MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Dwayne Singleton, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at Brooklyn Detention Complex, commenced this action on January 10, 2014 against Defendants Jane Doe, a Housing Works psychologist, and Glenda Bubb and Denise Granum, parole officers with the New York State Division of Parole, alleging violations of his constitutional due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Am. Compl. 1, Docket Entry No. 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Jane Doe made a "false sex allegation" against him and, as a result of
Plaintiff's parole supervision began on or about August 6, 2010, when he was released from Elmira Correctional Facility. (Decl. of Glenda Bubb in Supp. of Def. Mot. for Summ. J. ("Bubb Decl.")
After his release, Plaintiff received court-ordered psychiatric therapy through the New York Center for Addiction Treatment Services ("NYCATS"). (See Def. 56.1 ¶ 11; Am. Compl. 4.) On October 18, 2010, an employee of NYCATS reported to Plaintiff's parole office that Plaintiff had attempted to sexually touch the feet of his female therapist, sued herein as Jane Doe, during a psychiatric evaluation.
On or around November 10, 2010, Plaintiff's parole supervision was transferred to the office where Bubb and Granum work as parole officers. (Bubb Decl. ¶ 7.) On December 6, 2010, Plaintiff appears to have signed a document in which he agreed to comply with a number of "special conditions of release to parole supervision for sex offenders." (See Letter in Compliance with Court Order Dated Sept. 8, 2016 ("Def. Ltr."), Docket Entry No. 49.) Those special conditions directed Plaintiff to "participate and fully cooperate with the directives of sex offender treatment program," (id. ¶ 6), and directed Plaintiff not to "purchase or possess pornography or sexually explicit materials," (id. ¶ 11), "purchase, possess or engage in any way, the use of any sexually explicit materials or erotic magazines, tapes, pictures, films or digital images," (id. ¶ 14), "purchase or possess photographic or video equipment without prior and written permission of [his] parole officer," (id. ¶ 22), "possess [a cellular telephone] that is video or photo-capable," (id. ¶ 35), or "rent, operate or be a passenger in any vehicle without the permission of [his] parole officer,"
Plaintiff reported to the parole office on December 7, 2010. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 17.) During
On August 26, 2011, Bubb and Granum received a report that Plaintiff had been arrested for stealing a woman's purse while on the subway. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff was held in custody at Rikers Island until March 21, 2012, after which Plaintiff reported back to the parole office. (Id. ¶ 22.) On April 26, 2012, Bubb and Granum received a report that Plaintiff had engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior during an intake interview at a residential transition home. (Id. ¶ 14.) Granum then reviewed Plaintiff's special parole conditions and noted in Plaintiff's file that the discretionary sex offender conditions "were still appropriate." (Id. ¶ 15.) On or about May 19, 2012, Bubb and Granum learned that Plaintiff had been arrested for walking through subway cars. (Id. ¶ 23.) As a result, Bubb and Granum imposed an additional condition of parole, directing Plaintiff to "sign a contract" that prevented him from traveling by subway except when traveling to and from parole appointments, mandated programs or employment. (Id. ¶ 24; Singleton Dep. 19:22-25.)
Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 243 (2d Cir.2016); see also Cortes v. MTA NYC Transit, 802 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir.2015); Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir.2015); Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir.2013). The role of the
Finally, the court must "liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants" on a motion for summary judgment, reading such submissions "to raise the strongest arguments they suggest." Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir.2008) (first citing Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir.2000); and then citing Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994)); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that "when a plaintiff proceeds pro se ... a court is obliged to construe his pleadings liberally" (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 471 F.3d 363, 369 (2d Cir.2006) ("This Court will construe briefs submitted by pro se litigants liberally.").
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Garduno's false accusation, coupled with his discretionary sex offender status, he has had to attend a sex offender program and has had his cellular telephone confiscated.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty or property without due process of law, and "those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake." Victory v. Pataki, 814 F.3d 47, 59 (2d Cir.2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir.2012). A court first asks "whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived," and if so, "whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219, 131 S.Ct. 859, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011)).
