JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge.
Plaintiff Greta Kantrowitz ("plaintiff or "Kantrowitz") commenced this action against defendants Uniondale Union Free School District ("the District"), the Board of Education of the Uniondale Union Free School District ("the Board"), Terri Mangum ("Dr. Mangum"), and William K. Lloyd ("Dr. Lloyd") (collectively, "defendants"), alleging that defendants discriminated against her in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL") when they abolished her position as Administrative Assistant for Early Childhood and failed to re-hire her to a comparable position in the District. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the
The following facts are taken from the parties' depositions, declarations, exhibits and respective Local 56.1 statements of facts.
Plaintiff is a sixty-three year old Caucasian woman who began her teaching career in 1969, when she was hired as a teacher at a private nursery school after earning her undergraduate degree in early childhood education. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 10, 18; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 4.1.) Several decades later, in 1993, plaintiff was hired as Head Teacher at the Hewlett Jewish Center, where she planned the curriculum for all three and four year olds, and the following year, in 1994, she was hired as a kindergarten teacher in the Lawrence Public School District. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 4.2.) Plaintiff continued to teach kindergarten in the Lawrence Public School District from 1993 to 2000, and also served as the Principal of the summer school in that district in 1999. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 20.) Plaintiff holds a Bachelor of Science and a Masters Degree in early childhood education and has received a Certificate in School Administration and Supervision. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 4.1, 4.3) Plaintiff is also certified by New York State to teach nursery school through sixth grade. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 17.)
In February 2000, plaintiff was appointed to a probationary position of halftime Assistant Principal and half-time Kindergarten Coordinator within the Uniondale Union Free School District. (Id. ¶ 21.) In her position as Assistant Principal, plaintiff was responsible only for discipline at the Grand Avenue Elementary School. (Id. ¶ 22.) In her position as Kindergarten Coordinator, plaintiff was responsible for creating and implementing the District's full-day kindergarten program, which involved transitioning nine half-day programs into twenty-four full-day kindergarten classes by September 2000. (Id. ¶ 23; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 23.) Specifically, as to her responsibilities, plaintiff testified:
(Kantrowitz Depo. at 25:24-26:5.) Several months later, in June 2000, plaintiff was appointed to a full-time position of Kindergarten Coordinator. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 24.) In this full-time position, plaintiff was tasked
(Id. at 26:25-27:7.) This position was probationary, and plaintiff testified that it would take three years for her to receive tenure. (Id. at 27:8-16.) One year later, in June 2001, plaintiff was appointed to the position of Administrative Assistant for Early Childhood for kindergarten through first grade, with a probationary period to run through February 28, 2003. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 25.)
Plaintiff began having medical difficulties in the fall of 2002. Specifically, in October 2002, plaintiff was diagnosed with lung cancer, and in December 2002, plaintiff suffered a stroke. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) As to her stroke, plaintiff does not have any symptoms or complications therefrom, and there is nothing she is unable to do or has difficulty doing as a result of the stroke. (Id. ¶ 29.) As to her lung cancer, however, plaintiff had to have her lung surgically removed in January 2003, and she took disability leave in connection with this surgery from December 2002 until July 2003. (Id. ¶ 31; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 33.) Nevertheless, besides running, there is nothing that plaintiff is unable to do as a result of her lung cancer, and she has never requested any accommodations from the District as a result of her lung cancer or her stroke. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 32-33.) However, plaintiff testified that a Principal from the California Avenue school, Jennifer Bumford, and an Assistant Principal from Northern Parkway, Sheila Jefferson, made comments to plaintiff the effect of "oh, you will have to go to the second floor" or "I am sorry, you are going to have to walk up stairs." (Kantrowitz Depo. at 107:22-108:7.) Plaintiff noted that it "didn't bother [her] to walk up stairs," and she interpreted these comments—which, according to plaintiff, were made "constantly"—to mean that others perceived her to be disabled. (Id.)
