Jack B. Weinstein, Senior United States District Judge.
Defendant is guilty of serious crimes: possession of child pornography and sexual exploitation of a child. A fifteen year minimum term of incarceration is mandated by statute.
The long term required, if served under the routine harsh and dangerous prison conditions D.W. faces, would be destructive to him, dangerous to society, and unconstitutional.
Under prevailing prison conditions, such a long term of incarceration would deny D.W. — with his severe mental problems — any meaningful opportunity to obtain needed medical treatment. It would likely expose him — gay, and previously repeatedly raped — to physical and sexual abuse. It would greatly increase the risk of suicide, given his repeated attempts at taking his own life. To protect him, it would probably include long, debilitating protective solitary confinement. Predictably, D.W. would be released from prison — if he survived — in more danger of recidivism than if he had served a shorter sentence, thus presenting a greater danger to society. Appropriately carried out, however, a sentence of fifteen years can be structured to avoid cruel prison conditions for this defendant, thereby avoiding unconstitutionality.
The trial judge cannot close his or her eyes to the conditions a particular defendant being sentenced will necessarily experience in prison. When a long term is fixed by statute, the prison environment must be considered by the sentencing judge in estimating total harm and benefits to prisoner and society — a utilitarian as well as a compassionate exercise.
Ours is a Madisonian government of independent departments — legislative, executive and judicial. To effectively carry out the people's business these divisions of government must sometimes assist each other. Respectful cooperation is often required. The administration of criminal justice is an example: investigators, prosecutors, defense counsel, courts, prisons, and social assistance agencies must work together to protect the public and help the adjudicated criminal to a life free of crime. So, while a judge, in general, may lack the power on sentencing to direct the operation of federal prisons in an individual case — a responsibility of the Department of Justice — he or she must properly and reasonably recommend (assuming the recommendation will be given effect) how a person with special vulnerabilities should be treated in prison.
Sentencing is not merely an announcement of judgment. It is a prediction and assumption of how the sentence will be carried out.
Only defendant's initials are used in this memorandum because, were his full name published, the likelihood of his being attacked in prison would increase.
Defendant is a twenty-seven year old male born in Brooklyn, New York. See Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") at ¶ 81.
He has lost contact with his biological parents. He was separated from them when he was five years old. They lost custody as a result of their drug use and neglect. Id. In February 1996, the Kings County Family Court terminated their parental rights. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. of Points and Authorities, Feb. 23, 2016, ECF No. 130 ("Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem."), Ex. 13 (Forestdale Adoption Homestudy) at 4. He has not seen them since. PSR at ¶ 81.
As accurately stated by defense counsel:
Def.'s Sentencing Mem., June 8, 2015, ECF No. 69 ("Def.'s Sentencing Mem.") at 4 (emphasis added).
At age four, defendant was placed in his first foster care home. A psychological assessment conducted when he was five revealed diminished mental capacity and other symptoms identified in children exposed to drugs while in utero. PSR at ¶ 81. Lead exposure as a child increased adverse effects on defendant's mentation. Cf. G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez-Adams v. Kimpson, 116 F.Supp.3d 126, 129-130 (E.D.N.Y.2015) (describing the harm caused to young children by lead and the disproportionate exposure of low-income and minority families). Symptoms included "tiny stature, difficulties with language acquisition and comprehension of concepts, articulation problems, etc." Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 12 (Joan Healy, Ph.D., Psychological Assessment Report for [D.W.], Jan. 8, 1994) at 5.
The psychologist who performed the early evaluation, Dr. Joan Healy, noted that D.W. defecated in his bed and smeared feces on his face and in his hair. Id. According to her, this could be interpreted as a "gesture of despair in a child with plenty of reasons to feel that way." Id. (emphasis added). Dr. Healy observed that defendant suffered the traumatic consequences of his early separation from his parents:
Id.
Defendant was described as a "retarded and very young child with a deprived and emotionally traumatized background," living
Id. (emphasis added). D.W.'s foster placements by the City did not provide the stability and tranquility he required.
At his first foster home, defendant was repeatedly raped. PSR at ¶ 83. His anus was penetrated. Id. His genitalia and mouth were violated. Id. Physically beaten by his foster brother when he refused to drink urine out of a bottle, he suffered a broken arm, a final signal to the City's child welfare services that he needed to be removed from that home. Id.
When interviewed by a psychologist about his first foster home, he reported: "The kid who broke my arm also forced his penis into my mouth and would say `suck it like a pacifier, you baby.'" Id. Two other children living in the foster home reported stories of similar abuse; their foster brother "would wake them in the middle of the night, urinate in their mouths, make them take off their pants, and [tell] them to `lick [his] butt.'" Id.; see also Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 14 (Accident Report of Feb. 14, 1994).
Eventually, due to the children's reports of abuse, D.W. was transferred out of this foster family and placed with another one. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 15 (Social Worker Report of Nov. 8, 1993).
In a psychiatric assessment carried out shortly after his placement with a second foster family, D.W. was reported as functioning below his age level, and as having suffered from "severe emotional deprivation." Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 17 (Psychiatric Evaluation of D.W. by Dr. Flora F. Morente, M.D., Sept. 7, 1994) (emphasis added). At age six, he was described by an evaluating psychologist as experiencing strong feelings of rejection and abandonment:
Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 18 (Psychological Examination of D.W. by Randolph J. Malsky, Ph.D., Oct. 1994) at 5 (emphasis added).
Child welfare eventually removed him from this second foster home. The six-year-old had fled to a school bus in his underwear, clothing in hand, after being warned by his foster mother that if he was late to school she "would beat him all day." Id.
When he was about six years old, in 1995, D.W. was placed in a foster family of "lower socioeconomic circumstances." Id. at ¶ 85. He was legally adopted by the family in 1998. Id. Defendant described the family as "strict but nice," with loving parents. Id.
At age seven, a psychiatric evaluation again determined his self-esteem to be "poor." Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 19 (Psychiatric Evaluation of D.W. by Dr. Flora F. Morente, M.D., June 30, 1996) at 2. His intelligence was described as "borderline to low average;" he met the criteria for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"). Id. at 3. A psychological examination by Dr. Randolph J. Malsky, Ph.D. when D.W. was seven-and-a-half years old noted the effects of defendant's emotional deprivation and presaged his future behavior:
Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 23 (Psychological Examination by Dr. Randolph J. Malsky, Ph.D, Mar. 30, 1996) at 7 (emphasis added).
By age eight, D.W. had been diagnosed with a learning disorder, as well as ADHD. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 10 (Psychiatric Evaluation of D.W. by Dr. Flora F. Morente, M.D., Feb. 16, 1997) at 1. Ritalin was prescribed. The effect of this "psychostimulant medication" was closely monitored. Id. Again, he was described as being of "borderline to low average" intelligence and having "poor" self-esteem. Id. at 2. Lead exposure history was noted as contributing to his ongoing problems. Id. at 3.
Between 1998 and 2007, D.W. was treated at the Far Rockaway Mental Health Clinic. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. at 9. Provided were combinations of individual, group, and family therapy, as well as medication management. Id. He was identified as having an "excessive need to please adults." See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 24 (Far Rockaway Mental Health Clinic, Clinical Notes of Diane Nadasy, CSW, Dec. 3, 1999), Ex. 25 (Far Rockaway Mental Health Clinic, Clinical Notes of Diane Nadasy, CSW, July 16, 1999) (stating that D.W.'s "tendency is towards pleasing adults and he may feel that this is the only way that he'll be liked").
Defendant attended special education classes until he graduated from Far Rockaway High School in 2007. PSR at ¶ 95. His learning disabilities prevented him from earning a regular high school diploma. Id. at ¶ 105.
In the fall of 2007, defendant began attending Manhattan Community College. See PSR at ¶ 106. He did not earn any credits. In May of 2008 he was placed on academic probation. Id.
He subsequently was employed as a cashier at a Best Buy store for a year and a half; he was fired for failing to accurately record tardiness. Id. at ¶ 111. He then began work as a bus monitor. Id. at ¶ 110.
D.W. suffered from periods of intense depression resulting from his inability to complete college and loss of his job at Best Buy. See Dr. Richard Krueger, Psychiatric and Risk Assessment of Defendant, June 5, 2015, ECF No. 69-1 ("Krueger Report") at 5, attached as Ex. A to Def.'s Sentencing Mem., June 8, 2015, ECF No. 69. He reported trying to kill himself in 2007. He tried to jump in front of a car; a friend intervened and pulled him back. See Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Suicide Risk Assessment, Feb. 22, 2013) at 1. It does not appear that during this time his treatment addressed the severe abuse he had suffered as a young child. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. at 9-10. His adopted family was reportedly not aware of D.W.'s traumatic past until he wrote to his adoptive brother while incarcerated at the federal Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC") in the instant case. Id. at 10; PSR at ¶ 103.
Defendant reported that his first "crush" was at age eight on an eight year old female. See Krueger Report at 9. He told Dr. Krueger, an evaluating psychiatrist, that he considers himself bisexual. He reported that at age eleven, he began to look at, and masturbate to, images of prepubescent, pubescent and young teenaged males and females — males much more than females. He felt that he had a problem with "pornography addiction" from the age of eleven onwards, oftentimes deleting pornographic images from his computer to try and stop viewing them. Id.
He has never had a female coital partner, even though his first non-genital touching and petting was at thirteen with a thirteen-year-old girl. He had intercourse with a fifteen or sixteen year old male on one occasion when he was fourteen. Id.
While employed as a school bus attendant in April of 2009, at age twenty, defendant was arrested. He had given "wedgies" to three young boys — that is to say he pulled their underwear up between their buttocks — and he fondled two of them. PSR at ¶¶ 70-72. He also reportedly showed these victims pictures of naked children on his cell phone. Id. at ¶ 70.
In a New York State criminal court, he pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual abuse and one count of endangering the welfare of a minor child. Id. at ¶¶ 70-72. For this crime, at age twenty-one, he was sentenced to three years in State prison. Id. at ¶¶ 70-72, 87.
During his State period of incarceration, from April 2009 until April 2012, defendant was repeatedly raped by other prisoners. Id. at ¶¶ 96, 100; Krueger Report at 5.
The first rape occurred in the shower room of the Oneida State Correctional Facility by another inmate. PSR at ¶ 96. A sixty-year old inmate "smashed [defendant's] head against a showerhead and then raped him anally." Krueger Report at 5. The assailant, who was attending the
Transferred to Auburn Correctional Facility, defendant was again assaulted and anally raped by "several individuals." See Krueger Report at 6; PSR at ¶ 96. Fearing the usual ostracism that results from making a rape complaint in prison, defendant suffered this abuse in silence. See Krueger Report at 6; PSR at ¶ 96. "[Defendant] said that [the] rapes had an [adverse] effect on him. He said that he had kept thinking about them, that he had become very guarded and untrusting of anyone, and he described the development of a startle[d] response." Krueger Report at 6.
While in State custody, D.W. was prescribed Celexa, Paxil, and Remeron to treat depression and anxiety. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 37 (State of New York Department of Correctional Services Treatment and Medication Records).
Repeatedly, he tried to commit suicide. He twice attempted to hang himself. See Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Suicide Risk Assessment, May 8, 2013) at 14 (also submitted as Def.'s Ex. KK). On at least one of these instances, he was saved by a correctional officer. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 29 (Psychiatric Evaluation of D.W. by David Stern, M.D., May 3, 2012) at 1; Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Suicide Risk Assessment, Feb. 22, 2013) at 1; Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Suicide Risk Assessment, May 8, 2013) at 15. He stated that he then paid another inmate to "stab" or "punch" him. Instead, that person reported him. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 29 (Psychiatric Evaluation of D.W. by David Stern, M.D., May 3, 2012) at 1; Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Suicide Risk Assessment, Feb. 22, 2013) at 1.
D.W. stated that, while in custody at Rikers Island, he stockpiled medications and took them all at once. He was placed on suicide watch. At Bellevue Hospital, in a hospital prison ward, he tried to cut his wrists; at Downstate Correctional Facility, he dug into his wrists and was again placed on suicide watch. Krueger Report at 7.
Released from State custody in April 2012, defendant moved to the Charles H. Gay Shelter for Men on Ward's Island. PSR at ¶ 87. He was not allowed to live with his adoptive mother while on parole because of his sex offender status — a daycare center had recently opened near her home. Id. D.W. became increasingly "paranoid," depressed, and concerned with his safety at the shelter. See Dr. Robert Prentky, Evaluation of D.W., Sept. 12, 2013, ECF No. 69-2 ("Prentky Report") at 9, attached as Ex. B to Def.'s Sentencing Mem., June 8, 2015, ECF No. 69. He feared that other former prisoners would attack him if they found out he was a sex offender. He overheard other shelter residents calling sex offenders "pieces of shit who should be killed." Id. at 9, 15. Defendant experienced daily anxiety attacks; he reported feeling depressed, paranoid, and afraid, a sense that had started to overwhelm him after his first rape in prison. PSR at ¶ 97.
D.W. lost the help of his adoptive family following the significant shame and embarrassment they suffered as a consequence of his State arrest. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. at 14-15; PSR at ¶ 89; see also Letter of D.W. to the Court, July 6, 2015, ECF No. 74 (describing the adverse effect on his family of his State trial). Estranged from his family and with no support network, D.W. entertained suicidal ideations upon his release from State prison. See,
In April 2012, he walked along Grand Central Parkway with the intention of jumping in front of a car. He called his adoptive mother in what appears to have been a cry for help; she responded that she "could not deal with him anymore." Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Suicide Risk Assessment, Feb. 22, 2013) at 1; Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Suicide Risk Assessment, May 8, 2013) at 15. Ultimately, a friend picked him up.
D.W. attended sex offender treatment — a condition of his State parole — at Queens Counseling for Change. He also received psychiatric care from St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center and services from Getting Out and Staying Out ("GOSO"), a reentry program in New York City which provided assistance with medication and job placement. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. at 12; PSR at ¶ 97.
In an assessment carried out shortly after his release from State custody, GOSO noted defendant's "remarkable mental health history," including his past suicide attempts and current reports of suicidal ideation. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 28 (GOSO Assessment, Apr. 24, 2012). He was referred to Dr. David Stern, M.D., a psychiatrist, for evaluation.
Dr. Stern reported that D.W. had been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and adjustment disorder with depressed mood. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 29 (Psychiatric Evaluation of D.W. by David Stern, M.D., May 3, 2012) at 1. The doctor observed that "[t]he possibility of Dissociative Identity Disorder and Borderline Personality Disorder should be considered when making a psychiatric referral." Id. at 2. He noted that although D.W. denied a suicidal ideation or plan, he was "feeling suicidal two days prior." Id. The doctor concluded that "[w]hile he is currently not actively suicidal, his history of impulsive suicide attempts and the continued stress of his current living situation and the stressors inherent in his transition to the community make his risk for relapse of depression or suicidal attempt higher." Id. (emphasis added).
Because of his status as a sex offender, defendant struggled to find gainful employment. Id. at ¶ 109. He started handing out flyers for an energy company, North American Power, in 2012. Id. He then volunteered for "Green Energy," a company located on the same premises as North American Power, where he was ultimately arrested in 2013 for the instant offenses. Id.
As described below, despite engaging with the mental health support network available to him upon his release from State prison, D.W. relapsed. He downloaded, viewed and collected child pornography while on probation. According to Dr. Robert Prentky — a forensic psychologist who examined D.W. in September 2013 (see infra Part III.G.3) — the resources available to him in the community did not target his specific risk or needs:
Prentky Report at 10-11.
On February 7, 2013, an agent working for the Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI") logged into a publicly available peer-to-peer file-sharing program available on the internet. PSR at ¶ 3. He observed a user, operating under the screen name "Mikemunozl," sharing over 1,800 files, including pornographic images of children. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. Records obtained from the file-sharing website indicated two email addresses linked to the "Mikemunzol" screen name. Id. at ¶ 6. Both addresses were traced to a "facebook.com" account registered to an individual in Far Rockaway, New York, who shared the name and appearance of defendant. Id. The internet protocol address associated with the file-sharing activity was registered to "Golden Care," a Queens-based business. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 8.
The FBI interviewed the owner and manager of Golden Care. Id. at ¶ 8. She informed the agents that the second floor was rented out to a company, "Green Energy," which accessed the internet through the Golden Care router. Id. Green Energy had two employees; one was defendant. Id.
A search warrant was issued authorizing a search of the Green Energy premises. Id. at ¶ 9. D.W. was present and agreed to be interviewed. Id. He granted the agents access to his peer-to-peer file-sharing account and made oral and written admissions regarding his use of the screen name "Mikemunzol" and the trading of child pornography on the internet. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.
Defendant told FBI agents that he had been working without pay at Green Energy
Defendant told FBI investigators that he stored child pornography on an external hard drive. He explained that he had obtained some of the child pornography on the hard drive prior to his State arrest in 2009. He had given the hard drive to a friend to keep in a safe deposit box. The friend did not know that it contained child pornography. D.W. retrieved the hard drive upon being released from State prison in April 2012. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14, 16.
He informed investigators that "he had been viewing and trading child pornography since his release, and that he was addicted to child pornography." Id. at ¶ 14 (emphasis added). When arrested he possessed at least 1,000 video files and 7,000 child pornography images on his computer. Id. at ¶ 18. Defendant admitted to his adoptive mother that he has "an addiction" to child pornography and "really needs help." Id. at ¶ 89 (emphasis added).
During execution of the search warrant, the FBI found several school bus routes. It appears that defendant "fantasized about being a bus driver," and he had imagined a company called "Mike Transportation, Inc." Id. at ¶ 17; see also Gov't Post-Hr'g Mem. of Law in Opp'n to the Def.'s Req. for an Incarceratory Sentence Below the Statutorily-Required Mandatory Minimum, Apr. 1, 2016, ECF No. 140 ("Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem."), Ex. 501 (Def.'s Fictitious Bus Company Documents) at 50-62. The defendant told the FBI that he never in fact travelled to the schools identified in the made-up routes. PSR at ¶ 17.
One of the documents retrieved by the FBI was a "questionnaire for a position as bus driver, bus escort, or bus attendant." Id. The document included questions such as "What is your sexual orientation?; Have you or are you attracted to children in any way?; As part of security pre-screening, if you were asked to do something like give a description of your body would you?; Are you circumcised?; Are you a very hairy person?" Id.; see also Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 501 (Def.'s Fictitious Bus Company Documents) at 51-54.
It is not clear whether the questionnaire made-up by defendant was ever used by him. See PSR at ¶ 17 (not mentioning how and if the questionnaire was used by defendant); Gov't Sentencing Mem., June 10, 2015, ECF No. 71 ("Gov't Sentencing Mem.") at 5 (observing that "[t]hese materials can be interpreted different ways: perhaps the defendant was actually planning to start a bus company, or perhaps he was merely fantasizing about it. What is clear, however, is that he was using this fake bus company to lure people at his shelter to share their interest in child pornography and to provide nude photos.").
Dr. Krueger testified that the bus company fantasy "could be consistent with a pedophilic interest pattern." Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 71:19-20; see also infra Part IV.D.3. Defendant's counsel has posited that the incident relates to D.W.'s childhood traumatic experience and related desire to become a bus driver. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. at 7, n.5; Def.'s Reply to Gov't Mem. in Opp'n, Apr. 26, 2016, ECF No. 149 ("Def.'s Reply to Gov't Mem. in Opp'n") at 18-19. Pointed out was that when D.W. was found running in his underwear to catch the school bus, it was the bus matron who comforted him. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. at 7 ("Terrified and fearing for his life, [D.W.] ran to the bus,
Several of D.W.'s childhood medical and psychological evaluations indicate a consistent and recurring desire to become a school bus driver. See, e.g., Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 19 (Psychiatric Evaluation of D.W. by Dr. Flora F. Morente, M.D., June 30, 1996) at 2 (indicating that D.W., when seven years old, "would like to be a bus driver when he is grown"), Ex. 10 (Psychiatric Evaluation of D.W. by Dr. Flora F. Morente, M.D., Feb. 16, 1997) at 2 (again stating that D.W., then eight years old, "would like to be a bus driver when he is grown"), Ex. 20 (Queens Mental Health Clinic Psychiatric Evaluation, July 9, 1998) (noting that D.W., then nine years old, "wants to be a school bus driver"), Ex. 21 (FEGS Progress Note, Apr. 8, 1999) (stating that D.W., aged ten, "was looking forward to returning to school so that he can resume his job as the bus matron's assistant"), Ex. 22 (Far Rockaway Mental Health Clinic Clinical Note, July 5, 2000) (when asked to make three wishes, D.W., aged eleven, wrote "I wish I was a teacher to buses [sic] kid around").
Defendant was arrested on the premises of Green Energy on February 22, 2013 — the same day that the search warrant was executed. PSR at ¶¶ 9, 14. He has been incarcerated at the Brooklyn MDC since the date of his arrest. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. at 16.
Defendant's charge of sexual exploitation of a child relates to conduct that occurred prior to his 2009 State arrest. It was uncovered when federal agents reviewed evidence from his State conviction. PSR at ¶ 19. Included were images that had been on defendant's phone, retrieved at the time of his 2009 arrest by the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") pursuant to a search warrant. See Gov't Sentencing Mem. at 1-2. Among the images were sexually explicit photographs of at least one young boy, as well as photographs of local day care centers. See id. at 2; Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 501 (Def.'s Pictures of Nearby Childcare Centers) at 203-208. The evidence indicated that the images of the young boy had not been downloaded from the Internet, as defendant had originally claimed. PSR at ¶ 19. Rather, the pictures has been taken by him. Id.
Investigators interviewed the pastor of a local church frequented by defendant prior to his State incarceration. The pastor noted that defendant had shared a close relationship with a young boy, and expressed his suspicion that the boy might have been sexually abused by defendant. Id.
After obtaining the mother's permission, agents interviewed the boy. He told them that he first met defendant at church, when he was about five or six years old. He recounted that defendant showed him child pornography, which he identified as "sex with teens or younger," on a laptop computer. The boy indicated that, on several
There is no indication that these images were distributed by defendant. They do not involve penetration or sodomy. See Def.'s Sentencing Mem. at 6. Defendant has not engaged in any sexual contact with minors since his State arrest in 2009. Krueger Report at 15.
A five-count indictment was filed in federal court on March 15, 2013. See Indictment, Mar. 15, 2013, ECF No. 7. It included four counts for distribution of child pornography and one count for possession of child pornography. Id.
Defendant entered a plea of "not guilty." See Minute Entry, Mar. 23, 2013, ECF No. 10. Plea negotiations were conducted over a long period while defendant remained in the MDC. See Order, Apr. 19, 2013, ECF No. 16.
