CIPARICK, J.
Claimant Douglas Warney spent over nine years incarcerated for a murder he did not commit. The primary evidence against him was a confession that contained non-public details about the crime. Warney now seeks damages under Court of Claims Act § 8-b, the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act. We conclude that Warney's confession and other statements and actions the State attributes to him do not, on the facts as alleged here, warrant dismissal of his claim on the ground that he caused or brought about his conviction.
The facts as stated in the claim and record below are as follows. On January 3, 1996, Rochester Police Department (RPD) officers found William Beason dead in his home, stabbed 19 times in the neck and chest. The following day, Warney called the RPD to provide information about the murder, and was interviewed in his home by an officer. According to the officer's trial testimony, Warney told her that he had been shoveling snow outside "William's" house when he saw his cousin go inside, and that the cousin later admitted to Warney that he had killed Beason.
Warney alleges that he has an IQ of 68, was in special education until he dropped out of school in eighth grade, and was suffering at the time of the Beason investigation from AIDS-related dementia. Additionally, the RPD was aware of his mental condition when it began questioning him about the Beason murder, as officers had transported Warney to a psychiatric facility two weeks earlier for pulling fire alarms and reporting false incidents to the police.
On January 6, 1996, two RPD officers brought Warney to the police station for questioning. The claim alleges that they used "escalating coercive tactics to force . . . Warney to make statements or admissions concerning the murder," and one of them
Warney gave a series of increasingly inculpatory statements, initially blaming his cousin, but eventually confessing to murdering Beason on his own. He signed a detailed written confession stating that, acting alone, he had stabbed Beason repeatedly. The confession contained numerous details that allegedly corroborate crime scene evidence that the RPD had intentionally held back from the public.
At central booking, an officer not involved in the investigation asked Warney how he was doing. According to the officer's testimony, he responded, "[n]ot good. I've got a body," slang for having killed someone. In contrast, Warney testified that he said, "I'm being charged with a body."
On February 13, 1996, a grand jury indicted Warney on two counts of second degree murder. Before trial, Supreme Court denied Warney's motion to suppress his statements to police, finding that he "initiated most contacts with the police and then freely volunteered information to them," that he never requested an attorney, and that "no threats or promises were ever made to [him] and no fraud or tricks were used to solicit statements." At trial, Warney's signed confession was the primary evidence against him, although he testified that it was coerced and manufactured by the police. The prosecutor emphasized that the confession contained details that, in his words during closing, "only the killer would have known about."
Warney was convicted of both second degree murder counts on February 12, 1997. Supreme Court sentenced him on February 27, 1997 to imprisonment for 25 years to life on each count, to run concurrently. The Appellate Division affirmed (People v
Warney consistently maintained his innocence and sought to conduct DNA testing on biological crime scene evidence. Although his application to access this evidence was denied, the People submitted the material for testing, which resulted in a DNA profile that did not match Warney. In March 2006, nine years after Warney's conviction, the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database yielded a match, a man named Eldred Johnson. The RPD discovered that fingerprints from the crime scene matched Johnson's and, on May 11, 2006, Johnson confessed that, acting alone, he had murdered Beason.
Warney now seeks damages under Court of Claims Act § 8-b for the years he spent wrongly incarcerated. His claim alleges that he "did not cause or contribute to his own wrongful arrest, conviction, or incarceration," but rather his conviction "was the direct result of the intentional and malicious actions of members of the [RPD] who fabricated and coerced a false confession from. . . a man whom they knew had a history of serious mental health problems." The State moved to dismiss the claim for failing to state facts in sufficient detail to demonstrate that Warney is likely to succeed at trial in proving that he did not bring about his own conviction.
Court of Claims granted the State's motion and dismissed the claim. It was "not convinced" that only the perpetrator and police could have known many of the details contained in the confession, and noted that Warney "does not indicate how he was coerced by police to give a false confession." Moreover, the court held that Warney, "by his own actions, which included calling the police to tell them he had information about the murder, trying to frame an innocent man for the crime, and. . . volunteering that he had `a body' . . . did cause or bring about his own conviction." Warney appealed.
The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that a criminal defendant who gave an uncoerced false confession that was presented to the jury at trial could not subsequently bring an action under section 8-b, and that Warney failed to adequately allege that his confession was coerced (see Warney v State of New
Court of Claims Act § 8-b, the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act, provides a mechanism for "innocent persons who can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they were unjustly convicted and imprisoned . . . to recover damages against the state" (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [1]; see also Ivey v State of New York, 80 N.Y.2d 474, 479 [1992]). It offers claimants who meet its strict pleading and evidentiary burdens "an available avenue of redress over and above the existing tort remedies" (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [1]).
To present a claim under the statute, a claimant must "establish by documentary evidence" that (a) the claimant was convicted of a crime, sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and served at least part of the sentence; (b) the claimant was pardoned on the ground of innocence or, alternatively, the conviction was reversed or vacated and the accusatory instrument was dismissed; and (c) the claim is not time-barred (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [3]). Here, the State does not dispute that Warney met this initial burden.
The statute further requires that the claim "state facts in sufficient detail to permit the court to find that claimant is likely to succeed" in meeting his or her burden at trial of proving by clear and convincing evidence that, as relevant here, (a) "he did not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument" and (b) "he did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction" (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [4]). "If the court finds after reading the claim that claimant is not likely to succeed at trial, it shall dismiss the claim" (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [4]).
The parties here debate whether, in addition to being sufficiently detailed, the allegations in the pleading must have evidentiary support. We now clarify that no such support is necessary, except where expressly indicated by the statute. Although a claimant must submit documentary evidence supporting certain facts pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3), the pleading standard articulated in Court of Claims Act § 8-b (4) lacks any analogous requirement. Because the State, in waiving
Of course, section 8-b still imposes a higher pleading standard than the CPLR. Court of Claims must consider whether the allegations are sufficiently detailed to demonstrate a likelihood of success at trial (see Court of Claims Act § 8-b [4]). "[T]he allegations in the claim must be of such character that, if believed, they would clearly and convincingly establish the elements of the claim, so as to set forth a cause of action" (Solomon v State of New York, 146 A.D.2d 439, 442 [1st Dept 1989]). In evaluating the likelihood of success at trial, Court of Claims should avoid making credibility and factual determinations (see Klemm v State of New York, 170 A.D.2d 438, 439 [2d Dept 1991] ["In the absence of serious flaws in a ... statement of facts, the weighing of the evidence is more appropriately a function to be exercised at the actual trial" (quoting Dozier v State of New York, 134 A.D.2d 759, 761 [3d Dept 1987])]; Solomon, 146 AD2d at 445 [Court of Claims erred in "assess(ing) ... the credibility of the evidence ... (and) weighing ... the evidence (which) is more appropriately a function to be exercised at the actual trial"]). In short, a claimant who meets the evidentiary burdens described in Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3) and makes detailed allegations with respect to the elements described in section 8-b (4) is entitled to an opportunity to prove the allegations at trial (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [5]). With these principles in mind, we turn to the claim at issue here.
Court of Claims' dismissal was based in large part on factual determinations that were inappropriate at this stage of the litigation. First, although Warney alleges in detail that his confession was coerced, the court concluded that "the evidence presented" did not "indicate" that it was. The court was "not convinced" that, as Warney alleges, "only the police and the true perpetrator could have known many of the factual details"
Second, Court of Claims determined that Warney's statement to an RPD officer, "I've got a body," which was introduced against him at trial, was conduct contributing to his conviction. Warney has never admitted to making that statement, however, and his claim alleges that, as he maintained at trial, he actually said "I'm being charged with a body." Accepting Warney's allegations as true, we presume that he never made this inculpatory statement. Determining what Warney said is purely a credibility determination, pitting his account against the officer's. The officer's testimony is no more or less convincing, at this pleading stage, than Warney's account of the conversation.
