Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration

[ECF No. 151]

JENNIFER A. DORSEY, District Judge.

I previously granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Bradley Roberts on his gender-discrimination claim against defendant Clark County School District (CCSD). In that order, I also rejected CCSD's argument that Roberts's discrimination claims are time barred under the applicable statutes of limitations for two independent reasons: (1) the limitations period appears to be tolled by a Nevada statute, and (2) in any event, the circumstances warrant equitable tolling. CCSD believes I was wrong on both fronts, and it now asks me to reconsider my ruling.1 CCSD's motion for reconsideration rehashes the same arguments it made to me before. I reject them for the same reasons, but I also provide some additional explanation to the parties.

As to statutory tolling, CCSD first notes that NRS 613.430 requires discrimination claims to be filed in court within 180 days of the discrimination, and this period is tolled only while a claim is pending before NERC. CCSD concludes that because NERC discharged Roberts's first discrimination charge on October 11, 2012 (leaving it no longer "pending"), the limitations-period clock restarted and the deadline for Roberts to file this case expired shortly thereafter (a deadline Roberts clearly missed when he filed this case in October 2014).

But CCSD fails to fully address the impact of Roberts's second discrimination charge, which he filed in the end of October 2012 — weeks after NERC had closed his first charge.2 CCSD admits the statute of limitations period was tolled until October 11, 2012, when NERC closed Robert's first charge.3 The limitations period might have restarted at that point — as CCSD suggests — if it were not for the fact that Roberts filed a second discrimination charge later in October 2012, which triggered the tolling statute once again. This is precisely what I held in my prior order.4

CCSD's arguments for reconsideration implicitly suggest that a discrimination victim only gets one bite at the tolling statute: once he has been through NERC, he cannot use the tolling statute again for that claim by filing an additional charge. But CCSD cites no authority indicating that NRS 613.430 works that way. The statute's text says that as long as a charge is pending before NERC, the limitations period is tolled. Nothing in the statute or the authorities cited by CCSD suggests that a discrimination victim cannot re-toll the limitations period by filing another charge (in effect, asking NERC to reconsider its decision). NERC never withdrew Roberts's second discrimination claim, apparently it remained pending before both the EEOC and the NERC until shortly before Roberts filed this suit.5 This still-pending second discrimination charge tolled the statute of limitations until Roberts filed this case.

But even if Roberts's second discrimination charge did not trigger the tolling statute, the confusing history of the treatment of his charge makes this a prime case for equitable tolling. I may equitably toll the limitations period for a discrimination claim when the plaintiff diligently pursued his claims with the administrative agency, prejudice to the defendant is slight, and justice favors tolling.6 I also consider whether the plaintiff reasonably relied on the agency's statements and actions.7

Nevada courts have made clear that discrimination victims' cases should not generally be thrown out because of minor procedural mistakes, and if Roberts did make a mistake here, it was a minor one. Roberts filed two discrimination charges, and NERC only withdrew one. There was no way for Roberts to know that NERC intended to withdraw his second charge (or that it believed his first charge somehow applied to his second charge). Neither the EEOC nor NERC ever informed Roberts that his second charge was not pending with the agencies (and thus tolling the limitations period). Much the opposite: the EEOC continued to investigate his claim. From Roberts's perspective, his second charge had spurred the agencies to investigate — if anything, it was reasonable for him to believe he was foreclosed from filing this case until the investigation was completed. This is particularly true given that, as I explained above, NERC and the EEOC's materials expressed to Roberts that the agencies work together to process discrimination claims. It was perfectly plausible for Roberts to rely on the fact that the EEOC was investigating his charge as evidence that his case was still pending before the agencies.

And CCSD still fails to articulate any significant prejudice it will suffer if I were to toll the period. It suggests that it was prejudiced because it took some action in response to Roberts's first charge — but that is not the sort of prejudice that equitable tolling is concerned with. What matters is whether the "defendant, by reason of a plaintiff's delay, is or will be worse off than he would have been if the plaintiff had enforced his rights in a timely fashion."8 CCSD changed its policy after Roberts filed his administrative charge, but that does not explain how CCSD was made worse off by Roberts waiting (while the EEOC investigated his claims) to bring this lawsuit.9

Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that CCSD's Motion for Reconsideration [ECF No. 151] is DENIED.