In any event, during the time period that she was out on disability leave, plaintiff was granted tenure for her position as Administrative Assistant for Early Childhood. In fact, although the probationary period for plaintiff's position was not set to expire until February 28, 2003, plaintiff was granted tenure early for this position in December 2002. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 30; Defs.' Supp. 56.1 ¶ 30.1.) Plaintiff testified that she received notice of her tenure in January 2003, when she was in the hospital for her lung removal surgery. (Kantrowitz Depo. at 29:11-16.) Subsequently, according to the job description that was in effect from June 2004 until plaintiff's position was abolished, plaintiff was responsible for two dozen different tasks, including, inter alia: supervising the kindergarten, first grade, and second grade staffs; providing enrichment activities and recommending the supplies for Early Childhood grades; meeting with the five elementary school principals to discuss teacher observations, mid-year and end-of-year
In July 2004, Dr. William Lloyd, an African American man, became Superintendent of the District, after serving as Interim Superintendent from November 2003 until July 2004. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 11; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 11.) After his appointment as Superintendent, Dr. Lloyd, who was not familiar with plaintiff's position, met with plaintiff and asked her to describe her job to him, which plaintiff did both orally and in writing. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 38.) In addition, in or about 2004, Dr. Lloyd met with the principals of the elementary schools in the District, along with Maryann Llewellyn— who at the time was Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum and Instruction
One of the principals with whom plaintiff worked was Dr. Terri Mangum, an African-American
In January 2007, plaintiff was in charge of planning an Administrators' Party for current union members. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 48; Kantrowitz Depo. at 64:14-65:11.) Although some retired administrators had attended the party in years past, "[i]t had not been the practice" to do so, because current union members' dues pay for the party. (Kantrowitz Depo. at 65:12-66:4.) Accordingly, no one on the committee involved with planning the party had mentioned inviting any retired administrators. (Id. at 65:24-66:2.) However, on the day of the event, plaintiff received a phone call that Dr. Mangum, who had retired the previous June, wanted to attend. (Id. at 65:22-66:7.) After consultation with Walter Cole, the president of the union, it was determined that Dr. Mangum should not attend the party as a retiree because, according to plaintiff, it would "hurt[] other people who had retired." (Id. at 66:13-67:3; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 48.1.) Plaintiff then called Dr. Mangum and "apologized and said that we didn't realize that some retired administrators would want to come, but that at this point, number one, the count was in, everything was done, it was late, and that we would try to rectify the situation for June," when another party would be held. (Kantrowitz Depo. at 67:2-3, 67:21-68:8.) According to plaintiff, Dr. Mangum responded that she understood. (Id. at 68:18-20.) However, after her telephone call with Dr. Mangum, plaintiff received another call informing her that several African-American administrators would not be attending the party because Dr. Mangum was not coming. (Id. at 68:21-69:7; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 48.3 (defendants' admit that plaintiff learned that some African American administrators were planning on boycotting the party because Dr. Mangum was not going to attend).) During this phone call, plaintiff was not told whether the administrators themselves made the decision to boycott the party or whether Dr. Mangum asked them to do so. (Kantrowitz Depo. at 71:12-20.) In addition, Dr. Mangum testified at her deposition that she was not aware of the decision to boycott until after the decision was made, and that she told the administrators that "they were absolutely not to do that" and that "[t]hey were to go to the party." (Mangum Depo. at 29:5-18.) Ultimately, Dr. Mangum was extended an invitation to, and did attend, the party. (Kantrowitz Depo. at 70:9-71:8.)
