LISA A. SOKOLOFF, J.

On April 31, 2014, Defendant DANNY D. TEJADA was arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint charging that on August 30, 2014 at about 11:15 PM, at the southwest corner of Park Avenue and East 122nd Street, New York County, Defendant committed four offenses: Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated; per se (Vehicle and Traffic Law [VTL] § 1192[2]), Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated (VTL § 1192[3]), Reckless Driving (VTL § 1212), and Operating a Motor Vehicle While Impaired by Alcohol (VTL § 1192[1]).

By Affirmation in Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 30.30, the People conceded that 138 days of speedy-trial time had elapsed on the misdemeanor counts warranting their dismissal, but retained the VTL § 1192(1) charge, as it is a traffic infraction and therefore not subject to statutory speedy-trial rights CPL § 30.30 (People v Pabon, 46 Misc.3d 152[A] [NY App Term 2015]). Defendant now moves for dismissal of the remaining traffic infraction, upon the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated (US Const 6th, 14th Amends; CPL § 30.20; CPL § 170.30[1][e]).

A defendant charged with a traffic infraction, as with any other offense, has a constitutional right to a speedy trial (US Const 6th, 14th Amends; CPL § 30.20; People v Taylor, 189 Misc.2d 313 [App.Term, 2d Dept 2001]). For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED.

While there is no specific temporal duration after which a defendant automatically becomes entitled to dismissal, the Court of Appeals has identified five factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated (People v Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 445 [1975]). Those factors are: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay. Taranovich instructs the trial court to "... engage in a sensitive weighing process of the diversified factors present in the particular case," while noting that "... no one factor or combination of the factors ... is necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim, but rather the particular case must be considered in light of all the factors as they apply to it" (Id. at 445).

Having reviewed the specific circumstances of this case in light of the Taranovich factors, this court finds defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has not been violated.

1. The Extent of the Delay

Defendant was arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint on August 31, 2014. Subsequent to his arraignment, Defendant appeared in court for seven calendar calls. On June 25, 2015, Defendant filed his 30.30 motion to dismiss the complaint, and at the next appearance on August 10, 2015, the People conceded that the statutory time period pursuant to CPL § 30.30 had elapsed with respect to the top three charges and Defendant filed the instant motion. At that point, when the case was adjourned for this court's decision, the action had been pending one year. Although one year is not insignificant, only three of the court dates were scheduled for hearing and trial, which does not support a claim of delay.

2. The Reason for the Delay

Since the commencement of this case, the People have answered "not ready" for hearings and trial only twice and one of these occasions, no future readiness date was requested as the assigned assistant district attorney was about to start a trial on another case. Thus, as to the first two Taranovich factors, there has indeed been delay, but much of it has been attributable to motion practice. The delay does not appear to be a deliberate attempt to hamper Defendant's preparation for trial and the People were in fact ready for trial as recently as June 25, 2015. Both the reason and the extent of the delay weigh in favor of the People.

3. The Nature of the Underlying Charge

Given that the charge, Driving While Ability Impaired (VTL § 1192[1]) is not a crime, but a petty offense (CPL § 1.20[39]), punishable by a fine of not less than $300 nor more than $500 and/or up to 15 days in jail (VTL § 1193[1]; People v Fisher, 167 Misc.2d 850 [Crim Ct Richmond Co 1995]), this factor weighs in favor of Defendant. While a Defendant's right to a speedy trial is not dependent on the crime charged, a traffic infraction should require less deliberation and preparation than a more serious crime (Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 446).

4. Whether There Has Been an Extended Period of Pretrial Incarceration

Defendant was released from custody upon his arraignment, and thus, pretrial incarceration is not a factor in the court's analysis.

5. Whether There Is Any Indication That the Defense Has Been Impaired by Reason of the Delay

Defendant contends that the delay in the People's readiness has caused him to miss work and subjected him to stress. Defendant is correct that as time progresses, memories tend to fade. The memory of the police officer witness would be key in Defendant's trial; however, an officer is a trained observer and has notes upon which to rely and, therefore, is less likely to suffer from a faded memory which may plague other witnesses.

In the court's opinion, the factors, collectively, do not indicate that Defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. However, the People are strongly encouraged to announce their readiness at the next court appearance. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of VTL § 1192(1), Operating a Motor Vehicle While Impaired by Alcohol, for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, is denied.

This opinion constitutes the decision and order of the court. A copy of the decision will be mailed to the parties and placed in the court file.