RIVERA, J.
Defendants Pavarini Construction and Vornado Realty Trust appeal, pursuant to leave granted by the Appellate Division, from an order of that court that reversed, on the law, a Supreme Court order granting their motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff Glenford Morris' Labor Law § 241 (6) claim, which is predicated upon a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-2.2 (a). Upon a search of the record, the court granted summary judgment to plaintiff (98 A.D.3d 841 [2012]). The Appellate Division would later certify the following question to this Court: "Was the decision and order of this [c]ourt, which reversed the order of the Supreme Court, properly made?" We affirm the Appellate Division order and answer the certified question in the affirmative.
This is the second time the matter is before us, the Court having rendered a decision in this case in July 2007 reversing and remitting the matter to Supreme Court so that the parties could develop a fuller record on which to decide plaintiff's section 241 (6) claim (see 9 N.Y.3d 47 [2007]).
Plaintiff is a carpenter who was working at a building construction site in Manhattan when a large, flat object fell on and injured his hand. He commenced this personal injury action against defendants, the construction manager and owner of the building, alleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241 (6). As relevant to this appeal, in support of his section 241 (6) claim plaintiff alleged to Supreme Court that the object that fell on his hand was a "form" subject to specific safety requirements under Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-2.2 (a). A form refers to a mold used in the shaping and solidification of concrete. Defendants countered that the object was not a "form" within the meaning of the Industrial Code because it was only one side of an as-yet uncompleted form; in other words a component of an unfinished form.
Supreme Court denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's section 241 (6) claim.
We granted plaintiff's motion for leave to appeal (8 N.Y.3d 801 [2007]), reversed the Appellate Division order, and remitted the matter for further proceedings (9 NY3d at 51). We held that while the first sentence of section 241 (6) reiterates a common-law standard of care, the second sentence requires owners and contractors to comply with the Commissioner of Labor's rules (9 NY3d at 50), and where such a rule or regulation imposes a "specific, positive command[]," owners and contractors are subject to a nondelegable duty (id., quoting Allen v Cloutier Constr. Corp., 44 N.Y.2d 290, 297 [1978]). We found a specific requirement in section 12 NYCRR 23-2.2 (a) which mandates that "forms" be "braced or tied together so as to maintain position and shape" (9 NY3d at 50).
We concluded that the Appellate Division should not have granted summary judgment based on the record as then developed. While the interpretation of the regulation presented a question of law, we determined that "the meaning of specialized terms in such a regulation is a question on which a court must sometimes hear evidence before making its determination" (id. at 51, citing Millard v City of Ogdensburg, 274 A.D.2d 953, 954 [4th Dept 2000]), and remitted the matter to Supreme Court for a framed-issue hearing on whether "the words of the regulation can sensibly be applied to anything but completed forms" (9 NY3d at 51).
At the hearing before Supreme Court, the parties introduced expert testimony on how forms are assembled, and how component parts and completed forms are stabilized and secured at construction sites. Defendants introduced the testimony of a structural engineer, with 30 years' experience, who described a concrete form as "an assembly of all kinds of components" including form panels, and defined a brace as "a structural element" used to hold "the form in place so it won't move and shift." He also testified that a form wall must be secured in order to resist the impact of wind loads. On cross-examination, he testified that in addition to wind loads, forms must resist other types of impact, including human contact like being bumped by a worker. He admitted that the first side of a form that is put up, called the back component of the form, could be braced in order to prevent it from falling, and that braces can be installed when the back wall is raised.
Supreme Court thereafter granted defendants' summary judgment motion and dismissed plaintiff's section 241 (6) claim. The court concluded that the back form wall was part of an entire form, and as such did not come within the coverage of the regulation or section 241 (6). Plaintiff appealed.
The Appellate Division, with one Justice dissenting, reversed on the law, and, upon a search of the record, granted summary judgment to plaintiff (98 AD3d at 841). According to the majority, the expert testimony showed that the regulation could apply to forms as they were being constructed, and that a back form must be braced to maintain its position. The majority held that erection of the back form wall is the first step in the process of bracing and/or tying a form, such that it would defy common sense to maintain that the entire form could be structurally safe and maintain its "position and shape" pursuant to 12 NYCRR 23-2.2 (a) without a proper brace (id. at 842). Justice Presiding Tom dissented, and argued, inter alia, that the focus of 12 NYCRR § 23-2.2 (a) "is the structural integrity of the form during the placement of concrete" (id. at 845), and that the expert testimony was consistent with this interpretation. Defendants now appeal pursuant to leave granted by the Appellate Division (2013 NY Slip Op 60455[U] [1st Dept 2013]).