Later that year, in July 2007, Dr. Mangum became a member of the Board of Education for the District. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 14.) That same month, on or about July 14 to 15, 2007, the Board and members of Central Administration, including Dr. Lloyd and Maryann Llewellyn (Lloyd
After Dr. Lloyd received this request, he proceeded to conduct an evaluation by speaking with four of the five current elementary school principals in the District. (Id. at 26:24-27:2.) Of the four principals with whom Dr. Lloyd spoke, three were minorities and one was a Caucasian. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 57.) The principal Dr. Lloyd chose not to speak with was Linda Friedman, Principal of the Walnut Street Elementary School, because, in Dr. Lloyd's words, Ms. Friedman "would always brag about how positive and how good [plaintiff] was in her school." (Lloyd Depo. at 27:10-19.) Because Ms. Friedman had "told [Dr. Lloyd] this before," he felt it was not "necessary" to speak with her again. (Id. at 27:20-23.) Dr. Lloyd noted that Ms. Friedman is Caucasian. (Id. at 27:24-28:2.) Dr. Lloyd also chose not to speak with Ms. Llewellyn, despite her job in Central Administration, because, according to Dr. Lloyd, "[i]t came to my attention that current Deputy Superintendent Mrs. Llewellyn was very close personal relationship [sic] with Mrs. Kantrowitz and I didn't feel like I could get an objective answer." (Id. at 46:8-21.) Dr. Lloyd could not recall who informed him about Ms. Llewellyn and Ms. Kantrowitz's friendship. (Id. at 46:24-47:6.)
As to how Dr. Lloyd conducted his evaluation, he spoke to the four current principals and the one retired principal once each by phone and did not take any notes or keep any written documentation of his conversations. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 56.2-56.4.) Dr. Lloyd testified that the four principals told him that plaintiff "was rarely in the building and that she was in one particular school almost always." (Lloyd Depo. at 30:5-8.) He also noted that the principals reported that "the position could be completed and run by the current administration in the school and it was not necessary." (Id. at 65:10-15.)
During this same time period, on or about July 14, 2007, plaintiff and Ms. Friedman traveled to Oxford, England to present a paper to the Oxford Roundtable, which was described by plaintiff as "a gathering of scholars who share new and innovative programs they have been able to do in school districts." (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 50; Kantrowitz Depo. at 80:16-19.) Dr. Lloyd had recommended that plaintiff attend the roundtable, and the Board of Education approved plaintiff's request to attend. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 51.) Notably, in May 2007, the Board also had approved plaintiff's position in the budget. (Kantrowitz Depo. at 57:4-5.) Approximately two weeks after plaintiff's return from the roundtable, however, on or about July 30, 2007, plaintiff and her union representative attended a meeting with Dr. Lloyd wherein he informed plaintiff that on August 21, 2007, the Board was going to vote on his recommendation to abolish plaintiff's position. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 63.) Plaintiff recalls that Dr. Lloyd said that the recommendation to eliminate plaintiff's position had been made at the Board retreat (Kantrowitz Depo. at 87:5-8), but, as noted supra, Dr. Lloyd testified that no one informed him at the retreat to "look into the validity" of plaintiff's position. (Lloyd Depo. at 70:24-71:4.) At the August 21 Board meeting, the Board voted to abolish plaintiff's position effective September 4, 2007. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 68.)
After plaintiff was terminated, defendants claim that she was placed on a "preferred eligibility list" for future openings. (Defs.' Ex. X.) Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Mangum also recalled that Dr. Mangum was concerned about finding plaintiff another position in the District. (Lloyd Depo. at 42:6-10; Mangum Depo. at 46:25-47:3.) Plaintiff, however, disputes this contention, arguing, inter alia, that she was never offered a position comparable to her abolished position. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 70.) In any event, it is undisputed that plaintiff was offered a sixth grade teaching position, but that she declined this position because it was a "leave replacement" position
In addition, plaintiff was invited to interview for an assistant principal position that was to be split between the California Avenue School and the Northern Parkway School. (Id. ¶ 80.) Plaintiff testified that she felt this invitation to interview was mere "lip service" because one of the interview committee members was a teacher whose tenure plaintiff previously had opposed. (Kantrowitz Depo. at 137:21-138:4.) In fact, this teacher, Claire Meng, gave plaintiff a score of twenty out of fifty, which was the lowest score received out of all the interview candidates. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 82.1) One of the other members of the interview committee, however, submitted a declaration stating that plaintiff "did not continue further in the interview process for this position because the interview committee felt her experience was limited to early childhood and they wanted more well-rounded candidates, especially because of our concerns about testing that occurs in the third, fourth, and fifth grades." (Bumford Decl. ¶ 22.)
Plaintiff points to several other individuals who were younger than plaintiff or who were minorities, or both, and who allegedly were treated more favorably than plaintiff. (Pl.'s Opp. at 4-5, 12.) For example, Paul Brown ("Brown"), a fifty-seven year old African American man, was appointed to the position of Director of Physical Education, Athletics, and Health in May 2003, and was given a probationary term of July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2006. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 109.) After being advised that he would
Defendants filed their motion on October 15, 2010. Plaintiff filed her opposition on December 20, 2010. Defendants filed their reply on January 19, 2011. The Court held oral argument on defendants' motion on March 4, 2011. This matter is fully submitted, and the Court has considered all of the parties' arguments and submissions.
The standards for summary judgment are well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court may only grant a motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to summary judgment. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir.2005). "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). The court "is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments." Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (summary judgment is unwarranted "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party").
Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party "`must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... The nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). As the Supreme Court stated in Anderson, "[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may
Claims for employment discrimination based on race, age, and disability brought pursuant to § 1983 or pursuant to Title VII, the ADA,
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, "the burden of production [shifts] to the defendant, who must proffer a `legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for the challenged employment action." Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir.2001)). If the defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, plaintiff must then prove that defendant's articulated reasons are pretextual. Woodman, 411 F.3d at 76. "In short, the ultimate burden rests with the plaintiff to offer evidence `sufficient to support a reasonable inference that prohibited discrimination occurred.'" Id. (citing James v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir.2000)).
To meet this burden, the plaintiff may rely on evidence presented to establish her prima facie case as well as additional evidence. Such additional evidence may include direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-101, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). However, meeting "McDonnell Douglas's minimal requirements of a prima facie case plus evidence from which a factfinder could find that the employer's explanation was false" does not automatically and necessarily require the denial of summary judgment and the submission of the case to the jury. James, 233 F.3d at 157. Instead, the key is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of plaintiff on the ultimate issue, that is, whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support an inference of discrimination. See id. at 156; Connell v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 109 F.Supp.2d 202, 207-08 (S.D.N.Y.2000).
Defendants argue that they should be granted summary judgment on plaintiffs Title VII and ADEA claims because plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Because plaintiff must establish the same prima facie case with regard to both her race and age discrimination claims, the Court will address these claims together for purposes of the prima facie analysis. As an initial matter, defendants do not dispute, for purposes of this motion, that plaintiff could establish that she is a member of a protected group. (Defs.' Mem. of Law at 9.) Likewise, defendants accept for purposes of this motion that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. (Id.) Specifically, plaintiff alleges that she suffered two adverse employment actions—namely, the elimination of her position and the District's subsequent failure to re-hire her to any comparable position—which when "viewed together or independently ... raise an inference of discrimination." (Pl.'s Opp. at 9.) However, defendants do contend that plaintiff cannot demonstrate she was qualified for the assistant principal position that she sought after her previous position was abolished. In addition, defendants argue that plaintiff cannot show that the abolishment of her position and subsequent failure to hire her in a comparable position give rise to an inference of discrimination. The Court disagrees, and addresses each issue in turn.
For purposes of this motion, defendants do not dispute that plaintiff could establish that she was qualified for her position as Administrative Assistant for Early Childhood. (Defs.' Mem. of Law at 9.) However, defendants do argue that plaintiff cannot establish that she was qualified for the assistant principal positions that she sought after her previous position was abolished. (Id. at 14.) For the reasons set forth infra, the Court disagrees with defendants and concludes that there is a disputed issue of fact on this point that precludes summary judgment.