Plaintiff alleges, in substance, that Defendants violated his due process rights when they imposed on him additional special conditions of parole as a result of Garduno's false accusation. (Am. Compl. 4.) As explained above, the Court construes this as a challenge to both the extension
Defendants do not address whether Plaintiff was due — or whether Plaintiff received — any process before he was designated a sex offender or before Defendants "continued" his designation as a result of Garduno's accusation. (See id. at 3.) However, Defendants argue that Plaintiff was appropriately designated a sex offender based on the sexual conduct for which he received "tickets" while in prison. (Def. Mem. 2.)
The Court is unaware of any Second Circuit federal court determination that addresses a parolee's liberty interest in being free from a discretionary sex offender designation. However, federal and state courts in New York have considered a similar question of the process due to parolees who were previously convicted of sexual crimes, and who, in the years after the passage of New York's Sex Offender Registration Act ("SORA"), were assessed a risk level and forced to comply with certain registry and notification requirements.
Both courts applied the "stigma plus" test, established through Supreme Court jurisprudence, that described and developed the liberty interest implicated when a person's good name and reputation are at stake. See Doe III, 3 F.Supp.2d at 467; David W., 95 N.Y.2d at 138, 711 N.Y.S.2d 134, 733 N.E.2d 206. Under the
In Doe III, the Second Circuit identified the "community notification provisions" of SORA as creating reputational harm because those provisions would "likely result in [offenders] being branded as convicted sex offenders who may strike again and who therefore pose a danger to the community." Doe III, 3 F.Supp.2d at 467. The court noted that "[s]uch widespread dissemination of [offenders] information is likely to carry with it shame, humiliation, ostracism, loss of employment and decreased opportunities for employment," among other harms. Id. at 467-68. The court also found that the registration provisions of SORA, which subjects sex offenders to numerous requirements for a minimum of ten years and possibly for life, constituted a "tangible impairment of a right" in addition to mere harm to reputation. Id. at 468.
The New York Court of Appeals in David W. identified a similar reputational harm from "being classified and having that information disseminated," which the court deemed "a determination of status that can have a considerable adverse impact on an individual's ability to live in a community and obtain or maintain employment." David W., 95 N.Y.2d at 138-39, 711 N.Y.S.2d 134, 733 N.E.2d 206 (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 703, 96 S.Ct. 1155). In considering a probationer who would be subject to the most severe of SORA's registration and notification requirements, the court held that the requirements also altered the probationer's rights and, thus, triggered due process safeguards.
The decisions in Doe III and David W. are consistent with those of various federal appellate courts holding that a liberty interest is triggered when a prisoner who has not been convicted of a sex offense is nevertheless designated, in some form, as a sex offender and forced to comply with sex offender conditions. See Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 326 (3d Cir.2010) (holding that "only after a prisoner has been afforded due process may sex offender conditions be imposed on an inmate who has not been convicted of a sexual offense"); Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 223 (5th Cir.2004) (holding that the due process clause "provides [the plaintiff] with a liberty interest from the stigma and compelled treatment on which his parole was conditioned, and the state was required to provide procedural protections before imposing such conditions"); Chambers v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 205 F.3d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that an inmate designated a sex offender without having been convicted of a sex offense assumes a "label replete with inchoate stigmatization" that "requires some procedural scrutiny"); Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that "the stigmatizing effect of being classified as a sex offender constitutes a deprivation of liberty under the Due Process Clause"); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 831 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that the stigmatizing consequences of the sex offender label coupled with a mandatory treatment program "create the kind of deprivations of liberty that require procedural protections"); see also In re Gordon, 48 Misc.3d 926, 16 N.Y.S.3d 371, 375 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.
Here, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff's designation as a discretionary sex offender "create[s] the kind of deprivations of liberty that require procedural protections" because Defendants have not presented sufficient evidence regarding the nature of the designation and, thus, the harm to Plaintiff. See Neil, 131 F.3d at 831. The New York Parole Handbook defines a "discretionary sex offender" as "a person who has a history of sexual offense or pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior, but is not subject to the Sex Offender Registry for any number of reasons." N.Y. Parole Handbook § 3.13. "If [a person] is determined to be a discretionary sex offender, [he] will be supervised by the Division of Parole on an intensive basis."