A superseding indictment was filed. See Superseding Indictment, Aug. 28, 2014, ECF No. 45. Added was a count for receipt of child pornography. Id. at 2.
Asking for an adjournment of a trial set for October 2014, the parties jointly requested permission to pursue plea negotiations. See Parties' Joint Letter, Sept. 2, 2014, ECF No. 46. It was agreed that defense counsel would file a notice of intent to employ an insanity defense by late September. Id.
On September 22, 2014, notice was provided to the prosecution and the court that an insanity defense would be pursued on defendant's behalf. See Notice of Insanity Defense, Sept. 22, 2014, ECF No. 50.
Trial was reset for November 10, 2014. See Second Scheduling Order, Sept. 25, 2014, ECF No. 53. A plea hearing before the magistrate judge was scheduled for October 14, 2014. See Minute Entry, Sept. 30, 2014.
A superseding information was filed in October 2014, charging two counts: sexual exploitation of a child and possession of child pornography. See Superseding Information, Oct. 14, 2014, ECF No. 56; see also Gov't Letter, Oct. 3, 2014, ECF No. 54. Defendant waived his right to prosecution by indictment and consented to prosecution by information. See Waiver of Indictment, Oct. 14, 2014, ECF No. 55.
On October 14, 2014, defendant pleaded guilty before a magistrate judge to one count of possession of child pornography in violation of sections 2252(a)(4)(b) and 2252(b)(2) of title 18 of the United States Code, and one count of sexual exploitation of a child in violation of sections 2251(a) and 2251(e). See Hr'g Tr., Oct. 14, 2014, ECF No. 59. He did so despite being advised that, as a result of the plea, a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence would apply. Id. at 17:20-18:25.
The defendant has serious mental problems with repeated suicide attempts. He arrived at the MDC on February 22, 2013.
Immediately, he was placed on a suicide watch. A psychology report indicated his "overall risk of suicide" to be "high." Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Suicide Risk Assessment, Feb. 22, 2013) at 1. He remained on suicide watch for five days and was subsequently placed in the Special Programs Unit of the MDC, where inmates in need of additional psychological treatment are housed. See Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Post Suicide Watch Report, Feb. 27, 2013) at 8; Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 159:02-09.
While in custody at the MDC, defendant attempted suicide. See PSR at ¶ 98. Feeling utterly "helpless" and overwhelmed by depression, defendant slashed his wrist with a razor. Id. He explained: "I was inside my mind. Thinking of [my adoptive] Mom and family. I felt like my situation was helpless." Id.
Defendant again expressed suicidal ideas on May 8, 2013, as he was being taken to the MDC's Special Housing Unit ("SHU"): "He stated that he had just been in SHU overnight pending an outside medical trip, and stated his intention to not return to SHU. He stated that his current thinking is to kill himself and `put me and my family out of misery.'" Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Suicide Risk Assessment, May 08, 2013) at 15; see also infra Part IV.B (addressing the use of SHUs by the Bureau of Prisons). The psychology report identified the following "suicide risk factors": "SHU placement pending [Special Investigative Services] investigation, nature of his legal charges, history of suicide attempts, history of sexual abuse, unable to contact family currently, history of mental health concerns/treatment, reported suicidal ideation today." Id. It also noted that "[i]nmate reports his suicidal ideation is conditional upon placement in SHU. This does not eliminate suicide risk, but suggests his motivation is more to avoid SHU placement than to kill himself." Id. (emphasis added). He was again placed on suicide watch. Id. at 16.
After his release from suicide watch, defendant seemed to entertain some hope for the future, based primarily on his desire to reconnect with his family:
Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Post Suicide Watch Report, May 13, 2013) at 23-24.
He was returned to the SHU. Id. at 24. Subsequent reports indicated that he would be "seen by Psychology Services every 30 days throughout the duration of his confinement to SHU." Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Clinical Intervention-Clinical Contact Form, May 15, 2013) at 25.
At the MDC, D.W. has been diagnosed as having depressive disorder, anxiety, unspecified paranoid state, specified episodic mood disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Psychologists treated him with Divalproex (used in part to treat bipolar disorder), Setraline (antidepressant and anti-anxiety), Trazodone, Depakote (mood stabilizer), and Remeron (antidepressant). PSR at ¶ 99; Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Suicide Risk Assessment, May 08, 2013) at 14-16; Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Psychology Services Clinical Intervention-Clinical Contact Form, May 8, 2014) at 30 (also submitted as Ex. 40 to Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem.).
He has continued to exhibit symptoms of depression and anxiety throughout his pretrial
During his incarceration at the MDC, defendant had two disciplinary reports. One resulted in a six month loss of phone privileges for allowing another inmate to use his prisoner's number in placing a telephone call. Gov't Ex. 402 (BOP Incident Report Form, Oct. 21, 2015).
The other incident involved allegations related to the Prison Rape Elimination Act ("PREA"). See infra Part IV.A (providing an overview of PREA). On June 11, 2013, a Special Investigative Services investigation concluded that D.W. had violated BOP rules and regulations by "engaging in sexual acts." See Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 401 (BOP Incident Report, June 11, 2013) at 1. Defendant admitted to exposing his penis to another inmate, but stated "it was a mutual thing." Id. at 5. Staff members also found letters in D.W.'s cell which "outlined [D.W.'s] sexual preference and what [D.W.] liked to do to various inmates." Id. at 6. The Discipline Hearing Officer ("DHO") placed D.W. in sixty days of disciplinary segregation and restricted his "commissary and visits." Id. at 6-7. He was determined to no longer be eligible for housing in the Special Programs Unit. Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 159:06-20.
In a separate incident that did not result in disciplinary action, D.W. was found to have been writing sexually explicit documents. See Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP General Administrative Note, May 10, 2013) at 20; Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 404 (Def.'s Handwritten Notes). They included what appeared to be a journal entry describing a sexual fantasy with an eight-year old boy. See Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 166:23-167:01 (noting that there were no indications that defendant's handwritten note was intended to be sent and that it resembled "a diary type of reflection"). In the handwritten notes, D.W. described the young boy initiating and willingly participating in a sexual encounter involving oral, digital, and anal sex. Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 404 (Def.'s Handwritten Notes); Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 163:04-165:07. There was no evidence that this note was sent; defendant was not subject to discipline. See Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 164:14-165:12, 166:23-167:01, 195:09-196:09.
In November 2015, an investigation was initiated when D.W. wrote a "drop note" stating that an inmate had been sexually assaulted by another inmate. Gov't Ex. 405 (BOP Mem. of Interview, Nov. 6, 2015). When interviewed, D.W. admitted to writing the note and stated that he "felt like [he] needed to report this incident because [he] was sexually assaulted when [he] was in the state jail and [did] not want to see this to happen to another inmate." Id. An investigation was conducted and the allegation was determined to be "unfounded." Gov't Ex. 405 (BOP Mem. for Timothy Geier, Nov. 6, 2015).
Defendant's counsel indicated that D.W. has largely lost touch with his adoptive family:
Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. at 18-19 (emphasis added).
Although defendant has attempted to reconnect with his adoptive mother and brother, his efforts, so far, appear to have been unsuccessful:
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
In May 2014, it was reported by the MDC's Psychology Services department that D.W. "has been struggling with lack of support from family & friends. He feels abandoned, since his family has refused to talk to him." Gov't Ex. 403 (BOP Psychology Services Clinical Intervention-Clinical Contact Form, May 8, 2014) at 30.
According to his counsel, defendant has renewed a relationship with one of his biological siblings since his incarceration. Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. at 19. They exchanged letters, and D.W.'s brother "has vowed to remain supportive and be a part of D.W.'s life going forward." Id. He has also been in contact "with an elderly woman in Pennsylvania, whom he began corresponding with while in State prison." Id. at 20. Although they have never met, he refers to her as his "grandmother." The relationship appears to be supportive; she writes to him and contributes to his commissary account. Id.
The offenses D.W. pled guilty to carry a minimum term of imprisonment of fifteen years (180 months) and, if cumulated, a maximum term of fifty years (600 months). See Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 8:09-9:10.
The applicable Sentencing Guidelines range was agreed upon by the parties and found to be 292 months (24 years) to 365 months (30 years) of imprisonment, based on an offense level of 37 with a criminal history category of IV. See id. at 13:20-14:10.
Defendant's counsel sought a sentence no greater than the applicable mandatory minimum term of fifteen years. See Def.'s Sentencing Mem. at 1.
The government argued for a sentence higher than the minimum, within the applicable Guidelines range (24 years to 30 years), but it took no position as to where within the range the sentence should fall. See Gov't Sentencing Mem. at 1, n.1.
The young boy identified as having been molested by defendant, see supra Part III.C, submitted a victim impact statement. He stated:
PSR at ¶ 23.
A sampling of the child pornography images collected from defendant was sent to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children ("NCMEC"). Certain images depicted minors already known to law enforcement. See id. at ¶¶ 24-36. Some victims provided impact statements. Id. at ¶ 37. Three victims have submitted requests for monetary compensation from defendant. See id. at ¶ 38; Second Addendum to PSR, Apr. 25, 2016.
In preparation for sentencing, an evidentiary hearing was conducted. See Order, Apr. 15, 2015, ECF No. 63. The parties were ordered to present experts on the "dangers presented by the defendant and recommendations for treatment and incarceration." Id.
The defendant submitted reports by Dr. Richard Krueger, M.D. and Dr. Robert Prentky, Ph.D. The government noted that it would introduce the testimony of Dr. N. G. Berrill. Because defendant did not wish to be interviewed by Dr. Berrill, the government did not ask him to submit a written report. Gov't Sentencing Mem. at 6, n.5. The government had also previously requested Dr. Barry Rosenfeld, Ph.D. to evaluate defendant. His evaluation was limited to the issue of whether defendant was mentally fit to stand trial. See Hr'g Tr., June 11, 2015, ECF No. 128, at 10:17-20.
The experts' reports are summarized below.
Dr. Richard Krueger, M.D., is a psychiatrist specialized in the diagnosis and treatment of sex offenders. In addition to having a private practice, he is medical director of the Sexual Behavior Clinic at New York State Psychiatric Institute and associate professor of psychiatry at Columbia College of Physicians. See Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 4:16-19. A 1977 graduate of Harvard Medical School, Dr. Krueger was board certified in psychiatry at Boston University Medical Center in 1984. Id. at 4:22-5:02. He also is board certified in addiction psychiatry and forensic psychiatry. Id. at 5:02-05.
Dr. Krueger has had extensive experience researching paraphilic disorders. He was part of the committee that revised the American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic and treatment manual, and he participates in the work of the committee of the World Health Organization writing the criteria for the International Classifications of Disease manual, "revising the classification of paraphilic disorders, of disorders of sexual interest, patterns of sexual interest." Id. at 6:08-25.
He is a member of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, and, for the past twenty years, has been on the board of its New York chapter, the New York Association for Treatment of Sexual Abusers. Id. at 7:20-24. He also is a member of the International Academy of Sex Research and the International Association for the Treatment of Sexual Offenders. Id. at 8:01-06.
An "essential part" of his work in evaluating and treating sex offenders is assessing their risk of re-offense. Id. at 8:07-11. He estimates that he has evaluated, treated, and prepared risk assessments for over a thousand sex offenders. Id. at 8:12-15. He describes his work in such evaluations as performing "a comprehensive ... mental health assessment with the goal of achieving whatever diagnosis there might be, of seeing what might be treatable, then
At the request of defense counsel, Dr. Krueger carried out an evaluation of D.W. See generally Krueger Report. This evaluation was based on:
See id. at 1-4. His findings and recommendations were submitted to the court with defendant's sentencing submission of June 8, 2015.
Dr. Krueger utilized a number of tests aimed at assessing deviant and non-deviant sexual behavior, other psychiatric syndromes, personality functioning, and risk of re-offense. See id. at 10-13.
He found that D.W. "had a command of language and interaction, which was far beyond his purported IQ of 70. He was able to provide a very coherent history and he was quite open about his various sexual interests and experiences." Id. at 13. Defendant admitted to having a "pornography addiction ... with inappropriate interest in images of minors" and being "willing to engage in treatment." Id. at 14. He noted that D.W. "had good insight, good judgment, and good impulse control." Id.
Dr. Krueger observed that defendant "has an extreme history of adverse childhood experiences with his ACE [Adverse Childhood Experiences] score of 9 out of 10 being the highest I have encountered in my career." Id. (emphasis added). He determined that defendant continues to suffer from mental illness and "mild mental retardations":
Id.
This psychiatrist determined that defendant "makes [the] criteria for pedophilia," as well as "for a paraphilia not otherwise specified or ephebophilia, with a dysfunctional interest in teenagers, and for a sexual disorder not otherwise specified, or hypersexual disorder characterized by pornography dependence." Id. (emphasis added). His diagnoses are summarized in the following table:
Axis Description of Axis Diagnosis in Instant Case Axis I Describes major psychiatric 1. Bipolar disorder II, depressed syndromes that an individual has that phase; may be occasioning his or her seeking treatment. 2. Panic disorder without agoraphobia; 3. Posttraumatic stress disorder, chronic, severe; 4. Priapism secondary to trazodone; 5. Pedophilia; 6. Paraphilia not otherwise specked or ephebophilia; 7. Sexual disorder not otherwise specified or hypersexual disorder; 8. Learning disorder not otherwise specified. Axis II Refers to an individual's personality 1. ? Mild mental retardation. or their stable way of interacting with others. Axis III Involves a listing of medical 1. History of priapism secondary to conditions. trazodone; 2. Allergy to fish; 3. History of heart murmur; 4. Glaucoma, childhood onset; and 5. History of exposure to lead paint. Axis IV Identifies psychosocial and Stressors — severe — current legal environmental stressors. situation Axis V Offers a way to grade an individual's Highest level of functioning past overall level of functioning on a scale year was 20 of 100 (superior functioning over a wide range of activities) through 1 Highest level of functioning past (severe disability and dysfunction). It week was 20 asks that a judgment be made as to the best level of functioning over the past year and then over the past week.
Id. at 15-16.
While Dr. Krueger found that defendant's "risk of sexual re-offense is high according to several instruments used to assess such risk," the expert indicated that the lack of evidence of him having abused
Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added).
This expert concluded that "[d]espite his diagnosis and increased risk [D.W.] ... could be very well managed under the usual conditions of outpatient treatment imposed by Federal Probation." Id. at 15 (emphasis added). He pointed out that sex offender treatment "should be delivered with the awareness that he had downloaded child pornography while under the supervision of New York State parole." Id. According to Dr. Krueger, although defendant has "a moderate-high or high level of risk for re-offense," he is "very capable of being managed in the community under strict and intensive supervision and treatment." Id. In this expert's opinion, "a lengthy period of incarceration provides no additional benefit from a treatment perspective." Id. (emphasis added).
Dr. Krueger ended his report by summarizing D.W.'s position, while criticizing available treatment in federal prisons:
Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
Dr. Robert Prentky is a forensic psychologist specialized in the assessment of juvenile sex offenders. He is a fellow of the American Psychological Association and the Association for Psychological Science. See Prentky Report at 19. At the request of defendant's counsel, he examined D.W. in September 2013. He submitted a written evaluation. See generally id.
Dr. Prentky's findings and recommendations are based on:
See id. at 1-2. His findings and recommendations were submitted to the court with defendant's sentencing submission of June 8, 2015. At the time of his examination, the government had not yet learned that D.W. had molested an additional child in 2009.
Dr. Prentky detailed D.W.'s history of severe physical and psychological abuse, from when he was just a child to the time he was raped while in State custody. See id. at 3-8. According to Dr. Prentky "to say that [D.W.] is `a product of his upbringing' is tragically accurate." Id. at 14 (emphasis added). He described defendant's childhood in stark terms:
Id. at 14.
This expert emphasized the harsh difficulties that defendant faced upon his release from State custody; it included inadequate housing, inability to find work and feelings of abandonment. This lead to increased depression and his relapse into viewing child pornography:
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
Referring to his child pornography addiction, defendant told Dr. Prentky that "a lot of the stuff I watched, is stuff that happened to me. I don't know what drove me to go down this road, but it seemed like when I saw kids doing it to each other it wasn't rape, it wasn't forced." See id. at 10, 16. Dr. Prentky observed that such an "analysis" is "common for those with long histories of abuse." Id. at 16. This psychologist explained that as a victim of extreme childhood sexual abuse, D.W. may have been employing complex coping mechanisms to overcome the trauma he had experienced:
Id. at 16-17 (emphasis in original).
Dr. Prentky observed that "[D.W.] is now a young adult who has been failed by his birth parents and subsequently by the safety net of protections that are in place and intended for children like [him]." Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
The "AASI test" was used by this expert to assess defendant's sexual interest, including any pedophilic attraction to children. This test "relies on visual reaction time in response to clothed models of children, adolescents, and adults to measure sexual interests." Id. at 11. It has two components: a lengthy questionnaire inquiring about "sexual thoughts, fantasies, and behavior," as well as a "computerized assessment of self-reported sexual interest in slides" depicting both children and adults. Id.
Dr. Prentky reported that "[D.W.'s] AASI profile, as noted, is complex and undoubtedly reflects what is known about him, a history of severe, protracted sexual abuse with multiple perpetrators resulting in confusion and fluidity of sexual interests." Id. at 12. While defendant's sexual
In terms of the risk posed to the public, Dr. Prentky observed that defendant "undoubtedly is one of the saddest cases of neglect that I have seen. ... I have evaluated numerous sex offenders, however, with far less traumatic histories but who posed far more of a risk than [D.W.]." Id. at 17 (emphasis added). He also concluded that, despite defendant's history of serious abuse, he displayed no signs associated "with violence or chronic antisocial behavior." Id. at 18. Dr. Prentky summarized his positive evaluation of D.W. as follows:
Id. (emphasis in original; emphasis in first sentence added).
At the government's request, in April 2014 defendant was evaluated by a clinical psychologist, Dr. Barry Rosenfeld, Ph.D. See Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 501 (Psychological Evaluation of D.W. by Barry Rosenfeld, Ph.D., Apr. 21, 2014) at 113-118. Dr. Rosenfeld is a professor in the Department of Psychology at Fordham University. See Gov't Letter, Apr. 4, 2014, ECF No. 37.
Dr. Rosenfeld's evaluation was based on:
Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 501 (Psychological Evaluation of D.W. by Barry Rosenfeld, Ph.D., Apr. 21, 2014) at 113.
Dr. Rosenfeld reported that D.W.
Id. at 116.
Several psychological tests were administered, aimed at assessing D.W.'s cognitive effort (i.e., "[his] motivation to perform to the best of his abilities"). Id. at 117. Dr. Rosenfeld concluded that defendant was misrepresenting:
Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
In June 2015, defendant's sentencing hearings commenced. See Hr'g Tr., June 11, 2015, ECF No. 128. A video recording was made. Id.
This court observed that D.W. appeared "seriously troubled, exceptionally passive, and deeply depressed." United States v. D.W., No. 13-CR-0173, 2015 WL 3892643, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2015). Sua sponte, the court asked the parties to address defendant's capacity to plead, as well as whether a sentence of fifteen years in this case would effectively increase punishment, given defendant's past abuse in prison and the probability of a sexual assault while incarcerated:
See Hr'g Tr., June 11, 2015, ECF No. 128, at 4:16-6:16.
A further evidentiary hearing was ordered. In a memorandum, the court directed the parties to address: (1) defendant's capacity to understand the implications of his decision to plead guilty; and (2) whether sentencing him to a fifteen-year mandatory prison term would amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Specifically, the court raised the following five issues:
See D.W., 2015 WL 3892643, at *3-4.
Shortly after the initial sentencing hearing, D.W. submitted a hand-written letter
Letter of D.W. to the Court, July 6, 2015, ECF No. 74 (sealed, but now unsealed by this order) (emphasis added).
Defendant's counsel reported that "the defendant has no desire to withdraw his guilty plea, and has consulted with counsel on this issue. The defense does not intend to press any issue concerning the guilty plea." Letter from Def.'s Counsel, Nov. 19, 2015, ECF No. 93, at 1.
Further evidentiary hearings were held on November 23, 2015, December 22, 2015, December 23, 2015, and February 3, 2016.
At the start of the evidentiary hearings, the issue of defendant's guilty plea was addressed. Defendant reaffirmed his plea, which was accepted by the court:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 3:01-17:05.
Even though the court considered the plea "unwise," it accepted defendant's guilty plea. "It is the defendant's, not the court's, decision on this issue that should prevail in the absence of the most unusual circumstances." United States v. C.R., 792 F.Supp.2d 343, 357 (E.D.N.Y.2011), vacated and remanded sub nom. United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.2013).
The parties offered extensive testimony. They presented medical experts who testified about the risk posed by the defendant to the public, available treatment options, and the effect of a fifteen-year sentence on defendant's likely risk of recidivism. See infra Part IV.D. Bureau of Prisons ("BOP" or "Bureau") experts provided detailed information on the Bureau's policies and practice with respect to the use of solitary confinement and the measures available to protect highly vulnerable inmates such as D.W. See infra Part IV.A-B.
Defendant also introduced the testimony of Jason Lydon, national director of the organization Black & Pink, who discussed his organization's report on the experiences of incarcerated lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people ("LGBT") in the United States. The proffered testimony of Galen Baughman, Open Society Foundation Soros Fellow with the Human Rights Defense Center in Washington, D.C., was not accepted by the court. Details are included below.
The government introduced Dr. Naftali G. Berrill "as an expert in matters related to sex offenders, specifically, risk assessment and treatment." Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 101:19-22. Currently, Dr. Berrill is a Forensic Psychologist and Executive Director of the New York Center for Neuropsychology and Forensic Behavioral Science, a private practice. His work comprises evaluating and treating convicted sex offenders, including individuals
Dr. Berrill holds a Ph.D. in clinical psychology from Vanderbilt University and a Master's degree in clinical psychology from Long Island University. Berrill CV at 1; Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 96:23-97:01. Following his doctoral training, Dr. Berrill completed an ABA-approved clinical psychology internship at Sheppard Pratt Hospital in Maryland and a postdoctoral fellowship at Georgetown University Medical Center in neuropsychology. He is board certified in clinical psychology, neuropsychology and forensic psychology. Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 97:05-10. Before establishing a private practice, Dr. Berrill was the director and chief psychologist of a mental health services clinic in the Bronx Family Court. He also worked at Perkins Hospital, a maximum security forensic psychiatric setting in Maryland, where he treated violent offenders and sex offenders. Id. at 97:24-98:05.
Dr. Berrill's testimony was not based on a direct examination of D.W. because defendant declined, on the advice of counsel, to speak with him. See Gov't Witness List, Nov. 6, 2015, ECF No. 87. His testimony was instead predicated upon a review of relevant written materials, which included the PSR and FBI report in the instant case, D.W.'s State court proceedings, his criminal history report, and prior medical examinations. See Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 102:14-103:22; Gov't Ex. 501 (Documents Reviewed by Dr. Berrill) at 50-62, 113-18, 203-08. Dr. Berrill also reviewed the report provided by Dr. Krueger. Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 103:23-104:03.
Dr. Richard Krueger was proffered by defendant as an "expert psychiatrist in evaluating paraphilic disorders, treating paraphilic disorders and making risk assessment of sexual offenders." Id. at 9:21-24. His background and qualifications are set out at length in Part III.G.3, supra.
Mr. Phillip Wise was formerly a Warden and Assistant Director of the BOP. Currently, he works as a consultant on BOP operations. See Def.'s Ex. Q (Resume of Phillip Wise). His experience includes working with vulnerable inmate populations, as well as devising and implementing policies on the classification and management of inmates, particularly those suffering from mental illnesses. See Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 24:12-25:09.
Counsel for D.W. introduced him as an expert on BOP policies, procedures and programs, and on work with inmates with vulnerabilities. See id. at 21:19-22. Following a Daubert, Rule 702 Federal Rule of Evidence hearing, the witness was deemed "qualified as an expert on the issues he is expected to testify to by knowledge acquired through his profession, his experience, training and education and subsequent studies." Id. at 27:22-28:02; see also id. at 28:04-14.
Mr. Wise testified about: (1) the assessment and designation of vulnerable inmates; (2) the risks posed to them from other inmates and staff; (3) specialized sex offender units; and (4) the use of protective custody. Def.'s Witness List, Nov. 6, 2015, ECF No. 86, at 2.
The government introduced the testimony of Patricia Rodman as an expert on PREA compliance in BOP facilities. At the time of her testimony she held the position of Associate Warden of the MDC; she also was the PREA compliance manager for the facility. See Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 144:11-14. Ms. Rodman has since retired.
Her testimony addressed: (1) the ways in which BOP facilities meet the program requirements of PREA; (2) the specific PREA-relevant actions that were taken with regard to the defendant while he has been housed at the MDC; (3) the protections available to defendant while incarcerated; and (4) BOP use of protective custody and solitary confinement. See Gov't Witness List, Nov. 6, 2015, ECF No. 87.
Ms. Rodman acknowledged that her testimony was limited to her experience at the MDC and at Schuylkill, a Federal Correctional Institution. Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 198:14-17 ("Q. So you are not competent here today to talk about violence against sex offenders in facilities outside of Schuylkill or the MDC? A. Correct.").
The government also called Brad Trate, Correctional Services Administrator of the Correctional Programs Division of the BOP. See Gov't Notice of Expert Witness, Dec. 30, 2015, ECF No. 103. In that role, Mr. Trate is in charge of developing training and "the correctional services of the Bureau of Prisons as a whole." Hr'g Tr., Feb. 03, 2016, at 9:19-10:06 ("I set up training for correctional supervisors, lieutenants, captains. I do staffing analysis, compliment analysis, identifying how many correctional services officers, how many supervisors are appropriate for different security levels. I conduct training with those lieutenants, with those captains. I conduct training with regard to emergency preparedness, various issues. I teach associate wardens training, and I teach wardens' training as well regarding security-related issues for the Bureau of Prisons.").
Mr. Trate is also "responsible for the security of the Special Housing Units throughout the nation." Id. at 10:19-11:17.
Mr. Trate testified on: (1) the use of SHUs, including for protective custody; (2) current BOP statistics regarding the use of SHU and protective custody; (3) the BOP's implementation of PREA-related regulations; and (4) measures taken by BOP facilities to address the needs of potentially vulnerable inmates. See Gov't Notice of Expert Witness, Dec. 30, 2015, ECF No. 103.
The defendant relied upon the testimony of Nelson Aponte, a former Associate Warden, Chief Correctional Supervisor, and Special Investigative Agent for the BOP. See Resume of Nelson Aponte, ECF No. 102-1, attached as App. 1 to Def.'s Notice of Expert Witness, Dec. 11, 2015, ECF No. 102. He was qualified as an "expert on BOP practices and procedures, particularly, as applied to threats to inmates, investigations, and the use of protective measures." Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 133:24-134:03.
After spending twenty-five years working for the BOP, Mr. Aponte currently is a consultant regarding federal, state and private correctional systems. See Def.'s Notice of Expert Witness, Dec. 11. 2015, ECF No. 102. As Special Investigative Agent and Supervisor he was responsible for investigating incidents, including threats, assaults, and allegations of sexual abuse.
His testimony focused on the effects of PREA, the use of protective custody in federal prison, and the risks faced in prison by inmates convicted of sexual offenses involving children as well as available means of protecting them.
In its post-hearing brief, the government urged the court to disregard or discount Mr. Aponte's testimony. See Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem. at 45-51. It argued that "Aponte was neither candid nor honest with the Court in his testimony about his post-BOP employment." Id. at 48. The witness was asked about his demotion from his job with the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, following allegations that he falsified documents. Mr. Aponte explained that he refused a demotion and resigned after he was adjudicated guilty of falsifying documents and after going through the appeals process. He testified that he did not remember what kinds of documents he was accused of falsifying. Id. at 49-50.
Mr. Aponte's testimony in this case was redundant. His testimony is rejected. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons); Fed. R. Evid. 702 (Testimony by Expert Witnesses). The credible and reliable testimony of the remaining BOP experts — Mr. Wise, Ms. Rodman and Mr. Trate — is sufficient to aid the court in addressing the questions it posed to the parties.
Jason Lydon, national director of the organization Black & Pink, was called by defendant as an expert witness on the experience of LGBT people in prison. See Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 104:08-10, 105:10-12. Black & Pink is "a nationally networked grassroots organization working with lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender identified people who are currently incarcerated or affected by the criminal legal system." Id. at 104:04-07.
In 2014, the organization published a report addressing the experiences of LGBT people who are incarcerated in the United States. See Def.'s Ex. D (Coming Out of Concrete Closets: A Report on Black & Pink's National LGBTQ Prisoner Survey ("Black & Pink Report")). The report was based on data collected through a survey sent to all of the organization's subscribers — approximately 7,000 federal and State inmates. Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 107:05-18; see also id. at 110:12-18 (Mr. Lydon explained that survey respondents were "chosen through our membership, self-selected. They are LGBT individuals who are incarcerated in prisons. We reach prisons in every State across the U.S., and the respondents chose to answer the survey or not."). About 1,200 responses were obtained, of which 1,100 were considered usable. Id. at 107:21-23.
While Black & Pink's survey was stated to be "the largest ever survey of LGBT people in prison," Mr. Lydon acknowledged that it "was not a random survey." The respondents were not "representative or random," and it was not a "complete" survey of LGBT incarcerated individuals. Id. at 111:06-16. Approximately seventy-nine people out of the total 1,100 respondents included in the survey — i.e., about seven percent — were federal inmates. See id. at 121:12-14, 130:09-11. This represents
Prior to the hearing, the federal respondent data was sorted. See, e.g., Def.'s Ex. V (Excerpt from Black & Pink Report: Federal Respondent Answers to Survey Questions 1, 5, 34), Ex. W (Excerpt from Black & Pink Report: Federal Respondent Answers to Survey Questions 70-76, 78-79, 81-84), Ex. X (Excerpt from Black & Pink Report: Federal Respondent Answers to Survey Question 77a), Ex. Y (Excerpt from Black & Pink Report: Federal Respondent Answers to Survey Question 85), Ex. Z (Excerpt from Black & Pink Report: Federal Respondent Answers to Survey Question 41a). Of these federal respondents, sixty-eight percent were gay or bisexual men. See Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 109:14-17. Nineteen percent reported being "physically assaulted, either hit, punched, kicked, or beaten by prison staff." Id. at 112:08-10. Twenty-two percent stated they had experienced "unwanted touching by a prison staff person," and six percent reported being sexually assaulted or raped by prison staff. Id. at 112:17-22. Thirty-two percent stated they had been intentionally placed by prison staff "where they might be at high risk of being sexually assaulted [by] another prisoner." Id. at 113:01-04.
The survey was admitted into evidence, but with a finding that it did not meet scientific standards for such work. Id. at 112:01-02.
Defendant sought to qualify Galen Baughman, Open Society Foundation Soros Justice Fellow with the Human Rights Defense Center in Washington, D.C., as an expert witness on "prison conditions including assault, sexual abuse, rapes, and solitary confinement in federal and state prisons." Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 192:24-193:01. In his position, Mr. Baughman is a "policy analyst and advocate" who focuses "on the issue of indefinite detention at ... the federal and state [levels]." Id. at 183:19-25. Prior to his current position, he was incarcerated for nine years, of which four-and-a-half were spent in solitary confinement. See id. at 191:08-09. Most of his time was served in State facilities in Virginia. Id. at 191:15-16. This personal experience motivated him to "be a voice for change to help improve public safety through changing the way we treated people through our system." Id. at 191:09-13.
The government objected to Mr. Baughman as an expert witness. See id. at 193:22-194:22. His testimony was excluded. While Mr. Baughman "has extensive knowledge ... he doesn't have the skill, experience, training or education to testify in a case under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 702." Id. at 197:10-14 (statement of the court). His testimony as a fact witness was also precluded. See id. at 200:13-14 (finding that the proposed witness could not be qualified "by his personal history" since he never served in a federal prison); see also id. at 202:10-13 ("His knowledge is too narrow and it does not apply to the particular issues before us in the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the federal penitentiaries that we're concerned about....").
Two amicus curiae briefs have been submitted with the consent of the parties and the court.
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. ("Lambda Legal"), the National Center for Lesbian Rights ("NCLR"), the National Center for Transgender Equality
The Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs ("WLC") has submitted a brief addressing the Bureau of Prisons' "overuse of solitary confinement and its failure to properly diagnose and treat mentally ill men and women subjected to solitary confinement." See Mem. of Amicus Curiae WLC, Mar. 10, 2016, ECF No. 135 ("WLC Amicus Curiae Mem."), at 1.
Both briefs are included in the record. Non-parties Lambda Legal, NCLR, NCTE, SRLP and WLC were added to the case as amici. See Order, Mar. 11, 2016, ECF No. 136.
The main question presented is whether this defendant must be sentenced to the applicable statutory minimum term of imprisonment of fifteen years; or whether such a sentence, as applied, would amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United States Constitution.
Prison conditions requested by the court to protect the defendant and the public would permit a fifteen year sentence of incarceration. See infra Parts V.D. VI and VII (conditions requested by the court to avoid an Eighth Amendment violation).
Defendant has been convicted of a serious crime; the sexual abuse of a minor. As recognized by this court, this category of defendants "frequently represent[s] the worst and most dangerous type of offender." United States v. R.V., No. 14-CR-0316, 157 F.Supp.3d 207, 210, 2016 WL 270257, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2016).
Substantial punishment is warranted. First, and most importantly, the public needs to be protected against the possibility of any future acting out. Incapacitation might be necessary.
Yet, while defendant has been a sex abuser, he has lived most of his life as a victim. He requires medical treatment and protection. See supra Part II The past sexual abuse he himself has suffered, together with the fact that he is gay or bisexual, has a mental illness and is a convicted sex offender, make him a prime candidate for victimization in prison, unless adequate, appropriate precautions are taken. A sentence of fifteen years, without the protections suggested by the court, would likely be a condemnation to a decade and a half of unconstitutional physical, sexual, and psychological violence, as well as extended periods of debilitating solitary confinement.
Defendant's reentry into the community is also of concern. As demonstrated following his release from State prison, without the support needed to readjust to society, defendant will continue to present a danger to himself and others. The effect that a prolonged period of incarceration is likely to have on defendant's ability to reenter the community is vital in assessing the risks he probably will present to the public, and in devising an appropriate sentence and reentry conditions.
Ongoing medical and psychological treatment, including sex offender treatment, is needed. Assistance with housing and employment must be provided. Close and strict post-release supervision is imperative. Support from family and friends is crucial.
The court has addressed these issues in sentencing hearings with the extensive aid
See Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 61:09-62:17.
Hearing testimony, documentary evidence, and memoranda were submitted. This section of the memorandum presents the evidence as it relates to the following sentencing concerns: (1) risk of harm to defendant while he is incarcerated (Part IV.A); (2) the BOP's use of solitary confinement to protect and punish inmates (Part IV.B); (3) the BOP's program for sex offenders (Part IV.C); (4) the possible risks posed by defendant to the public and relevant treatment options after release (Part IV.D); and (5) the resources available to defendant upon his reentry into the community to minimize the danger he poses to himself and others. (Part IV.E).
The relevant BOP framework concerning the protection of vulnerable inmates and use of solitary confinement is set out below. The evidentiary record strongly indicates that the defendant in this case falls within a category of individuals exceptionally vulnerable to abuse while incarcerated. Due to his risk profile, it is likely that D.W. would spend a substantial amount of time in solitary confinement, unless adequate precautions are taken by the BOP.
While a sentencing court can make a recommendation to the BOP about where a defendant should serve his prison term, the recommendation is not binding on the Bureau. In imposing a prison term, therefore, the court cannot alone ensure that programs necessary to an appropriate sentence will be available to a defendant. In this case it believes cooperation from the BOP is likely. See infra Part VII.A.
After sentencing, inmates are designated to a correctional facility by the BOP's Designation and Sentence Computation Center ("DSCC"), "a centralized location where the vast majority of classification and designation decisions are made." Alicia Vasquez & Todd Bussert, How Federal Prisoners are Placed, 31 Crim. Just. 19, 20 (Spring 2016) ("Vasquez & Bussert"). The BOP utilizes "an objective classification system that's determined by an individual's security level...." Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 64:02-03 (Testimony of Mr. Wise). The five available security levels are "minimum, low, medium, high, or Administrative Max...." Id. at 64:04. "An institution's security level assignment is based on its level of staff supervision (inmate-to-staff ratio) and security measures,
To determine the security level of an inmate, BOP officials focus mainly on the PSR prepared by the Probation Department. The determinative issues are whether the inmate is violent and whether the offense is a violent one. See Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 93:23-25 (Testimony of Mr. Wise). Once an inmate is assigned a security level, he or she is generally designated to a facility that is within that level. See id. at 64:02-08. Some factors may override the security level designation. For example, as a convicted sex offender, D.W. would not be eligible to be placed in camps — lower security facilities generally offering more programming opportunities for inmates. See id. at 64:09-16. Application of a public safety factor or a management variable may also affect an inmate's placement:
Vasquez & Bussert at 21.
Also to be considered is the Judgment and Commitment Order — including any recommendation from the sentencing judge — and any applicable sentencing objectives. See Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 64:17-65:09 (Testimony of Mr. Wise). Ms. Rodman testified:
Id. at 179:02-13; see also Vasquez & Bussert at 20 (stating that "[t]he designation process begins when the case documents — the judgment and commitment order, the presentence report (PSR), and the marshals request for designation (USMS 129) — are uploaded to eDesignate and electronically transmitted to the [BOP's Designation and Sentence Computation Center]" and noting "the critical role that the PSR plays in the designation process").
Congress has directed the BOP to take into consideration any statement made by the sentencing court "concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was determined to be warranted" or "recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate." 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(4). While judicial recommendations
Id. (emphasis added).
This description of the Bureau's attempts to comply with judicial recommendations was confirmed by Mr. Wise at the evidentiary hearing:
Determinations as to which inmates will be housed in one of the BOP's nine Sex Offender Management Programs (see infra Part IV.C.1) are also made by the BOP through its DSCC unit. Access to intensive resident Sex Offender Treatment Programs is usually limited to the last three years of an offender's sentence, and participation is voluntary:
Vasquez & Bussert at 21-22; see also infra Part IV.C.
In the instant case, the parties agreed that D.W. is likely to be classified as either a medium or high security inmate. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 67:03-12 (Testimony of Mr. Wise). He would therefore be ineligible for designation to low-security facilities. Id. at 67:13-22 (Mr. Wise explained that if D.W. "scores for medium security or high security, he's got to go, unless there's some really significant overriding reason, he's going to go to at least a medium-security facility"); see also id. at 67:24-68:04 (explaining that if D.W. were classified as a high security prisoner, he could potentially be assigned to a medium security facility; "because of some vulnerability issues that [the BOP] may perceive ... even if he scores in the high security level they may drop him to a medium").
Medium or high security facilities are inherently more dangerous than lower security ones, as explained by Mr. Wise:
Id. at 71:14-22 (emphasis added). The dangers faced by defendant are likely to be compounded by the overcrowding plaguing most BOP institutions. See Transforming Prisons, Restoring Lives, Charles Colson Task Force on Federal Corrections Final Recommendations 15-17 (Jan. 2016) (describing the "overcrowding and poor conditions of confinement" in the federal prison system). Overcrowding increases security risks and limits the availability of services such as medical treatment and other programs. See id. at 17 ("In addition to creating security problems, overcrowding undermines the BOP's ability to provide programs, health services, case planning, and treatment that can help those in prison successfully return to the community."); cf. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 517-26, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011) (overcrowding in California State prison was primary cause of Eighth Amendment violations).
The government has long recognized that prison rape is a problem. It has taken serious steps to tackle this pervasive issue. Yet, despite its efforts, rape and other forms of sexual assault continue to occur in BOP facilities.
In 2003 Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act ("PREA"). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609 (2003). PREA was a response to reports of the high prevalence of male rape in prison.
Congress found that although "[i]insufficient research has been conducted and insufficient data reported on the extent of prison rape ... experts have conservatively estimated that at least 13 percent of the inmates in the United States have been sexually assaulted in prison," with several inmates suffering "repeated assaults." Id. at § 15601(2). It was observed that inmates suffering from mental illness and young offenders were at greater risk of sexual victimization. Id. at § 15601(3).
PREA recognized that inmates who experience sexual violence in prison are less likely to successfully reenter society. The Act notes that "[v]ictims of prison rape suffer severe physical and psychological effects that hinder their ability to integrate into the community and maintain stable employment upon their release from prison." Id. at § 15601(11). Sexually assaulted inmates are also more likely to commit crimes once they reenter their communities. Id. at § 15601(8) ("Prison rape endangers the public safety by making brutalized inmates more likely to commit crimes when they are released[.]").
Recognizing that "[t]he high incidence of sexual assault within prisons involves actual and potential violations of the United States Constitution," PREA created the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission ("NPREC"). Id. at §§ 15601(13), 15606. The NPREC was tasked with issuing a report on the impact of prison rape and recommendations as to national standards aimed at improving the "detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of prison rape." Id. at § 15606(e).
A report and recommendations were issued in June 2009. See National Prison Rape Elimination Commission Report (June 2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf. Based in part on that report, the Department of Justice issued proposed rules in 2011, which were implemented the following year and are binding upon the BOP. See National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 76 Fed. Reg. 6248-6302 (Feb. 3, 2011); 28 C.F.R. § 115 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 15607.
The rules address, among other issues: supervision and monitoring to protect inmates against sexual abuse; training of staff "on key topics related to preventing, detecting, and responding to sexual abuse;" the screening of inmates "for [the] risk of being sexually abused," providing that the "screening information be used to inform housing, bed, work, education, and program assignments," with the goal of keeping inmates "at high risk of victimization away from those at high risk of committing abuse;" the provision of medical and mental health care; and improved processes for the submission of grievances by inmates. See Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 701 (Executive Summary, National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, Dep't of Justice Final Rule (May 2012)) at 4-9.
The BOP's Program Statement on Sexually Abusive Behavior Prevention and Intervention Program ("PREA Program Statement") provides a written policy implementing the rules adopted pursuant to PREA. See Def.'s Ex. R (BOP Program
Pursuant to the PREA Program Statement, all incoming inmates are to be screened "for risk of victimization and abusiveness" within 72 hours of entering an institution. Id. at § 115.41. "[A]t a minimum," the intake screening shall consider the following factors in order to determine an inmate's risk of being subjected to sexual abuse:
Id. at § 115.41(d).
The guidelines expressly recognize that inmates may possess several characteristics rendering them vulnerable to sexual abuse while in prison:
Id. An inmate's "risk of victimization or abusiveness" is to be reassessed "within a set time period, not to exceed 30 days from the inmate's arrival at the facility" as well as "when warranted due to a referral, request, incident of sexual abuse, or receipt of additional information that bears on the inmate's risk of sexual victimization or abusiveness." Id. at § 115.41(f)-(g).
The information obtained through this initial screening process is then to be used to:
Id. at § 115.42(a); see also Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 148:21-25 (Ms. Rodman testifying that the purpose of the provisions is "[t]o ensure the appropriate housing and program and treatment options for inmates"). The information is also used to determine whether an inmate should be referred to Psychology Services for treatment. See Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 149:25-150:06.
In order to elicit this information, upon arrival to a BOP facility, an "intake screening form" is filled out. The form includes questions aimed at determining the risks associated with placing the particular inmate in the general population. An excerpt from the form is set out below:
Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 103 (Current Inmate Intake Form).
As pointed out by Mr. Wise, the purpose of the form is to ascertain the risks to which a particular inmate may be exposed:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 46:06-47:02.
At the time of intake, inmates are provided with a document that sets out the BOP's sexual abuse behavior prevention and intervention program. See Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 105 (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Sexually Abusive Behavior Prevention and Intervention: An Overview for Offenders (2014)). The document provides an overview as to what amounts to sexually abusive behavior and includes details on how to prevent or report any incidents. See id.
Once the intake form has been completed, an "objective screening instrument" is used by BOP officials to assess whether the inmate meets any of the risk factors identified in the PREA Program Statement, and whether a referral to Psychology Services is warranted. See Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 151:19-25 (Testimony of Ms. Rodman); Def.'s Ex. R (PREA Program Statement) at § 115.41(d) and Attachment A, reproduced below.
