MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge:
Defendants Jorge Estrada-Tepal, Ricardo Estrada-Tepal and Victor Leonel Estrada-Tepal are charged with sex trafficking and sex trafficking conspiracy, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a)(1)-(2), 1594(c), conspiracy to transport illegal aliens, in violation of Title 8, United States Code, Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), and transportation of illegal aliens for financial gain, in violation of Title 8, United States Code, Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). Currently before the Court is Defendant Ricardo Estrada-Tepal's ("Defendant") motion to dismiss all counts brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1591 on the basis that the law is unconstitutionally overbroad.
In approximately March 2013, Homeland Security Investigations ("HSI") began
Victim #1 met Defendant in Mexico, where they started dating. (Id. ¶ 5.) Shortly thereafter, she moved in with Defendant at his home in Puebla, Mexico. (Id.) Within a week of moving in, Defendant told Victim #1 that they were going to travel to the United States to work. (Id.) Defendant smuggled Victim #1 into the United States on a train. (Id.) Victim #1 eventually met with Defendant's brother, Victor Leonel Estrada-Tepal ("Leonel"), in New Jersey on or about August 9, 2011. (Id.) Leonel pressured Victim #1 to pay her debt — the price of her smuggling into the United States. (Id.) Victim #1 attempted to obtain money from friends and family but Leonel told her that she would have to work as a prostitute to pay the debt. (Id.) Victim #1 told Defendant about this demand and Defendant told Victim #1 to listen to Leonel. (Id.) Victim #1 was told that if she did not work, her family would pay the price. (Id.) In October 2011, Victim #1 decided to run away. (Id. ¶¶ 8.) Defendant called Victim #1 and told her that if she did not return, something was going to happen to her or her family. (Id.)
Victim #2 met Jorge Estrada-Tepal ("Jorge") in Mexico where they began dating. (Id. ¶ 11.) Shortly thereafter, Jorge smuggled Victim #2 into the United States where they lived together in Queens, New York. (Id.) Jorge initially pressured Victim #2 into working at a bar, and later forced Victim #2 into prostitution. (Id. ¶ 12.) Victim #2 worked as a prostitute for approximately four years. (Id. ¶ 13.)
In addition, Victim #3 claims that she was asked by a member of the Estrada-Tepal trafficking organization to travel to the United States for work and was later forced into prostitution. (Id. ¶ 14.)
On January 30, 2014, HSI agents arrested Defendant, and his brothers, Leonel and Jorge, based on their illegal immigration status. (Id. ¶ 25.) Upon arrest, Defendant admitted that he paid approximately $5,500 to have another female victim smuggled into the United States, and after her arrival, she engaged in prostitution. (Id.)
Defendant argues that "18 U.S.C. § 1591 is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face because it significantly infringes upon the right to free association guaranteed by the First Amendment. . . ." (Def. Mem. at 17.) The government contends that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 does not substantially burden protected speech. (Gov. Opp'n Mem. at 35.) The Court agrees with the government.
"A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it punishes a substantial amount
"The first step in overbreadth analysis is to construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute covers." United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008)). The second step is to determine whether the statute, as construed by the court, "criminalizes a substantial amount of protected expressive activity." Williams, 553 U.S. at 297, 128 S.Ct. 1830. "[I]n considering facial challenges we must `vigorously enforce[ ] the requirement that a statute's overbreadth be substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.'" Adams, 606 F.3d at 38 (quoting Williams, 553 U.S. at 292, 128 S.Ct. 1830).
Defendant asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 is a "criminal prohibition of alarming breadth." (Def. Mem. at 19 (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474, 130 S.Ct. 1577).) Specifically, Defendant takes issue with "the lack of a necessary criminal purpose connected to many of the associational actions [18 U.S.C. § 1591] prohibits." (Def. Mem. at 20.) The government appears to not contest Defendant's interpretation of the statute.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1591 states in pertinent part:
18 U.S.C. § 1591. The plain language of the statute requires only that a person have knowledge that he or she is committing any of the seven prohibited actions enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) and knowledge, or reckless disregard of the fact, that a person subject to any of the prohibited actions will engage in an underage or coerced commercial sex act. (Def. Mem. at 20); see also United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir.2013) (stating the elements of a child sex trafficking under § 1591(a)); United States v. Myers, 430 Fed.Appx. 812, 816 (11th Cir.2011) (same); see also United States v. Williams, 564 Fed.Appx. 568, 571 (11th Cir.2014) ("The plain language of [18 U.S.C.] § 1591(a) makes it a crime to knowingly recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, obtain, or maintain an individual under the age of eighteen to engage in commercial sex acts, where the defendant either knows the individual is under the age of eighteen, or acts in reckless disregard of whether the individual is under the age of eighteen." (emphasis added)); United States v. Wilson, No. 10-CR-60102, 2010 WL 2991561, at *9 (S.D.Fla. July 27, 2010) (dismissing a vagueness challenge to § 1591and finding that "[n]othing about what this statute proscribes is left to the imagination"), report and recommendation adopted, No. 10-CR-60102, 2010 WL 3239211 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 16, 2010).
