ORDER

JAMES C. MAHAN, District Judge.

Presently before the court is defendant Montecito Village Community Association's (the "HOA") motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 21). Plaintiff Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC ("CMS") filed a response (ECF No. 27), to which the HOA replied (ECF No. 35).

Also before the court is defendant Premier One Holdings, Inc.'s ("Premier") motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 22). CMS filed a response (ECF No. 28), to which Premier replied (ECF No. 31).

Also before the court is CMS's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 24). The HOA (ECF No. 29) and Premier (ECF No. 30) filed responses, to which CMS replied (ECF No. 37).

I. Facts

This case involves a dispute over real property located at 8552 Barkeria Court, Las Vegas, Nevada 89149 (the "property"). On March 3, 2008 Cristian Portillo and Carmen Morilla obtained a loan in the amount of $204,786.00 to purchase the property, which was secured by a deed of trust recorded on March 10, 2008. (ECF No. 1).

The deed of trust was assigned to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP ("BAC") via an assignment of deed of trust recorded on July 26, 2011. (ECF No. 23-3).

On December 28, 2011, defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc. ("NAS"), acting on behalf of the HOA, recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien. (ECF No. 1). On February 22, 2012, NAS recorded a notice of default and election to sell to satisfy the delinquent assessment lien, stating an amount due of $2,440.90. (ECF No. 1).

On March 29, 2012, Bank of America, N.A. ("BANA") requested a ledger from the HOA/NAS identifying the superpriority amount allegedly owed to the HOA. (ECF No. 1). The HOA/NAS allegedly refused to provide a ledger. (ECF No. 1). BANA calculated the superpriority amount to be $423.00 and tendered that amount to NAS on March 29, 2012, which NAS allegedly refused. (ECF No. 1).

On February 7, 2013, NAS recorded a notice of trustee's sale, stating an amount due of $4,096.17. (ECF No. 1). On March 1, 2013, Premier purchased the property at the foreclosure sale for $10,000. (ECF No. 1). A trustee's deed upon sale in favor of Premier was recorded on March 4, 2013. (ECF No. 1).

After the foreclosure sale extinguished the deed of trust, it was assigned to CMS via an assignment of deed of trust recorded on March 2, 2015. (ECF No. 1 at 3).

On July 27, 2016, CMS filed the underlying complaint, alleging four causes of action: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113 against NAS and the HOA; (3) wrongful foreclosure against NAS and the HOA; and (4) injunctive relief against Premier. (ECF No. 1).1

In the instant motions, the HOA, Premier, and CMS all move for summary judgment in their favor. (ECF Nos. 21, 22, 24). The court will address each as it sees fit.

II. Legal Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

For purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.

In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. The moving party must first satisfy its initial burden. "When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case." C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

By contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).

If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987).

In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

At summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The evidence of the nonmovant is "to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249-50.

III. Discussion

A. Claims (2) through (4)

Claims (2) and (3) of CMS's complaint (ECF No. 1) will be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred by the statute of limitations.

Claim (2) of CMS's complaint alleges that NAS and the HOA violated NRS 116.1113, which imposes an obligation of good faith in every contract or duty governed by Chapter 116. (ECF No. 1). For relief, CMS seeks damages in the amount of either the property's fair market value or the unpaid principal on the loan as of the date of the HOA sale. (ECF No. 1).

Because claim (2) is a claim for damages based on the alleged breach of a statutory duty, it must be brought within three years. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3)(a). The foreclosure sale took place on March 1, 2013. CMS brought this lawsuit more than three years later, on July 27, 2016. Therefore, claim two is time-barred, and the HOA's motion to dismiss will be granted as to this claim.

Claim (3) of CMS's complaint alleges that the foreclosure sale was wrongful because the HOA and NAS failed to give proper notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiency, and the HOA sold the property for a grossly inadequate amount. (ECF No. 1). CMS seeks damages in the amount of the property's fair market value or the unpaid principal loan balance as of the time of the foreclosure sale. (ECF No. 1).