RISK OF VICTIMIZATION Factor Objective Criteria Referral Guidance Answer to Intake Questions 1, 6a, 6b, concerning history of If inmate responds yes to any of the Screening Form sexual assault and inmate perception of questions. refer to Psychology Services in whether the can be housed in general all cases. population. General Physical Inmate is under 21 over 65: If inmate meets two or more criteria, Appearance and leading staff to determine that the inmate Presentation Inmate has small physical statute (5'6, 120 is at risk, then consider a referral to lbs or under for males: 5'0 and 118 lbs or Psychology Services. Please take under for females). institution security and missions into account in deciding to make the referral Developmental/mental/medical disability. (e.g., older inmates with disability may if apparent or identified as SCRN4-MH, not need to be referred at a medical SCRN3-MH CARE4-MH, CARE3-MH, facility). SCRN4, SCRN3, CARE4, CARE 3. Inmate is or may be perceived to be gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, interest, or gender-nonconforming, based on documentation received (e.g., PSR), or correctional judgment would indicate the inmate would have issues being placed in general population. Criminal history Inmate has not previously been Criminal history should be evaluated: from available incarcerated. however, the existence of only one of documentation these factors alone may not warrant a Inmate's criminal history is exclusively referral to Psychology Services based on nonviolent. the security level of the institution and mission of the facility (e.g., SOMP sites). Inmate has prior convictions for sex offenses against an adult or child. Inmate is in custody solely under civil immigration detention.RISK OF ABUSIVENESS Documented history Inmate prior acts of sexual abuse. Referral to Psychology Services should be of abusiveness, made if inmate previously perpetrated from available Inmate has prior convictions for violent sexual abuse in community or in an documentation (PSR, offenses. institutional setting. Staff must notify incident reports, etc.) Correctional Services of the inmate's Inmate has history of prior institutional history of predation to ensure that violence or sexual abuse. appropriate steps (investigation, documentation. CIMS concerns, etc.) have been taken. The Chief of Correctional Services also updates a current SENTRY STG assignment.
According to Mr. Wise, PREA achieved three main objectives: (1) it eases reporting of issues by inmates and by staff and protects them when they do report; (2) it helps codify and ensure the identification of vulnerable inmates; and (3) it requires a substantial amount of reporting and recordkeeping, to "identify what is going on there and what may be causing sexual
The parties and experts agree that, although the BOP has made progress in addressing physical and sexual abuse in its facilities, the problem is far from being solved. See, e.g., Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem. at 30 ("The defendant points out in his brief that, by certain measures, the rate of sexual assault in prison has not dropped since the imposition of PREA. This is true.") (emphasis added); id. at 42 (noting that the collection of data mandated by PREA "clearly indicate[s] that sexual assault persists as a problem in the prison context to a certain degree").
Sexual assaults in prisons, including staff abuse of inmates, continue to be a reality. Ms. Rodman acknowledged as much:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 179:20-180:02 and 193:01-02 (emphasis added); see also Br. of Amici Curiae Lambda Legal, NCLR, NCTE, and SRLP, in Supp. of Def., Mar. 10, 2016, ECF No. 134 at 17 (noting that PREA's goals are "significantly unfulfilled, and abuse of vulnerable prisoners persists").
The Department of Justice's Bureau of Statistics noted that, comparing data from 2011 and 2012 to previous years, the rate of sexual victimization had not changed in a statistically significant way:
Def.'s Ex. NN (PREA Data from Bureau of Justice Statistics (2014)) at 3 (emphasis added). A further breakdown of the data is included in the table below:
Def.'s Ex. H (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sexual Victimization in Prisons and Jails Reported by Inmates, 2011-12 (May 2013)) at 10.
PREA's impact is also limited in that it only relates to sexual assaults; it does not cover other types of harm or physical abuse. Ms. Rodman testified:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 180:07-181:03; see also id. at 102:03-08 (Mr. Wise testified that while PREA helps, it only deals with sexual assaults; most assaults that occur in the BOP are not sexual).
The experts recognized that some inmates are more vulnerable than others and will have a particularly hard time adjusting to incarceration. As acknowledged by the BOP, several factors render an inmate especially susceptible to abuse while in prison. They include being perceived as gay, having been a victim of sexual abuse in the past, suffering from mental illness, and being a known sex offender, particularly against children. See, e.g., Def.'s Ex. R (PREA Program Statement) at § 115.41(d). An individual with any one of these characteristics is considered especially vulnerable to physical or sexual assault while incarcerated.
This is confirmed by the data in the table below, from the Bureau of Justice Statistics' 2011-2012 National Inmate Survey.
Def.'s Ex. H (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sexual Victimization in Prisons and Jails Reported by Inmates, 2011-12 (May 2013)) at 18.
D.W. possesses nearly every factor of vulnerability identified by the BOP as well as the experts in the instant case. He is young, identifies as gay or bisexual, suffers from mental illness, has experienced repeated sexual abuse in the past, and is a convicted sex offender of children. The experts agree that his potential for victimization is compounded. Mr. Wise explained:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 35:14-20 (emphasis added). Mr. Trate agreed that defendant's characteristics make him particularly susceptible to abuse while in prison:
Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 112:09-113:08 (emphasis added).
Mr. Wise testified that other inmates would have no difficulty in finding out details about D.W., including the fact that he had been on suicide watch at the MDC, his prior incident reports, and the nature of his offense:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 72:02-19. He explained that with this information readily available to the prison population it would be easy for some inmates to recognize and exploit defendant's vulnerabilities:
Id. at 39:02-06.
This inmate focus would greatly increase D.W.'s risk of being assaulted. According to Mr. Wise, D.W. would likely face pressures from other prisoners to "check in" — meaning get out of the general population and into protective custody. See infra Part IV.B (describing the BOP's use of segregated housing, including protective custody). The pressure could take the form of veiled threats or outright assault:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 75:05-76:04.
The factors that make defendant uniquely susceptible to sexual and physical abuse in prison are individually analyzed below. According to amici, due to defendant's combination of vulnerabilities, "a sentence of 15 years is a sentence to a decade and a half of torture and abuse." See Br. of Amici Curiae Lambda Legal, NCLR, NCTE, and SRLP, in Supp. of Def., Mar. 10, 2016, ECF No. 134 at 16.
The fact that D.W. was previously raped, both while in State custody and in foster care, places him at greater risk of sexual victimization in prison. According to Mr. Wise, the same factors that had rendered him a target in the past are likely to lead to abuse in the future:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 38:14-39:02 (emphasis added).
Amicus Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs explained that having been previously sexually victimized renders prisoners more vulnerable to abuse:
WLC Amicus Curiae Mem. at 14 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
The data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics shows that for the 2011-2012 period,
The fact that D.W. identifies and is identifiable as gay or bisexual makes him more attractive to sexual predators. According to Mr. Wise, D.W.'s actual or perceived sexual orientation may be "misinterpreted as a message that he might be interested in sexual activity in prison." Id. at 36:03-06. The government recognized that gay inmates are at greater risk of assault. See Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem. at 41-42 ("[A]ccording to studies done by the Department of Justice, the rates of assault of gay inmates are higher than those of heterosexual inmates.").
In its 2009 report, the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission stressed the vulnerability of LGBT inmates in prison due to, among other reasons, the existence of strict gender stereotypes and the risk that their consent to sexual activity may be presumed by officials:
See National Prison Rape Elimination Commission Report (June 2009) at 73 (emphasis added). Despite the passage of PREA, the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates that nonheterosexual inmates continue to experience greater rates of abuse:
Def.'s Ex. TT (PREA Data from Bureau of Justice Statistics (2013)) at 2 (emphasis added). According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics 2011-2012 survey, non-heterosexual inmates in "each demographic subgroup (sex, race or Hispanic origin, age and education) ... reported higher rates of
Individuals suffering from mental illness have been found to be at greater risk of sexual assault than other prisoners. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, for the year 2011-2012 inmates suffering from mental illnesses reported higher rates of sexual victimization:
Def.'s Ex. TT (PREA Data from Bureau of Justice Statistics (2013)) at 2.
LGBT prisoners suffering from mental illness were, in turn, more likely to be victimized by other inmates. The Bureau of Justice Statistics found that, "[a]mong inmates with serious psychological distress, non-heterosexual inmates reported the highest rates of inmate-on-inmate sexual victimization." Def.'s Ex. H (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sexual Victimization in Prisons and Jails Reported by Inmates, 2011-12 (May 2013)) at 7 (emphasis added).
Mr. Wise testified that individuals such as D.W. suffering from bipolar disorder can face special difficulties if they do not take prescribed medications. He explained that an inmate may not receive his required pharmaceuticals for a variety of reasons, including unavailability during transfer between housing units and because of the high pressures experienced by medical staff in critically overcrowded BOP facilities:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 42:15-43:11.
In D.W.'s case, Mr. Wise explained, if D.W. were to not receive Depakote, the medication he is currently prescribed, he would "revert to the symptoms" of bipolar disorder. Id. at 43:17-21. This, in turn, may make him more susceptible to abuse or to confinement in segregated housing; other inmates may become irritated with his behavior, which may also give rise to incident reports:
Id. at 41:20-42:14 (emphasis added); cf. Human Rights Watch, Callous and Cruel: Use of Force Against Inmates with Mental Disabilities in U.S. Jails and Prisons (May 12, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/12/callous-and-cruel/use-force-against-inmates-mental-disabilities-us-jails-and (recounting the use of force by prison staff against prisoners with mental disabilities such as bipolar disorder, often in response to behavior symptomatic of the prisoners' mental health problems); Plata, 563 U.S. at 519, 131 S.Ct. 1910 (in the context of suits brought by mentally ill California prisoners challenging their conditions of confinement, the Supreme Court determined that the "shortfall of [medical] resources relative to demand contributes to significant delays in treatment. Mentally ill prisoners are housed in administrative segregation while awaiting transfer to scarce mental health treatment beds for appropriate care. One correctional officer indicated that he had kept mentally ill prisoners in segregation for 6 months or more. Other prisoners awaiting care are held in tiny, phone-booth sized cages. The record documents instances of prisoners committing suicide while awaiting treatment.") (quotation marks and citations omitted); Eyal Press, Madness, New Yorker, May 2, 2016 (describing the severe physical and sexual abuse suffered by mentally ill inmates at Florida's Dade Correctional Institution, as well as the improper use of solitary confinement, and the pressures on inmates and medical staff not to report incidents of violence).
As a person convicted of a sex offense involving children, D.W. is particularly vulnerable to attack by other inmates. The literature suggests that such sex offenders are at the bottom of the "prison hierarchy" and susceptible to both physical and sexual abuse from staff and inmates:
Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 Colum. J. Gender & L. 139, 159-60 (2006) (footnotes omitted); James E. Robertson, A Clean Heart and an Empty Head: The Supreme Court and Sexual Terrorism in Prison, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 433, 461-62 (2003) (stating that "[s]ex offenders, especially those convicted of victimizing children, ... represent an anathema in inmate subculture" where "norms call for their savage beating") (footnotes omitted); see also WLC Amicus Curiae Mem. at 15-16.
Not unusual are instances of child pornography offenders being brutally beaten — even killed — in prison. See, e.g., Def.'s Ex. O (Federal Tort Claim Notice, Dec. 26, 2013) (detailing the ferocious beating and killing of an elderly inmate convicted of viewing child pornography; he was attacked and murdered while in a transfer cell waiting to be moved to a different facility because of concerns with his safety); Emily Horowitz, Growing Media and Legal Attention to Sex Offenders: More Safety or More Injustice? 2007 J. Inst. Just. Int'l Stud. 143, 155-56 (2007) ("Sex offenders are aware that being a murderer is a much less threatening and offensive crime among prison populations. In a Massachusetts prison in 2003, defrocked priest John. J. Geoghan, an elderly convicted child molester, was beaten to death by another inmate while in protective custody.") (citations omitted).
Mr. Wise agreed that convicted sex offenders are more susceptible to abuse while incarcerated. He testified that other inmates would "try to get that offender off the compound, out of the general population." Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 37:06-08. For example, D.W. could be approached by other inmates and told to get himself off the compound. Id. at 37:12-17. To do so, D.W. would likely have to seek protective custody or otherwise try to get assigned to the prison's restrictive housing unit. Other ways inmates may try to get an offender "off the compound" include veiled or overt threats of physical violence, or an "actual assault." Id. at 37:18-21. The expert explained:
Id. at 37:24-38:05. Mr. Wise told the court that certain gangs present in medium or high security facilities, such as the Aryan Brotherhood, "have a code that they absolutely do not tolerate child molesters or people that are sexually involved with kids and they will drive them off the compound for assault." Id. at 81:22-82:01.
The government's expert, Mr. Trate, acknowledged that there is a minority of sex offenders who cannot adjust to life in the general population and may be more vulnerable to sexual and other types of assaults while incarcerated:
Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 104:07-15, 105:06-19.
"Solitary confinement, generally speaking, is the practice of socially isolating a prisoner from the general inmate population and depriving him or her of most environmental stimuli." Peoples v. Annucci, No. 11-CV-2694, 180 F.Supp.3d 294, 298, 2016 WL 1464613, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2016). It has long been used as a form of punishment. Prisoner isolation is also adopted in response to safety concerns; inmates who are at risk of harm are segregated from the general population for their own protection. Even though non-punitive, inmates in "protective custody" — as this form of isolation is known — experience the same deprivations as prisoners separated for punitive purposes.
The problem of sexual and physical abuse in prison and the overuse of solitary confinement go hand in hand: often, the only means of protection available to vulnerable inmates is separation from the general population. Recently, the government has recognized the need to reduce both the prevalence of sexual abuse in BOP facilities and the use of restrictive housing to protect vulnerable inmates. As accurately stated by the government in its post-hearing brief:
Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem. at 22 (emphasis added).
Despite the passage and implementation of PREA setting limits on the use of solitary confinement, in the summer of 2015
Barack Obama, Opinion, Why We Must Rethink Solitary Confinement, Wash. Post (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barack-obama-why-we-must-rethink-solitary-confinement/2016/01/25/29a361f2-c384-11e5-8965-0607e0e265ce_story.html.
In its report, the Department of Justice recognized that segregated housing continues to be necessary, especially as a protective tool: "[a]fter extensive study, we have concluded that there are occasions when correctional officials have no choice but to segregate inmates from the general population, typically when it is the only way to ensure the safety of inmates, staff and the public." Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 702 (Dep't of Justice, Executive Summary, Report and Recommendations Concerning the Use of Restrictive Housing (2016)) at 1 (emphasis added). The report included a series of recommendations to limit the use of restrictive housing, which were adopted by the President. See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Department of Justice Review of Solitary Confinement (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/25/fact-sheet-department-justice-review-solitary-confinement.
An overview of the use of solitary confinement in BOP facilities is provided below. It distinguishes between punitive and administrative detention, explains the use of segregation for protective purposes, and addresses the likelihood that vulnerable inmates like D.W. will be trapped in a long-term cycle of punitive and non-punitive isolation.
For purposes of this memorandum, the terms "solitary confinement," "restrictive housing," "special housing" and "segregated housing" are used interchangeably to mean the following type of detention, as defined by the Department of Justice:
Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 702 (Dep't of Justice, Executive Summary, Report and Recommendations Concerning the Use of Restrictive Housing (2016)) at 2.
The BOP Program Statement on Special Housing Units ("SHU Program Statement") defines Special Housing Units as follows:
Def.'s Ex. SS (BOP Program Statement, Special Housing Units (July 29, 2011) ("SHU Program Statement")) at § 541.21. SHUs are the most common type of segregated housing in the federal prison system, used in 109 out of the 122 BOP facilities. See WLC Amicus Curiae Mem. at 12; U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-13-429, Report to Congressional Requesters, Bureau of Prisons: Improvements Needed in Bureau of Prisons' Monitoring and Evaluation of Impact of Segregated Housing (2013) ("GAO Report") at 59.
Inmates placed in the SHU are either in disciplinary segregation status or administrative detention status. While only the former is considered to be punitive, the conditions of confinement in the SHU are often the same. See WLC Amicus Curiae Mem. at 6 (citation omitted).
Disciplinary segregation is "a punitive status imposed only by a Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO) as a sanction for committing a prohibited act(s)." Def.'s Ex. SS (SHU Program Statement) at § 541.22(b) (emphasis added). An inmate may be released from disciplinary segregation "after satisfying the sanction imposed by the DHO." Id. at § 541.33(b). As explained by Mr. Trate:
Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 20:06-16 (emphasis added).
Administrative detention, a form of segregated housing, is described as "non-punitive":
Def.'s Ex. SS (SHU Program Statement) at § 541.22(a) (emphasis added).
Generally, an inmate may be placed in administrative detention pending classification, transfer to a different facility, an investigation into a possible violation, or if there is a need to remove him or her from the general population for security reasons. The SHU Program Statement explains these categories as follows:
Def.'s Ex. SS (SHU Program Statement) at § 541.23; see also Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 19:19-20:03 (Testimony of Mr. Trate).
Upon the removal of an inmate from the general population, correction staff are required to fill out a form known as an Administrative Detention Order ("ADO"). This form is used to classify and track inmates placed in segregated housing for non-punitive purposes. See Hr'g Tr., Feb. 03, 2016, at 12:19-14:08; Gov't Ex. 601 (BOP Administrative Detention Order Form). As explained by Mr. Trate, individuals housed in the SHU in administrative detention may be classified as follows:
Administrative detention includes the placement of inmates in segregated housing for purposes of protection ("protective custody"). An inmate may request admission for his or her own safety. Although technically considered "non-punitive," the conditions of confinement in protective custody are essentially the same as those applicable to inmates in disciplinary segregation. See, e.g., WLC Amicus Curiae Mem. at 6-8. Mr. Wise explained:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 82:18-83:02 (emphasis added); see also Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 57:10-24 (Mr. Trate testifying that even within the administrative detention category, the living conditions are essentially the same, regardless of whether an inmate is being separated on a protective custody basis).
Segregation from general population based on protective grounds may be either voluntary — i.e., at the inmate's request — or involuntary, based on the risk assessment of staff. As explained by Ms. Rodman:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 170:07-12 (emphasis added).
According to the BOP's SHU Program Statement, an inmate may be placed in segregated housing for protective purposes in the following circumstances:
Def.'s Ex. SS (SHU Program Statement) at § 541.27.
PREA limits the use of involuntary protective custody to separate potentially vulnerable inmates from likely sexual abusers. PREA is only concerned with sexual abuse; it does not address other types of
Def.'s Ex. R (PREA Program Statement) at § 115.43 (emphasis added).
Form BP-A1002, titled "Safeguarding of Inmates Alleging Sexual Abuse/Assault Allegation" provides that: "[p]lacing an inmate in protective custody or transferring the inmate to another federal, state, or local correctional facility remain viable options to safeguard an inmate. However, staff must first consider other alternatives based on the circumstances of the allegation." Gov't Ex. 301 (Safeguarding of Inmates Alleging Sexual Abuse/Assault Allegation
While PREA restricts the amount of time an inmate can be held involuntarily in protective custody, it does not address voluntary protective custody. See id. at 88:03-07 and 89:16-18 (Testimony of Mr. Wise); see also Def.'s Ex. R (PREA Program Statement); Gov't Ex. 301 (Safeguarding of Inmates Alleging Sexual Abuse/Assault Allegation Form). Ms. Rodman acknowledged that voluntary protective custody is more common than forced segregation for at-risk inmates:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 175:24-176:03. She further explained that inmates generally seek protective custody in response to a threat:
Id. at 176:04-10.
As stated by Ms. Rodman, following an inmate's placement in the SHU for protective purposes, an investigation will take place in order to verify the reasons for the placement:
Id. at 176:11-20; see also Def.'s Ex. SS (SHU Program Statement) at § 541.28.
In the event that the threat is verified, the inmate may either "remain in the SHU or be transferred to another institution where [his or her] status as a protection case may not be necessary, at the Warden's discretion." Def.'s Ex. SS (SHU Program Statement) at § 541.29. As explained by both Ms. Rodman and Mr. Trate, in cases of verified threats, either the victim or the aggressor may be transferred to a different facility or housing unit:
See Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 37:06-13 (Testimony of Mr. Trate); see also Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 177:03-05 (Ms. Rodman testifying that, in instances concerning threats to specific persons, the BOP would sometimes deal with the aggressor rather than the victim).
Pending transfer, an inmate may stay in the SHU — his or her designation at this point is likely to change "from protective custody status over to pending transfer [status]":
Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 23:20-24:04 (Testimony of Mr. Trate) (emphasis added).
In the event that, following an investigation, the threat is unverified — i.e., the correctional staff are unable to determine whether the threat is well-founded — the inmate would be returned to the general population. See Def.'s Ex. SS (SHU Program Statement) at § 541.30; Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 23:18-20 (Mr. Trate testifying that "[i]f it's [an] unverified threat, then, at that point, we would ask the inmate to return to general population"). "Unverified" does not necessarily mean that the threat does not exist — just that staff were unable to validate it.
In 2014, CNA, a non-profit research organization, carried out a comprehensive audit of the BOP's use of segregated housing. See Def.'s Ex. J (CNA Analysis and Solutions, Federal Bureau of Prisons: Special Housing Unit Review and Assessment (2014) ("CNA Audit")) at i (explaining that the "report provides an independent, comprehensive review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' operation of restrictive housing and identifies potential operational and policy improvements"). The CNA Audit is based on data collected during visits to the BOP's restrictive housing units carried out between November 2013 and May 2014. See id. It was found that a "significant portion" of inmates had "legitimate protection needs":
Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
If, after a threat has been deemed unverified, the inmate refuses to return to the general population, he or she "may be
Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 91:09-19 (emphasis added).
An inmate may go from being housed in the SHU on an administrative basis, because of his or her alleged need for protection, to being there on a disciplinary — and punitive — basis, due to the inmate's refusal to return to the general population when the threat remains "unverified" following staff investigation. This process could repeat itself, potentially exposing the inmate to long stints in solitary confinement:
Id. at 64:12-65:04 (Testimony of Mr. Trate) (emphasis added).
The receipt of multiple disciplinary sanctions could increase an inmate's security profile and cause him to be re-classified as a high security inmate. This could lead to transfer to a different facility, likely of a higher security — and greater risk — level:
Id. at 66:10-22 (emphasis added).
As noted by amicus Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, D.W. is likely to be particularly vulnerable to this cycle, leading to prolonged stays in solitary confinement:
WLC Amicus Curiae Mem. at 28-29 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
The CNA Audit pointed out that most inmates in the SHU are being held "for investigation or protective custody" purposes, rather than on disciplinary grounds. Their experience is equivalent:
Def.'s Ex. J (CNA Audit) at 219 (emphasis added). The Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs provided further details on the highly restrictive conditions of confinement experienced by inmates held in protective custody:
WLC Amicus Curiae Mem. at 6-8 (footnotes omitted).
The BOP's SHU Program Statement recognizes that, in disciplinary segregation status, "participation in programming activities, e.g., educational programs, may be suspended." Def.'s Ex. SS (SHU Program Statement) at § 541.31(n). With respect to administrative segregation, the statement provides that inmates "will have access to programming activities to the extent safety, security, orderly operation of a correctional facility, or public safety are not jeopardized." Id. (emphasis added). In practice, access to programming is severely limited, even though segregation in such instances is supposed to be non-punitive. As explained by Mr. Wise:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 84:12-85:04.
