RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II, District Judge.
Before the court for a decision on the merits is an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by David A. Joyce, a Nevada prisoner. (ECF No. 8.)
On May 7, 2008, a jury sitting in the state district court for Clark County, Nevada, found Joyce guilty of burglary. The jury acquitted Joyce on a charge of robbery. On July 8, 2008, the court sentenced Joyce under the habitual criminal statute to a term of twenty years with parole eligibility after eight years. The judgment of conviction was entered on July 21, 2008. Joyce appealed.
On May 29, 2009, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. The Nevada Supreme Court recounted the facts supporting the conviction as follows:
On April 28, 2010, Joyce filed a post-conviction habeas petition in the state district court. The state district court denied the habeas petition, entering written findings of fact and conclusions of law on August 26, 2010. Joyce appealed.
On May 10, 2011, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the state district court. The court concluded that the lower court had erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing on one of Joyce's ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims and remanded the case for that purpose.
After holding an evidentiary hearing, the state district court denied relief and entered, on January 25, 2012, written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Joyce appealed. On June 14, 2012, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in all respects.
In December 2012 Joyce initiated this federal habeas proceeding. Respondents filed an answer to Joyce's petition on March 10, 2014. Joyce did not file a reply.
This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the standard of review under AEDPA:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. "[A] federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411.
The Supreme Court has explained that "[a] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a `highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and `demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (describing the AEDPA standard as "a difficult to meet and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The state court's factual findings are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by the petitioner by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007). "[R]eview under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. In Pinholster, the Court reasoned that the "backward-looking language" present in § 2254(d)(1) "requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made," and, therefore, the record under review must be "limited to the record in existence at that same time, i.e., the record before the state court." Id at 182.
All four grounds in Joyce's petition allege the he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), provides the federal law standard for analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under Strickland, the petitioner must show that (1) "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment," and (2) counsel's errors "deprive[d] the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687. The first Strickland prong asks whether an attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. The second prong requires the petitioner to "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.
In Ground 1, Joyce claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his constitutional rights, because his counsel failed to adequately review discovery for the purposes of developing a viable defense to the burglary charge. ECF No. 8, p. 6-9.
Joyce presented this claim to the Nevada courts in his first state post-conviction proceeding. ECF No. 20-10, p. 19-22. The Nevada Supreme Court analyzed the claim under Strickland. ECF No. 21-15, p. 2-3. In denying the claim, the court stated as follows:
Id.
The Nevada Supreme Court applied the correct federal law standard to the claim. Joyce has not shown that the court's application of that standard was unreasonable or that the court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, under § 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), this court must defer to the Nevada court's denial of the claim.
Ground 1 is denied.
In Ground 2, Joyce claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his constitutional rights, because his counsel focused too much attention on the robbery charge, at the expense of preparing to defend the burglary charge. ECF No. 8, p. 11-13. In particular, Joyce alleges that counsel should have presented evidence demonstrating that Joyce was "doing nothing more than adjusting, and pulling up his shorts" and should have placed more emphasis on the fact that the store's security alarm did not sound despite the merchandise being wrapped in theft prevention packaging. Id.
Joyce presented this claim to the Nevada courts in his first state post-conviction proceeding. ECF No. 20-10, p. 22-24. The Nevada Supreme Court analyzed the claim under Strickland. ECF No. 21-15, p. 2-3. In denying the claim, the court stated as follows:
Id.
The Nevada Supreme Court applied the correct federal law standard to the claim. Joyce has not shown that the court's application of that standard was unreasonable or that the court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, under § 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), this court must defer to the Nevada court's denial of the claim.
Ground 2 is denied.
In Ground 3, Joyce claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his constitutional rights, because his counsel failed to prevent the trial court's habitual criminal adjudication. ECF No. 8, p. 15-18. In support of this claim, Joyce contends that his sentence is excessively disproportionate to the crime, which consisted of the theft of a $130.00 electronic toothbrush, and a violation of his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Id. He further alleges that the prosecution presented a certified copy for only one prior conviction. Id.
In deciding Joyce's direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court addressed Joyce's argument that the trial court erred in applying the habitual criminal statute to his sentence. ECF No. 19-27, p. 7-8. The Nevada Supreme Court stated as follows:
Id.
Joyce presented Ground 3 to the Nevada courts in his first state post-conviction proceeding. ECF No. 20-10, p. 24-27. The Nevada Supreme Court analyzed the claim under Strickland. ECF No. 21-15, p. 2-4. In denying the claim, the court stated as follows:
Id.
The Nevada Supreme Court applied the correct federal law standard to the claim. Joyce has not shown that the court's application of that standard was unreasonable or that the court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, under § 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), this court must defer to the Nevada court's denial of the claim.
Although the state court found the claim procedurally defaulted, Joyce's IAC claim based counsel's failure to challenge the sentence as cruel and unusual punishment is without substantive merit. The U.S. Supreme Court has routinely held that the Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime, and does not require strict proportionality between the crime and sentence. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28-30 (2003) (upholding 25 years to life sentence for theft of three golf clubs imposed on defendant with long history of felony recidivism); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (upholding two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for felony theft of videotapes imposed on defendant with prior felony burglary convictions); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980) (upholding life sentence, with the possibility of parole, imposed on defendant convicted of felony theft (for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses), and who had prior felony convictions for fraudulent use of a credit card and passing a forged check); but see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983) (striking recidivist sentence of life, without possibility of parole, because uttering a "no account" check for $100 is nonviolent crime, and defendant's six prior felonies were relatively minor). When viewed against the backdrop of these cases, the trial court's application of the habitual criminal statute in Joyce's case did not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Thus, counsel was not ineffective by failing to raise such a challenge.
Ground 3 is denied.
In Ground 4, Joyce claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his constitutional rights, because his counsel failed to relay to him a favorable plea offer from the prosecutor. ECF No. 8, p. 20-24. In particular, Joyce alleges that counsel did not inform him of a "global plea offer" of five to twelve-and-a-half years to settle three criminal cases then-pending against him. Id.
Joyce presented Ground 4 to the Nevada courts in his first state post-conviction proceeding. ECF No. 20-10, p. 27-28. This is the IAC claim that the Nevada Supreme Court remanded to the state district court for an evidentiary hearing. ECF No. 21-15, p. 4-5. In ruling upon the claim after the evidentiary hearing and denial of relief by the state district court, the Nevada Supreme Court addressed the claim as follows:
ECF No. 22-16, p. 2-5.
The Nevada Supreme Court applied the correct federal law standard to the claim. Joyce has not shown that the court's application of that standard was unreasonable or that the court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, under § 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), this court must defer to the Nevada court's denial of the claim.
Ground 4 also contains a broad allegation that cumulative errors committed by counsel undermined his constitutional right to a fair trial. Joyce does not identify, however, the particular errors on which he bases the claim or how they may have combined to have a cumulative effect on his state court trial. The errors alleged throughout the petition do not, for the reasons discussed above, provide grounds for habeas relief.
Ground 4 is denied.
For the reasons set forth above, Joyce's petition for habeas relief is denied.
This is a final order adverse to the petitioner. As such, Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires this court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability (COA). Accordingly, the court has sua sponte evaluated the claims within the petition for suitability for the issuance of a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2002).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a COA may issue only when the petitioner "has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." With respect to claims rejected on the merits, a petitioner "must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)). For procedural rulings, a COA will issue only if reasonable jurists could debate (1) whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and (2) whether the court's procedural ruling was correct. Id.
Having reviewed its determinations and rulings in adjudicating Joyce's petition, the court declines to issue a certificate of appealability for its resolution of any procedural issues or any of Joyce's habeas claims.
