ROGER L. HUNT, District Judge.
This matter having come on for trial before the Court on April 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 30, 2012, the Parties having appeared by and through their respective counsel, and the Court having heard the testimony of witnesses and having considered all exhibits accepted into evidence at trial, the Court now renders its Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Decision, as follows:
1. On March 11 and 12, 2006, UMC published in the Las Vegas Review-Journal an Invitation to Bid No. 2006-06 ("ITB"), Accounts Receivable Sale, for the sale of approximately 766,000 in one lot of charged-off consumer healthcare accounts (the "Portfolio") from UMC. (Ex. 305, Invitation to Bid p. 1; Ex. 302 Addendum No. 1 p. 1.)
2. UMC intended to obtain a quick influx of cash for a one-time transaction with the highest responsive and responsible bidder and to transfer all the subject accounts to the successful bidder without further obligations.
3. UMC is a county hospital and the only "safety net" hospital (meaning indigent patients or patients without insurance are funneled there for medical care) in Clark County.
4. UMC, up to that at the time, had had contracts with Allied Collection Services, Inc. ("Allied"), Aargon Collections, Inc. ("Aargon"), and two other collection agencies, to handle third-party collections of accounts more than 90/120 days old; these companies retained a percentage of the amount collected per contract. They were assigned to collect primary debt and are considered first-party collectors.
5. Primary debt collections generally have much higher collection rates than secondary debt collections; furthermore, accounts which are newer (from the date of service) are generally more collectible than older accounts.
6. UMC indicated in the Las Vegas Review-Journal advertisement that the bid package was available for pick-up by prospective bidders.
7. Patient level data reflecting the specific account receivables being purchased was furnished to bidders on a CD-ROM if the prospective bidders signed a Business Associate Agreement. (Ex. 305 p. 8.)
8. The ITB contemplated a public opening of bids and a procurement process following the competitive bidding strictures of the Nevada Revised Statutes of Chapter 332 providing a level playing field for all bidders and prospective bidders and protection of the public interest as well through transparency, fairness and increased competition.
9. The purpose behind a public bid opening is to ensure the public is aware of the amounts being received for the specific services or goods listed in the solicitation.
10. An overriding purpose of public bidding is to maximize competition and thereby avoid contracts for which proposals are received from only one company.
11. A public bid opening is an important mechanism by which the public can police the fairness and integrity of the bidding system. The purpose of a public bid opening is to ensure that the public knows at the time of bid opening exactly how much is being paid by the successful bidder for government property.
12. The public disclosures of an open bid process furthers the integrity of the public bidding system.
13. Prior to a bid opening, a bidder is not supposed to know the other bid prices, or even the number of bids which have been submitted.
14. This serves to enhance competition, because it requires bidders to submit their most competitive possible offer before bid opening. Consequently, it benefits the public by ensuring the municipal entity is either using its money wisely or getting the best price for any sale.
15. A bidder gains an unfair advantage when it can negotiate additional or different terms and conditions or change the terms and conditions of the invitation with the Seller after the other bids have already been exposed.
16. Other bidders are also disadvantaged if they were not given equal opportunity to bid on additional terms which are only negotiated after the bid opening.
17. In addition, allowing a bidder an opportunity to explain an ambiguous or conditional bid after bid opening provides an unfair advantage as well because the bidder has already seen the other bid prices and any proposed bid deviations. If a bidder decided that its bid was too low, or too high, the bidder could then explain its bid in a way which necessitated rejection, thereby relieving itself of the requirement to submit a non-revocable bid. Alternatively, the bidder could attempt to negotiate additional and more favorable contract terms.
18. The negotiation of different terms after the bid opening violates the competitive bidding hallmark of transparency as well. The damage to the competitive process directly prejudices the public and material deviations prejudice competitive bidding.
19. The ITB published by UMC in March of 2006 included, inter alia, the following General Provisions:
20. The ITB further included the following General Conditions:
21. The ITB included the following Special Provisions providing information regarding the subject accounts:
22. The ITB General Provisions included an indemnity clause whereby the successful bidder shall indemnify UMC from any claims arising out of the acts, or fault of the successful Bidder and its agents. (Ex. 305 p. 2.)
