Filed: Nov. 21, 2019
Latest Update: Nov. 21, 2019
Summary: Order Denying Motion to Consolidate Cases [ECF No. 144] [ECF No. 21] JENNIFER A. DORSEY , District Judge . Two special-needs students, H.H. and L.R., allege that they were mistreated and abused in the classroom of Kasey Glass at Kirk Adams Elementary School. Both filed suit through guardians ad litem, and they now move to consolidate their cases for all purposes. 1 They contend that the cases present near-identical issues and involve mostly the same players and that consolidation will se
Summary: Order Denying Motion to Consolidate Cases [ECF No. 144] [ECF No. 21] JENNIFER A. DORSEY , District Judge . Two special-needs students, H.H. and L.R., allege that they were mistreated and abused in the classroom of Kasey Glass at Kirk Adams Elementary School. Both filed suit through guardians ad litem, and they now move to consolidate their cases for all purposes. 1 They contend that the cases present near-identical issues and involve mostly the same players and that consolidation will ser..
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Order Denying Motion to Consolidate Cases
[ECF No. 144]
[ECF No. 21]
JENNIFER A. DORSEY, District Judge.
Two special-needs students, H.H. and L.R., allege that they were mistreated and abused in the classroom of Kasey Glass at Kirk Adams Elementary School. Both filed suit through guardians ad litem, and they now move to consolidate their cases for all purposes.1 They contend that the cases present near-identical issues and involve mostly the same players and that consolidation will serve judicial efficiency. The defendants oppose the motion, arguing that the procedural postures of these cases and their material differences render any benefit achieved by consolidation nugatory.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) governs the consolidation of separate actions. When two cases "involve a common question of law or fact," district courts may join them for any or all matters at issue, consolidate the suits, or issue any other order that would prevent unnecessary cost or delay. The threshold question is whether the cases involve common questions of law or fact. If common questions exist, the court must balance the savings of time and effort that consolidation will yield against any inconvenience, delay, confusion, or prejudice that may result.2
Although these cases involve many common questions of law and fact, I find that the disparate procedural postures of these matters tips the scale against consolidation at this time. Due to the fourteen-month age difference between these cases,3 they are in markedly different stages of litigation. In H.H.'s case, discovery has closed and there is just one other motion pending—a fully briefed motion for partial summary judgment.4 Motions to dismiss were long ago resolved, and although H.H.'s mother had pled her own claims, those have been dismissed.5 But in L.R.'s case, discovery battles persist, the cutoff is still months away, the motions to dismiss have not yet been decided, and L.R.'s mother's claims are still pending.6 I find that consolidation of these cases while they are in such manifestly different postures will net little economic benefit to the court or the parties. And that small gain would be substantially outweighed by the additional efforts that the court would have to expend to coordinate these proceedings.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to consolidate [ECF No. 144 in Case No. 2:18-cv-0021-JAD-VCF and ECF No. 21 in Case No. 2:19-cv-0403-JAD-VCF] is DENIED without prejudice to the ability to re-urge this request in the event that the procedural postures of these cases become far more aligned.