Defendant's constitutional challenge is primarily based on three of the seven actions listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) — harbors, transports and maintains. He argues that "harbor," "transport" and "maintain" are unambiguous terms, which encompass a variety of innocuous and charitable actions such as sheltering, feeding and clothing
Two additional aspects of the statute merit mention. First, as Defendant correctly notes, absent from 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) is any requirement that an individual have the desire or "criminal purpose" to further sex trafficking; instead, one need only have knowledge, or reckless disregard to the fact, that the victim will be caused to have underage or coerced commercial sex. See United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir.2010) (discussing the elements of the statute
Having construed the statute, the Court now determines whether 18 U.S.C. § 1591 substantially burdens protected speech.
Freedom of association includes within its ambit the right of "intimate association" and "expressive association." See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) (discussing these "two distinct senses" of freedom of association); Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 995-96 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The United States Constitution affords protection to two distinct types of association, `intimate association' and `expressive association.'" (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18, 104 S.Ct. 3244)). Defendant argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 substantially interferes with both types of associational freedoms.
Although "the diversity of human relationships necessitate[s] a sliding-scale analysis rather than a bright-line test" with respect to which relationships warrant protection under the United States
Defendant argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 impermissibly interferes with familial relationships. (Def. Mem. at 21.) According to Defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 1591's ban on "harboring" criminalizes the cohabitation of family members when one knows that a family member is an underage or coerced sex worker, the ban on "maintaining" criminalizes the provision of food and clothing and the sharing of finances and property, and the ban on "transportation" criminalizes a "broad category of interaction between people who cohabit or otherwise share their lives with family or close friends." (Id. at 21.) The government contends that any intrusion on these relationships cannot be considered substantial when compared to the legitimate reach of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. (Gov. Opp'n Mem. at 37-39.) The Court agrees with the government.
Invalidating a law pursuant to the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine" to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908. Here, the Court acknowledges that 18 U.S.C. § 1591, as written, could hypothetically criminalize the conduct of a mother who feeds, clothes and drives around her daughter with knowledge that her daughter is or will be a victim to a sex trafficking scheme, but without any intent or desire to further the trafficking scheme. However, this hypothetical compassionate mother, articulated by Defendant, is at the periphery of 18 U.S.C. § 1591's applicability.
Defendant also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 chills the actions of shelters and support organizations that seek to provide support to sex workers. (Def. Mem. at 21-22.) Defendant further argues that such organizations "are often rooted in religious, political, or social beliefs that are protected under the First Amendment." (Id. at 22.)
The First Amendment includes the "right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000); see also Sanitation & Recycling Indus., 107 F.3d at 996 (stating that expressive association "protects the right of individuals to associate for purposes of engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment, such as speech, assembly, the exercise of religion, or petitioning for the redress of grievances"). The Court assumes, for purposes of this motion, that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 may, hypothetically, be applied to circumscribe the expressive association rights of "hospitals, counseling services and soup kitchens," as argued by Defendant. (Def. Mem. at 27.) However, the Court is not persuaded that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 substantially burdens expressive association rights. Any possible infringement upon the expressive association of hospitals, counseling services and soup kitchens working with known victims of sex trafficking is indirect and incidental to the plainly legitimate scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 which properly seeks to eliminate the "largest manifestation of slavery today." See 22 U.S.C. § 7101, Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(b)(1), 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1589 et seq.) Therefore, Defendant's overbreadth challenge is denied.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss all counts brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1591.
SO ORDERED.
Whether the right to intimate association finds its home in the First or Fourteenth Amendment becomes important because "[t]he facial overbreadth doctrine is restricted in its application, . . . and is `not recognized. . . outside the limited context of the First Amendment.'" Musser v. Mapes, 718 F.3d 996, 1001 (8th Cir.2013) (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). Thus, it is not clear that an overbreadth challenge based on the right to intimate association is viable. The Second Circuit has yet to rule on this issue. See Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 996 (2d Cir.1997) ("Under the circumstances, we do not need to decide whether overbreadth attacks apply to alleged infringements of the right to intimate association as they do to First Amendment rights, or whether overbreadth challenges do not apply because, as several circuits have held, the right to intimate association lies not in the First but in the Fourteenth Amendment."); cf. Corso v. Fischer, 983 F.Supp.2d 320, 330 (S.D.N.Y.2013) ("It `has not been authoritatively determined' whether this right to intimate association is implied in the First Amendment or exists as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (quoting Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 42 (2d Cir. 1999))). For the purposes of this motion, the Court assumes that Defendant may facially challenge 18 U.S.C. § 1591 based on his right to intimate association.