23. The ITB General Conditions included an insurance clause whereby the successful bidder shall carry insurance with a minimum amount of 1 million per occurrence and 2 million aggregate for the duration of the contract. (Ex. 305 p. 6.)
24. The ITB also contained a section entitled DEVIATIONS TO BID. It stated:
25. The ITB did not contain any terms authorizing incorporating into the bid a separate, subsequent purchase and sale agreement negotiated between the highest bidder and UMC.
26. The ITB did not contain any terms indicating the successful bidder would have on-line access to UMC patient or billing information after transfer of the accounts.
27. The ITB did not indicate UMC would be responsible for obtaining hard copies of documents for the accounts sold to the successful bidder.
28. The ITB did not indicate UMC would waive immunity for any liability arising from the bid or a resulting contract or pay attorney fees for a dispute arising out of the resulting contract.
29. The ITB did not indicate UMC would conduct a scrub of the accounts on the disc for bankruptcies and deaths at UMC's cost or that the purchase price would be reduced in any way as a result of such a scrub.
30. On March 24, 2006, UMC issued Addendum No. 1 to Bid No. 2006-06 which deleted Special Provision 1 and 2 and replaced them with the following:
31. Special Provision 1 and 2 were changed to the following:
32. Addendum No. 1 also replaced Special Provision 4 with the following details concerning the account portfolio:
33. Addendum No. 1 also added the following Special Provision:
34. Also, on March 24, 2006, UMC submitted in writing to all bidders answers to questions submitted by prospective bidders at the pre-bid meeting (which OPS2 did not attend).
35. UMC indicated in answer to a question that the accounts were initially worked by the internal collection department at UMC which sent two statements and a final notice sent on the 70
36. UMC indicated in answer to a question that all accounts had been placed for first party collections and that the collection agencies were required to send notices and make calls. All accounts are reported to Trans Union and one other credit reporting entity 90 days from placement. (Ex. 302 p. 3.)
37. UMC indicated, in answer to a question, that no transferred account had been reduced to legal judgment. (Ex. 305 p. 3.)
38. UMC was also asked what percentage of accounts had been "offered a
39. An offer to engage in settlement discussions, or even to enter a settlement, does not constitute a "structured settlement."
40. UMC indicated, in answer to a question regarding what supporting documentation would be made available, that "
41. In answer to a question about the last date the accounts were scrubbed for bankruptcy filings and deaths, UMC answered: "
42. UMC also clarified questions posed regarding the inapplicability of several sections in the ITB as they were mistakenly included and had to do with competitive bids where UMC was a buyer as opposed to a seller. (Ex. 302 p. 4.)
43. On March 29, 2006, UMC issued Addendum No. 3 to Bid No. 2006-06 that deleted and replaced Special Provision 9. It stated:
44. Neither the ITB nor the amendments contained language requiring UMC to repurchase or replace any of the accounts identified as "one lot" of consumer healthcare accounts with UMC consumer healthcare accounts newer than December 31, 2003.
45. Mr. Anurag Sett ("Sett"), the principal of OPS2, consulted with Michael Feeney ("Feeney") and Duane Christy ("Christy"), the respective principals of Allied and Aargon, on how their companies were handling collection of the subject accounts and their opinions of the value of these accounts. Feeney and Christy told Sett they had authorization to offer debtors a discount on bills and utilized this discretion in their collection efforts. Christy also told Sett about a communication from Lee Myers ("Myers") urging UMC's collection agencies to offer discounts on their accounts for a two-week period in April 2006. Sett confirmed this settlement discussion via e-mail communication with Steve Helvie ("Helvie") before OPS2's bid was submitted. (Ex. 8.)
46. Accordingly, Sett had knowledge of how these collection agents approached the debtors and attempted to obtain payment or reach a settlement accord. Sett had actual knowledge prior to OPS2's bid submission that some of the debtors were given an opportunity to contact the collection agency for settling their debts.
47. Prior to submitting its bid, OPS2 entered into an agreement with Aargon to handle collection efforts on the accounts if it was awarded the bid and UMC's accounts receivables portfolio was transferred to OPS2.
