ORDER

JAMES C. MAHAN, District Judge.

Presently before the court is defendant Maria Larkin's motion in limine. (ECF No. 260). The government filed a response (ECF No. 270), to which defendant replied (ECF No. 281).

I. Facts

On November 16, 2016, the government filed a second superseding indictment, charging defendant with one count—tax evasion in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 7201. (ECF No. 135). Trial is currently set for March 13, 2017.

The second superseding indictment alleges that defendant willfully attempted to evade and defeat the payment of trust fund recovery penalties by concealing and attempting to conceal her access to personal funds and assets from the IRS through acts, including, but not limited to the following:

(ECF No. 135 at 4-5).

In the instant motion in limine, defendant moves to preclude the government from introducing various exhibits into evidence during trial. (ECF No. 260).

II. Legal Standard

"The court must decide any preliminary question about whether . . . evidence is admissible." Fed. R. Evid. 104. Motions in limine are procedural mechanisms by which the court can make evidentiary rulings in advance of trial, often to preclude the use of unfairly prejudicial evidence. United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2009); Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2003).

"Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials." Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1980). Motions in limine may be used to exclude or admit evidence in advance of trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 103; United States v. Williams, 939 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming district court's ruling in limine that prosecution could admit impeachment evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 609).

Judges have broad discretion when ruling on motions in limine. See Jenkins v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 922 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The district court has considerable latitude in performing a Rule 403 balancing test and we will uphold its decision absent clear abuse of discretion."). "[I]n limine rulings are not binding on the trial judge [who] may always change his mind during the course of a trial." Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n.3 (2000); accord Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 (noting that in limine rulings are always subject to change, especially if the evidence unfolds in an unanticipated manner).

"Denial of a motion in limine does not necessarily mean that all evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted at trial. Denial merely means that without the context of trial, the court is unable to determine whether the evidence in question should be excluded." Conboy v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, No. 2:11-cv-1649-JCM-CWH, 2013 WL 1701069, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 18, 2013).

III. Discussion

Defendant argues that various government exhibits should be excluded as irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, improper testimonial statements, cumulative, and hearsay. (ECF No. 260).

In response, the government asserts that it will limit exhibits 1, 2, 3, 50, 61, 62, 65, 70, 82-84, and 134 to the years 2009, 2010, and 2011. (ECF No. 270 at 3-5). The government further asserts that it will remove the requested documents from exhibits 59, 61, 62, 65, 83, and 133. (ECF No. 270 at 5-6).

In light of the government's concessions in its response (ECF No. 270), the court will deny defendant's motion in limine (ECF No. 260). The court will rule on objections to the exhibits as they are offered into evidence at trial.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that defendant Maria Larkin's motion in limine (ECF No. 260) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.