JAMES C. MAHAN, District Judge.
This is a pro se prisoner civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. On March 19, 2012, the court entered an order screening the complaint. (ECF No. 9). The screening order dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. (Id.). Judgment was entered on March 19, 2012. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff has filed a motion for relief from judgment, and in the alternative, motion to alter or amend judgment. (ECF No. 11).
Where a ruling has resulted in final judgment or order, a motion for reconsideration may be construed either as a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), or as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule 60(b). School Dist. No. 1J Multnomah County v. AC&S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9
Motions to reconsider are generally left to the discretion of the trial court. See Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In order to succeed on a motion to reconsider, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision. See Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds 828 F.2d 514 (9
In his motion to vacate judgment, plaintiff asserts that the court failed to address his Fourth Amendment claim regarding correctional officers conducting cell searches in its screening order of March 19, 2012. Prisoners have no expectation of privacy in their cells, and as such, searches of prisoner cells do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984); Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that a right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure security and internal order), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1534 (2011). Plaintiff's citation to Michenfelder v. Sumner is inapposite, as that case applies to body searches, not cell searches. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that prisoners have a very limited Fourth Amendment right to shield themselves from being observed nude).
Plaintiff also asserts that the court failed to address his Eighth Amendment claim regarding cell searches under Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). In Hudson v. Palmer, a state prisoner alleged that correctional officers conducted a "shakedown" search of his prison locker and cell in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of property without due process of law. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 519-21. The Supreme Court held that a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell entitling him to the protection of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizure of items taken in the course of the cell search. Id. at 525-26, 536. The Supreme Court further held that the destruction of inmate property during a cell search did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the prisoner had an adequate post-deprivation remedy under state law. Id. at 530-36. The portion of Hudson v. Palmer cited by plaintiff is clearly dicta, in which the Supreme Court noted that: "The Eighth Amendment always stands as a protection against `cruel and unusual punishments,'" and that prisoners may avail themselves of adequate state tort remedies regarding cell searches and property destruction. Id. at 530. Nothing in the holding of Hudson v. Palmer supports plaintiff's argument that the alleged cell searches and property destruction violated his Eighth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff has not identified any mistake, intervening change in controlling law, or other factor that would require vacating the judgment entered in this case. Plaintiff has not shown that manifest injustice resulted from dismissal of the action. Plaintiff also has not presented newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence. Plaintiff has failed to make an adequate showing under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) to justify granting his motion to vacate the judgment.