48. The opening bid date was April 6, 2006, at 3:00 p.m. P.S.T., at which time OPS2's sealed bid was opened revealing its bid of $8,583,710.82 for the accounts with the number reached by multiplying the total value of the accounts receivables by 1.26%. The bid contained the following caveat in small print: ("Contingent on mutual agreement on Purchase & Sale Agreement and a cut-off date that corresponded to date of creation of data files that tie back to the $681,246,890.28"). (Ex. 306 p. 1.)
49. The bid submitted by OPS2 did not contain a separate sheet of paper entitled "Deviations to Bid Conditions" as required per the bid instructions. (Ex. 306.) OPS2 acknowledged receipt and awareness of Addendum No. 1 to Bid No. 2006-06 and the two subsequent addenda in its April 6, 2006 bid. (Ex. 306 p. 3.)
50. OPS2's bid specifically conditioned its acceptance upon a subsequent negotiation of an Account Purchase Agreement with terms that were mutually agreeable. The ITB and its addenda did not allow for a bid to be placed on such an open-ended contingency such that OPS2 had unfettered discretion to abandon its bid. OPS2 gained a material advantage to be able to negotiate one-on-one with a UMC representative after bid opening. It also gained a material advantage over bidders and prospective bidders alike in bidding itself into a negotiation without having any monetary stake should it decide that it could not agree with UMC's terms at the end of future negotiations.
51. OPS2 did not, prior to submitting its bid, ever utilize a bid protest to seek clarification of any provision in the ITB and its addendum. OPS2 did not inform UMC in its bid of any proposed, substantive deviations upon which the offer was contingent.
52. On April 18, 2006, UMC CEO Lacy Thomas submitted an agenda item for the Board of Hospital Trustees/Clark County Board of Commissioners ("Board") recommending it award Bid No. 2006-06, Accounts Receivable Sale, to OPS2 as the highest, responsible bidder. (Ex. 317.)
53. The recommendation was designated to be part of the consent agenda at the April 18, 2006 meeting. Prior to the meeting, the Board was only informed that, among the three bids submitted, the amount bid by OPS2 was highest. It was not given a copy of the OPS2's bid or any proposed contract.
54. Based on this limited information, the Board accepted the recommendation and awarded "the sale of one lot of Aged Accounts Receivables" to OPS2 and "authorize[d] the Chief Executive Officer [Thomas] to sign the necessary documents to effectuate the sale." (Ex. 316.)
55. Because the sale exceeded $500,000.00, Board approval was necessary for any resulting contract arising from the Invitation to Bid and its addenda.
56. After the bids were opened, but before bid approval, Sett and his lawyer began negotiating with Don Haight ("Haight"), contract administrator for UMC, and Thomas to create (as Sett testified, "from scratch") a contract for the purchase of the accounts receivable.
57. Sett utilized a contract he had used for the sale of accounts from a private sale as a model and sent Haight a draft document entitled Account Purchase Agreement ("APA"). He did not make any attempt to conform the draft agreement to the terms and conditions set forth in the ITB. He did however meet with Christy to discuss the particular exclusions of accounts that they now believed should be a part of the contract in order to put back certain accounts for repurchase or replacement with more valued and collectible ones.
58. Several versions of the APA were still passed between OPS2's legal representatives and Haight. (Exs. 11, 12 and 15.)
59. On May 16, 2006, OPS2, through its representative Sett, and Thomas executed the APA for the transfer of the subject accounts. (Ex. 307.) This contract was never submitted to the Board for approval.
60. The APA varied from the ITB and the Addendums in the following areas:
61. Each of these deviations inured to the benefit of OPS2 and gave it a material advantage over bidders and prospective bidders and undermined the public's interest in compliance with the competitive bid process. The deviations increased the potential profitability of the accounts by markedly increasing their collectability and value as a whole, while decreasing the financial expenditures OPS2 would have to invest to collect on the accounts. These material advantages given to OPS2 came without a corresponding increase to the public coffers.
62. On May 18, 2006, Sett and Thomas executed an Amendment to the APA ("Amendment Number 1") allowing OPS2 to only pay $5,740,881.54 for the account portfolio. (Ex. 308.) This amendment reduced the sale price by $2,842,828.82. This figure was comprised of two considerations: (1) a $2.2 million dollar "hold back" to account for adjustments OPS2 desired for the post-sale scrub by UMC mandated in the APA; and (2) a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the sale price for monies which had been received by UMC on accounts sold from March 20, 2006 until April 30, 2006.
