Order Denying Motion to Recuse

ECF No. 304

JENNIFER A. DORSEY, District Judge.

Defendant Brian Keith Wright is charged in the January 2017 armed robberies of two jewelry stores, and—after seven continuances and Wright's "ready-for trial" announcement at calendar call—trial is scheduled to begin tomorrow. Wright, who has chosen to represent himself, maintains that he has been falsely accused. He theorizes that law enforcement has it out for him because he beat a — robbery case in this district1 and then posted a video to YouTube in which he lambasted the U.S. Attorney's Office and law enforcement, so they're falsely pinning the 2017 robberies on him purely to retaliate. Wright's motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution and prosecutorial misconduct was denied,2 and he has been repeatedly cautioned that he will not be permitted to present his conspiracy theory as a defense at trial.3

Wright's vindictive-prosecution motion leveled accusations of misconduct against the law-enforcement agents and agencies responsible for his arrest, the prosecution, the media, the district judge originally assigned to his — case, and Magistrate Judge Ferenbach.4 His accusations become increasingly serious and disparaging as trial in this case approaches. They also get more preposterous. Earlier this month, Wright began accusing his standby counsel of conspiring with the prosecution.5 And now, on the eve of trial, Wright moves to disqualify me6 claiming, "Dorsey herself is conducting herself as if she has a personal vendetta against Wright" as evidenced by my rulings on motions7 and Wright's belief that I am now "lieing [sic] on the record to cover up the misconduct that has taken place."8 He concludes that "Judge Dorsey has been acting as an A.U.S.A. in this case and is doing everything possible to make sure Wright is convicted," and he asks that I be removed from this case to "let a judge that is fair and not personally working with the government take over the case."9

Discussion

Wright's dissatisfaction with me boils down to this: he maintains that this prosecution is vindictive, and Wright is frustrated that I have not granted him relief on that basis.10 His frustration grows as we get closer to trial and I repeatedly remind him that the law does not permit him to present his vindictive-prosecution theory as a defense at trial, and I issue additional rulings that he disagrees with based on his untrained sense of how these proceedings should go.11

To be sure, this jurist is not "working" for the government or with the goal of a conviction for Wright. Nor do I have a vendetta against Wright or any of the other 130 criminal defendants currently assigned to me.12 Each time I issue a ruling that is unfavorable to Wright or I remind him of the procedures and rules that will apply at trial, he interprets these acts and statements as bias against him or my cooperation with the prosecution. His ire has only increased when, after he yells over me in hearings and suggests that he will not be following courtroom procedures or rules at this trial, I remind him that his right to self-representation is not absolute and that it will be revoked if he cannot act appropriately during trial.13 In sum, any time I make a ruling or issue an instruction that Wright disagrees with, he deems it evidence that I am part of the dark and grand conspiracy to falsely convict him of masterminding and directing the armed robberies of two jewelry stores by the handful of recruits who carried them out.14

When Wright and I disagree about an event in the procedural history of this case, or he characterizes an event differently than I do, he concludes that I am lying or altering the record of the proceedings.15 As I have repeatedly reminded Wright in this and his prior case, I do not agree with his views on the record of this prosecution, his characterization of others' statements, or the legal significance of his arguments.16 Time and limited judicial resources do not allow Wright to continue to re-raise his points over and over again; he has not provided me a basis for reconsideration, and this case must continue to move forward. But Wright subjectively interprets my courtroom administration and insistence on applying the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence as me being "more worried about procedures then [sic] the actual facts and the truth of the events surrounding the case. . . ."17

As the United States Supreme Court explained in Liteky v. United States, "judicial rulings, routine trial administration efforts, and ordinary admonishments" are no basis for recusal.18 Even "judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge."19 And because the law recognizes that judges are human, "expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display" do not establish bias or partiality.20 "A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain immune."21

Conclusion

In short, opinions formed by the judge "in the course of the current proceedings . . . do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible."22 Wright has made no legitimate showing of such favoritism or antagonism. Indeed, he can't—because none exists.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Wright's Motion to Disqualify and or Recuse Judge Dorsey from Both of Wright's Cases [ECF No. 304] is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to file a copy of this order in 2:17-cr-142-JAD-VCF, as this ruling applies to Wright's duplicate motion filed in that case [see ECF No. 153] as well.