PAMELA K. CHEN, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Defendants seek attorney's fees as prevailing defendants, following this Court's Order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment based upon the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable Gary R. Brown. (See Dkt. 57 (Report & Recommendation); Dkt. 61 (Order dated March 31, 2015 adopting Report & Recommendation).) The Court entered judgment in Defendants' favor on April 16, 2015. (Dkt. 62.) Defendants filed the instant motion on May 20, 2015. (Dkt. 64.)
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a prevailing party in a proceeding brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may move for an award of reasonable attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Where the prevailing party is the defendant, the district court may exercise its discretion to award such fees "upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978); see also Carter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Christianburg).
The procedure governing a prevailing party's application for attorney's fees pursuant to Section 1988 is governed by FRCP 54. See, e.g., Lovejoy v. Gure-Perez, No. 10 CV 5748, 2014 WL 2459656, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2014) (denying a motion for attorney's fees under Section 1988 for plaintiff's failure to comply with FRCP 54). That rule provides, in relevant part, that a motion for attorney's fees must "be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment" and "state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it" "unless a statute or a court order provides otherwise[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Here, there is no Court order in place excusing Defendants from following the requirements of FRCP 54(d)(2)(B), and nothing in Section 1988 does either. Thus, a prevailing defendant seeking attorney's fees under Section 1988 must comply with FRCP 54.
Defendants' motion is untimely. Defendants' motion for attorney's fees is untimely because they failed to file within the 14-day deadline set forth in FRCP 54(d)(2)(B). Judgment was entered on April 16, 2015, but Defendants did not file their motion until May 20, 2015-34 days after judgment was entered. While a party's failure to file a motion for attorney's fees in a timely manner may be excused upon a showing of "excusable neglect," Defendants make no such showing here. Indeed, Defendants do not even acknowledge the fact that their motion was untimely. The Court therefore denies Defendants' motion as untimely. Lovejoy, 2014 WL 2459656, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2014) (denying motion for attorney's fees under Section 1988 where motion was made 24 days after judgment); Slader v. Pearle Vision Inc., 199 F.R.D. 125, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying motion for attorney's fees under Section 1988 as untimely because defendant did not file within 14 days of the entry of judgment and "offered no good reason why [the deadline] should not be enforced here.").
Defendants' motion fails to state the amount sought or provide an estimate. Defendants' motion is deficient for a second reason: they fail to "state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it" as required by FRCP 54(d)(2)(B)(ii). By failing to provide any figure or estimate as to the fees sought, Defendants essentially ask the Court to approve a blank check for Plaintiff to write. The Court rejects Defendants' motion for failure to comply with FRCP 54(d)(2)(B)(ii).
The Court DENIES Defendants' motion for attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.