63. Amendment Number 1 deviated from the ITB and the Addendums in the following areas:
64. As with the deviations between the ITB and the original APA, the deviations between Amendment 1 and the ITB are also material. They also inured to the benefit of OPS2 and directly and markedly affected price. The unauthorized 1/3 reduction of $2,842,828.82 from $8,583,710.82 lowered OPS2's effective percentage on the bid from 1.26% to 0.84%.
65. On June 19, 2006, Sett and Thomas executed Amendment 2 to the APA with a new agreement regarding judgment accounts. (Exs. 329 and 330.)
66. Addendum Number 1 to the ITB stated there would a reduction in the value of the accounts receivables sold for accounts which had either payment arrangement accounts or judgments as those accounts would be withheld by UMC.
67. Neither Amendment 1 nor Amendment 2 were ever submitted to the Board for approval.
68. UMC did not received the $2,842,828.82 difference from the bid award amount.
69. OPS2, after bid opening, was therefore able to lower its bid substantially to an amount which was only slightly higher than the next highest bid. (Ex. 317.) In addition to lowering its bid 33% it was also able to negotiate a contract and amendments to the contract that markedly modified the ITB and its amendments so as to give OPS2 numerous additional benefits that increased the value of the account portfolio, increased the likelihood of collectability on the accounts and diminished costs and the level of resources needed by OPS2 to collect on the accounts.
70. OPS2 subsequently attempted to enforce the terms of the Section 7.2 of the APA requiring UMC to substitute the potentially uncollectible accounts for newer accounts. (Ex. 346.) The alleged amount of the total accounts for which OPS2 sought substitution with UMC accounts outside of the lot with dates of service on or after January 1, 2004 was a total of $83,752,584.57.
71. Following disagreement regarding the scope of the APA substitution clause, OPS2 then submitted a third Amendment to be signed by Thomas in November of 2006.
72. After this third Amendment was prepared by OPS2, Holly Gordon (the civil DA assigned to UMC) became aware of the APA, the two Amendments to that purported Agreement and the proposed Third Amendment as well as the disputes that had arisen from them.
73. Upon learning this information
74. After receiving the accounts receivable portfolio from UMC, OPS2 transferred all accounts-save Allied's judgments-to Christy and Aargon.
75. Christy used the same methodology towards collection for OPS2 that he had for UMC. Aargon had sufficient manpower, technology, tactics and motivation to be considered a superior collection agency.
76. Christy reported his first 12 months of collections for OPS2 was very lucrative and went "very well."
77. Aargon collected less than 1% of the transferred portfolio the first 12 months. After 18 months, Aargon had only collected a total of 1.2% of the transferred portfolio.
78. The highest collections success on a purchased account receivable portfolio occurs within the first 12 to 18 months after purchase. Thereafter, the liquidation rates decrease dramatically.
79. In the subsequent 12 months (2008), Aargon collected an additional 0.26% of the transferred portfolio. In 2009, Aargon's collections dropped to 0.092%. Through March of 2012, OPS2 collected a total of $9,426,236.52 or 1.68% of the transferred portfolio.
80. There is no credible evidence that the access provided OPS2 from May 19, 2006 to the present had a substantive negative impact on either OPS2's non-litigation collection efforts or litigation collection efforts.
81. William Ayers ("Ayers") and John Collier ("Collier") provided testimony about collection rates and expected returns but those opinions were speculative and failed to account for the unique nature of the subject accounts or the community from which they were generated.
82. The opinions of Ayers and Collier fail to meet the standards of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
83. The Court finds the allegations surrounding UMC's receipt of the Teni Azjeri check to be unfounded. Even if true, however, the allegation provide no basis for a damage award in this case. OPS2 has at best established that Myers placed the check in an envelope to give to Aargon. There is no breach of contract for Myers' alleged conduct and there is no other claim in the suit to impose liability against UMC for this alleged conduct.
84. UMC has directly received payment on some of the accounts that were included in the one lot of accounts placed on the disc. The total amount received by UMC from March 20, 2006, up through end of March 2012 on over 5,559 of these particular accounts, is $1,124,286.46. UMC received approximately 84% of this total during the first six months after transfer of the account and nearly 90% of the total was received in the first year after transfer. [Ex. 321].
85. OPS2's allegation that UMC's retention of this money provides a basis for damages is also unfounded. First, OPS2 has already been credited with $642,829.28 as part of the over-stated Pre-Closing Netted Collections figure of Section 2.4 of Amendment 1 to the APA. [Exs. 308 p. 2]. OPS2's claim that it is owed the money UMC received in March — April 2006 of the accounts in the portfolio is another attempt to have a double recovery. OPS2 was in effect already paid by the reduction of the purchase price by approximately $643,000 based upon UMC's receivables on these accounts during this time.
86. Further, the remaining $481,457.18 is subsumed by OPS2's offset retention of the entire $2.2 million dollar hold-back and the retention of nearly $4 million dollars of Allied's judgments. Even assuming the scrub performed by UMC and the resulting hold-back from the scrub for alleged deceased or bankrupt debtors were not material deviations from the ITB and its addenda, the evidence establishes OPS2's retention of the $2,200,000 from the scrub was considerably more than the value of accounts turned up in the scrub. This fact is established through the testimony of Collier and the fact that OPS2 paid less than 1.26% of all accounts that it states are conforming under the APA.
87. If this Court were to consider the number mentioned by Collier reflecting the alleged value of accounts which were conforming and non-litigation, OPS2 paid substantially less for these accounts than it bid. An application of the 1.26% purchase rate to this smaller number of APA conforming accounts reveals as of today OPS2 has still underpaid UMC in the amount of $340,238.04 (i.e., $482,628,538.43 x .0126 = $6,081,119.58 and subtracting the paid $5,740,881.64 from that number = $340,238.04). In other words, if the Court were to credit OPS2 for the value of every account it alleges is non-conforming is under the APA and assign these accounts a zero value, OPS2 still underpaid for the remaining "conforming' accounts in the portfolio at their 1.26% bid rate by over $340,000.00.
88. The Court further notes the potential for OPS2 to have recovered money from the accounts it seeks to have substituted. The APA permitted OPS2 to both collect on medicare/medicaid accounts as well as obtain substitution for those same accounts. [Ex. 307 pp. 6, 10, 12]. OPS2 under the APA could theoretically collect from Account debtors, who have filed for bankruptcy at one point, if the UMC debt has not been discharged and obtain payment of debts from decedent's estates and yet still declare these accounts non-conforming and subject to substitution.
89. In addition, OPS2 would have received money from the settlement campaign effort employed by Aargon from May 1, 2006 to the end of the month when the alleged offers expired per the letter.
90. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds OPS2 recovery of $9,426,236.52 from the sold accounts to date, given their dramatically reduced payment of only $5,740,881.54 in May of 2006 for these accounts, to be a more than reasonable compensation for their efforts.
91. If any Finding of Fact is also considered a Conclusion of Law it is the Court's intention that it be so considered.
1. The APA contained material deviations from the ITB and is therefore void. OPS2's bid did not confirm to the bid specifications and therefore the ITB did not become a contract between the parties. Orion Portfolio Serv. 2, LLC v. County of Clark ex rel. Univ. Med. Ctr. of Southern Nevada, 245 P.3d 527, 533 (2010) (A "contract is void if it materially differs from the contents of the invitation to bid." ).
2. The Court concludes that the differences between the APA and the ITB are material because they were objectively capable of affecting the amount of the bid or giving a bidder an advantage or benefit that other bidders or prospective bidders did not enjoy. See Cypress Security, LLC v. City and County of San Francisco, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 107, 117 (2010) (stating a variance is allowable only if it "cannot have affected the amount of the bid or given a bidder an advantage or benefit not allowed other bidders").
3. Additionally, OPS2 failed to make certain that the APA contained no material deviations from the ITB. On this point, the Nevada Supreme Court unanimously held:
Orion, 245 P.3d at 534 n.5; see also Schaefer v. Anne Arundel County, MD., 17 F.3d 711, 714 (4th Cir. 1994) ("it seems more reasonable that an individual should occasionally suffer from the mistakes of public agents or officials, than to adopt a rule, which, through improper combinations or collusion, might be turned to the detriment and injury of the public. . . . Thus, persons who contract with the government do so at their own peril when they fail to take notice of the limits of the agent's authority.").
