KATHERINE A. LEVINE, J.
The decision/order on this motion is as follows:
This case was submitted, after oral argument, solely on the issue of whether the Civil Court of the City of New York obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is served in Long Island when the record is bereft as to whether Allstate is a resident of New York City. The issue arises as part of defendant Allstate's motion to vacate a default judgment. Allstate contends that it should have been served at its Brooklyn office since it transacts business in the City of New York and that since it was improperly served, it could not answer the complaint and the court therefore never obtained personal jurisdiction over it.
The parties do not dispute that for purposes of this lawsuit, one Mr. Bergami, an employee of Allstate in Long Island, was authorized to and did accept service on the part of Allstate. However, neither side presented testimony or evidence as to whether Allstate met the definition of a resident of New York City. Nor did either side present a witness to explain why, in this particular case, service was not initially attempted in Brooklyn.
Pursuant to New York City Civil Court Act § 403, the
CCA 404, otherwise known as the Civil Court's "longarm statute" (David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, CCA 404 at 132 [internal quotation marks omitted]), addresses how personal jurisdiction may be obtained over acts by nonresidents. Pursuant to section 404 (a),
CCA 404 (d) addresses service upon a corporation or association and provides that if service of the summons cannot be effectuated by personal delivery within New York City so as to acquire in personam jurisdiction, the corporation shall be deemed to be a nonresident of New York City. In such a situation, service of the summons, pursuant to subdivision (b), shall be made at such place as would confer jurisdiction on supreme court in a like case.
The Civil Court Act thus limits service of process to the City of New York (§ 403) "except as this act otherwise provides." (Goldman v Goldman, 48 Misc.2d 985, 988 [Civ Ct, NY County 1966].) Section 404 (a) (1) and (b) expands this limitation without regard to city or state lines (in the same manner) as in the New York Supreme Court, provided the defendant "transacts" any business within the City of New York and the cause of action arises out of the transaction of said business. (Id.)
A statutory exception must be strictly construed so that the major policy underlying the legislation is not defeated. Exceptions extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exception. (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 213; Matter of Radich v Council of City of Lackawanna, 93 A.D.2d 559, 562 [4th Dept 1983].) Although there does not appear to be any precedent that specifically addresses the interplay between CCA 403 and 404, the plain meaning of these statutes mandates that service be effectuated within the City of New York if Allstate in fact is a resident of one of the counties within the city. Only if proof is submitted that Allstate is a nonresident may service be effectuated outside of the city.
The ultimate burden of proof on whether a court may assert jurisdiction over a defendant rests with the party asserting jurisdiction. (Castillo v Star Leasing Co., 69 A.D.3d 551 [2d Dept 2010]; Sanchez v Major, 289 A.D.2d 320 [2d Dept 2001]; Anglin v
Virtually no evidence was offered as to whether Allstate is a resident of the city. However, since this issue is being raised within the context of defendant's motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a), the burden rests upon the defendant to provide both a reasonable excuse for its failure to appear and a meritorious defense to the action. (Henry v Kuveke, 9 A.D.3d 476 [2d Dept 2004]; Katsnelson v ELRAC, Inc., 304 A.D.2d 619 [2d Dept 2003].) The decision as to whether to set aside a default in answering is generally left to the sound discretion of the court, "the exercise of which will generally not be disturbed if there is support in the record therefor." (Calderon v 163 Ocean Tenants Corp., 27 A.D.3d 410, 410 [2d Dept 2006], quoting MacMarty, Inc. v Scheller, 201 A.D.2d 706 [2d Dept 1994]; see Koyenov.)
Since the parties stipulated at the traverse hearing that personal service was effectuated upon Mark Bergami in Nassau County, plaintiff has met its burden of proving service. (See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v Apple Pool & Contr. Corp., 36 Misc.3d 134[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012].) The burden thus switches to Allstate to show that plaintiff failed to obtain personal jurisdiction over Allstate because it is a resident of the City of New York and must therefore be served in one of Allstate's principal offices, here — the Brooklyn Office. (Cf. Stephan B. Gleich & Assoc. v Gritsipis, 87 A.D.3d 216, 221 [2d Dept 2011].) Much to the court's bemusement, Allstate has failed to offer any proof as to its residency although a multitude of Allstate's officials and official