The State further argues that Warney's initial interactions with the RPD ought to bar him from recovery. We disagree. A claimant's statutory obligation to prove that "he did
In sum, the courts below inappropriately made credibility and factual findings, dismissing Warney's claim without giving him the opportunity to prove his detailed allegations that he did not cause or bring about his conviction. Because these allegations, taken as true, demonstrate a likelihood of success at trial, Warney is entitled to proceed with his claim, secure discovery, and obtain a disposition on the merits.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the defendant's motion to dismiss the claim denied.
SMITH, J. (concurring).
I agree with the result the majority reaches, and have no major quarrel with the general principles it states. I write separately to emphasize that the application of those principles in this case is easy, because this claimant appears, on the present record, to have an exceptionally strong case. Our decision today should not be read as implying that any claimant can, by skillful pleading, get a significantly weaker case past a motion to dismiss.
It may not be obvious from the majority opinion how compelling a case Warney's statement of claim presents. His confession, now known to be false, included a number of facts — many
Now that his innocence has been established, Warney echoes the prosecutor's question: How indeed could he have known all these facts? It is hard to imagine an answer other than that he learned them from the police. In short, the details set forth in Warney's 41-page statement of his claim, with 58 pages of annexed exhibits, point strongly to the conclusion that the police took advantage of Warney's mental frailties to manipulate him into giving a confession that contained seemingly powerful evidence corroborating its truthfulness — when in fact, the police knew, the corroboration was worthless.
The majority correctly holds that this sort of police conduct, if proved at trial, would be sufficient to show that Warney "did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction" (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [4] [b]). In general, a claimant who gives an uncoerced confession to a crime he did not commit should be found to have caused his own conviction (see Report of the Law Revision Commission to the Governor on Redress for Innocent Persons Unjustly Convicted and Subsequently Imprisoned [hereafter Commission Report], reprinted in 1984 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2899, 2932 [listing "falsely giving an uncoerced confession of guilt" as among the acts of misconduct that justify rejecting a claim]). But a confession cannot
Of course it would be wrong to assume that the State cannot refute Warney's assertions. Claims that appear strong at the pleading stage do not always win. But I have no hesitation in concluding that Warney's claim states facts "in sufficient detail to permit the court to find that claimant is likely to succeed at trial" (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [4]). The contrary decisions of the courts below seem to me not just "premature," as the majority says (majority op at 436), but simply wrong.
I have emphasized the strength of Warney's claim because I am concerned that some of the majority's generalizations, made in the context of this very strong claim, will be misunderstood as requiring courts to uphold much weaker ones. I agree that, as a general matter, a claimant need not actually present his evidence as part of his claim; detailed allegations are enough. And I also agree that CPLR 3211 applies in actions under Court of Claims Act § 8-b, except to the extent that section 8-b imposes a more stringent pleading standard; thus, where there is a bona fide factual dispute, the claimant's allegations should be taken as true. That does not mean, however, that allegations implausible or unconvincing on their face are sufficient to prevent dismissal of a claim for unjust conviction and imprisonment. So to hold would be to read out of the statute provisions that the Legislature wrote in, in an attempt to balance two important, and competing, goals: to compensate people who have been unjustly convicted, but also to protect the State against the administrative burden, and the cost of nuisance settlements, that could result from having to litigate a large number of false claims.
In pursuit of the latter goal, the Legislature strengthened the tests normally applied to gauge the sufficiency of pleadings, requiring not only that a claim be stated in "detail" — itself a significant departure from the normal rule — but "in sufficient
The Commission added: "Consequently ... most cases will not survive a motion to dismiss. The few exceptions will be the ones appropriate for a full hearing on the claim of innocence" (id. at 2930). No one should conclude from today's decision that we have opened a loophole that will defeat this legislative goal.
Order reversed, etc.