Defendants argue that the reason plaintiff did not continue in the interview process for this position was that the interview committee felt her experience was "too limited to early childhood issues and that she did not seem well-rounded enough for the position." (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 83.)
The Court concludes that plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of disputed fact regarding whether the circumstances surrounding her termination—including the abolishment of her position and the District's subsequent failure to hire her into a comparable position—give rise to an inference of race and age discrimination. As discussed in detail below with respect to the ultimate issue of whether defendant's articulated non-discriminatory reasons for their employment decisions were pretextual, plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding these employment actions to meet this prima facie requirement.
Even though plaintiff has established a prima facie case, defendants have articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their employment actions—namely, (1) that plaintiff's position was abolished for purposes of economy and efficiency, and (2) that she was not qualified for the assistant principal position. Hence, the Court proceeds directly to the ultimate question of whether plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury, if all of plaintiff's evidence is credited and all reasonable inferences are drawn in her favor, could find age and/or race discrimination.
In response to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff points to several pieces of evidence in support of her position that a reasonable jury could find that defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons were a pretext for race discrimination.
First, as to plaintiff's race discrimination claim, plaintiff presented evidence that, in January 2007, approximately seven months before plaintiff's termination, several African American administrators were going to boycott a party plaintiff was organizing because Dr. Mangum, also African American, had not been invited. Although Dr. Mangum denied having any involvement in the planning of the boycott, construing the evidence in plaintiff's favor for purposes of the current motion, plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence on this point to create a disputed issue of fact that survives summary judgment. In particular, plaintiff testified that she received a call about the boycott after she informed Dr. Mangum that she could not attend the party and that, during this call, it was not made clear whether the administrators themselves or Dr. Mangum had spearheaded the boycott. (See generally Kantrowitz Depo. at 64:14-71:20; Mangum Depo. at 29:5-18.) Thus, plaintiff asserts that Dr. Mangum harbored race-based animosity toward plaintiff stemming from this January 2007 planned boycott of the union party (organized by plaintiff) by African American administrators.
Second, plaintiff points to evidence that, in May 2007, prior to Dr. Mangum's appointment to the Board, the Board apparently approved plaintiff's position in the budget. (Kantrowitz Depo. at 57:4-5.) In addition, two months later, in July 2007, plaintiff attended the Oxford Roundtable to present a paper, after having been recommended to attend by Dr. Lloyd and approved to attend by the Board. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 50-51; Kantrowitz Depo. at 57:4-5.) In addition, around the time that plaintiff attended the conference in July 2007, Dr. Mangum was appointed to the Board and attended a retreat with other Board members and certain administrators, including Dr. Lloyd. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 14, 52; Lloyd Depo. at 22:25-23:8.) Approximately two weeks after the retreat, and after plaintiff returned from Oxford, she was informed that her position was going to be abolished. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 63.)
Third, plaintiff has put forth evidence that, prior to Dr. Mangum's appointment to the Board, her work was viewed, at the very least, as satisfactory. For example, only a year prior to her termination, plaintiff has received a favorable review from Dr. Lloyd, in which it was noted that not only would plaintiff attend the Oxford Roundtable and "bring global recognition to the District" but also that the Dr. Lloyd and Ms. Llewellyn looked "forward to [plaintiff's] continued help and assistance with our District Goals and thank her for being a conscientious and outstanding administrator." (Defs.' Ex. EE.) Moreover, the Board had approved her position in the budget in May 2007 and had approved her travel to the July 2007 roundtable, at which Dr. Lloyd thought plaintiff would do "a nice job representing the district." (Lloyd Depo. at 16:13-16.) Nevertheless, only two weeks after going to the roundtable, and in the same month that Dr. Mangum had been appointed to the Board and attended a retreat with District administrators, plaintiff was informed that her position would be abolished. Although defendants deny that plaintiff's position was discussed at the retreat, plaintiff testified that she remembered Dr. Lloyd saying the abolishment of her position was recommended on the retreat. (Compare Lloyd
Fourth, plaintiff has presented evidence regarding the incomplete nature of the evaluation of her position in support of her contention that it was pretextual. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that her "evaluation" was mere window dressing intended to legitimize a decision that had already been recommended at the retreat to terminate her position. For example, plaintiff points to evidence that Dr. Lloyd spoke selectively to only four of the five current principals with whom plaintiff worked, after expressly declining to speak to the fifth (Caucasian) principal because this principal supposedly would only have positive things to say about plaintiff. In addition, he took no notes of his single phone conversations with each principal, nor did he keep any other written records related to the evaluation. Dr. Lloyd also declined to speak to the Deputy Superintendent and plaintiff's boss, Maryann Llewellyn, because he had heard from an unspecified source that plaintiff and Llewellyn were friends. Llewellyn's testimony reveals, however, that while she may have been friendly with plaintiff, the two of them had socialized on only "maybe three" occasions. (Llewellyn Depo. at 12:22-14:2.)