A tortious wrongful foreclosure claim "challenges the authority behind the foreclosure, not the foreclosure act itself." McKnight Family, L.L.P. v. Adept Mgmt., 310 P.3d 555, 559 (Nev. 2013). NAS's authority to foreclose on the HOA lien on behalf of the HOA arose from Chapter 116, essentially rendering count (3) a claim for damages based on liability created by a statute. Therefore, claim three is likewise time-barred under NRS 11.190(3)(a) because it was not brought within three years.

Claim (4) is dismissed without prejudice because the court follows the well-settled rule in that a claim for "injunctive relief" standing alone is not a cause of action. See, e.g., In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig., 490 F.Supp.2d 1091, 1130 (D. Nev. 2007); Tillman v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., No. 2:12-CV-346 JCM RJJ, 2012 WL 1279939, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2012) (finding that "injunctive relief is a remedy, not an independent cause of action"); Jensen v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 702 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ("A request for injunctive relief by itself does not state a cause of action.").

Accordingly, the court will dismiss claims (2) and (3) of CMS's complaint (ECF No. 1) with prejudice as time-barred by the statute of limitations and dismiss claim (4) without prejudice.

B. Claim (1) — Quiet Title2

As an initial matter, the court takes judicial notice of the following recorded documents: first deed of trust (ECF Nos. 23-1, 23-2); notice of delinquent assessment (ECF No. 23-4); notice of default and election to sell (ECF No. 23-5); notice of trustee's sale (ECF No. 23-6); trustee's deed upon sale (ECF No. 23-7); and assignments of deed of trust (ECF Nos. 23-3, 23-8). See, e.g., United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a court may take judicial notice of public records if the facts noticed are not subject to reasonable dispute); Intri-Plex Tech., Inv. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007).

Under Nevada law, "[a]n action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real property, adverse to the person bringing the action for the purpose of determining such adverse claim." Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.010. "A plea to quiet title does not require any particular elements, but each party must plead and prove his or her own claim to the property in question and a plaintiff's right to relief therefore depends on superiority of title." Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, for plaintiff to succeed on its quiet title action, it needs to show that its claim to the property is superior to all others. See also Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 918 P.2d 314, 318 (Nev. 1996) ("In a quiet title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to prove good title in himself.").

Section 116.3116(1) of the Nevada Revised Statutes gives an HOA a lien on its homeowners' residences for unpaid assessments and fines; moreover, NRS 116.3116(2) gives priority to that HOA lien over all other liens and encumbrances with limited exceptions—such as "[a] first security interest on the unit recorded before the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent." Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2)(b).

The statute then carves out a partial exception to subparagraph (2)(b)'s exception for first security interests. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2). In SFR Investment Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, the Nevada Supreme Court provided the following explanation:

334 P.3d 408, 411 (Nev. 2014) ("SFR Investments").

Chapter 116 of the Nevada Revised Statutes permits an HOA to enforce its superpriority lien by nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Id. at 415. Thus, "NRS 116.3116(2) provides an HOA a true superpriority lien, proper foreclosure of which will extinguish a first deed of trust." Id. at 419; see also Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.31162(1) (providing that "the association may foreclose its lien by sale" upon compliance with the statutory notice and timing rules).

Subsection (1) of NRS 116.31166 provides that the recitals in a deed made pursuant to NRS 116.31164 of the following are conclusive proof of the matters recited:

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.31166(1)(a)-(c).3 "The `conclusive' recitals concern default, notice, and publication of the [notice of sale], all statutory prerequisites to a valid HOA lien foreclosure sale as stated in NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31164, the sections that immediately precede and give context to NRS 116.31166." Shadow Wood Homeowners Assoc. v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp., Inc., 366 P.3d 1105 (Nev. 2016) ("Shadow Wood"). Nevertheless, courts retain the equitable authority to consider quiet title actions when a HOA's foreclosure deed contains statutorily conclusive recitals. See id. at 1112.

