LLOYD D. GEORGE, District Judge.
The defendant, Rick Lee Archer, moves pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (ECF Nos. 133, 136). The Court sentenced the defendant as a career offender under the then-mandatory United Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1. He argues this sentence must be vacated because, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), he can no longer be classified as a career offender. The United States opposes the motion (ECF No. 138). The Court will deny the motion as premature, pursuant to United States v. Blackstone, 903 F.3d 1020, 1022 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 2762, 204 L. Ed. 2d 1146 (2019).
As relevant to the instant matter, a motion brought pursuant to § 2255 may be timely filed within one year of "the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." Id. § 2255(f)(3). Archer filed the present motion within one year of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson.
Archer's motion would be timely if Johnson recognized a new right applicable to the mandatory sentencing guidelines. In Blackstone, however, the Ninth Circuit held that "Johnson did not recognize a new right applicable to the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines on collateral review." Blackstone, 903 F.3d at 1028. As in the present matter, Blackstone concerned a § 2255 motion brought by a defendant sentenced under the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines as a career offender pursuant to § 4B1.2. Blackstone cannot be distinguished from this matter.
"If the Court extends Johnson to a sentence imposed at a time when the Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory, then [the defendant] may be able to bring a timely motion under § 2255. As of now, however, [the defendant's] motion is untimely." Id. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Archer's motion as premature.
To appeal this order, Archer must receive a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1); 9th Cir. R. 22-1(a). To obtain that certificate, he "must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a demonstration that ... includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000) (quotation omitted). This standard is "lenient." Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 553 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). In the present matter, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Blackstone precludes this Court from finding that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) Archer's motion was timely filed. Accordingly, the Court will not grant a certificate of appealability.
Therefore, for good cause shown,
THE COURT
THE COURT FURTHER
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS that it DENIES Defendant Rick Lee Archer a certificate of appealability.
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS that the Clerk of Court is directed to enter a separate civil judgment denying Defendant Rick Lee Archer's § 2255 motion. The Clerk also shall file this order and the civil judgment in this case and in the related civil case number 2:17-cv-0758-LDG.