Labor Law § 241 (6) states that
The legislative intent of section 241 (6) is to ensure the safety of workers at construction sites (Nagel v D & R Realty Corp., 99 N.Y.2d 98, 102 [2002] ["That the Legislature sought to protect workers from industrial accidents specifically in connection with construction, demolition or excavation work is, therefore, patent"]). As we stated in our 2007 opinion, the statute sets forth the common-law standard of care and mandates compliance with the Commissioner of Labor's rules, including any nondelegable duty imposed on owners and contractors set forth in those rules (9 NY3d at 50). We found such nondelegable duty in the mandate set forth in 12 NYCRR 23-2.2 (a) that "forms" be "braced or tied together so as to maintain position and shape" (id.), and concluded the record needed further development to determine the applicability of the regulation to plaintiff's case (id. at 51).
On this appeal, following the framed-issue hearing and opinions of Supreme Court and the Appellate Division on the legal question of the applicability of 12 NYCRR 23-2.2 (a) to plaintiff's case, defendants reassert their argument with renewed vigor that the regulation applies only to completed forms, and not to the back form wall which caused plaintiff's injuries. According to defendants, the operative regulatory language that imposes more than a general duty of care requires that forms "shall be properly braced or tied together to maintain position and shape," and the expert testimony established that this requirement cannot sensibly be applied to one side of a form standing on its own because it has no shape to maintain. Defendants contend this is the only plausible reading of 12
The testimony adduced at the framed-issue hearing establishes that the object that fell on plaintiff was a back wall panel, which was a component of a form under assembly at the time of the injury, and that the back wall is the type of component which can be subjected to the requirements of 12 NYCRR 23-2.2 (a).
Plaintiff's engineer testified that a form wall must be braced otherwise it topples over, and that the only way to prevent a wall from turning over from a wind load blowing on it is "by having a brace." He also testified that once the back wall goes up it is braced, and that both walls did not need to be in place to install a brace. Moreover, he testified that, once up, the wall may be standing for some period, possibly up to days at a time, before the form is completed, a reality of construction work also
Despite the expert testimony supporting the application of the regulation to other than completed forms, defendants argue that the regulation's subdivision (b), titled "Inspection," which requires that certain designated persons make continuous inspections to ensure "the stability of all forms, shores and reshores including all braces and other supports during the placing of concrete," similarly limits the mandatory bracing and tying requirement of subdivision (a) to completed forms (12 NYCRR 23-2.2 [b] [emphasis added]). Defendants' argument is unpersuasive. The ongoing inspection requirement contained in subdivision (b), applicable only to periods of the "placing of concrete," merely recognizes that during this stage of concrete work, the stability of the form is specially vulnerable and requires particular attention, as noted by its other requirement that "[a]ny unsafe condition shall be remedied immediately" (id.). Interpreting the regulation as defendants suggest would result in diminished protections for workers during the assembly of forms, as compared with the concrete pouring process stage of the work, a reading of the regulation that runs counter to its text and undermines the legislative intent to ensure worker safety.
The expert testimony supports the conclusion that the language of 12 NYCRR 23-2.2 (a) can sensibly be applied to other than a completed form, and may apply to a wall component. Therefore, the Appellate Division properly reversed Supreme Court's order and, moreover, did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law by granting summary judgment to plaintiff (see generally Merritt Hill Vineyards v Windy Hgts. Vineyard, 61 N.Y.2d 106, 111 [1984]; see also CPLR 3212 [b]).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question answered in the affirmative.
PIGOTT, J. (dissenting).
Plaintiff's Labor Law § 241 (6) claim hinges on defendants' alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-2.2 entitled "concrete work" and specifically subdivision (a) thereof, which states, as relevant here, that "[f]orms ... shall be structurally safe and shall be properly braced or tied together so as to maintain position and shape." When this case was before us in 2007 (9 N.Y.3d 47 [2007]), we concluded that the words
The testimony at the "framed issue" hearing was clear that a form was just that, a completed form; and that the regulation could not be reasonably interpreted as applying to anything but completed forms. For that reason, I dissent and would answer the certified question in the negative.
On its face, the aim of the regulation at issue is to ensure the structural integrity of "forms" that have been assembled as part of the concrete work. Even plaintiff's expert conceded that forms are constructed by erecting a "form wall," placing rebar in the middle, erecting a back form wall and then tying it together. He further explained that whenever concrete is poured, it must be poured into a form.
It is of no moment that both sides' experts agreed that a form "wall" should be braced before the form is completed to ensure that it does not tip over during the process of constructing the form. The issue is not whether such bracing should be used to support a form "wall" or whether such bracing could be utilized as such support but, rather, whether section 23-2.2 (a) was designed to address the bracing of a form wall in the first place. In my view, the majority's interpretation expands the reach of the regulation to include the bracing of an object, i.e., a form "wall" that is absent from the regulation, which directs that "forms" (and not a form wall) "be properly braced or tied together."
Simply put, although plaintiff may have been struck by a form "wall," he was not injured by a "form" and, more specifically, was not the victim of a type of accident this section was designed to prevent.
Order affirmed, with costs, and certified question answered in the affirmative.