Fifth, with respect to the failure to hire her to the assistant principal position, plaintiff points to the following evidence: (1) plaintiff's evidence regarding her qualifications as compared to Dirolf's qualifications; (2) that plaintiff was not offered comparable positions when her original position was abolished; (3) that Dr. Lloyd refused to create a permanent position for plaintiff when such a position was proposed by Ms. Llewellyn and Ms. Friedman; and (4) that the interview committee for the only assistant principal position for which plaintiff was invited to interview had as a member a teacher who potentially harbored animus against plaintiff because plaintiff had opposed that teacher's tenure.
Finally, plaintiff has put forth evidence that purportedly demonstrates that similarly situated minority employees were treated more favorably than plaintiff. In particular, as noted supra, plaintiff has pointed to two minority employees who were granted extensions on their probationary periods when it became clear that they would not immediately be receiving tenure, and another candidate who was allowed to return to a previously held middle school teaching position when she was notified that she would not be recommended for tenure in her assistant principal position. (See Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 109-11, 113-17.) According to plaintiff, when plaintiff was informed that her position would be abolished, in contrast, not only was she not offered comparable positions, but her request to use her sick days while she looked for another job was denied by the Board (Kantrowitz Depo. at 93:10-94:7), and Ms. Llewellyn and Ms. Friedman's proposal to create a permanent teaching position was plaintiff was rejected by Dr. Lloyd. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 79.)
Although defendants contend that these employees were not similarly situated to plaintiff (Defs.' Mem. of Law at 13), the Court disagrees and finds that there is a genuine issue of disputed fact on this point that precludes summary judgment. It is well-settled that a plaintiff can raise an inference of discrimination by showing disparate treatment—namely, that a similarly situated employee outside the protected group received more favorable treatment. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); Mandell v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir.2003); Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir.1999). The law does not require the employees to
Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted). In the instant case, plaintiff is comparing herself to minority employees subject to the same workplace standard—they were all teachers or administrators in the same District during the time since Dr. Lloyd was appointed as Superintendent. As to whether the abolishment of a position is comparable to a grant of an extension on a probationary term, defendants have presented no evidence other than conclusory statements in their brief to support their argument that these two employment actions are not sufficiently similar. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that no reasonable jury could find the similarly situated requirement was met. See Graham, 230 F.3d at 39 ("Whether two employees are similarly situated ordinarily presents a question of fact for the jury."); see also Lizardo v. Denny's, Inc., 270 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); cf. Curry v. City of Syracuse, 316 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir.2003) ("It is well established that `[credibility assessments, choices between conflicting versions of the events, and the weighing of evidence are matters for the jury, not for the court on a motion for summary judgment.'" (quoting Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 55-56 (2d Cir.1997))).
In short, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, the Court concludes that sufficient evidence exists to raise an issue of material fact as to whether defendants' reasons for the abolishment of plaintiff's position, and subsequent refusal to re-hire her to a comparable position, were a pretext for race discrimination. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient for plaintiff to survive defendants' summary judgment motion on her race discrimination claims.
