ORDER

NANCY J. KOPPE, Magistrate Judge.

The Court has a duty to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it, which is an issue it can raise at any time. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

The currently operative complaint does not allege a federal cause of action, and instead contends that diversity jurisdiction exists. Compl. at ¶ 4. On March 8, 2018, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction given that (1) the complaint does not allege the existence of diverse parties, Docket No. 3 at 1 (citing Benton v. Doe 1, et al., 2013 WL 2038225, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 19, 2013), adopted, — WL 2037470 (D. Or. May 14, 2013)), and (2) the complaint's assertion of the amount in controversy was not supported by facts, Docket No. 3 at 2.

Plaintiff responded to that order to show cause by abandoning his attempt to rely on diversity jurisdiction. Docket No. 4. Instead, Plaintiff now contends that he may be able to plead a federal cause of action for retaliation under Title VII, and seeks leave to amend to do so. Plaintiff did not attach a proposed amended complaint, but see Local Rule 15-1(a), nor does Plaintiff explain why leave is required to file an amended complaint at this juncture, but see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (addressing amending as a matter of course). The Court has serious doubts as to Plaintiff's ability to state a claim for retaliation under Title VII,1 but it will defer ruling on that issue until Plaintiff has actually filed an amended complaint (if he chooses to do so). Once that amended complaint is filed, the Court will determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists and, in particular, whether Plaintiff has stated a federal cause of action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2017) (district court may sua sponte dismiss for failure to state a claim).

While the Court is deferring ruling on subject matter jurisdiction to afford Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint, the Court feels compelled to remind Plaintiff and his counsel of their obligations under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in drafting and filing any such amended complaint. In the limited filings in this case, Plaintiff has already provided what appear to be directly contradictory factual assertions. For example, Plaintiff attempted to plead diversity jurisdiction on the premise that "Defendants are not known at this time. Plaintiff has no knowledge of which states Defendants belong to." Compl. at ¶ 5(b) (emphasis added). In his current filing, however, Plaintiff asserts that he has reason to believe one of the defendants is a supervisor working for Nye County. Docket No. 4 at 2. It is difficult to imagine how Plaintiff could allege (on March 7, 2018) that he had "no knowledge" of the doe defendants' citizenship, while changing course (on March 22, 2018) to say he believes one of the defendants works for Nye County. Cf. Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1986) (citizenship for diversity purposes is determined based on a number of factors, including "place of employment").

In short, Plaintiff is permitted to file an amended complaint if he chooses. Such amended complaint must be filed by March 30, 2018. In the alternative, Plaintiff may consider it to be the better course to simply file a notice of voluntary dismissal and to pursue his claims in state court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (plaintiffs may voluntarily dismiss their cases prior to the filing of an answer or motion for summary judgment and, absent an earlier filed-case involving the same claim, such dismissal is without prejudice).2

IT IS SO ORDERED.