Here, Premier has provided the recorded trustee's deed upon sale, the recorded notice of delinquent assessment, the recorded notice of default and election to sell, and the recorded notice of trustee's sale. (See ECF No. 23). Pursuant to NRS 116.31166, these recitals in the recorded foreclosure deed are conclusive to the extent that they implicate compliance with NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31164, which provide the statutory prerequisites of a valid foreclosure. See id. at 1112 ("[T]he recitals made conclusive by operation of NRS 116.31166 implicate compliance only with the statutory prerequisites to foreclosure."). Therefore, pursuant to NRS 116.31166 and the recorded foreclosure deed, the foreclosure sale is valid to the extent that it complied with NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31164.

Importantly, while NRS 116.3116 accords certain deed recitals conclusive effect—e.g., default, notice, and publication of the notice of sale—it does not conclusively, as a matter of law, entitle Premier to success on its quiet title claim. See Shadow Wood, 366 P.3d at 1112 (rejecting contention that NRS 116.31166 defeats, as a matter of law, actions to quiet title). Thus, the question remains whether CMS has demonstrated sufficient grounds to justify setting aside the foreclosure sale. See id.

"When sitting in equity . . . courts must consider the entirety of the circumstances that bear upon the equities. This includes considering the status and actions of all parties involved, including whether an innocent party may be harmed by granting the desired relief." Id.

CMS raises the following grounds in support of its motion for summary judgment: Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 832 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2016) ("Bourne Valley"); rejected tender; commercial reasonability; supremacy clause; and retroactivity. (ECF No. 24). As set forth in further detail below, the court finds that CMS has failed to set forth sufficient grounds to justify setting aside the foreclosure sale and has not raised a genuine issue to withstand summary judgment.

1. Due Process

CMS argues that NRS Chapter 116 is unconstitutional under Bourne Valley, wherein the Ninth Circuit held that the HOA foreclosure statute is facially unconstitutional. (ECF No. 24 at 5). CMS further contends that Bourne Valley renders any factual issues concerning actual notice is irrelevant. (ECF No. 24 at 6).

The Ninth Circuit held that NRS 116.3116's "opt-in" notice scheme, which required a HOA to alert a mortgage lender that it intended to foreclose only if the lender had affirmatively requested notice, facially violated mortgage lenders' constitutional due process rights. Bourne Valley, 832 F.3d at 1157-58. The facially unconstitutional provision, as identified in Bourne Valley, exists in NRS 116.31163(2). See id. at 1158. At issue is the "opt-in" provision that unconstitutionally shifts the notice burden to holders of the property interest at risk. See id.

"A first deed of trust holder only has a constitutional grievance if he in fact did not receive reasonable notice of the sale at which his property rights was extinguished." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sky Vista Homeowners Ass'n, No. 315CV00390RCJVPC, 2017 WL 1364583, at *4 (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2017). CMS, however, has yet to show that it is a holder of the first deed of trust so as to properly assert a constitutional grievance. See, e.g., Spears v. Spears, 596 P.2d 210, 212 (Nev. 1979) ("The rule is well established that one who is not prejudiced by the operation of a statute cannot question its validity.").

To state a procedural due process claim, a claimant must allege "(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections." Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998). CMS has failed on both prongs.

CMS has failed to show that it was entitled to any notice as it was not assigned the deed of trust until after the foreclosure sale took place. Specifically, the foreclosure sale took place on March 4, 2013. After the foreclosure sale extinguished the deed of trust, it was assigned to CMS via an assignment of deed of trust recorded on March 2, 2015. Therefore, CMS's due process argument fails as a matter of law.

Further, CMS confuses constitutionally mandated notice with the notices required to conduct a valid foreclosure sale. Due process does not require actual notice. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006). Rather, it requires notice "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also Bourne Valley, 832 F.3d at 1158.

Accordingly, CMS has failed to show that summary judgment is proper based on Bourne Valley.