The Court reaches the same conclusion regarding plaintiff's age discrimination claim. In connection with this claim, plaintiff relies on some of the same evidence of pretext—including her satisfactory performance and purportedly incomplete nature of defendants' evaluation of her position—that was utilized above with respect to the race discrimination claim. In addition, there is evidence in the record that at least one younger employee who plaintiff alleges is similarly situated to her was treated more favorably than plaintiff. (See
In sum, although defendants have pointed to portions of the record that defendant argues undermine the strength of various aspects of plaintiffs proffered evidence of discrimination, plaintiff's evidence is sufficient, when construed most favorably to plaintiff, to survive defendants' summary judgment and to require these discrimination claims, including critical issues of credibility, decided by a jury.
In contrast to her Title VII and ADEA claims, the Court concludes that plaintiff has not put forth sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her disability claims. As an initial matter, it is undisputed that: (1) in October 2002, plaintiff was diagnosed with lung cancer; (2) in December 2002, plaintiff suffered a stroke; and (3) from December 2002 until July 2003, plaintiff took a medical leave of absence for lung removal surgery. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶27-28, 31; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 33.)
However, it is equally uncontroverted that plaintiff suffers no ill-effects from these medical issues that would impair or affect her ability to do her job. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 29, 32-33 (noting that, besides running, there is nothing plaintiff is unable to do as a result of her stroke or lung cancer).) Moreover, despite her on-going medical problems in 2002 and 2003, plaintiff acknowledges that, in December 2002, she was granted tenure early and, in fact, she received notice of her tenure while she was in the hospital for her lung removal surgery. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 30; Defs.'
Plaintiff also has brought claims pursuant to § 1981 and § 1983 against the District and the Board, alleging that they violated her equal protection rights. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on these claims on the ground that plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she suffered a constitutional violation as a result of a District policy, custom, or practice. For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), a municipal entity may only be held liable where the entity itself commits a wrong; "a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. It is well established that "[a] plaintiff stating a .. . claim via § 1983 for violation of the Equal Protection Clause by a school district or other
Here, plaintiff has alleged that the School Board discriminated against her on the basis of her race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. As discussed supra, plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence to create a disputed issue of fact regarding whether the Board, through the influence of Dr. Magnum, was involved in the decision to abolish plaintiff's position based upon allegedly discriminatory motives. Accordingly, plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence regarding her § 1983 equal protection claim against the School District, to survive summary judgment.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the Section 1981 and Section 1983 claims asserted against Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Mangum on the ground that plaintiff cannot establish the personal involvement of either defendant in the alleged constitutional violations. The Court disagrees.
Here, as discussed in great detail supra, plaintiff has put forth evidence outlining the personal involvement of both Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Mangum in the decision to abolish plaintiff's position, beginning with the Board and administrator's retreat and culminating with Dr. Lloyd's evaluation of plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to overcome a motion for summary judgment on her claims against the individual defendants.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court denies defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's race and age discrimination claims, but grants defendants' motion with respect to plaintiff's disability discrimination claim. The Court also denies defendants' motion for summary judgment on the Monell claim and on the claims against the individual defendants.
SO ORDERED.
(Id. at 38:7-39:3.) However, plaintiff stressed in a written declaration submitted after her deposition that she was not "close personal" friends with Ms. Llewellyn, that Ms. Llewellyn remained plaintiff's "boss in all sense [sic] of the word," and that "[w]hatever relationship that existed between Ms. Llewellyn and I grew from our positions within the District, but our relationship never had anything to do with Ms. Llewellyn's supervision of my position." (Kantrowitz Decl. ¶ 2.) As to Ms. Llewellyn's deposition, she testified that she was "friendly" with plaintiff during plaintiff's employment with the District and that the two socialized "[m]aybe three" times. (Llewellyn Depo. at 12:22-14:2.)