While the PREA guidelines provide that inmates placed in the SHU for purposes of protective custody "shall have access to programs, privileges, education, and work opportunities to the extent possible," Mr. Wise testified that access to such programs and privileges is in fact restricted:
Id. at 98:14-18 (emphasis added); Def.'s Ex. R (PREA Program Statement) at § 115.43(b).
This testimony is confirmed by the CNA Audit. One of the "key findings" in its December 2014 report is that "[t]he Bureau does not have adequate non-punitive protective custody housing units that have equivalent levels of programs and privileges as general population inmates." Def.'s Ex. J (CNA Audit) at iv (emphasis added). As explained by the CNA:
Id. at 83 (emphasis added); see also id. at 217-18.
The Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs concluded that:
WLC Amicus Curiae Mem. at 21 (emphasis added).
According to the CNA Audit, "[t]he application of the same security and operational restrictions to the protective custody population as to others in administrative segregation is contrary to nationally accepted practices." Def.'s Ex. J (CNA Audit) at 83 (emphasis added).
The BOP tracks the total number of people housed in the SHU on any given day. What its system does not track, however, is how long a particular inmate has spent in the SHU and whether he was reclassified — for example, from protective custody to pending investigation to disciplinary segregation — throughout his stay in the SHU.
When placed in administrative detention, except in instances where the inmate is pending classification or in holdover status, the individual will receive a copy of the ADO with the reasons for the placement:
Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 14:19-24 (Testimony of Mr. Trate); see also Def.'s Ex. SS (SHU Program Statement) at § 541.25(a).
Once the form is filled out, the information is then "keyed into the system" and is collected through the "SHU Application Dashboard Report." Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 16:03-17:01 (Testimony of Mr. Trate); see also Gov't Exs. 602-607 (SHU Application Dashboard Reports).
As noted by the Department of Justice, "[t]here are ... limitations to the data collected by the SHU Application. At present, the SHU Application can only provide a `snapshot' of all inmates in [the] SHU at a particular moment; it cannot track information about individual inmates." Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 702 (Dep't of Justice, Executive Summary, Report and Recommendations Concerning the Use of Restrictive Housing (2016)) at 9. Specifically, the Dashboard Reports do not reflect the fact that the same individual could (1) potentially fit into more than one category; and (2) be re-classified without actually leaving the SHU. As acknowledged by Mr. Trate:
Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 97:20-98:12 (emphasis added).
For example, an inmate in protective custody could be re-classified and remain in the SHU under the category "pending investigation BOP violation" if he receives incident reports while in the SHU. See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. at 47; Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 57:25-59:17 (Testimony of Mr. Trate). In such an instance, the Dashboard would show a decrease in the protective custody numbers, and an increase in the pending investigation ones. It would not show that the same individual is still being held in solitary confinement under a different classification. As explained by defendant's counsel:
Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. at 51 (citing Def.'s Ex. ZZ (SHU Data: Nov. 10, 2015-Jan. 29, 2016) and Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 89:02-90:17 (Testimony of Mr. Trate)).
Similarly, an inmate previously in protective custody and who the BOP has chosen to transfer to a different facility would be re-classified to a "Pending Transfer/Holdover" status category. See Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem. at 28 (stating that "it is not possible to determine the exact number of individuals that are currently in protective custody").
The Dashboard Reports are also limited by the fact that they only track inmates who have been in the SHU for periods longer "than 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, 6 months or 364 days in one [single] stretch." See Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. at 52 (emphasis added). The Dashboards do not track the total amount of time individuals who enter and leave the SHU spend in segregated housing. See Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 80:15-81:24 (Testimony of Mr. Trate); Def.'s Ex. CCC (Dep't of Justice, Final Report, Report and Recommendations Concerning the Use of Restrictive Housing (2016) ("2016 DOJ Report")) at 31 (noting that "it is impossible to tell how long a particular inmate has been housed in segregation") (emphasis added). As emphasized by the Department of Justice in its 2016 report, the Dashboards do not track how long an individual inmate has been housed in the SHU, the number of times that inmate has returned, or if that inmate's SHU status has changed over time from, for example, protective custody to disciplinary segregation. See Def.'s Ex. CCC (2016 DOJ Report) at 31; see also WLC Amicus Curiae Mem. at 8-9.
Despite the considerable attention that has been given to the use and overuse of solitary confinement, few alternatives exist for at-risk inmates, especially if they are convicted sex offenders. This underscores the seriousness of the problem and the difficulties in addressing D.W.'s situation.
In 2014, the CNA concluded its review of the use of restrictive housing in BOP facilities by recommending that the Bureau "[e]xpand housing alternatives for inmates in verified protective custody status that have levels of programs and privileges that are equivalent to those for general population inmates." Def.'s Ex. J (CNA Audit) at 85. The BOP agreed, although it noted that it was constrained in its efforts by limited resources:
Federal Bureau of Prisons, Special Housing Unit Review and Assessment Report Response: Response to Report by CNA Analysis and Solutions 2 (2015) ("BOP Response to CNA Audit"), https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/pdfs/CNA_Response-V05a-saa.pdf (emphasis added).
Since then, the BOP has been working on developing alternatives to protective custody. For example, Mr. Trate explained that the BOP is in the process of developing and expanding Reintegration Housing Units ("RHUs"):
Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 37:22-38:11. Mr. Trate identified RHUs as a viable alternative for inmates who have difficulty leaving protective custody and joining the general population:
Id. at 91:21-92:04.
Little progress has been made in the development of RHUs since the CNA Audit of 2014. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 125:04-12 (Mr. Trate testifying that the BOP is currently in the process of "[i]dentifying sites that are appropriate and in the planning phases, to look at sites in order to potentially expand [RHUs], you know, to three to five facilities throughout our various facilities across the country"); id. at 128:20-25 (confirming that the existing RHU has a limited number of beds which was recently decreased further). Two years after the CNA Audit, in 2016, the Department of Justice recommended that the BOP "expand its RHU program, with the goal of eventually housing all inmates with a verified need for protective custody who cannot be housed in any other Bureau facilities." Def.'s Ex. CCC (2016 DOJ Report) at 111.
Importantly, for present purposes, RHUs are not currently available to convicted sex offenders. Def.'s Ex. J (CNA Audit) at 84 ("Those whose sex offender classification is the basis for placement in SHU will ordinarily not be assigned to the RHU."); see also Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 129:08-20; Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem. at 26, n.9.
Were D.W. threatened or assaulted in prison he would likely be placed in an SHU in protective custody, at least until the conclusion of an investigation regarding the nature of the threat. Mr. Trate acknowledged that, although in his experience the majority of sex offenders manage to adjust to the general population, there is a minority that is unable to do so:
Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 104:07-15; see also id. at 114:15-115:10 (Q. And so there is a minority of sex offenders who were not able to program in the general population, and so you do your best, but there are some inmates who are especially vulnerable and need that protection? A. Yes.") (emphasis added).
These inmates are likely to spend longer periods of time in the SHU, in both administrative
Hr'g Tr., Feb. 3, 2016, ECF No. 158, at 120:04-19.
Eventually, if either the security threat to the inmate is verified or the inmate persistently refuses to leave the SHU because of fear of harm, the correctional staff is left with the possibility of transferring the inmate. One option would be to transfer the at-risk or challenging inmates out of protective custody and into a different general population housing unit within the same facility. For example, Ms. Rodman testified:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 176:21-177:12; see also id. at 88:08-15 (Testimony of Mr. Wise) (explaining that "if the threat comes with one specific inmate and it's not an overt threat, it's a general sort of thing, you may try and move him to a different part of the institution or his housing area...").
Yet, in practice, such options to cut short protective custody are likely to be limited:
Id. at 85:10-85:22 (emphasis added); see also id. at 82:18-85:09; Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. at 40 (stating that while the BOP will often "attempt to separate the person [that needs protection] from the inmate or inmates who are a danger to them," in defendant's case "the threat comes from all sides. It is not a problem with a specific inmate; it is a problem with the nature of prison hierarchies, which PREA did not alter.") (emphasis added).
Ultimately, an inmate who faces a verified threat or who refuses to leave protective custody is likely to be transferred to a different facility. If the inmate was disciplined for failing to leave the SHU, his security level might have increased, and he might be re-designated to a higher security — and a more dangerous — facility. Even if transferred, the issues that rendered an inmate vulnerable to abuse and exposed to prolonged periods in the SHU are likely to follow him to the next facility. As explained by Mr. Wise:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 99:07-17 (emphasis added).
Mary E. Buser, Lockdown on Rikers: Shocking Stories of Abuse and Injustice at New York's Notorious Jail viii (2015).
As recently stated by Judge Shira Scheindlin in her seminal decision approving a class-action settlement reducing the
Peoples, 180 F.Supp.3d at 299, 2016 WL 1464613 at *3 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted). While this finding is limited to supermax prisons, the effects of being housed in the SHUs of medium and high security prisons is probably much the same.
Research has demonstrated that time served in solitary confinement can lead to serious mental illness in healthy individuals. It significantly exacerbates the condition of those already suffering from emotional instabilities. Dr. Stuart Grassian, a Board Certified Psychiatrist with extensive experience in evaluating the psychiatric effects of solitary confinement, explained that incarceration in solitary can cause either "severe exacerbation or recurrence of preexisting illness, or the appearance of an acute mental illness in individuals who had previously been free of any such illness." Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 325, 333 (2006) ("Grassian"); see also Alex Kozinski, Worse than Death, 125 Yale L.J.F. 230 (2016).
Dr. Grassian described how deprivation of external stimuli causes the onset of a phenomenon known as the "SHU Syndrome":
Grassian at 330-31 (emphasis added).
He explained that the absence of external stimuli experienced in solitary confinement can cause an impairment of alertness leading to an inability to focus, a dissociative stupor known as a mental "fog," and an incapacity to shift attention, which can cause obsessional preoccupations:
Id. at 331-332 (emphasis added).
Specifically, Dr. Grassian found that long-term solitary confinement often leads to an "acute organic brain syndrome — a delirium," the symptoms of which include: (a) hyper-responsivity to external stimuli; (b) perceptual distortions, illusions, and hallucinations; (c) panic attacks; (d) difficulties with thinking, concentration, and memory; (e) intrusive obsessional thoughts, including the emergence of primitive aggressive ruminations; (f) overt paranoia; and (g) problems with impulse control. See id. at 334-38.
While individuals with stronger cognitive functioning are likely to be less affected, anyone serving time in solitary confinement "will still experience a degree of stupor, difficulties with thinking and concentration, obsessional thinking, agitation, irritability, and difficulty tolerating external stimuli (especially noxious stimuli)," with many people suffering permanent harm as a result. Id. at 332.
Dr. Craig Haney, a psychologist and professor at the University of California-Santa Cruz, similarly concluded that "there is not a single published study of solitary or supermax-like confinement in which nonvoluntary confinement lasting for longer than 10 days, where participants were unable to terminate their isolation at will, that failed to result in negative psychological effects." Craig W. Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and "Supermax" Confinement, 49 Crime & Delinq. 124, 132 (2003) ("Haney").
Anecdotal evidence supports the notion that very few are able to endure solitary confinement without suffering severe adverse mental effects. Albert Woodfox, a former inmate in Louisiana State prisons, spent 43 years in solitary confinement. He reported suffering "such intense claustrophobia that every time he lay down he felt he was being smothered. So he took to leaning his mattress against the wall, wrapping himself in a blanket and sleeping sitting up." Ed Pilkington, Albert Woodfox Speaks after 43 Years in Solitary Confinement: `I Would Not Let Them Drive Me Insane,' Guardian (Feb. 20, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/20/albert-woodfox-angola-3-first-interview-trump-confinement. He recalled that
Id.
In January 2013, Rick Raemisch, the then recently-appointed Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, volunteered to spend a night in solitary confinement. See Rick Raemisch, Opinion, My Night in Solitary, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 2014, at A25. A man with no history of mental illness, Mr. Raemisch found that the "[f]irst thing you notice is that it's anything but quiet. You're immersed in a drone of garbled noise ... I couldn't make sense of any of it, and was left feeling twitchy and paranoid.... For a sound mind, those are daunting circumstances." Id. After he had been locked in a seven-by-thirteen foot cell for about sixteen hours, furnished with only a metal bed, toilet, and sink all screwed to the floor, he broke a promise he made to himself and asked a staff member for the time. What had been only sixteen hours felt like days. Mr. Raemisch recalled that "I felt as if I'd been there for days. I sat with my
Such deleterious psychological effects are likely to be present in individuals who experience solitary confinement for protective purposes; they experience the same extreme isolation as people being separated on a disciplinary basis. See, e.g., Haney at 135; Stanley L. Brodsky & Forrest R. Scogin, Inmates in Protective Custody: First Data on Emotional Effects, 1 Forensic Reports 267 (1988).
Reliable studies show that inmates with pre-existing mental illnesses are likely to suffer the most severe consequences from isolation. The American Psychiatric Association, the American Public Health Association, the National Alliance on Mental Illness, the Society of Correctional Physicians, and Mental Health America, have all issued formal policy statements opposing the use of solitary confinement, especially with regard to mentally ill inmates. See Peoples, 180 F.Supp.3d at 298-99, 2016 WL 1464613 at *3; Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Position Statement on Segregation of Prisoners with Mental Illness (2012); Am. Pub. Health Ass'n, Policy Statement No. 201310, Solitary Confinement as a Public Health Issue (2013); Nat'l All. on Mental Illness, Public Policy Platform ¶ 9.8 (11th ed. 2015); Soc'y of Corr. Physicians, Position Statement: Restricted Housing of Mentally Ill Inmates (2013); Mental Health Am., Position Statement 24: Seclusion and Restraints (2011). As explained by Dr. Grassian, "in a situation of restricted environmental stimulation, preexisting central nervous system dysfunction is a major predisposing factor to the development of adverse psychiatric reactions and of overt delirium." Grassian at 348.
Individuals suffering from ADHD, such as D.W., are likely to be "associated with a particular inability to tolerate restricted environmental stimulation." Id. at 350. According to Dr. Grassian "[t]hose most severely affected are often individuals with evidence of subtle neurological or attention deficit disorder, or with some other vulnerability." Id. at 332 (emphasis added); see also Herbert C. Quay, Psychopathic Personality as Pathological Stimulation-Seeking, 122 Am. J. Psychiatry 180, 180 (1965). Vulnerable individuals such as these, "suffer from states of florid psychotic delirium, marked by severe hallucinatory confusion, disorientation, and even incoherence, and by intense agitation and paranoia." Grassian at 332. Dr. Grassian concluded that "individuals with primitive or psychopathic functioning or borderline cognitive capacities, impulse-ridden individuals, and individuals whose internal emotional life is chaotic or fearful are especially at risk for severe psychopathologic reactions to [solitary confinement]." Id. at 348 (footnote omitted).
Similarly, Dr. Craig Haney found that "prisoners with preexisting mental illnesses are at greater risk of having this suffering deepen into something more permanent and disabling," and that those experiencing the greatest risk for further deterioration include "persons who are emotionally unstable, who suffer from clinical depression or other mood disorders, who are developmentally disabled, and those whose contact with reality is already tenuous." Haney at 142 (emphasis added).
The effects of solitary confinement do not end when an individual is released. The harm caused is likely to translate into greater risks for the public when a former inmate is unable to reenter his or her community even somewhat rehabilitated —
Experts point to solitary confinement as a form of "social death," and characterize a post-SHU Syndrome which "can lead to the permanent harm of `a continued intolerance of social interaction' that prevents an inmate from reintegrating into the larger prison population and into society." See Samarth Gupta, From Solitary to Society, Harv. Pol. Rev. (Feb. 7, 2016), http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/solitary-society (emphasis added); see also Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem. at 59.
This continuing effect is likely to intensify the risk of harm to the public posed by a newly released inmate who has served time in solitary confinement:
Christie Thompson, From Solitary to the Street: What Happens When Prisoners Go from Complete Isolation to Complete Freedom in a Day? The Marshall Project & NPR News Investigations (June 11, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/11/from-solitary-to-thestreet#.AvKMQDCnz.
Many of these newly released inmates "suffer from mental illnesses that were either triggered or exacerbated in segregation [and] often cannot participate in the classes or services offered to other inmates approaching their release date.... Those who make the jarring leap from solitary to the streets can easily end up jobless, homeless — or back in prison." Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Expert Report of Terry A. Kupers, M.D., M.S.P., June 16, 2014, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/expert_report_of_terrry_kupers_with_table_of_contents.pdf (evaluating the mental health impact of the conditions of confinement in the segregation units at East Mississippi Correctional Facility)).
D.W. has a documented history of trauma, mental disorders, and depression. He repeatedly attempted suicide. He was diagnosed with ADHD, borderline personality disorder, severe depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. He was prescribed, and continues to take, multiple psychotropic drugs.
Spending substantial time in solitary confinement will severely aggravate D.W.'s already brittle psyche. Such conditions will substantially increase the probability of his death by suicide. At the very least, repeated stays in the SHU will further break the spirit of this highly traumatized person, making D.W.'s readjustment to society upon his eventual release from prison more unlikely, and increasing the risk he poses to the public. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 43:18-44:06 (Testimony of Dr. Krueger).
As testified by the experts, some facilities may be more or less safe for a defendant
Not all BOP facilities provide treatment programs for sex offenders. Currently, some form of sex offender treatment is available at nine BOP institutions. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Custody & Care: Sex Offenders, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/sex_offenders.jsp (last visited July 25, 2016).
One of these institutions is the Federal Medical Center in Devens, Massachusetts ("FMC Devens"). FMC Devens is a federal administrative facility capable of holding inmates in all security categories. Federal Bureau of Prisons, About Our Facilities, https://www.bop.gov/about/facilities/federal_prisons.jsp (last visited July 25, 2016).
Its focus is on housing inmates who require long-term medical or mental health care. The facility's Psychology Services provide specialized treatment, including sex offender treatment, as well as "assessment services, with a goal of enhancing insight, coping skills and overall functioning." Carolyn Rickards Williams, Final PREA Audit Report 3 (June 15, 2016) ("Williams, Final PREA Audit Report"), https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/dev/DEV_prea.pdf. The Psychology Department's pre-doctoral internship program at FMC Devens is accredited by the American Psychological Association; it features two post-doctoral fellowship positions in sex offender management and treatment. Id. Other programs include work, education, and vocational training. Id. Both a Sex Offender Management Program ("SOMP") and a residential Sex Offender Treatment Program ("SOTP-R"), which houses a smaller number of inmates separately from the general population, are offered.
"Because of the unique programming offered at FMC Devens, sex offenders make up approximately 40% of the inmate population." Id. (emphasis added). Inmates with a history of sexual offenses are enrolled in the facility's SOMP automatically. The intensive SOTP-R is instead purely voluntary. Id.
The court visited this institution on December 17, 2010 and studied its sex offender treatment programs. See C.R., 792 F.Supp.2d at 476, 520-24 App. B. There is no evidence that conditions and forms of treatment there have substantially changed.
According to the BOP, SOMPs are offered at designated institutions in order to "assist in the effective management of the Bureau's population of sexual offenders and to provide services that minimize this population's risk for sexual reoffense." BOP Program Statement, Sex Offender Programs, section 1.1 (Feb. 15, 2013), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5324_010.pdf ("Sex Offender Program Statement"). SOMP institutions are primarily concerned with "reduc[ing] the need to place sexual offenders in protective custody, and to create an institution climate conducive to voluntary participation in treatment." Id. at section 1.1.a. (emphasis added). To this end, "SOMP institutions will maintain a significant portion of sexual offenders in the population." Id.
The BOP indicates that "[n]ewly sentenced inmates with a sex offense history may receive initial designation to a SOMP institution to have access to program components available at those facilities." Id. at section 1.2.1. According to the Bureau, "[t]he target population for SOMP is inmates with a history of convictions for
Inmates may be redesignated to a SOMP facility for a number of additional reasons, including if they volunteered for participation in sex offender treatment services. See id. at section 1.2.2. The BOP notes that this category of inmates is a "priority for redesignation at SOMP institutions" and "[i]t is expected that SOMP institutions will accommodate these referrals." Id. Importantly, "[i]nmates with verified protective custody needs due to their sex offense history may be redesignated to SOMP institutions." Id. at section 1.2.3 (emphasis added).
The SOMP at FMC Devens was described by an official there as "a way of managing sex offenders in the general population." C.R., 792 F.Supp.2d at 523, App. B (emphasis added). Participation in the program is not voluntary. It constitutes an alternative to housing individuals in the SHU. Inmates in the SOMP have access to general psychology services and are monitored in a "specialized way" by staff. They are encouraged to join treatment and may be moved into the SOTP-R if they volunteer for the program. Id.
An SOTP-R is a "high-intensity program designed for high-risk sexual offenders." Sex Offender Program Statement at section 3.1. Inmates participating in the program are housed in a separate unit, in order to create a "modified therapeutic community" which prepares them for reentry into the outside world:
Id.; see also id. at section 3.5.5 ("Living together in a unit allows all inmates to work together to create a community that supports pro-social attitudes and behaviors.").
Inmates are prioritized for placement in SOTP-R programs based on their projected release date; they must generally have at least twenty-seven months left in their sentence in order to complete the program. Id. at section 3.3.1.b. Once they complete the program, inmates will be expected to continue treatment upon transfer to a Residential Reentry Center. See id. at section 3.7.1.
FMC Devens offers a voluntary and intensive SOTP-R. The description below of the program is largely derived from the court's visit to the unit in 2010, and the report of that visit published as Appendix B to the memorandum and order issued in the case of United States v. C.R.
Participants in FMC Deven's SOTP-R reside in separate housing in the downstairs section of the facility's G-Unit. Inmates must volunteer in order to participate. The SOTP-R unit includes several staff offices, providing inmates with greater access to staff than they would have in general population. There is a common room that is used for SOTP-R treatment sessions. Half the inmates participate in treatment during the morning and half are treated in the afternoons. Treatment consists of group and individual sessions for
The program takes approximately twenty-seven months from entry to completion. Some inmates can complete treatment in eighteen months if no additional psychological services are needed. Id. at 523, App. B.
An FMC Devens official explained to the court during its 2010 visit that "a 30 month sentence is reasonable to get treatment in the program," if the defendant wishes to volunteer. Id. At the time, there was a waitlist of about 188 inmates, many with long prison sentences. The waitlist is adjusted based on the length of time of the inmate's sentence so that, for example, a prisoner who has a ten-year sentence participates in the SOTP-R during the last few months of his term. A prisoner who has a shorter sentence, for example thirty to sixty months, will be moved to the top of the list so that he does not run out of time to complete the program. Id. The process for admitting a defendant into the SOTP-R at FMC Devens was described to the court as follows:
Id. at 524, App. B.
With respect to the safety of the sex offenders receiving treatment in the prison, the Warden explained that there have been situations where other inmates have alleged that sex offenders "propositioned" them or tried to get magazines that are only available in the general population. There was some concern that general population inmates would make false accusations because they do not like the sex offender treatment inmates. Id. at 523-524, App. B.
When there is a concern for safety, a sex offender inmate may be housed in the K-Unit ("Special Housing"), the facility's solitary confinement unit, while an investigation is conducted into allegations. At the time of this court's visit, none of the facility's officials indicated that there was a substantial probability of abuse of the sex offenders either while in the program or when in the general population. Id.
Following the conclusion of treatment, inmates stay in the unit for a short period of time, the intensity of services is reduced, and they are then transitioned to the general population. After discharge from the program, past participants still have access to medical maintenance services such as group sessions and community meetings. Id. at 524, App. B.
The physical conditions, trained personnel, and facilities observed by the court supported the conclusion that a prisoner with the defendant's characteristics would be much less likely to be attacked or put in solitary confinement if housed at a facility like FMC Devens than if he were in the general population of a medium or high security prison — the probable assignment
A PREA compliance audit of FMC Devens was recently carried out by an out-side agency, the Nakamoto Group Inc. A report, authored in June, was published in July. See generally Williams, Final PREA Audit Report.
The audit, based on a review of relevant files as well as an on-site visit, found the facility in compliance with all applicable PREA standards:
Id. at 4.
The report stated that the federal medical facility is not overcrowded: it had a design capacity of 1,066 inmates and then housed 1,051 people. Id. at 2; see also Federal Bureau of Prisons, FMC Devens, https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/dev/ (last visited July 26, 2016) (reporting that FMC Devens was currently housing 1,031 inmates at the institution's federal medical facility).
The audit found that inmates are almost always screened for risk of victimization and abusiveness the first day of their arrival and then reassessed within thirty days. Williams, Final PREA Audit Report at 12. "Housing and program assignments are made on a case-by-case basis and inmates are not placed in housing units based solely on their sexual identification or status." Id. (emphasis added). Inmates who disclosed prior victimization during the screening process were offered a follow up meeting with a medical or mental health practitioner. Id. at 23. The same applied to all of the inmates who were perpetrators of sexual abuse. Id. The report states that "FMC Devens offers medical and mental health evaluation and as appropriate, treatment to all inmates who have been victimized by sexual abuse." Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
The audit found that "[t]here were 14 allegations of sexual abuse and sexual harassment during the auditing period" — i.e., the past twelve months. Id. at 9. The report specified that "[a]ll 14 allegations resulted in an administrative investigation," and that "[t]here were no administrative findings of inmate-on-inmate sexual abuse" as well as "no cases of staff and inmates engaging in sex during the past 12 months." See id. at 9, 22.
The auditors reviewed the facility's use of involuntary protective custody. FMC Devens has seventy-two SHU cells and thirty locked inpatient cells in its psychiatric unit, which house inmates in both administrative and disciplinary detention. See id. at 13. It was concluded that:
Id.
According to the audit, "[i]interviews with staff and an examination of the facility indicated that there is a viable alternative to the placement of inmates in involuntary segregated housing. Staff consider separate housing of the victim/predator, to include transfer of the inmates." Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
No details were included in the audit as to the use, if any, of voluntary protective custody.
The parties were asked to address the risks posed by defendant to the public. See Order, June 25, 2015, ECF No. 73.
Protection of the public is a matter of vital concern. Defendant is not only guilty of viewing and possessing child pornography. He has also been convicted of the sexual exploitation of a child. Prior to the instant convictions, he was found guilty in New York State court of having molested three children. Although not involving rape or sodomy, his conduct sets him apart from the usual passive child pornography viewers before this court. See, e.g., United States v. E.L., No. 15-CR-137, 188 F.Supp.3d 152, 2016 WL 2939152 (E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2016); R.V., 157 F.Supp.3d 207, 2016 WL 270257.
D.W. also presents some indication of lying to treatment providers and evaluating physicians. He resumed downloading and viewing child pornography while he was undergoing court-ordered treatment following his release from State custody. He lied to Dr. Prentky about his past conduct, although this could have been due to a rational fear of self-incrimination. At the time Dr. Prentky evaluated D.W., the government had not yet learned that he had molested an additional child. Dr. Rosenfeld, the doctor hired by the government to administer an IQ assessment, determined he could not opine about the defendant's mental capabilities other than to note that the defendant's efforts were insincere. See Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 501 (Confidential Psychological Evaluation by Dr. Barry Rosenfeld, Apr. 21, 2014) at 113-18; see also supra Part III.G.3. Defendant also arguably lied to Dr. Krueger when he indicated that he was only interested in adult females. See Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 81:23-82:09.
This section presents the sentencing hearing testimony of the medical experts, Dr. Krueger and Dr. Berrill, concerning defendant's diagnosis, risk assessment, and treatment options. Only Dr. Krueger evaluated defendant on this issue. D.W. declined, on the advice of counsel, to speak with Dr. Berrill. See Gov't Witness List, Nov. 6, 2015, ECF No. 87, at 1; see also supra Part III.G.3 (detailing Dr. Krueger's credentials and the basis for his evaluation of defendant). Dr. Berrill's testimony was based only upon a review of relevant written materials, including the report provided by Dr. Krueger. Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2016, ECF No. 105, at 102:09-104:03.
The experts largely agreed on defendant's overall diagnosis — pedophilia and child pornography addiction — and that he presents a "moderate high to high" risk of sexual re-offense. They also agreed on the most appropriate treatment plan. Their views diverged, however, on D.W.'s amenability to treatment and the most appropriate timing for that treatment.
Following his evaluation, Dr. Krueger concluded that defendant met the criteria
Id.
Dr. Krueger noted that once he was released from State prison, defendant initially resisted his urge to view child pornography. He then relapsed, in part due to "depressed feelings when he stopped caring about himself and which his use of pornography improved." Id.
Dr. Berrill agreed that D.W. suffers from pedophilic disorder and is attracted to young and adolescent boys. He described defendant's relapse into viewing child pornography as evidence of "the compulsive nature of his behavior." He explained:
Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, 107:09-22 (emphasis added).
Dr. Krueger administered several tests aimed at assessing defendant's general risk of "sexual re-offense." Krueger Report at 14-15. He concluded that D.W. presents a "moderate high to high risk" of re-offending. See Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, 17:04-06 (emphasis added).
He explained the test results in his report:
Krueger Report at 14-15. Dr. Berrill agreed that D.W.'s risk of re-offense was high. He referred to defendant's misrepresentations to his treatment providers and described a "compulsive need" to be near children:
Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 115:10-116:16 (emphasis added).
At the evidentiary hearing, the experts were asked to analyze defendant's risk of sexual reoffense by assessing the likelihood of his reengaging in a contact versus a non-contact sexual offense. Dr. Krueger explained that the tests he had administered do not take into account this distinction. See id. at 21:11-16 ("But these particular instruments don't partition the risk for contact and noncontact. They are just sort of a global sense. In fact, most of them have been developed contemplating from contact, from large data sets that involve contact offenses."); cf. C.R., 792 F.Supp.2d at 430-32, 445-60 (discussing issues of bias and other problems in using tests to assess recidivism risk in the case of a defendant not charged with a contact sexual offense); Jed S. Rakoff, Neuroscience and the Law: Don't Rush In, N.Y. Review, May 12, 2016 at 31 ("[I]f there is one thing psychiatrists are not very good at, it is predicting future violence. Indeed, in an amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court in 1980, the American Psychiatric Association reported that its members were frequently no better than laypeople in predicting future violence. The `future danger' test, it argued, was therefore not a very useful one.").
Clinical analysis was therefore used to assess future risk. Under this approach, "past behavior predicts future behavior." Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 21:18-22.
Dr. Krueger pointed out that defendant's most recent known past sexual contact offense occurred in 2009. This involved giving "wedgies" to three children and fondling two of them, for which defendant was convicted in State court, and molesting a young boy in the back of a car, which is part of the basis for the instant case. See supra Part II.F and Part III.C. Since
Dr. Krueger concluded that D.W.'s past behavior indicates that he is more likely to reengage in the viewing of child pornography rather than in committing a contact offense. He explained that D.W. has "gone from contact offenses with the wedgies and making child pornography to noncontact, to viewing pornography. He's always been involved with child pornography, but he did not reengage in contact offenses in the time that he was in the community for nine months." Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 30:09-13. According to this defendant's expert, however, D.W.'s risk of committing either a contact or non-contact sexual offense remained "moderate high or high":
Id. at 22:06-19.
Dr. Krueger further explained that the greater risk of recidivism concerned the viewing of child pornography:
Id. at 25:06-21 (emphasis added).
He then differentiated between types of contact sexual offenses, pointing out that defendant's behavior involved "some touching" but no "penetrative sexual behavior":
Id. at 24:17-25:03 (emphasis added). This doctor concluded, based on the nature of defendant's past contact offenses and other available information, that D.W. is at a greater risk of reengaging in an offense involving "light touching" — meaning masturbation or indirect touching, such as through social media — rather than "heavy touching" such as penetration. Yet, the risk of "heavy touching" could not be ruled out:
Id. at 25:22-26:20 (emphasis added); see also id. at 28:08-12 ("But you could certainly make a gradient from light touching to heavy touching to, you know, sadistic touching, that kind of thing. And he clearly is at the light side of things, so to speak, with respect to his risk for touching.").
Dr. Berrill agreed that D.W.'s past behavior provided useful insight into risk. He emphasized that this included both contact and non-contact sexual offenses:
Id. at 106:23-107:08 (emphasis added).
At the evidentiary hearing, the medical experts were asked to opine on the significance of relevant documents.
Both experts were asked to evaluate the significance of the handwritten note found in D.W.'s belongings while he was at the MDC, in which he describes a fictional consensual sexual encounter with an eight-year-old boy at a water park. See Gov't Ex. 404 (Def.'s Handwritten Notes); see also supra Part III.F.2.
According to Dr. Krueger, this note is reflective of D.W.'s pedophilia; it is a typical cognitive distortion that would need to be addressed through treatment:
Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 78:21-80:03 (emphasis added).
Dr. Berrill agreed that the note "is part and parcel of [D.W.'s] pedophilia." He added that it underscores defendant's risk of reengaging in a contact offense:
Id. at 114:04-115:08.
Dr. Berrill recognized that D.W.'s sexual fantasy, as well as his other symptoms including his addiction to child pornography, are likely to be linked to the extreme abuse he suffered as a boy:
Hr'g Tr., Dec. 23, 2015, ECF No. 104, at 240:15-241:04 (emphasis added).
The experts were asked about the significance of D.W.'s creation of a fictitious bus company, "Mike's Transportation," including his design of a questionnaire for potential "applicants." See supra Part III.A.2.
Dr. Krueger testified that the questionnaire "seemed to be kind of a fantasy construction" rather than a document that would be seriously handed out to others. See Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 88:08-12. He nonetheless explained that creating and distributing such a document would be "consistent with a pedophilic pattern" as well as with someone who scores high on the Hare Psychopathy score:
Id. at 70:25-72:01; but see supra Part III. A.2 (defendant's counsel explaining the connection to D.W.'s childhood traumatic experience and his related desire to become a bus driver).
The experts testified as to the relevance of defendant's child pornography addiction on future activity. According to Dr. Krueger, defendant is amenable to treatment; his recognition of his addiction to child pornography is a first step in this direction:
Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 32:24-33:05.
Dr. Berrill initially testified that defendant's self-professed addiction to child pornography was a factor increasing his overall risk, because it indicated that defendant himself felt he had no control over his actions:
Id. at 111:09-112:15 (emphasis added).
He then concluded that defendant's recognition of his child pornography addiction could be a sign of his acceptance of responsibility and "motivation to get better":
Hr'g Tr., Dec. 23, 2015, ECF No. 104, at 259:02-260:07 (emphasis added).
Dr. Krueger gave significant weight to the fact that D.W. misled his prior treatment providers by not disclosing that he was viewing child pornography while in treatment following his release from State custody. In Dr. Krueger's opinion, defendant's deception was consistent with his
Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 47:02-18.
Both experts agreed on the importance of empathy in the treatment of sex offenders, who are asked to relate to their victims in order to understand the wrongfulness of their conduct. A lack of empathy is associated with a greater risk of sexual re-offense. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr., Dec. 23, 2015, ECF No. 104, at 244:14-245:09 (Dr. Berrill testified to the importance of empathy noting that the "lack of empathy ... is correlated with recidivism and essentially dangerousness with respect to sex offending.").
Their opinions diverged, however, with respect to their assessment of defendant's ability to feel empathy.
Dr. Krueger believed that defendant's prior sexual victimization would allow him to empathize:
Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 87:09-25 (emphasis added).
Dr. Berrill disagreed. He considered defendant's continued resort to child pornography and sexual fantasies involving minors an indication of his yearning for that type of contact:
Id. at 112:16-114:03 (emphasis added); see also id. at 119:14-21 ("And as I said earlier, I really question the whole empathy issue. I don't know that he does have well-developed appropriate, age-appropriate empathy for his victims or those children depicted in child porn who have been victimized. I don't think he has it.").
The government's expert acknowledged that defendant's statements to the court, including his oral remarks at the November 23, 2015 evidentiary hearing and his letter dated July 6, 2015 did suggest a degree of empathy:
Hr'g Tr., Dec. 23, 2015, ECF No. 104, at 245:15-248:06 (emphasis added).
Dr. Berrill also recognized that defendant's letter to the court and his actions upon his arrest in the instant case indicated remorse for his crimes:
Id. at 248:18-249:23.
At the evidentiary hearing and in their post-hearing briefs, the parties referred to studies on the relationship between incarceration and sex offenders' recidivism risk. See Gov't Suppl. Mem. of Law in Response to the Court's Apr. 8, 2016 Request for Additional Briefing, Apr. 25, 2016, ECF No. 148 ("Gov't Suppl. Mem. of Law"), Ex. 801 (Roger Przybylski, Adult Sex Offender Recidivism in Sex Offender Management Assessment and Planning Initiative, Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice, http://www.smart.gov/SOMAPI/sec1/ch5_recidivism.html ("Przybylski")), Ex. 802 (Kristin Budd & Scott Desmond, Sex Offenders and Sex Crime Recidivism: Investigating the Role of Sentence Length and Time Served, 58(12) Int'l J. of Offender Therapy & Comp. Criminology 1481 (2013) ("Budd & Desmond")); Def.'s Ex. EE (R. Karl Hanson et al., High Risk Sex Offenders May Not Be High Risk Forever, 29 J. of Interpers. Violence 1 (2014) ("Hanson et al., 2014")); Def.'s Ex. FF (Kevin L. Nunes et al., Incarceration & Recidivism Among Sex Offenders, 31 L. & Hum. Behav. (2007) ("Nunes et al.")); Def.'s Ex. GG (R. Karl Hanson et al., Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. of Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 348 (1998) ("Hanson et al., 1998")).
As stated in the 2013 study carried out by Kristin Budd and Scott Desmond, although there is an abundance of research on sex offender recidivism in general, "the literature on sentence length, time served, and sex offender recidivism" is "sparse." See Gov't Suppl. Mem. of Law, Ex. 802 (Budd & Desmond) at 1485.
Research on sex offender recidivism is subject to several limitations. Studies may measure recidivism rates differently or fail to account for different types of sex offenders, leading to seemingly inconsistent results. Gov't Suppl. Mem. of Law, Ex. 801 (Przybylski) at 3. Available studies also generally focus on contact offenses rather than child pornography non-contact crimes. An additional factor is that research indicates that sexual offenses are generally underreported, in particular when the victim is a child. See, e.g., id. at 2, 7 (noting studies indicating that sex offenders were arrested for between one and five percent of the actual offenses they committed and that "the likelihood that a
Relevant findings from the studies cited by the parties in the instant case are summarized below:
At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Krueger was asked about the conclusions drawn in the Nunes study. See Def.'s Ex. FF (Nunes et al.) (concluding that "[s]entencing sexual offenders to terms of incarceration appears to have little, if any, impact on sexual and violent recidivism following release"). He testified that, in general, he agreed with the determination that incarceration has little effect on sex offender recidivism:
Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 90:16-25.
Yet, he explained that the effect of incarceration on D.W. was likely to be more intense, potentially increasing his risk of recidivism, because of his unique vulnerabilities:
Id. at 77:05-20 (emphasis added); see also id. at 78:06-11 ("I do know that [D.W.] has an extreme case and it doesn't seem implausible that his is so extreme that he would be different from any of these. But I don't know specifically that beyond that, I don't know specific details of this. It's just my basic analysis of [D.W.].").
A custodial sentence of fifteen years, would, in Dr. Krueger's opinion, increase D.W.'s recidivism risk. In prison, D.W. would have limited treatment opportunities, his adaptive skills would deteriorate, and his links to outside supportive networks would suffer:
Id. at 39:21-41:14 (emphasis added).
Dr. Krueger explained that he regularly interviews and evaluates individuals who have served time in prison and who have been sexually abused while incarcerated. See id. at 41:21-42:18. Based on this experience, he testified that likely abuse in
Id. at 42:20-44:06.
This expert explained that any treatment of D.W. would be significantly more effective if provided in the community rather than in the context of incarceration:
Id. at 44:14-45:24.
Id. at 62:18-63:10.
He concluded that the least risky sentencing option would be a sentence of time served plus a long period of supervised release. See id. at 61:03-12. He explained that a long incarceratory sentence would make defendant more dangerous to the public upon his reentry; he could be better treated and managed in the community:
Id. at 57:06-24 (emphasis added).
Id. at 116:17-117:12 (emphasis added).
The experts were asked to opine on the most appropriate treatment plan available to defendant upon his release from custody that would help him readjust to the community and be protective of the public. Dr. Krueger and Dr. Berrill largely agreed on the elements of this plan, set out below.
A central feature of a treatment plan tailored to D.W.'s needs would include one-on-one sessions with a therapist. Individual therapy would help defendant establish appropriate relationships, deal with stress and integration into the community, and monitor his progress. Dr. Krueger explained the likely features of such individualized treatment as including assistance with social skills development, the establishment of appropriate relationships, use of cognitive behavioral therapy and the "containment model" to develop techniques to help avoid relapse, as well as use of "masturbatory satiation" and "covert sensitization" to address his atypical sexual interests:
Id. at 48:09-49:15.
He explained that individual therapy would also address D.W.'s mental health diagnoses and help treat his depression through medication:
Id. at 50:12-51:01.
In addition to individual therapy sessions, D.W. would also be required to participate in group therapy, which would help provide support:
Id. at 51:02-09.
Dr. Berrill agreed that individual and group therapy are standard components of any treatment plan:
Id. at 120:22-121:04.
Both Dr. Krueger and Dr. Berrill testified that outside controls should be integrated in defendant's treatment plan. They explained that strict supervision, carried out by the court's Probation Department, should likely include home visits, computer monitoring, polygraphs, limitations on contacts with minors, curfews and electronic monitoring. Id. at 51:10-52:06, 121:06-20.
Educational assessment and job training should be a part of the treatment plan to help defendant reintegrate and find purpose in his community. Dr. Krueger noted that defendant has potential to succeed, if provided with proper support:
Id. at 52:07-15.
Helping defendant reconnect with his family and build an outside support network would be an important component of a treatment plan. According to Dr. Berrill, to the extent that social support "is available in the community," treatment may help defendant "access that social support" so that he can "rely on friends and family to shore up [his] defenses and [his] behavior and add a little bit of help [in] trying to cope out in the world." Id. at 120:21-122:01.
Members of D.W.'s adoptive family, who raised him lovingly, might still be within reach. Dr. Krueger noted the significance of this possibility, and how the goal of any treatment plan should be to "enhance their presence in his life and otherwise help him to develop a supportive network." Id. at 52:24-53:01.
The parties submitted thoughtful and detailed post-hearing memoranda following the end of the evidentiary hearing. The court noted that it
Order, Apr. 8, 2016, ECF No. 141, at 1-3 (citation omitted).
The parties were told they could submit briefs addressing:
Order, Apr. 8, 2016, ECF No. 141, at 3.
Both parties submitted helpful memoranda on these issues. See generally Gov't Suppl. Mem. of Law; Def.'s Reply to Gov't Mem. in Opp'n. Defendant's counsel and the government largely agreed on the measures available to protect the public while helping defendant reintegrate into the community upon his release. Defendant's counsel indicated that the Social Work Department of the Federal Defenders of New York would be involved in devising and assisting with a reentry plan. See Def.'s Reply to Gov't Mem. in Opp'n at 2 and Ex. 45 (Federal Defenders of New York Reentry Plan). Both parties identified the key role that the court's Probation Department should play in both supervising the defendant upon his release, as well as referring him to a relevant network of supporting organizations offering assistance with treatment, housing and job training. See also Def.'s Post-Hr'g Mem., Ex. 9 (Mem. re the Treatment and Supervision of Sex Offenders by the Probation Department of the Eastern District of New York, Nov. 30, 2010).
The table below provides an overview of the main items included in the reentry plans submitted by the defendant and the government. Where one party did not address a specific item in its proposed reentry plan, the term "N/A" is used.
Measure Defendant Government Supervision and Monitoring Electronic Monitoring Electronic monitoring will Probation can use GPS devices provide public safety by to track the whereabouts of the allowing the defendant to defendant. Probation uses move throughout the "passive" GPS monitoring — community only with meaning that Probation will Probation's permission and learn about the defendant's knowledge and under its close location at some point after the supervision. defendant's movements are made rather than contemporaneously. Probation can use the GPS to designate areas where the defendant may not travel, also known as "exclusion zones," if there are specific locations of concern to the court (such as the house of a victim, for example). Such exclusion zones, however, cannot be used to designate
general areas of temptation, such as all schools or playgrounds. Curfew A curfew will protect public N/A safety by ensuring that the defendant takes responsibility for following a daily schedule of productive activities when he is in the community. Computer monitoring If the defendant is allowed to Probation can install software on use electronic devices, they the defendant's computer to will be installed with software monitor his internet activities, and hardware that allow the subject to certain limitations. FBI and Probation to monitor Probation would likely request his activity to ensure that he is that the defendant's use of a only engaging in appropriate, smartphone be prohibited, as safe communication and Probation does not currently recreation. have the capability to monitor usage on such devices. Treatment Monitoring Probation will monitor the N/A defendant's treatment and medical records, having preapproved his medical providers, such as his primary care physician and hospital, with consents signed by the defendant. This approach will ensure that the defendant is maintaining his physical health and provide another layer of supervision. Polygraph Monitoring Probation would include N/A polygraphy testing at periodic intervals as one method of encouraging compliance with release conditions. Home Visits by Probation can conduct both Probation can visit the defendant Probation random and scheduled visits on a regular basis to ensure that will allow officers to compliance. search the defendant's home
and person and allow for observation of his living conditions and potential needs. Home Visits by Family Members of defendant's N/A and Community community, both family Members members and service providers, can conduct both scheduled and unscheduled visits with the defendant. They can check on his wellbeing and serve as additional support to ensure that he is maintaining his treatment schedule and engaging in appropriate social relationships. Sex Offender Registry N/A Probation will ensure that the defendant's information with the sex offender registry is kept up to date. Treatment Psychological Treatment The defendant listed the names Probation would likely request of several treatment providers that the court refer the defendant that could offer him any to a treatment facility. This needed medication as well as treatment facility would address therapeutic intervention. the defendant's psychological Treatment would include both needs in several ways, utilizing individual and group therapy individual therapy, group to address his three major therapy, mental health outreach mental health problems: and (if necessary) medication. pedophilia, chronic depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder.Housing Residence Approval N/A Probation will likely request the standard release condition requiring the defendant to seek approval from Probation prior to making living arrangements.