2. Rejected Tender

CMS contends that the deed of trust still encumbers the property because the HOA/NAS wrongfully rejected BANA's tender of the superpriority amount. (ECF No. 24 at 13). The court disagrees as BANA did not tender the amount set forth in the notice of default. Rather, BANA tendered a lesser amount, an amount it calculated to be sufficient.

Under NRS 116.31166(1), the holder of a first deed of trust may pay off the superpriority portion of an HOA lien to prevent the foreclosure sale from extinguishing that security interest. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.31166(1); see also SFR Investments, 334 P.3d at 414 ("But as a junior lienholder, U.S. Bank could have paid off the SHHOA lien to avert loss of its security . . . ."); see also, e.g., 7912 Limbwood Ct. Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., 979 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1149 (D. Nev. 2013) ("If junior lienholders want to avoid this result, they readily can preserve their security interests by buying out the senior lienholder's interest." (citing Carillo v. Valley Bank of Nev., 734 P.2d 724, 725 (Nev. 1987); Keever v. Nicholas Beers Co., 611 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Nev. 1980))).

The superpriority lien portion, however, consists of "the last nine months of unpaid HOA dues and maintenance and nuisance-abatement charges," while the subpriority piece consists of "all other HOA fees or assessments." SFR Investments, 334 P.3d at 411 (emphasis added); see also 7912 Limbwood Ct. Trust, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 1150 ("The superpriority lien consists only of unpaid assessments and certain charges specifically identified in § 116.31162.").

BANA merely presumed, without adequate support, that the amount set forth in the notice of default included more than the superpriority lien portion and that a lesser amount based on BANA's own calculations would be sufficient to preserve its interest in the property. See generally, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 107.080 (allowing trustee's sale under a deed of trust only when a subordinate interest has failed to make good the deficiency in performance or payment for 35 days); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.430 (barring judicially ordered foreclosure sale if the deficiency is made good at least 5 days prior to sale).

The notice of default recorded February 22, 2012, set forth an amount due of $2,440.90. (ECF No. 1). Rather than tendering the $2,440.90 due so as to preserve its interest in the property and then later seeking a refund of any difference, BANA elected to pay a lesser amount ($423.00) based on its unwarranted assumption that the amount stated in the notice included more than what was due. See SFR Investments, 334 P.3d at 418 (noting that the deed of trust holder can pay the entire lien amount and then sue for a refund). Had BANA paid the amount set forth in the notice of default ($2,440.90), the HOA's interest would have been subordinate to the first deed of trust. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.31166(1).

After failing to use the legal remedies available to BANA to prevent the property from being sold to a third party—for example, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and filling a lis pendens on the property (see Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 14.010, 40.060)— BANA/CMS now seeks to profit from its own failure to follow the rules set forth in the statutes. See generally, e.g., Barkley's Appeal. Bentley's Estate, 2 Monag. 274, 277 (Pa. 1888) ("In the case before us, we can see no way of giving the petitioner the equitable relief she asks without doing great injustice to other innocent parties who would not have been in a position to be injured by such a decree as she asks if she had applied for relief at an earlier day."); Nussbaumer v. Superior Court in & for Yuma Cty., 489 P.2d 843, 846 (Ariz. 1971) ("Where the complaining party has access to all the facts surrounding the questioned transaction and merely makes a mistake as to the legal consequences of his act, equity should normally not interfere, especially where the rights of third parties might be prejudiced thereby.").

Accordingly, the deed of trust does not still encumber the property as BANA failed to tender the amount due proper to the foreclosure sale.

3. Commercial Reasonability

CMS argues that the foreclosure sale was commercially unreasonable because the property sold at approximately 7% of its fair market value, which is grossly inadequate so as to justify setting the foreclosure aside. (ECF No. 24 at 20). CMS further argues that the Shadow Wood court adopted the restatement approach, quoting the opinion as holding that "[w]hile gross inadequacy cannot be precisely defined in terms of a specific percentage of fair market value, generally a court is warranted in invalidating a sale where the price is less than 20 percent of fair market value." (ECF No. 24 at 20) (emphasis omitted).

