLC ("Nationstar") filed its objections to the billing statement ("Objection"). (ECF No. 183).
On September 19, 2016, the Debtor filed an "errata" to the Fee Motion ("Fee Errata"). (ECF No. 184).
The court has considered the Fee Motion and attached billing statement, as well as Nationstar's objection to the $500.00 hourly rate charged by Debtor's counsel.
Nationstar argues that counsel has failed to meet his burden of establishing that $500.00 is an appropriate hourly rate. Debtor's counsel believes the rate is appropriate when compared to other bankruptcy practitioners before this court who charge at $425.00 and $550.00 per hour. Nationstar does not dispute that those counsel actually charge those rates. Debtor's counsel also requests that the court take judicial notice that his proposed $500 hourly rate was approved in a different bankruptcy case before another judge in this district. See Exhibit "1" to Fee Errata. Nationstar does not dispute that counsel may have been approved at the $500 rate in that particular case, but notes that Debtor's counsel also charges at lower hourly rates in other cases and even charged at a $400.00 rate in the Chapter 13 plan proposed in the present case. Although it objects to the $500.00 hourly rate charged by Debtor's counsel, however, Nationstar does not propose a specific hourly rate, nor does it provide evidence that similarly qualified attorneys bill their services at an appreciably lower hourly rate.
The court has considered the proposed hourly rate and concludes that it is commensurate with the range of hourly rates charged in the community by bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy counsel having comparable skills, experience and reputation.
In this instance, the court takes judicial notice of the order entered by Bankruptcy Judge Laurel Davis on April 13, 2016, approving a $500.00 hourly rate for Debtor's counsel in
The court also takes judicial notice of the order entered by Bankruptcy Judge Linda Riegle on January 22, 2013, approving compensation at a $450.00 hourly rate for attorney Zachariah Larson in
The court notes that all of the attorneys referenced above have extensive years of experience in nonbankruptcy areas of practice, and also have represented both debtors and creditors in consumer and business bankruptcy cases. Just as the hourly rates charged by Debtor's counsel has fluctuated, usually increasing with the years of experience, the other counsel's hourly rates also have fluctuated. Under these circumstances, the rates charged by the attorneys suggested by Debtor's counsel, together with the rates approved by the bankruptcy judges in this district for other counsel, are sufficiently reliable to establish the market rate for bankruptcy services in the community. As the proposed rate for Debtor's counsel falls well within that range of rates, the court concludes that the proposed rate is reasonable.
The court finds that the descriptions of the services rendered by Debtor's counsel are sufficient for the court to understand the scope, necessity and time expended in this matter. The court finds that the services rendered were not duplicative and were necessary to counsel's representation of the Debtor. Nationstar does not object to any of the specific services set forth in the billing statement. The court having found that the services provided were necessary and that the $500.00 hourly rate requested is appropriate, concludes that the professional compensation and cost reimbursement requested in the Fee Motion is reasonable in this case.