JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge.
Anastasia Katsoulakis (the "plaintiff or "Katsoulakis") commenced this action pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), challenging the decision of defendant Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner" or "defendant") denying her request for disability benefits and separately bringing a civil suit against defendant, which was consolidated with her challenge to the Commissioner's decision.
Defendant has moved to dismiss the consolidated case under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court concludes that it has no subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims for the reasons set forth herein. In the alternative, the Court concludes that, even if there was subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims, she has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
On July 17, 2006, plaintiff applied for disability benefits. (Decl. of Patrick J. Herbst ("Herbst Decl.") Ex. 7 at 2.) Her application for disability benefits was denied on September 21, 2006.
On January 7, 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint against the Commissioner contesting defendant's denial of disability benefits. On March 5, 2010, plaintiff filed a civil action against the Commissioner for monetary damages based upon the denial of disability benefits. In a March 17, 2010 Order, this Court consolidated the two complaints into one action. On June 25, 2010, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated action. On July 23, 2010, the Court received plaintiff's response. The Court also received a letter from plaintiff on June 15, 2011 regarding her health. The Court also received various letters from plaintiff that do not pertain to the merits of this suit. The Court has fully considered the submissions and arguments of the parties.
A motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) "is reviewed under the same standards as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)." See Coveal v. Consumer Home Mortgage, Inc., No. 04-CV-4755 (ILG), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25346, at *6 (e.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2005) (citing Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A, 318 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1012 (2003)). Further, the court may consider evidence beyond the pleadings to resolve disputed issues of fact regarding its jurisdiction. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 255 n. 30 (2d Cir. 2003). "A court presented with a motion to dismiss under both Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) must decide the `jurisdictional question first because a disposition of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is a decision on the merits, and therefore, an exercise of jurisdiction.'" Coveal, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *7 (quoting Magee v. Nassau Cnty. Med. Ctr, 27 F.Supp.2d 154, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)); see also Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Alambama Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 896 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be decided only after finding subject matter jurisdiction).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006). "In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege a plausible set of facts sufficient `to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Operating Local 649 Annuity Trust Fund v. Smith Barney FundMgmt. LLC, 595 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). This standard does not require "heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
The Supreme Court recently clarified the appropriate pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, setting forth a two-pronged approach for courts deciding a motion to dismiss. 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). The Court instructed district courts to first "identify[ ] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth."
Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, "[c]ourts are obliged to construe the [plaintiff's] pleadings . . . liberally." McCluskey v. N.Y. State Unified Court Sys., No. 10-CV-2144 (JFB)(ETB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69835, 2010 WL 2558624, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 2010) (citing Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) and McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004)). Nonetheless, even though the Court construes a pro se complaint liberally, the complaint must still "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" to survive a motion to dismiss. Mancuso v. Hynes, 379 F. App'x 60, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying Twombly and Iqbal to pro se complaint).
Plaintiffs claims against defendant must be dismissed because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review them. The Court first addresses plaintiffs appeal from the denial of her disability benefits and subsequently her civil action for money damages.
This Court has limited jurisdiction over appeals of defendant's decisions regarding disability benefits. Specifically, this Court may review "any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which [plaintiff] was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). However,
42 U.S.C. § 405(h).
In order to obtain review of a final decision by the Commissioner, the claimant must follow a four-step administrative process. Specifically, this includes
20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a). According to the Supreme Court, this creates "an orderly administrative mechanism, with district court review of the final decision of the [Commissioner]." Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 102 (1977). If an administrative appeal is not pursued by the claimant, the administrative determination by the Social Security Administration becomes final. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900(b), 404.905, 404.921, 404.955, 404.981, 422.210.
This Court can only review an administrative decision denying disability benefits where a hearing has been held unless plaintiff raises a constitutional challenge to the decision. In Sanders, the Supreme Court concluded that because "a petition to reopen a prior final decision may be denied without a hearing," it was not reviewable absent a "colorable" constitutional challenge. 430 U.S. at 107-09. The Sanders Court noted that section 405(g) "clearly limits judicial review to a particular type of agency action."
Some courts have consented to review a claim for benefits where no hearing was held, but only under circumstances suggesting that plaintiff has raised a viable constitutional issue. See Hatcher v. Barnhart, No. 06 CV 999 (JG), 2006 WL 3196849, at *3-5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2006) (concluding that there is no jurisdiction where no hearing is held except, where as in the case, there is a colorable constitutional claim based on inappropriate notice); Crumble v. Sec'y of Health & Human Serv., 586 F.Supp. 57, 58-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (claimant asserted he never received notice of his hearing and was never given an opportunity to explain why he did not appear, thereby raising a constitutional question); Raga v. Secretary of HHS, No. 5:91 CV 1600, 1992 WL 188825, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 1992) ("The Court is not anxious to embrace a result that insulates an administrative decision from judicial scrutiny where the claim is made that the agency failed to follow its own regulations.").