NRS 116.3116 codifies the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act ("UCIOA") in Nevada. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.001 ("This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act"); see also SFR Investments, 334 P.3d at 410. Numerous courts have interpreted the UCIOA and NRS 116.3116 as imposing a commercial reasonableness standard on foreclosure of association liens.4

In Shadow Wood, the Nevada Supreme Court held that an HOA's foreclosure sale may be set aside under a court's equitable powers notwithstanding any recitals on the foreclosure deed where there is a "grossly inadequate" sales price and "fraud, unfairness, or oppression." 366 P.3d at 1110; see also Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 184 F.Supp.3d 853, 857-58 (D. Nev. 2016). In other words, "demonstrating that an association sold a property at its foreclosure sale for an inadequate price is not enough to set aside that sale; there must also be a showing of fraud, unfairness, or oppression." Id. at 1112; see also Long v. Towne, 639 P.2d 528, 530 (Nev. 1982) ("Mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to justify setting aside a foreclosure sale, absent a showing of fraud, unfairness or oppression." (citing Golden v. Tomiyasu, 387 P.2d 989, 995 (Nev. 1963) (stating that, while a power-of-sale foreclosure may not be set aside for mere inadequacy of price, it may be if the price is grossly inadequate and there is "in addition proof of some element of fraud, unfairness, or oppression as accounts for and brings about the inadequacy of price" (internal quotation omitted)))).

Despite CMS's assertion to the contrary, the Shadow Wood court did not adopt the restatement. In fact, nothing in Shadow Wood suggests that the Nevada Supreme Court's adopted, or had the intention to adopt, the restatement. Compare Shadow Wood, 366 P.3d at 1112-13 (citing the restatement as secondary authority to warrant use of the 20% threshold test for grossly inadequate sales price), with St. James Village, Inc. v. Cunningham, 210 P.3d 190, 213 (Nev. 2009) (explicitly adopting § 4.8 of the Restatement in specific circumstances); Foster v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 291 P.3d 150, 153 (Nev. 2012) ("[W]e adopt the rule set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm section 51."); Cucinotta v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 302 P.3d 1099, 1102 (Nev. 2013) (affirmatively adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 592A). Because Nevada courts have not adopted the relevant section(s) of the restatement at issue here, the Long test, which requires a showing of fraud, unfairness, or oppression in addition to a grossly inadequate sale price to set aside a foreclosure sale, controls. See 639 P.2d at 530.

Nevada has not clearly defined what constitutes "unfairness" in determining commercial reasonableness. The few Nevada cases that have discussed commercial reasonableness state, "every aspect of the disposition, including the method, manner, time, place, and terms, must be commercially reasonable." Levers v. Rio King Land & Inv. Co., 560 P.2d 917, 920 (Nev. 1977). This includes "quality of the publicity, the price obtained at the auction, [and] the number of bidders in attendance." Dennison v. Allen Grp. Leasing Corp., 871 P.2d 288, 291 (Nev. 1994) (citing Savage Constr. v. Challenge-Cook, 714 P.2d 573, 574 (Nev. 1986)).

Nevertheless, CMS fails to set forth sufficient evidence to show fraud, unfairness, or oppression so as to justify the setting aside of the foreclosure sale. CMS relies on its repeated assertion that BANA tendered the superpriority amount to show fraud, unfairness, or oppression. However, as the discussed in the previous section, the amount due on the date of BANA's tender was set forth in the notice of default. Rather than tendering the noticed amount under protest so as to preserve its interest and then later seeking a refund of the difference in dispute, BANA chose not to tender a lesser amount, an amount it calculated to be the superpriority portion.

Accordingly, CMS's commercial reasonability argument fails as a matter of law as it failed to set forth evidence of fraud, unfairness, or oppression. See, e.g., Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, No. 70653, 2017 WL 1423938, at *2 n.2 (Nev. App. Apr. 17, 2017) ("Sale price alone, however, is never enough to demonstrate that the sale was commercially unreasonable; rather, the party challenging the sale must also make a showing of fraud, unfairness, or oppression that brought about the low sale price.").

