ARTHUR D. SPATT, District Judge.
On June 16, 2011, the Plaintiff Stephen Flanagan, as trustee and fiduciary of the General Building Laborers' union No. 66 Welfare, Pension, Vacation, Annuity, Health & Safety, Greater New York Employer Cooperative and Educational, and Training Funds (the "Funds") and as business manager of the General Buildings Laborers' Local Union No. 66 of the Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO (the "Union"), commenced this action pursuant to 29 §§ U.S.C. 1145 and 1132(g)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and § 185(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 to recover delinquent fringe benefits and union wages/dues owing.
The Clerk of the Court noted the default of the Defendant Marson Group, LTD. d/b/a Marson Contracting Co., Inc. d/b/a Marbro Realty Co., Inc. (the "Marson Group") on October, 21, 2013, and the Plaintiff moved for a default judgment against the Marson Group on October 30, 2013.
On October 31, 2013, the Court respectfully referred this matter to United States Magistrate Judge Gary R. Brown for a recommendation as to whether the motion for a default judgment against the Corporate Defendant should be granted, and if so, (1) whether damages should be awarded, including reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and (2) whether any other relief should be granted.
On August 11, 2014, Judge Brown issued a thorough Report and Recommendation recommending that the Court enter a default judgment against the Marson Group and that the Plaintiff be awarded $6,393.33 in unpaid fringe benefit contributions; $7,946.82 in dues checkoffs; an amount of prejudgment interest on the unpaid fringe benefit contributions ($6,393.33) calculated pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6621; an amount of prejudgment interest on the unpaid union dues check-offs ($7,946.82) calculated at 9% per annum; an amount of liquidated damages that is equal to the amount of prejudgment interest for unpaid fringe benefit contributions; $3,079.12 in attorney's fees; and $430 in costs.
In reviewing a report and recommendation, a court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). "To accept the report and recommendation of a magistrate, to which no timely objection has been made, a district court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record."
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby: