PAMELA K. CHEN, District Judge.
Pro se Plaintiff Ileen Randolph brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision by the Acting Commissioner ("Commissioner") of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") denying Plaintiff's claim for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). The Commissioner moves to dismiss this Complaint on the ground that it was not timely filed. (Dkt. 13.) Plaintiff filed a one-page letter in opposition. (Dkt. 10 ("Pl.'s Opp'n").) For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the Commissioner's motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff applied for SSI on March 17, 2011, claiming that she had been unable to work due to disabling neck and spinal impairments since March 7, 2005. (See Dkt. 13-1, Decl. of Roxie Rasey Nicoll ("Nicoll Decl.") ¶ 3(a); Dkt. 1 ("Compl.") ¶ 4.) The SSA denied Plaintiff's claim on June 16, 2011, and Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Nicoll Decl. ¶¶ 3(a), 3(b).) On May 30, 2012 and again on February 21, 2013, Plaintiff appeared and testified at administrative hearings before an ALJ. (Id. Ex. 2 at ECF 12.
When the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request to review the ALJ's decision on January 20, 2015, the ALJ's opinion became the final decision of the Commissioner, and Plaintiff had sixty days from receipt of the 1/20/15 Notice to seek judicial review of the Commissioner's determination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
While the sixty-day time limit is not jurisdictional, it does constitute a statute of limitations. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 478 (1986). And because the sixty-day statute of limitations "is a condition on the waiver of [the United States'] sovereign immunity," it must be strictly construed. Id. at 479. Thus, courts routinely dismiss Social Security appeals even when they are filed only a few days past the sixty-day filing deadline. See, e.g., Twumwaa v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-5858, — WL 1928381, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2014) (dismissing pro se complaint filed seven days late); Pressley v. Astrue, No. 12-cv-8461, 2013 WL 3974094, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2013) (five days late); Smith v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 08-cv-1547, 2010 WL 5441669, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010) (four days late). To overcome a failure to timely file, a plaintiff bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is warranted. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 479-80; Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). A late-filing plaintiff seeking equitable tolling must prove two things: (1) plaintiff "has been pursuing his rights diligently"; and (2) "some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Torres v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). However, "the principles of equitable tolling . . . do not extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect." Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990).
Here, Plaintiff asserts in her one-page letter opposition that on the day she filed her Complaint,
In this case, Plaintiff previously had no issues complying with time limits for requesting an ALJ hearing and Appeals Council review; moreover, Plaintiff points to no extraordinary circumstances preventing her from filing her SSA appeal within the sixty-day time limit. Rather, it is clear from Plaintiff's own letter, though unfortunate, that she missed the sixty-day deadline because she misread it as providing for ninety days. Notwithstanding any representations made by the "receptionist of Social Security"—which are not substantiated—that Plaintiff may still file a Complaint, this is not a basis for equitable tolling.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's claim is dismissed as time-barred. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to enter judgment for the Commissioner and to close this case.
SO ORDERED.