4. The words "structured settlement" as used in Exhibit 302 at page 3 means a settlement offer made calling for periodic payments over time. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 5891(c)(1). The ITB did not prohibit the inclusion of accounts offered other types of settlements. The Court further finds the words under Special Provision 13 stating UMC had the right to elect to repurchase or replace "ineligible Accounts due to a filed bankruptcy" means that this election applied to UMC debts that were discharged in a bankruptcy. The election attached with the account becoming ineligible due to a filed bankruptcy as opposed to any bankruptcy merely involving the debtor.
5. The APA and the executed Amendments to the APA are void because they contain various terms not included in the ITB and its addenda and exclude various terms that were included in the ITB and its addenda. Certain of these deviations are material in and of themselves and certain other deviations cumulate to become material as they clearly affect the price and the quantity and quality of the account portfolio in total.
6. The guarantees in Section 3.4 of the APA, enabling OPS2 to disqualify numerous accounts in the portfolio identified in the ITB that included hundreds of thousands of accounts that came without guarantee of collectability with newer accounts free of any indicia of non-collectability, are material, either individually or cumulatively. (Ex. 307, Section 3.4.)
7. The substitute accounts provision included in Section 7.2 of the APA and not provided for in the ITB clearly affects the price, quantity and quality of what was included in the bid, and is material.
8. The hold-back provisions in the APA and Amendment 1 enabling OPS2 to pay UMC only $5,740,882 of its bid of $8,583,710.82 (a discount of approximately 33%) is also a material deviation and demonstrates the problem with changing terms and conditions of a bid when negotiating a contract with a governmental entity after a bid award in the competitive bidding process.
9. The APA provision calling for UMC to provide documentation of the debts and permitting OPS2 on-line access to computers is also a material deviation from the ITB as the ITB only stated that patients will be provided itemized bills when there was a challenge to the debt. The availability of these UMC resources makes the portfolio more valuable as collection percentage would increase and consequently affect the valuation of the bid. It further places a resource burden and increased costs on UMC and thus the taxpayers that was not revealed to the public in the ITB.
10. The inclusion of the provisions in the ABA waiving sovereign immunity, requiring insurance coverage, and allowing for attorney fees are further material deviations from the ITB as this additional conditions also affect valuation of the bid for both the public and the potential bidders.
11. The exclusion of certain terms in the ITB from the APA, specifically (1) Discrimination; (2) Assignment of Contractual Rights; (3) Termination for Convenience; and (4) Termination for Cause, are further material deviations as they increase UMC liabilities and ability to terminate the contract which also substantively affect the quality and price of the bid.
12. UMC did not violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because UMC and OPS2 failed to enter into a valid contract. As the Court has previously stated, the material deviations between the ITB and the APA make the APA void.
13. In Nevada, a noncomplying governmental contract that is declared void denies the possibility of any equitable recovery, even when work has been performed and the governmental unit has received the benefit of that performance. Blaine Equipment Co., Inc. v. State, 138 P.3d 820, 824 (2006). Therefore, OPS2 cannot recover for any equitable claim including unjust enrichment and a quanum meruit theory. Further, even if the Court could grant equitable relief, it would not do so because OPS2 has not sufficiently proven actual damages. OPS2 has received more than reasonable compensation for its services from the monies it has already collected from the accounts in the portfolio of $9,426,236.52.
14. Therefore, UMC has not deprived OPS2 of a benefit that justly belongs to OPS2. "[U]njust enrichment occurs whenever a person has and retains a benefit which in equity and good conscience belongs to another. Unjust enrichment is the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another. . . ." Nevada Industrial Dev. v. Benedetti, 741 P.2d 802, 804 n. 2 (1987) (citations omitted).
15. It has been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that OPS2 was enriched by its dealings with UMC of an amount far greater than it was justly due under the ITB and its addenda. It even paid less than it owed UMC using OPS2 own bid rate for accounts it determined was free and clear of the guarantees embodied in the APA-which are all still material deviations from the ITB and its addenda.
16. If any Conclusion of Law is considered a Finding of Fact it is the Court's intention that it be so considered.
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision of the Court that the APA is void because it materially differed from the ITB, and OPS2 cannot recover for any breach thereof. Furthermore, OPS2 has no valid claim for: (1) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) quantum meruit; or (3) unjust enrichment.