ORDER

MIRANDA M. DU, District Judge.

Defendant John Thomas Abrams is facing trial on a three-count indictment, including two counts of kidnapping. (Dkt. no. 65.) Defendant elected to represent himself (dkt. no. 86), and the Court appointed Dennis Cameron as standby counsel (dkt. no. 87). Trial is set to commence on February 16, 2016. (Dkt. no. 145.)

During a status conference held on February 1, 2016, Defendant reiterated his desire to represent himself, but requested that the Court expand Mr. Cameron's role to allow him to serve as "co-counsel." In particular, Defendant asked that Mr. Cameron be permitted to conduct Defendant's examination and the cross-examination of one of the government's witnesses. The government objected to Defendant's request, citing concerns that such "hybrid representation" is not permissible under governing case law.1 This Order addresses Defendant's request.

In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the United States Supreme Court recognized a criminal defendant's right to represent himself. Subsequently, in McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-78, 182-84 (1984), the Court established the contours of standby counsel's role, explaining the extent to which standby counsel may participate in a proceeding without violating a pro se defendant's right to self-representation.2 Before McKaskle, the Ninth Circuit observed that "[t]he Supreme Court and this circuit have recognized the efficacy of hybrid representation to aid pro se defendants and protect the integrity of the trial process." Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983). "Hybrid representation" refers to two distinct forms of representation — (1) advisory counsel, which "describe[s] the situation when a pro se defendant is given technical assistance by an attorney in the courtroom, but the attorney does not participate in the actual conduct of the trial;"3 or (2) co-counsel, which describes the situation when "the attorney may participate directly in the trial proceedings with the defendant (examining witnesses, objecting to evidence, etc.)." Id. at 407. While the court may appoint advisory counsel or co-counsel, a pro se defendant does not have a constitutional right to such representation. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183 ("Faretta does not require a trial judge to permit `hybrid' representation. . . ."); United States v. Kienenberger, 13 F.3d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1994) ("A defendant does not have a constitutional right to `hybrid' representation."); Locks, 703 F.3d at 407.

In McKaskle, the Supreme Court also clarified that "[p]articipation by counsel with a pro se defendant's express approval is, of course, constitutionally unobjectionable." 465 U.S. at 182. Thus, a pro se defendant's request for standby counsel to participate in a trial "obliterates" any claim that the participation usurps his or her Faretta rights. Id.; Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) ("Faretta established that standby attorneys can assist pro se defendants `if and when' their help is requested.") (quoting Faretta, 465 U.S. at 834 n. 46). Whether to "allow a defendant to proceed with either form of hybrid representation" (i.e., as stand-by counsel or co-counsel) is within the trial court's discretion. Locks, 703 F.2d at 408.

In this case, Defendant has expressly requested that Mr. Cameron elevate his role to co-counsel in two ways — by conducting Defendant's examination and by cross-examining one of the government's witnesses. To be fair, for Mr. Cameron to be effective in his role as co-counsel, he must have full discretion to make strategic decisions relating to these two examinations. But Mr. Cameron's exercise of such discretion may result in a disagreement with Defendant, and could even infringe on Defendant's Faretta rights. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178 (noting that standby counsel's unsolicited control over witness questioning may undermine Faretta rights). To alleviate the first concern and to ensure an efficient and smooth presentation before the jury, the Court must establish in advance the contours of Mr. Cameron's elevated role of co-counsel. Doing so will also permit Defendant to knowingly decide whether to request Mr. Cameron's added participation. If, after accepting these contours, Defendant consents to Mr. Cameron's representation, Defendant cannot raise constitutional objections to such representation, even though Mr. Cameron's expanded role could limit Defendant's right to self-representation. Instead, Mr. Cameron's expanded participation is provided only at Defendant's request and with his consent. Thus, Defendant's consent to Mr. Cameron's increased participation after being informed of the parameters of Mr. Cameron's co-counsel role would obviate any concerns about eroding Defendant's Faretta rights.

After balancing Defendant's request for assistance with the risk of impairing his Faretta rights, the Court is inclined to grant Defendant's request as long as he understands the following contours of Mr. Cameron's elevated role as co-counsel in connection with Defendant's examination and the cross-examination of one of the government's witnesses:

The Court will entertain input from the parties at the next scheduled status conference before issuing a final ruling. The parties should, of course, continue their preparation for trial, which will proceed on February 16, 2016, as scheduled.