JENNIFER DORSEY, District Judge.
This is a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a Nevada state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This order resolves all pending motions.
Respondents' answer and supporting exhibits were accompanied by a motion to file petitioner's presentence report under seal. See Docs. 11-18. Although there is a strong presumption favoring public access to judicial filings and documents, see Nixon v. Warner Comm., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006); Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003), the court has inherent power over its own records and files and may deny access if the documents may be used for "improper purposes." Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598; Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179; Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1433-34 (9th Cir. 1995).
Petitioner's presentence report is offered in support of Respondents' answer, making it part of a dispositive pleading. The Ninth Circuit permits district court to seal this type of document for "compelling reasons." Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179-89. Compelling reasons exist to seal petitioner's presentence report. This document contains confidential information about petitioner, as defined under NRS 176.156. On balance, the potential harm to petitioner if the presentence report is unsealed outweighs the public's right to access this sensitive document. Accordingly, Respondents have made an adequate showing of compelling reasons to keep the presentence report sealed, and I grant the motion to seal the presentence report. Doc. 17.
Back in April, petitioner filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 3. I denied that application as moot because petitioner already paid the filing fee, and the point of a pauper application is to obtain relief from the initial obligation of paying the $5 filing fee. See Doc. 4. On November 12, 2014, petitioner filed a second application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 20. I deny this second application as moot for the same reason I denied the first one: petitioner already paid the filing fee.
Also in April, I denied petitioner's request for appointment of counsel. I reasoned that the petition is well-written and presents the issues with sufficient clarity, and the issues in this case are not complex, therefore appointed counsel is not justified. Doc. 4 at 2. Nothing in petitioner's second motion for counsel (Doc. 21) persuades me otherwise. Accordingly, petitioner's second motion for the appointment of counsel is denied.
Finally, petitioner has filed a motion for an extension of time in which to file a reply to the answer. Doc. 22. Good cause appearing, petitioner is granted a 30-day extension. If he desires to file a reply brief, it is due by February 11, 2015.