4. Preemption

CMS argues that the HOA lien statute cannot interfere with the federal mortgage insurance program or extinguish mortgage interests insured by the FHA. (ECF No. 24 at 22).

The single-family mortgage insurance program allows FHA to insure private loans, expanding the availability of mortgages to low-income individuals wishing to purchase homes. See Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Sky Meadow Ass'n, 117 F.Supp.2d 970, 980-81 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing program); W Wash. & Sandhill Homeowners Ass'n v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 2:13-cv-01845-GMN-GWF, 2014 WL 4798565, at *1 n.2 (D. Nev. Sept. 25, 2014) (same). If a borrower under this program defaults, the lender may foreclose on the property, convey title to HUD, and submit an insurance claim. 24 C.F.R. § 203.355. HUD's property disposition program generates funds to finance the program. See 24 C.F.R. § 291.1.

Allowing an HOA foreclosure to wipe out a first deed of trust on a federally-insured property thus interferes with the purposes of the FHA insurance program. Specifically, it hinders HUD's ability to recoup funds from insured properties. As this court previously stated in SaticoyBayLLC, Series 7342 Tanglewood Park v. SRMOF II 2012-1 Trust, the court reads the foregoing precedent to indicate that a homeowners' association foreclosure sale under NRS 116.3116 may not extinguish a federally-insured loan. No. 2:13-CV-1199 JCM (VCF), 2015 WL 1990076, at *4 (D. Nev. Apr. 30, 2015).

However, the instant case is distinguishable from these cases in that, here, FHA is not a named party. The complaint does not seek to quiet title against FHA. Thus, this argument provides no support for CMS as the outcome of the instant case has no bearing on FHA's ability to quiet title.

5. Retroactivity

CMS contends that SFR Investments should not be applied retroactively to extinguish the first deed of trust. (ECF No. 24 at 26).

The Nevada Supreme Court has since applied the SFR Investments holding in numerous cases that challenged pre-SFR Investments foreclosure sales. See, e.g., Centeno v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 64998, 2016 WL 3486378, at *2 (Nev. June 23, 2016); LN Mgmt. LLC Series 8301 Boseck 228 v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 64495, 2016 WL 1109295, at *1 (Nev. Mar. 18, 2016) (reversing 2013 dismissal of quiet-title action that concluded contrary to SFR Investments, reasoning that "the district court's decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of the controlling law"); Mackensie Family, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 65696, 2016 WL 315326, at *1 (Nev. Jan. 22, 2016) (reversing and remanding because "[t]he district court's conclusion of law contradicts our holding in SFR Investments Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank"). Thus, SFR Investments applies to this case.

In light of the foregoing, the court finds that CMS has failed to show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its quiet title claim against Premier and the HOA.

On the other hand, Premier and the HOA have shown that they are entitled to judgment as a matter as CMS cannot show that CMS's interest in the property is superior to that of Premier's interest. Premier has provided the recorded foreclosure deed in its favor, which is conclusive of the recitals contained therein, and has shown that its interest in the property is superior to that of CMS's interest.

Further, CMS has provided no grounds to justify setting aside the otherwise valid foreclosure sale.

Accordingly, the court will grant the HOA's (ECF No. 21) and Premier's (ECF No. 22) motions for summary judgment and deny CMS's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 24).

IV. Conclusion

Based on the aforementioned, claims (2) and (3) of CMS's complaint (ECF No. 1) will be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred by the statute of limitations and claim (4) will be dismissed without prejudice. Further, Premier's (ECF No. 22) and the HOA's (ECF No. 21) motions for summary judgment will be granted, and CMS's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 24) will be denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the HOA's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 21) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED consistent with the foregoing.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Premier's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 22) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED consistent with the foregoing.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that CMS's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 24) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

The clerk is instructed to enter judgment accordingly and close the case.