SANDRA L. TOWNES, District Judge.
On April 7, 2014, Defendant Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. filed a Notice of Removal of the action filed against it in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County by Plaintiff Manuel J. Pardo. The Court finds that it lacks original jurisdiction over the state court action. Accordingly the case is hereby remanded to state court.
According to the complaint Plaintiff filed in state court, he was hired by Defendant and began working at University Towers as a security guard on July 2, 2008. (Complaint, ¶¶ 2-3 (ECF Entry #1, Exhibit A, ECF pp. 5-20).) Plaintiff alleged that when he began his employment at University Towers, the site had separate locker rooms for men and women. (
Plaintiff further alleged that Mr. Saez was hired as an Account Manager in the Spring of 2010 and prohibited employees from using the restroom inside the employee room.
"The defendant told plaintiff he needed to report to work in uniform because a female employee complained about being made uncomfortable in the locker room. Plaintiff had been protesting the locker room situation for two years. . . Suddenly, Mr. Saez had a mysterious woman complaining about feeling uncomfortable." (
Plaintiff alleged that Saez violated other employment protection regulations: "Mr. Saez blatantly violated New York state employment law by refusing to allow employees to leave the job site during their lunch periods." (
"The plaintiff's insistence on having regular restroom and locker room facilities ultimately led to his being unjustly terminated." a (
Plaintiff alleged that he and other employees were terminated "on trumped up charges."
Plaintiff also alleged "intentional infliction of emotional distress," "harassment," "slander" and "tortuous actions implemented by a defendant bent on retaliation." (
Plaintiff previously filed an action against the same Defendant in this Court pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2002-17 ("Title VII"). That case alleged similar allegations against Securitas. In it, Plaintiff alleged that he complained to the union and the NLRB about the unisex locker room and the closing of the restroom, and that he was retaliated against as a result. That complaint was filed on a Title VII form, but specifically denied that he was discriminated against. Instead, he alleged that "Drily site manager, Mr. Francisco Saez, would `flip-flop' the rules every time I went to the union."
Plaintiffs state court complaint does not rely on Title VII, although it makes one reference to this federal statute: "defendant is guilty of harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, retaliatory discrimination which violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." (
Defendant Securitas's Notice of Removal alleges that Plaintiff's claims arise under Title VII and OSHA. (Notice of Removal ¶ 1.) Defendant seeks to remove this action to this Court on the grounds that the Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims. (Notice of Removal ¶ 1)
Title 28, Sections 1441-1453 of the United States Code set forth the criteria and procedures for removing a civil action from state court to federal court. The Notice of Removal must be filed within 30 days after the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(4 The defendant or defendants seeking removal must also file a notice "containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
The statute provides for removal of claims over which the federal courts have "original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Thus, a claim may only be removed to federal court if it could have been filed in federal court originally.
Defendant removed this case on the grounds that the Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under Title VII and OSHA. (Notice of Removal 1, 3.) Indeed, Plaintiff did refer to both of these federal statutes in his pleading. He suggested that the state law claims he raised — "harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, [and] retaliatory discrimination" — also violated Title VII. He also references sections of OSHA related to the provision of toilet facilities. (Complaint ¶ 20.) However, the Court finds that the gravamen of Plaintiff's complaint, related to retaliatory discharge, sounds in state law, not in the federal laws which he gratuitously cited.
Plaintiff's state court complaint, like his prior federal complaint, fails to state a claim under Title VII. That statute provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). To state a cause of action under Title VII, abusive conduct in the workplace must be related to the plaintiffs membership in one of these protected classes.
The state court complaint makes multiple references to OSHA and the NLRB, Plaintiff alleges that his former workplace violated multiple OSHA regulations, including those related to access to toilet facilities. However, district courts do not have jurisdiction over OSHA regulations or violations. OSHA's workplace protections are to be enforced by the Secretary of Labor, and not through a private right of action by employees.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs claims do not arise "under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Accordingly, the complaint is not properly removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) or any other provision of the removal statute, and thus the above-captioned action is hereby remanded to state court.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that removal of this action is improper. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to remand the case back to the New York Supreme Court, Kings County. The Clerk is further directed to send a certified copy of this Order to the Clerk of the Kings County Court, and to close the case in this Court.
SO ORDERED.