As set forth below, it is clear that there is no final decision by the defendant for this Court to review. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to raise a colorable constitutional claim against defendant. As a result, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.
There is no final decision denying plaintiff disability benefits because no hearing was held. An ALJ may dismiss a request for a hearing at claimant's request or at the request of claimant's counsel. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.957(a), 404.1710. In this case, claimant's counsel submitted a letter to the ALJ requesting that the hearing be dismissed.
(Herbst Decl. Ex. 1 at 3.) Thus, there is no final decision for review by this Court because a hearing was not held. See, e.g., Plagianos, 571 F. Supp. at 497; Matos-Cruz, 187 F.3d at 622 (collecting cases).
Nor does plaintiff assert a colorable constitutional claim. As a threshold matter, plaintiff does not allege any constitutional violations in her complaint. In any event, it is apparent that defendant followed appropriate agency procedure. As an initial matter, the Notice of Hearing sent to plaintiff indicated that failure to appear without good cause could result in dismissal of the hearing request. (Herbst. Decl. Ex. 7 at 1.) Plaintiff was notified by mail that her dismissal request was granted and set forth procedures plaintiff had to follow to appeal the decision to the Appeals Council. (Id. Ex. 1 at 1.) The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review, concluding that plaintiff did not provide any basis for reversal. (Id. Ex. 3.)
In sum, the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's appeal of the Commissioner's decision denying her benefits.
Similarly, this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim for monetary relief based on the defendant's denial of her disability benefits. There is no private right of action under the Social Security Act. In the alternative, even if there was a private right of action, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
In her complaint against the Social Security Administration ("SSA" or "defendant"), plaintiff asserts that she is entitled to monetary damages because the SSA failed to grant her request for disability benefits. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the jurisdiction over her civil suit is "based on a Social Security appeal," and further alleges that the Social Security Administration "ignored to give" her disability benefits "from 2006" and failed to "liv[e] up to their financial obligation." (Compl. Civ. at 2-3; see also Pl.'s Letter to the Court filed on July 23, 2010 (alleging that plaintiff "went through their process and they failed me" after plaintiff filed an appeal to the Appeals Council which was denied).)
Plaintiff is barred from bringing a civil action against the SSA for monetary relief based on violations of the Social Security Act (the "Act") because there is no private right of action under the SSA. As noted above, federal courts are vested with subject matter jurisdiction only over "final decisions" of social security claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Social Security Act does not bestow a private right of action for monetary relief. See Maloney v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 02-CV-1725 (JFB)(SMG), 2006 WL 1720399, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2006), aff'd 517 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Krauss v. Bowen, Nos. 80 CV 2638, 83 CV 0237, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2458, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1989) ("[T]he Social Security Act does not confer any right to an action for consequential or punitive damages resulting from the denial of disability benefits." (collecting cases)).
In any event, even assuming arguendo that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's civil action against the SSA, her claims also fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. To the extent plaintiff is attempting to allege violations of her constitutional rights by the SSA, the SSA is immune from suit. Generally, plaintiffs whose constitutional rights have been violated by employees of the federal government may recover money damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). A Bivens claim "alleging violation of a constitutional right may be brought against a federal officer in his individual capacity. However, a Bivens claim against a federal agency is precluded, as an action against a federal agency is essentially a suit against the United States, and Bivens actions against the United States are barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity." Sereika v. Patel, 411 F.Supp.2d 397, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citation omitted); see also Platsky v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 953 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[J]urisdictional limitations permit a plaintiff to sue only the federal government officials responsible for violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights; a plaintiff cannot sue the agency for which the officials work.").
Though plaintiff does not specifically name individual defendants in her civil action, any such claims would similarly be barred because the Supreme Court has held that social security claimants may not bring Bivens actions alleging violations of their constitutional rights. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 424-25 (1988) ("The [Social Security] Act . . . makes no provision for remedies in money damages against officials responsible for unconstitutional conduct that leads to the wrongful denial of benefits."). The Schweiker Court refused to create a money damages remedy against Social Security officials finding that Congress'"inaction has not been inadvertent" and that "the design of [the Social Security] program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms" through the administrative process. 487 U.S. at 423.
In sum, the Court dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction both plaintiff's appeal from the defendant's denial of disability benefits, as well as plaintiffs claim against the SSA for monetary damages.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's motion to dismiss is granted in its entirety. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