This would enable Probation to restrict the defendant from living in locations that, for example, allow inappropriate proximity to children. Halfway House Upon release, the defendant In light of the defendant's may reside at Brooklyn House, estrangement from his family, the Eastern District of New Probation would likely York's Residential Reentry recommend that the court add a Center ("RRC"). Staff there special condition releasing the would monitor him while defendant to the care of a Probation would also keep him halfway house at the end of his under close supervision. He mandatory minimum sentence. would initially have Such a placement would likely permission to leave the RRC help the defendant acclimate only for preapproved back into society. The court appointments related to his could, for example, order the treatment and supervision. defendant to stay at the halfway Later, he would gradually earn house for a period of six months, permission to move around or allow the defendant to leave more, but only after he the halfway house once he found progresses in treatment and a suitable new residence (subject begins to seek educational and to approval by Probation). This vocational training as well as latter approach would provide employment. Location housing stability for the monitoring devices as well as defendant while ensuring that his surveillance cameras at the placement in the halfway house RRC can help monitor his was not perceived as a movement into and out of the punishment. RRC. Employment Job Training The defendant provided a list Probation would also refer the of organizations that offer defendant to one of the job vocational training as well as training institutions that work job opportunities for formerly with EDNY defendants, such as incarcerated individuals with Workforce One and the Fortune different levels of education. Society. These institutions, among others, provide vocational training and reentry skills to individuals like the
defendant. These institutions often work with sex offenders. Additional Outside Support Reentry Organizations The defendant noted that The government also identified organizations such as the the Fortune Society as an Fortune Society and the organization that could assist Federal Defenders of New defendant with job training. York could provide additional support for his reentry into the community. Family and Community While incarcerated, defendant N/A Support has reconnected with some family. He will continue to work towards repairing and strengthening these relationships. His connection to family and community supports will serve as an additional protection and point of supervision.
See Def.'s Reply to Gov't Mem. in Opp'n, Ex. 45 (Federal Defenders of New York Reentry Plan); Gov't Suppl. Mem. of Law at 2-4.
Defendant pleaded guilty to a two-count superseding information charging him with sexual exploitation of a child, in violation of section 2251 of title 18, and possession of child pornography, in violation of section 2252(a)(2) of title 18. The former of these two counts carries a fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) ("Any individual who violates, or attempts or conspires to violate, this section shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 15 years nor more than 30 years. . . ."). The latter carries a ten year mandatory minimum sentence, due to defendant's prior State convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2); see also Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem. at 11, n.8.
A district court must determine the applicable sentencing range pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir.2010) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)). Although no longer mandatory, the Guidelines' sentencing ranges continue to function as "the starting point and the initial benchmark" for sentencing proceedings. Gall, 552 U.S. at 46, 49, 128 S.Ct. 586 (noting that the Guidelines are presumed to be "the product of careful study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of individual sentencing decisions"); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245, 264, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).
A sentencing court shall "state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). If the sentence is not of the kind prescribed by, or is outside the range of, the Sentencing Guidelines referred to in section 3553(a)(4) of title 18, the court shall indicate the specific reasons for imposing a different sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). These "reasons must also be stated with specificity in a statement of reasons form." Id.
In view of the excessive incarceration rates in the recent past and their unnecessary, deleterious effects on individuals sentenced, society, and our economy, parsimony in incarceration is to be prized. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ("The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary"); National Research Council of the National Academies, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States, Exploring Causes and Consequences 8 (2014) ("Parsimony: The period of confinement should be sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing policy.").
Pursuant to section 2259 of title 18, victims of certain child exploitation offenses, including possession of child pornography, are entitled to mandatory restitution. The order of restitution "shall direct the defendant to pay the victim (through the appropriate court mechanism) the full amount of the victim's losses." 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1). This includes:
18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3).
In Paroline v. United States, the Supreme Court outlined how to determine the proper amount of restitution that "a possessor of child pornography must pay to the victim whose childhood abuse appears in the pornographic materials possessed." ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1710, 1716, 188 L.Ed.2d 714 (2014). The Court held that "[r]estitution is ... proper under § 2259 only to the extent the defendant's offense proximately caused a victim's losses." Id. at 1722. In a case in which a defendant possesses images of a victim and the
Id. at 1727 (emphasis added).
The Paroline defendant possessed two images of the victim seeking restitution; he was one of potentially thousands of people possessing her images. Although any award should not be "a token or nominal amount," the Court declared that in such instances restitution "would not be severe... given the nature of the causal connection between the conduct of a possessor like Paroline and the entirety of the victim's general losses from the trade in her images, which are the product of the acts of thousands of offenders." Id. (emphasis added).
In directing how a restitution award should be calculated, the Court concluded that "[t]his cannot be a precise mathematical inquiry and involves the use of discretion and sound judgment." Id. at 1728. A court should "assess as best it can from available evidence the significance of the individual defendant's conduct in light of the broader causal process that produced the victim's losses." Id. at 1727-28. As a starting point, district courts should "determine the amount of the victim's losses caused by the continuing traffic in the victim's images," and "then set an award of restitution in consideration of factors that bear on the relative causal significance of the defendant's conduct in producing those losses." Id. at 1728. District courts take into consideration a variety of factors, including:
Id.
The Court cautioned that "[t]hese factors need not be converted into a rigid formula, especially if doing so would result in trivial restitution orders." Id. Rather, the factors are to serve as "rough guideposts for determining an amount that fits the offense." Id.
The current federal criminal sentencing regime is limited by the Eighth Amendment, which proscribes punishments that are "cruel and unusual." The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. It prohibits "inherently barbaric punishments under all circumstances." Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). An "essential principle" under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is that "the State must respect the human attributes even of those who have committed serious crimes." Id.
To determine whether a punishment is constitutionally cruel and unusual, "courts must look beyond historical conceptions to `the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a mature society.'" Id. at 58, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)).
The Eighth Amendment proscribes sentences that are both unusual and grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) ("The final clause prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed."); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Eighth Amendment prohibits "extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime") (quotation omitted); Graham, 560 U.S. at 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (providing that the "concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment"). "Embodied in the Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishments is the `precept of justice that punishment for [the] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.'" Graham, 560 U.S. at 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910)).
The Supreme Court's analysis of sentence proportionality falls within two general classes: (1) challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences, given all the circumstances in a particular case; and (2) categorical rules to define Eighth Amendment standards. Id. at 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011. It is the former category that is relevant to the present case. Under this classification, "all of the circumstances of the case" are considered in order to "determine whether the sentence is unconstitutionally excessive." Id.
The proportionality principle has been declared by the Court to be "narrow." Id. at 59-60, 130 S.Ct. 2011. The Eighth Amendment "does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence," but rather "forbids only extreme sentences that are `grossly disproportionate' to the crime." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 288, 103 S.Ct. 3001) (upholding life sentence without the possibility of parole for defendant convicted of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28-31, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to prison term of twenty-five-years to life under California's "three strikes law" for a recidivist who was convicted of stealing golf clubs worth $1,200).
While it was previously unclear to lower courts whether the proportionality requirements of the Eighth Amendment were applicable outside the capital context, it is now established that they do govern non-capital sentences. Compare United States v. Polizzi, 549 F.Supp.2d 308, 362 (2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir.2009) ("Whether proportionality analysis applies in non-capital cases such as those involving mandatory minimum sentences is unclear.") with Graham, 560 U.S. at 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (applying proportionality analysis to invalidate sentence of life without parole for individuals who committed non-homicide offense before age eighteen).
"Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (holding that a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole as applied to a three-time offender is constitutional); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994, 111 S.Ct. 2680 ("Proportionality review is one of several respects in which we have held that `death is different,' and
The Court has "not established a clear or consistent path for courts to follow" in applying the proportionality analysis. United States v. Cunningham, 191 Fed. Appx. 670, 673 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72, 123 S.Ct. 1166). In 1983, Solem established a three-part test for determining whether a sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate:
Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. 3001.
The Court subsequently refined its approach to proportionality in Harmelin. Although there was no majority decision, seven Justices agreed that the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual language included a proportionality principle. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-96, 111 S.Ct. 2680. Since Harmelin, courts have generally applied Justice Kennedy's analysis in his concurrence. See, e.g., United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 753 (10th Cir.2006) ("Justice Kennedy's opinion in Harmelin... sets forth the applicable Eighth Amendment proportionality test.") (quoting Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir.1999)) (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy first identified "common principles that give content to the uses and limits of proportionality review":
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998, 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 288, 103 S.Ct. 3001). Justice Kennedy then applied a modified Solem test: A court must initially consider the nature of the crime and its relation to the punishment imposed. Only if that analysis gives rise to an inference of disproportionality should a court then consider the punishment for other offenses in its jurisdiction and the punishment for similar offenses in other jurisdictions:
Graham, 560 U.S. at 60, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (citations omitted); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (declining to perform any comparative jurisdictional analysis because the gravity of the adult prisoner's offense — possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine — was not grossly disproportionate to his sentence of mandatory life in prison without possibility of parole; the Court explained that "intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality").
Courts are reluctant to invalidate sentencing schemes under the proportionality principle; an overly aggressive approach is not consistent with our scheme of federalism or of division of powers within the federal government. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999-1000, 111 S.Ct. 2680. Both states and the federal government must have considerable freedom to experiment in matters of criminal policy. See id. Holding a sentencing law unconstitutional involves a rejection of the judgment of a legislature, which may entail rejecting the moral judgment of the community it represents. See id. at 1006, 111 S.Ct. 2680; see also Arizona v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473, 134 P.3d 378, 385 (2006) (en banc) (noting that Solem, in which the Supreme Court invalidated a judicially-imposed sentence, did not involve the "traditional deference" that courts must afford legislative policy choices). "Courts must show restraint when wielding the powerful disproportionality sword." C.R., 792 F.Supp.2d at 492.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has found that "[l]engthy prison sentences, even those that exceed any conceivable life expectancy of a convicted defendant, do not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when based on a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines or statutorily mandated consecutive terms." United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 163 (2d Cir.2003). "[I]n a noncapital case, it is exceedingly rare to uphold a claim that a sentence within the statutory limits is disproportionately severe." United States v. Caracappa, 614 F.3d 30, 44 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted); see also United States v. Adams, 768 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir.2014) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1726, 191 L.Ed.2d 694 (2015); United States v. Martin, 180 Fed.Appx. 301, 302 (2d Cir.2006) (finding that "the sentence is not unconstitutionally disproportionate to the crime [the defendant] committed, even in light of his physical disability").
The cruelty of some statutorily imposed mandatory terms of imprisonment has been recognized. See Polizzi, 549 F.Supp.2d at 360. Judges, legal scholars and practitioners, as well as community activists, among others, have expressed increasing concern over rigid application and expanded use of mandatory minimums. See, e.g., Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Provisions under Federal Law, Public Hearing before the United States Sentencing Comm'n, 15 (May 27, 2010) (statement of Michael Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of Virginia) http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20100527/Testimony_Nachmanoff.pdf
Sixty-two percent of the judges who participated in a recent survey conducted by the United States Sentencing Commission declared that mandatory sentences were generally too high across all cases. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Results of Survey of United States District Judges January 2010 through March 2010, 5 table 1 (2010) ("Survey of Federal Judges"), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-andsurveys/surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf; see also Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 1 n.2 (2010) (citing numerous instances of federal judges "voicing dismay at the excessive sentences they were required to pronounce and affirm").
In a speech to the American Bar Association, Justice Kennedy noted that he could "accept neither the necessity nor the wisdom of federal mandatory minimum sentences. In too many cases, mandatory minimum sentences are unwise and unjust." Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Address at A.B.A. Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003) (suggesting the Association urge Congress to repeal mandatory minimums).
Congress seems poised to agree on the necessity of reconsidering mandatory minimums. The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act eliminated the five-year mandatory minimum sentence for simple possession (without intent to distribute) crack cocaine. This law marks the first time since 1970 that Congress has repealed a mandatory minimum sentence. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) ("Fair Sentencing Act").
Recent legislative initiatives aim to reduce or eliminate mandatory minimums for nonviolent drug offenders. In the Senate, the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, if passed, would reduce mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent drug offenders and provide greater access to programs in prison aimed at reducing recidivism. See Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015). A similar bill is currently pending in the House of Representatives. See Sensenbrenner-Scott Over-Criminalization Task Force Safe, Accountable, Fair, Effective Reinvestment Act of 2015, H.R. 2944, 114th Cong. (2015). Both bills presently include exclusions for people convicted of federal sex offenses pursuant to section 16911 of title 42 of the United States Code — an extremely broad category of offenders that encompasses individuals convicted of offenses such as distributing or producing child pornography.
The Department of Justice has reformed its charging practices in order to avoid unnecessary application of lengthy mandatory minimum prison terms. The Smart on Crime Initiative, launched by then Attorney General Eric Holder in 2013, provided that low-level nonviolent drug offenders would no longer be charged with offenses triggering severe mandatory sentences:
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Smart on Crime: Reforming the Criminal Justice System for the 21st Century, 3 (Aug. 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2013/08/12/smarton-crime.pdf.
Attorney General Holder explained in a department-wide memorandum that
Mem. from Eric Holder, Attorney General, on Department Policy on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases, 1 (Aug. 12, 2013) ("Holder Memo"), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2014/04/11/ag-memodrug-guidance.pdf.
Discussing the Smart on Crime Initiative, he emphasized that mandatory minimums may not contribute to public safety:
Dan Roberts & Karen McVeigh, Eric Holder Unveils New Reforms Aimed at Curbing US Prison Population, Guardian (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/ericholder-smart-crime-reform-us-prisons (internal quotation marks omitted).
In a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Chair of the United States Sentencing Commission agreed that statutory changes to mandatory minimum legislation were warranted:
Reevaluating the Effectiveness of Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentences, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1 (Sept. 18, 2013) (statement of Judge Patti B. Saris, Chair, United States Sentencing Commission), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/submissions/20131126-Letter-Senate-Judiciary-Committee.pdf.
Although increasingly recognized as cruel, statutory mandatory minimum sentences are not unusual. See generally Polizzi, 549 F.Supp.2d at 398-99 (discussing mandatory minimums historically and today); id. at 488, App. C (listing federal statutory provisions with mandatory minimums); see also Christopher Wimmer et al., Sentencing in the United States, in Current Trends in Criminal Procedure and Evidence: A Collection of Essays in Honor
Because of their commonality, ours is "a world of statutorily fixed mandatory sentences for many crimes," Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 331, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting), "[s]evere, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been employed in various forms throughout our Nation's history." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680; see also Polizzi, 549 F.Supp.2d at 360.
In Harmelin, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a sentence because of its mandatory nature. It explained that "[i]t is beyond question that the legislature has the power to define criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing discretion[.]" Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1006, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (quotation omitted). "Since the beginning of the Republic, Congress and the States have enacted mandatory sentencing schemes." Id. The Court noted that "[w]e have never invalidated a penalty mandated by a legislature based only on the length of sentence, and, especially with a crime as severe as this one, we should do so only in the most extreme circumstance." Id. at 1006-07, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (emphasis added). It recognized the legislature's power to require minimum sentences — subject to constitutional limitations:
Id. at 1007, 111 S.Ct. 2680.
The Supreme Court has declared that conditions of incarceration affect decisions on Eighth Amendment violations. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) ("Confinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.").
Plata, 563 U.S. at 511, 131 S.Ct. 1910 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court explained that the principles governing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence "apply when the conditions of confinement compose the punishment at issue. Conditions must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be
In Wilson v. Seiter, Justice White, concurring, emphasized that the Court's prior decisions "have made it clear that the conditions [of confinement] are themselves part of the punishment, even though not specifically `meted out' by a statute or judge." 501 U.S. 294, 306, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (emphasis in original). The Court recently declared in Brown v. Plata,
563 U.S. at 510, 131 S.Ct. 1910 (quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. Ken Strutin, Pain, Punishment and the Path Forward, N.Y.L.J., July 19, 2016 ("Pain is the unwanted companion of every inmate. It is at the heart of retribution and the meaning behind punishment. But there must be limits to the grotesqueries of penal confinement. Education about the reality and effects of pain can cast a light on the unseen and unquantified suffering of imprisonment.").
The Eighth Amendment places a constitutional duty on prison officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement and take reasonable steps to protect inmates' health and safety:
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
The duties of prison officials include protecting prisoners from assault or other forms of abuse by fellow inmates. As emphatically put by the Court, being violently attacked in prison does not advance any legitimate penological objective and is not part of the penalty that offenders should pay for their criminal conduct:
Id. at 833-34, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court addressed the "deliberate indifference" standard applicable to civil suits challenging conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 837-38, 114 S.Ct. 1970. While Farmer concedes that prison conditions bear on the constitutionality of punishment, its focus is on the standard applicable to civil rights suits brought by incarcerated individuals. It does not apply to the proportionality analysis governing sentencing. The "deliberate indifference" standard outlined in Farmer is not applicable to the instant case.
Although subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny, the extent to which a defendant's likely future conditions of incarceration may impact the constitutional proportionality of his or her sentence is not clear. As noted by Justice Kennedy, "there is no accepted mechanism" for a sentencing judge to take into account a prisoner's likely conditions of incarceration — in that case, whether time would be served in solitary confinement — at the time of sentencing:
Davis v. Ayala, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2209-10, 192 L.Ed.2d 323 reh'g denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 14, 192 L.Ed.2d 983 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy observed that judges may be required to inquire as to correctional policies and consider alternatives to longterm solitary confinement:
Id. at 2210.
Outside of the Eighth Amendment context, sentencing courts have taken into consideration the impact of conditions of confinement on punishment. For example, even prior to Booker, the Supreme Court found that downward departures from the then mandatory Sentencing Guidelines could be justified based on a defendant's likelihood of victimization in prison. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (finding that district court acted within its discretion in considering police officers' high "susceptibility to abuse in prison" in downwardly departing from the guidelines). Section 3553(b) of title 18 of the United States Code allowed courts to downwardly depart from the otherwise mandatory Guidelines range if they found that a "mitigating circumstance" existed "of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
In the Second Circuit, courts recognize that vulnerable individuals may experience particularly oppressive conditions in prison, and that this bears on the propriety of the sentence imposed. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 945 F.2d 525, 527 (2d Cir.1991) (noting that the court had previously recognized that "prison conditions may be particularly oppressive to vulnerable individuals"). In particular, courts understand that factors such as a defendant's physical appearance and demeanor, or his actual or perceived sexual orientation, increase susceptibility to prison abuse.
In United States v. Lara, the district judge issued a sentence below that prescribed by the Guidelines based on the defendant's "potential for victimization" in prison. 905 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir.1990) (emphasis added). In that case, the defendant was deemed to be particularly vulnerable to prison abuse because of his "diminutive size, immature appearance and bisexual orientation." Id. The only available means of protection while incarcerated was solitary confinement. See id. at 602-03. The court explained that applying the sentencing range indicated by the Guidelines would result in a "sentence which is unduly severe relative to most other defendants in this Court who do not have the vulnerability, the appearance, the sexual orientation that this defendant presents." Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in Lara. It held that "extreme vulnerability of a criminal defendant [in prison] is a proper ground for departure." Id. at 603 (emphasis added). It agreed that the characteristics rendering the defendant particularly vulnerable to prison abuse presented an "extraordinary situation," justifying the consideration of factors generally not relevant to sentencing determinations:
In United States v. Gonzalez, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, relying on its decision in Lara, affirmed a below-Guidelines sentence to ensure the defendant's safety. 945 F.2d 525 (2d Cir.1991). In that case, the court determined that the defendant "was extremely small and feminine looking, and that, although he was nineteen, he had the appearance of a fourteen or fifteen year old boy." Id. at 526. This was "sufficient to establish that [the defendant] was unusually susceptible to prison abuse." Id. The court noted that the fact that defendant could be perceived as gay was sufficient to render him vulnerable to abuse, regardless of his actual sexual orientation:
Id. at 526-27 (citation omitted).
While in Lara the defendant had already been victimized in prison, this was not the case in Gonzalez. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that it would be "absurd" to require prior victimization before allowing a downward sentencing departure in instances where inmate safety was a concern:
Id. at 527 (emphasis added). It affirmed the sentence, finding that "the [district] court sensibly balanced [the defendant's] need for safety against the Government's interest in incarcerating wrongdoers." Id. at 527.
Courts adopt a similar approach outside of the Second Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming downward departure based on former prison guards' susceptibility to abuse in prison which was compounded by public and emotional outrage at offense); United States v. Parish, 308 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir.2002) (affirming downward departure based on the determination that defendant was susceptible to abuse in prison because he had been convicted of a child pornography offense, combined with his stature, demeanor and naiveté); United States v. Shasky, 939 F.Supp. 695 (D.Neb.1996) (downwardly departing from the applicable guidelines range because the defendant was "a Nebraska state trooper at the time of the offense, is a homosexual, of diminutive stature ... who is charged, in a well-publicized case, with receiving pornography involving minors, and he is therefore unusually susceptible to abuse in prison").
A fifteen year sentence, if served in the general population of a medium or high
While still opposing such a long sentence as inappropriate in the instant case, the court finds that the BOP can structure a fifteen year sentence to avoid unconstitutional cruelty. By providing care and following the court's recommendations in the treatment afforded D.W., cruelty in prison can be minimized.
The court strongly recommends that D.W. serve his sentence at a BOP medical facility such as FMC Devens, where sex offender treatment programs are available and the staff is trained to manage inmates with defendant's vulnerabilities. See supra Part IV.C.
