JENNIFER A. DORSEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff Meridian OHC Partners, LP, sues defendants Michael Davis and Rudolf Steiner Foundation, Inc. (RSF) for violating Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Davis, RSF, and Meridian are the three largest shareholders in Cyanotech Corporation—a company that produces natural nutritional supplements made from microalgae. Davis acquired 19.6% of Cyanotech's outstanding common-stock shares in 2002, has served as a member of Cyanotech's Board since 2003, and has been Chairman of the Board since 2011. As of March 17, 2017, Davis claims beneficial ownership of approximately 16.8% of the outstanding common stock.
At some point in 2011, another shareholder wanted to sell its 9.7% interest in Cyanotech. When Davis got wind of the sale, he donated an unprecedented $2.5 million to RSF, who used that money to buy the shares. Then, by using one of his charitable foundations as a vehicle, Davis transferred additional Cyanotech shares to RSF while contemporaneously recouping his own interest through the open market. As of March 17, 2017, RSF holds 16.2% of the outstanding common stock. Davis and RSF collectively own 33% of Cyanotech's outstanding common stock; Meridian owns 13%.
Davis had been reporting his ownership interest on short-form Schedule 13G—a form reserved for passive investors and unavailable to those seeking to control or influence the issuer—instead of Schedule 13D—the standard long-disclosure form for shareholders owning more than 5% of a company's outstanding common stock. In response to Meridian's May 2016 demand, Cyanotech appointed a special committee to investigate whether Davis was required to file a Schedule 13D based on his significant ownership interest, position on the Board, and relationship with RSF. Meridian filed its original complaint against Davis and RSF one week after making the demand, alleging, among other things, that Davis was committing securities fraud and breaching his fiduciary duties to Cyanotech by filing inaccurate Schedules 13G instead of accurate Schedules 13D.
Because Meridian's first-amended complaint alleged that Davis had not yet filed a Schedule 13D, I dismissed it as moot in light of Davis's newly filed disclosure and gave Meridian leave to amend.
The parties then stipulated to give Meridian leave to amend its complaint a third time to account for the amended Schedule 13D.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires every complaint to contain "[a] short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
District courts employ a two-step approach when evaluating a complaint's sufficiency on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. First, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, recognizing that legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
Davis argues that Meridian's third-amended complaint should be dismissed for four reasons: (1) Section 13(d) does not imply a private cause of action outside the context of threatened corporate takeover; (2) Meridian has not shown that it will suffer irreparable harm without the requested injunctive relief; (3) this lawsuit moots Meridian's second claim because it provides shareholders with the information required to make informed investment decisions and satisfies Congress's intent in passing Section 13(d); and (4) the allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's (PSLRA) heightened pleading requirement.
"Congress enacted Section 13(d) in 1968, in response to a sharp increase in corporate takeover bids . . . to provide for full disclosure in connection with cash tender offers and other techniques for accumulating large blocks of equity securities of publicly held companies."
Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act requires beneficial owners of more than 5% of an outstanding class of registered securities to file a disclosure statement on a long-form Schedule 13D or short-form Schedule 13G.
Section 13(d) does not expressly authorize a private right of action, but the United States Supreme Court has recognized "the power of federal courts to fashion private remedies for securities laws violations when to do so is consistent with the legislative scheme and necessary for the protection of investors . . . ."
The Ninth Circuit has not yet extended that right to individual shareholders, but the defendants do not dispute Meridian's ability to bring this action as an individual shareholder.
Defendants argue that courts recognize a right of action under Section 13(d) only when a cash tender offer or some other "large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of securities" threatens a change in corporate control,
Meridian responds that courts "have found a private right of action to exist in multiple situations when necessary to remedy an incorrect or incomplete filing of a Schedule 13D."
The Second Circuit held in Milstein that "the obligation to file truthful statements is implicit in the obligation to file with the issuer, and a fortiori, the issuer has standing under Section 13(d) to seek relief in the event of a false filing."
All of these cases, however, arose in the context of an express or alleged takeover attempt. So, they don't stand for the proposition that a Section 13(d) action can be brought beyond that context, but nor do they say that one can't be. What I glean from these cases is their focus on the need for truthful and complete Schedules 13D. This focus seems to support a private right of action for curative injunctive relief even after a change in control has occurred.
But what I find most compelling is Meridian's common-sense argument that to agree with Davis and RSF would be to "eviscerate Section 13(d)." Davis and RSF argue that they have collectively owned 33% of Cyanotech's outstanding common stock for several years and currently exercise actual control in light of Davis's position as Chairman of the Board, so there can be no future threat of usurpation from them. But Meridian alleges that they gained their controlling share while they were in violation of Section 13(d). Agreeing with the defendants, then, is tantamount to saying: "If you violate Section 13(d) long enough, you can't be sued under Section 13(d)." And this cannot be what Congress intended. So, in light of the caselaw's focus on truth, accuracy, and completeness, I find that Meridian may assert a private cause of action under Section 13(d).
Next, Davis and RSF argue that Meridian fails to allege any irreparable harm that entitles it to injunctive relief.
If Section 13(d)'s mandate to provide shareholders with complete and accurate information is not honored, then shareholders will continue to be harmed until full and accurate disclosures are reported.
The defendants also argue that this lawsuit, by its very nature, moots Meridian's second claim because it provides shareholders with all of the information that they need in order to make informed investment decisions.
Finally, Davis and RSF argue that Meridian's complaint fails to satisfy the PSLRA's heightened pleading standard—the functional equivalent of FRCP 9(b).
Meridian's allegations exhibit a comprehensive plan by Davis to use RSF as an alter ego and use their combined interest in Cyanotech as a means of controlling it. Meridian alleges that Davis has always invested in Cyanotech with a view to control it, as shown by his early placement on the Board, continued influence as its Chairman, and alleged involvement in cycling out CEOs. Meridian further alleges that Davis used RSF to gain more influence, as shown by their close preexisting relationship, the unprecedented and never-repeated donation of $2.5 million dollars to RSF so that it could fund the purchase—that Davis allegedly negotiated—of a 9.7% interest in Cyanotech, and the subsequent transfers of stock to RSF through Davis's charitable foundation. And Meridian sufficiently alleges that Davis and RSF have been in cahoots since at least 2011 when RSF first invested because Davis was allegedly responsible for every share that RSF acquired. These allegations are sufficient to plead plausible claims of noncompliance with Section 13(d).
Accordingly, the defendants' motions to dismiss