Data indicates that the BOP follows judges' recommendations as to sentencing in approximately seventy-four percent of cases. See supra Part IV.A.1; Vasquez & Bussert at 21. The necessity of housing this defendant in a safe and medically appropriate environment is apparent, as demonstrated by findings after extensive hearings in the present case. See supra Part IV. It must be assumed that this court's recommendation for appropriate incarceratory conditions will be followed by the Bureau. See infra Part VII.A. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the BOP's and the federal government's policy is to reduce the use of solitary confinement to protect vulnerable inmates.
If the court's recommendations are followed so that defendant serves his term under prison conditions reasonably calculated to protect him from the hazards he would face in the open, general population of a medium or high security prison, and he is treated appropriately medically, his mandatory sentence of fifteen years cannot be found to violate the United States Constitution.
In imposing a sentence of fifteen years, the court takes into consideration the defendant's express desire to be sentenced to the statutory minimum term, lest a reversal ultimately result in a lengthier sentence. See Letter of D.W. to the Court, July 6, 2015, ECF No. 74.
An appropriate sentence would be an incarceratory term of approximately five years with intensive treatment both in prison and following release. But, there is no sentence less than fifteen years presently allowed. See, e.g., United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.2013). By providing protective conditions for the prisoner, the effective prison term becomes substantially less harsh, and, therefore, constitutional. The law can thus be moved in a required direction without flouting Congressional requirements. As already pointed out, Congressional concern over abuse in prison indicates that its policy accords with the court's concerns over the conditions D.W. will face after sentencing. See, e.g., supra Part IV.A.2 (discussion of PREA).
In the instant case, D.W. is subject to a congressionally mandated minimum term of imprisonment. Unlike the Sentencing Guidelines at issue in Lara or Gonzalez, the relevant statute does not allow a sentencing court to depart from the applicable minimum term if mitigating circumstances exist. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(e), 2252(b)(2).
Limits, if any, on imposition of the statutory mandatory minimum sentence are to be found in the Eighth Amendment's
In challenges to the proportionality of sentences as applied to a particular defendant, courts must initially consider whether the "gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence" give rise to an "inference of gross disproportionality." Graham, 560 U.S. at 60, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Defendant pled guilty to serious crimes. Possession of child pornography arguably tends to perpetuate the harm initially suffered by minors in the production of the images. See, e.g., R.V., 157 F.Supp.3d at 209, 2016 WL 270257 at *1 ("The theory is that (1) computer depiction of children being sexually exploited creates a permanent widespread record of abuse, perpetuating and potentially exacerbating the harm initially suffered by the victim in the production, and (2) acquisition of these images encourages abuse of children in their production since viewers create demand.").
Defendant was not simply a passive viewer of child pornography. He pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a child. In 2009, he abused a young boy in the back of a car. He pulled the boy's pants and underwear down, rubbed his penis and masturbated him. PSR at ¶ 20. On at least one occasion, defendant masturbated in front of the boy. Id. He did not engage in any sodomy, penetration, or fellatio. Defendant took pictures of the abuse; they were found on his phone. Id. There is no evidence that defendant ever distributed the images. The boy complained about the harm he suffered as a consequence of D.W.'s conduct: "When I was younger it affected me a lot because I thought about it a lot but never told anyone." Id. at ¶ 23; see also supra Part III.G.2.
Defendant was himself the victim of serious abuse. His offenses were driven, at least in part, by his own prior victimization. See, e.g., Prentky Report at 16-17; Hr'g Tr., Dec. 23, 2015, ECF No. 104, at 240:12-241:04 (Testimony of Dr. Berrill). He has expressed remorse and a desire to take responsibility for his actions. See supra Part IV.D.4; see also Letter of D.W. to the Court, July 6, 2015, ECF No. 74. These are powerful mitigating factors.
Nonetheless, the gravity of the offense is underscored by defendant's conduct following his release from State custody. Despite being under State supervision and attending treatment, he quickly returned to viewing child pornography. Although nothing in the record suggests that D.W. physically accosted any minor during this period of presence in the community, the medical experts agreed that his test scores and past conduct indicate a substantial risk
Judges have increasingly criticized the often unjustified harshness of lengthy mandatory minimum sentences in the child pornography context. In a recent survey, over seventy-one percent of judges found the five-year minimum for receiving child pornography to be unduly severe in the circumstances of their cases. See Survey of Federal Judges at 5, table 1. This sentiment was shared by almost a fifth of judges with respect to the ten-year mandatory minimum for producing child pornography, and over a third of judges with respect to the five-year minimum for distribution. Id. American prison terms for conduct such as D.W.'s are far more severe than those in comparable countries. See, e.g., Yaman Akdeniz, Internet Child Pornography and the Law: National and International Responses passim (2008).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recognized that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, as well as other penological considerations, may impact the reasonableness of lengthy sentences, even if authorized by statute. In the case of United States v. Brown, the defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of production and two counts of possession of child pornography. No. 13-1706, 826 F.3d 51, 53, 2016 WL 3254735, at *1 (2d Cir. June 14, 2016). A minimum term of fifteen years and a maximum sentence of thirty years applied to the production counts. The statutory maximum for the possession charges was ten years. Id. at 56-57, 2016 WL 3254735 at *4. The defendant was sentenced by the district court to sixty years' imprisonment — twenty years for each count of production of child pornography to run consecutively and ten years on each possession count to be served concurrently with the sixty year term. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded, "to ensure that the sentence [was] not based on a clearly erroneous understanding of the facts." Id. at 760, 2016 WL 3254735 at *7 (footnote omitted). The court, while noting that it was not at that time expressing a definitive view on the reasonableness of the sentence, urged the district court to consider the appropriateness of an effective life term:
Id. at 59-62, 2016 WL 3254735 at *7-8 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Despite its disquiet about extremely long prison sentences, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has regularly rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to the constitutionality of long mandatory minimum sentences in child pornography offenses. See, e.g., Reingold, 731 F.3d at 216-22 (finding that the application of a mandatory five-year sentence to defendant convicted of distributing child pornography did not give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality suggestive of cruel and unusual punishment); United States v. Ramos, 685 F.3d 120, 134, n. 11 (2d Cir.2012) ("The district court acted well within its discretion in imposing the statutory mandatory minimum of 180 months' imprisonment, a sentence that was well below the Guidelines range of 324-405 months, and that was reasonable under all the circumstances."); United States v. Puglisi, 458 Fed.Appx. 31, 35-36 (2d Cir.2012) ("While we agree that compelling mitigating factors exist in this case, there are also aggravating factors: [the defendant] abused his position as a teacher to maintain a sexual relationship with a teenage student, and obstructed the authorities' attempts to obtain the photographic evidence of his crimes. Moreover, the mitigating factors in this case do not render the sentence imposed `grossly disproportionate' to the serious crimes [the defendant] committed."); United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 255 (2d Cir.2008) (no "inference of gross disproportionality" arose from mandatory life sentence for recidivist offender convicted of charges involving the sexual exploitation of children) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Courts in other circuits have reached similar decisions upholding long mandatory minimums. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 632 F.3d 956, 959-60 (6th Cir. 2011) (upholding defendant's ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) for attempting in online chats to entice an undercover officer he thought was fourteen to engage in joint sexual activity); United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1343-45 (11th Cir.2010) (upholding thirty-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) for crossing State line with intent to have sex with a child); United States v. Nagel, 559 F.3d 756, 762-65 (7th Cir.2009) (upholding mandatory ten-year minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) for attempted sexual enticement of a minor); United States v. Paton, 535 F.3d 829, 837-38 (8th Cir.2008) (upholding life sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) for recidivist offender who pleaded guilty to five counts of production of child pornography); United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 249-50 (3d Cir.2006) (upholding fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence for receiving child pornography by a repeat offender).
The severity of the sentence in the instant case is, however, exacerbated by the possible conditions of defendant's incarceration. Being raped or beaten in prison or,
Defendant's characteristics — the fact that he identifies as gay or bisexual, was the victim of repeated sexual abuse, suffers from mental illness and is a convicted sex offender of children — make D.W. uniquely susceptible to abuse in prison and to placement in solitary confinement for protective purposes. Although called "administrative" segregation, the conditions of confinement in protective custody — whether voluntary or involuntary — are essentially the same as those suffered by inmates in punitive segregation. See supra Part IV.B. There is growing national and international consensus that such extreme isolation and the pain it causes may be in violation of constitutional and international standards prohibiting cruel and usual punishment. See, e.g., Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-CV-5796, 2013 WL 1435148, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 9, 2013) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss putative class action brought by ten Pelican Bay SHU inmates, finding that they "have adequately plead both elements of an Eighth Amendment claim. They have alleged that their prolonged social isolation and lack of environmental stimuli — each Plaintiff has lived in the SHU for at least eleven years — causes `serious psychological pain and suffering and permanent psychological and physical injury.' ... Plaintiffs' asserted injuries — the symptoms of which include `chronic insomnia,' `severe concentration and memory problems,' `anxiety,' and other ailments — are sufficient to satisfy the objective component of their Eighth Amendment claim, considering the length of Plaintiffs' exposure to these conditions.") (citations omitted); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146, 1264-65 (N.D.Cal. 1995) ("[T]he conditions of extreme social isolation and reduced environmental stimulation found in the Pelican Bay SHU will likely inflict some degree of psychological trauma upon most inmates confined there for more than brief periods."); Peoples, 180 F.Supp.3d 294, 2016 WL 1464613 (approving a landmark class action settlement limiting the use of disciplinary solitary confinement in New York State prisons); Eur. Comm. for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), 21st General Report of the CPT, 39-50 (Aug. 1, 2010 to July 31, 2011), http://www.cpt.coe.int/ien/annual/rep-21.pdf (finding that "the damaging effect [of solitary confinement] can be immediate and
A sentence of fifteen years in this case, if served in the general population of a medium or high security prison, is likely to be significantly more severe than a sentence of fifteen years served by a defendant who does not possess the combination of grave vulnerabilities exhibited by D.W.
The BOP has taken steps to limit violence in its facilities and develop alternatives to solitary confinement for inmates in need of protection. The court is reasonably assured that the BOP can, and will, carry out the court's recommendation for treatment and attempt to minimize risks and dangers, as well as the unnecessary use of solitary confinement, by housing defendant in a medical facility such as FMC Devens rather than in the general population of a medium or high security prison.
If housed and treated in a facility responsive to defendant's treatment and safety needs, the minimum term of incarceration of fifteen years, although excessive in this court's judgment, is not grossly disproportionate to the offense.
Defendant was housed for over three years in the Brooklyn Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC"), awaiting trial or plea, and sentence. The court has recently visited the MDC in connection with defendant's sentencing.
The MDC is an administrative pretrial detention facility which houses defendants awaiting trial or sentencing. It is different in its relaxed, safe atmosphere from the BOP's medium or high security institutions where dangerous offenders often serve long sentences. See Def.'s Reply to Gov't Mem. in Opp'n at 29-30.
At the MDC, D.W. has been housed primarily in specialized units for vulnerable inmates. Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem. at 36-37 and Ex. 202 (Inmate History Quarters). The government indicates that D.W. has not been attacked during his incarceration at the MDC. See Gov't Opp'n Post-Hr'g Mem. at 6, 18, 35-41. As Mr. Wise testified:
Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 68:23-70:19.
During the court's visit to the MDC it inquired about the facility's operations, particularly with respect to accommodations for vulnerable inmates, use of protective custody, and incidence of physical and sexual assaults in relation to an inmate's gender, sexual orientation or sex offender status. Sexual assaults were said to be rare in the MDC. The few PREA allegations made in the last several months involved harassment rather than contact claims and were found to be unsubstantiated. Protective custody is used at the facility, but sparingly; the handful of inmates in protective custody at the time of the court's visit were described by MDC officials as being in the SHU for their safety because of prior gang affiliations.
The MDC is quite different from a medium or high security BOP facility. D.W.'s experience at the MDC is not indicative of what his experience is likely to be following sentencing, should this court's recommendations not be followed.
In connection with defendant's sentence, the court also visited the Eastern District of New York's Residential Reentry Center ("RRC"). This is a halfway house where newly released individuals are placed towards the end of a long prison term. It assists in readjustment and reentry into the community. No attacks based on sexual or gender reasons were reported. Notices are posted informing residents of their right to be free from sexual abuse and with indications as to how to report any incidents.
The RRC is the facility that defendant will be placed in for some months at the end of his prison term. During that period, he will be able to leave for medical treatment, work, and visits with family and friends. He will be closely supervised. If he is granted home detention, he will wear a device allowing the facility to find him at any time.
The Guideline term provided by the Sentencing Commission for the instant case is 292 months (24 years) to 365 months (30 years) of imprisonment. See Hr'g Tr., Nov. 23, 2015, ECF No. 101, at 13:20-14:10.
Such a term is absurdly excessive. It results primarily from the Sentencing Commission's reliance on Congressional mandates rather than on its own empirical analysis of what sentences courts were likely to — or should — impose. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing, 73 (2004) ("The frequent mandatory minimum legislation and specific directives to the Commission to amend the guidelines make it difficult to gauge the effectiveness of any particular policy change, or to disentangle the influences
Having considered the Guidelines and the sentencing factors set forth in section 3553(a) of title 18, as required by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court, the applicable Guidelines advisory sentencing range is rejected in this case as a basis for an appropriate sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 46, 49, 128 S.Ct. 586; Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101, 128 S.Ct. 558. The unreasonable harshness of the child pornography Sentencing Guidelines has been recognized by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 184-87; United States v. Alhakk, 505 Fed.Appx. 51, 55 (2d Cir.2012) ("[T]he court noted that it had given `special consideration' to the concerns expressed in Dorvee. Based on all of these considerations, the court concluded that a below-Guidelines sentence ... was sufficient but not greater than necessary to fulfill the requirements of § 3553(a).") (citation omitted); United States v. Chow, 441 Fed.Appx. 44, 45 (2d Cir.2011) ("Dorvee recognizes district courts' post-Booker authority to `vary from the Guidelines range based solely on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines,' and encourages courts to take seriously that discretion `in fashioning sentences under § 2G2.2' for child pornography defendants.") (citations omitted); United States v. Tutty, 612 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir.2010) ("[T]he district court should ... bear in mind that the eccentric child pornography Guidelines, with their highly unusual provenance, can easily generate unreasonable results if they are not carefully applied.") (citations and quotation marks omitted).
D.W. suffered a childhood marked by extreme abuse. Time and again, the system failed him; he was exposed to sexual assault as a child in New York City's foster care program and then as a young adult in New York State's prisons. See supra Part II. He was diagnosed with mental illnesses such as depression, bipolar disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder, but the treatment he received was never sufficient to address the trauma he had endured. From victim, he became abuser. The experts testified that his offense conduct could be attributed, at least in part, to the abuse he himself experienced as a child. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr., Dec. 23, 2015, ECF No. 104, at 240:12-241:04 (Dr. Berrill testifying that there "certainly [is] some relationship between all of this.... His early inappropriate exposure to sex, his being abused a kid and traumatized, I'm sure it did lay the groundwork for his developing an interest in finding young kids sexually attractive").
While unacceptable, D.W.'s conduct did not involve penetration or fellatio. There is no evidence that he has physically accosted a minor after 2009. He has expressed remorse for his actions, recognized his addiction to child pornography, and indicated his need and desire to be treated medically. See Part IV.D.4 (describing defendant's amenability to treatment); Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 32:24-33:05 (Dr. Krueger testified that "[D.W.] said that he was interested in treatment. He was insightful. He ... said he had a problem with pornography addiction ... and he realized he had a problem with pedophilia.... He realized that he wants treatment
Defendant's risk of recidivism and the need to protect the public must, under the law, be addressed in part through the imposition of an incarceratory sentence aimed at treatment other than incapacitation.
A sentence longer than the mandatory minimum of fifteen years is not necessary and would, in all likelihood, further limit defendant's chance of obtaining much-needed treatment and successfully reentering the community. See Hr'g Tr., Dec. 22, 2015, ECF No. 105, at 39:21-41:14 (Dr. Krueger explained that a long period of incarceration in D.W.'s case "would do more harm than good" since he would likely not obtain treatment, would lose his adaptive skills and further sever his remaining ties to his outside support network). The high risk of being abused while incarcerated or placed in solitary confinement would compound D.W.'s already serious mental health problems, making readjustment upon his eventual release from custody less likely and increasing the risk he poses to the public. See id. at 42:20-44:06.
General and specific deterrence are achieved by a below-Guidelines sentence. Assuming the court's recommendations, as outlined below, are followed, defendant will serve approximately fifteen mandatory years in prison. He will be entitled to a credit of up to 54 days at the end of each year for "exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations." See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b).
Upon his release, he will have to live with the serious collateral consequences of his conviction: he will perpetually bear the scarlet letter that comes with being a convicted felon registered as a sex offender. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (recognizing that the "stigma" imposed for a violation of a sex crime statute "is not trivial"); Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and Related Offenses, General Commentary at 12 (Am. Law. Inst., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015) ("[T]he treatment of sex offenders has borne many of the hallmarks of an unjustifiably punitive state. For instance, sex offenders as a class have been subjected to some of the most unforgiving and indiscriminate collateral consequences of conviction, such as unduly severe residency restrictions or registration requirements.") (emphasis added); see also E.L., 188 F.Supp.3d at 172-75, 2016 WL 2939152 at *17-18.
The court is required by Congress and current case law to impose a sentence of fifteen years in prison on this defendant. But, it has the responsibility and power to ensure that the sentence is carried out in a civilized way — a way that recognizes the humanity, the personhood, of defendant.
As indicated in Part VII.C below, the sentence in the instant case is based on a number of specific recommendations. Nothing in the record or in the court's visits to federal correctional institutions suggests that the BOP will be unable to readily follow this court's recommendations, including that defendant serve his sentence at FMC Devens or a similar medical facility.
Recent data, confirmed by expert testimony, indicates that the BOP makes every effort to comply with judges' sentencing recommendations and, in most cases, succeeds
None of these concerns are present in the instant case. For example, FMC Devens is an administrative medical facility capable of holding inmates in all security categories. See supra Part IV.C. A recent audit, as well as the facility's own website, report that the facility's medical center where D.W. should be housed (given that, as a sex offender, he is not eligible for the prison's minimum security camp) is not overcrowded; it is operating at under its inmate capacity. See Williams, Final PREA Audit Report; Federal Bureau of Prisons, FMC Devens, https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/dev/ (last visited July 26, 2016).
Security, medical, and programming concerns all underscore defendant's need to be housed at a facility such as FMC Devens. It is a BOP institution offering specialized treatment for sex offenders. It has a comprehensive residential Sex Offender Treatment Program of approximately thirty months. In addition to this intense medical work, a non-voluntary Sex Offender Management Program geared towards managing sex offenders in its special general population is available. See supra Part IV.C. It also has medical staff trained to treat and manage defendants suffering from mental illness, such as D.W. Id. While the facility has a Special Housing Unit and the use of protective custody may at times be warranted, an independent audit report published in July of this year indicates that it is in full compliance with the requirements of the Prison Rape Elimination Act. See Williams, Final PREA Audit Report; see also supra Part IV.C.3.
Should the BOP be unable to comply with this court's recommendations, it is requested to explain in writing to this court the reasons that it is unable to do so. See Vasquez & Bussert at 22 ("Where the Bureau cannot meet a recommendation, it will attempt to identify another suitable facility that will. The Bureau no longer writes courts explaining the reason(s) why a recommendation is not followed unless the court specifically requests such a notification.").
If a sentence of fifteen years is to be constitutional in the instant case — and properly protective of the public and defendant — defendant's sentence must be served primarily at FMC Devens or a comparable facility. See, e.g., supra Part III.G.3 and Part IV.D.
Defendant warns that, "[d]espite the sentencing judge's recommendation [in past child pornography cases], litigation on this issue, pledges by the BOP, and the particular vulnerabilities and suitability of the defendants in question, on no occasion that we know of has the Court's request been honored by the BOP." Def.'s Reply to Gov't Mem. in Opp'n at 46-47.
Should this court's recommendations not be followed, defendant may raise a challenge to the constitutionality of the sentence. The sentence relies on the assumption that recommendations will be carried out by the BOP. If recommendations are ignored, the court's assumptions are without adequate foundation, and a resulting cruel sentence is not avoided by amelioration in prison.
The defendant is sentenced to fifteen years of incarceration for count one (sexual exploitation of a child) pursuant to section 2251(e) of title 18 of the United States Code, and ten years of incarceration for count two (possession of child pornography) pursuant to section 2252(b)(2) of title 18, to run concurrently, with time off for good behavior (see 18 U.S.C. 3624(b)) and time already served in pretrial detention.
The total mandatory sentence of fifteen years (180 months) is broken down as follows:
The court strongly recommends (assuming its recommendation will be followed) that defendant serve his incarceration at FMC Devens or a similar federal medical facility, and that he be treated in a Sex Offender Management Program and Sex Offender Treatment Program while incarcerated. Placing him in the general population of a medium or high security non-medical prison would expose him to dangers of rape and other physical attack that would almost certainly result in illegal excess solitary confinement.
The court strongly recommends (assuming its recommendation will be followed) that defendant not be placed in solitary confinement for his protection, but that more appropriate, less harsh, methods of protection be relied upon. This recommendation does not apply to reasonable disciplinary action.
After D.W. completes an appropriate intensive medical program in prison, the court strongly recommends (assuming its recommendation will be followed) that he remain in that institution or a similar one until he is released.
The court assumes, based on current practice (expecting that its assumption is correct) that the ending months of D.W.'s incarceration will include a period of intensive halfway house community residence assisting the defendant in reentering into society and in receiving appropriate medical treatment.
Five years of intense supervised release by this court's Probation Department after release from incarceration, with continued sex offender treatment, is imposed, plus other standard conditions of supervised release stated orally at the sentencing. See Hr'g Tr., July 28, 2016. This court's Probation Department shall carefully supervise and assist defendant during the period of supervised release, promptly reporting to
No fine is imposed. Defendant is unable to pay now or in the future. A special assessment of two hundred dollars is imposed.
Restitution is ordered as follows: $1,000 for the victim known as "Angela"; $3,000 for the victim known as "J_Blonde"; and $5,000 for the victim known as "Andy." In determining restitution, the court has relied upon the fully briefed and supported government suggestions. See Gov't Letter, July 18, 2016, ECF No. 152. It has also considered defendant's objections. See Def.'s Letter, July 24, 2016, ECF No. 155. The amounts requested by the government are fair.
SO ORDERED.