(Singleton Dep. 54-57.) Defendants have not provided any evidence regarding the mandatory or permissive requirements that stem from a discretionary sex offender designation, including whether and where the information of Defendant's designation is maintained and to whom it is available. Without such information, the Court cannot identify the scope of the reputational harm that attaches to Plaintiff's designation.
Furthermore, based on the record before the Court, it is unclear whether the designation places a "tangible burden" on Plaintiff. The courts in Doe III and David W. focused on the combined burden of repeated registration requirements and the possible loss of employment opportunity, for example, as a result of employer access to registration databases. See, e.g., Doe III, 3 F.Supp.2d at 468 (discussing registration requirements, which "obviously encroach on the liberty of convicted sex offenders, and, therefore, [cause them to] suffer a tangible impairment of a right in addition to mere harm to reputation"); David W., 95 N.Y.2d at 137-38, 711 N.Y.S.2d 134, 733 N.E.2d 206 ("This Court has held that the mere likelihood of dissemination to prospective employers of allegations of rape and abuse in a fired public employee's personnel file sufficiently impaired that employee's liberty interest to warrant due process protections.... [W]e are persuaded that [the sex offender designation] implicated [the] defendant's liberty interest and triggered due process safeguards.").
The record before the Court does not address whether Plaintiff's designation imposes any particular restrictions or burdens on him. Plaintiff is clearly subject to over thirty-five special conditions, (see generally Def. Ltr.), concededly as a result of being designated a discretionary sex offender and not merely because of his lewd conduct while in prison, (see Def. Mem. 3-4, 7). The special conditions of parole that Plaintiff signed on December 6, 2010, are in fact expressly titled "Special Conditions of Release to Parole Supervisions for Sex Offenders," and appear to include, with few exceptions, the very conditions imposed against registered sex offenders.
In the absence of evidence from Defendants regarding the effects or permanence of the designation, the Court cannot determine
Qualified immunity protects public officials from liability for civil damages "unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2044, 192 L.Ed.2d 78 (2015); see also Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir.2015). "To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Taylor, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S.Ct. at 2044; see also Garcia, 779 F.3d at 92 (noting that the "dispositive inquiry ... is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted"). "When properly applied, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Taylor, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S.Ct. at 2044 (alterations omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)). "Only Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent existing at the time of the alleged violation is relevant in deciding whether a right is clearly established," Moore v. Vega, 371 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir.2004), and while there need not be "a case directly on point... existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate," Taylor, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S.Ct. at 2044 (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2083).
As explained above, although a prisoner or parolee has a liberty interest in avoiding the stigma and tangible impairment associated with a registered sex offender designation, neither the Second Circuit nor the Supreme Court has made clear that the interest extends to a discretionary sex offender designation. Thus, Plaintiff's right to receive due process prior to being designated a discretionary sex offender is not clearly established, and to the extent that Plaintiff had such an interest upon which Defendants wrongly infringed, Plaintiff cannot recover money damages from Defendants because they are entitled to qualified immunity. See Taylor, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S.Ct. at 2044; see also Allen v. Coughlin, 64 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity in the context of a prisoner's due process claims where the New York Appellate Division had upheld a somewhat contrary rule to the rule set forth by the Second Circuit).
Nevertheless, qualified immunity does not bar declaratory and injunctive relief. See Allen, 64 F.3d at 81 (noting that qualified immunity was not grounds for dismissing all of the plaintiff's claims because the doctrine "does not bar declaratory and injunctive relief," which the plaintiff had requested (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982))); Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir.1988) ("When a plaintiff seeks both damages and equitable relief, successful assertion of
Defendants seek summary judgment as to Plaintiff's challenge to the special conditions of parole imposed on him. Defendants argue that the special conditions of the cellular telephone restriction and the sex offender program were reasonably related to Plaintiff's designation as a "discretionary sex offender," based on his conduct in prison, and that the special condition of the restriction on Plaintiff's subway access was reasonably related to Plaintiff's arrest on the subway.
Although the liberty rights of parolees have not been well-defined, it is clear that "[p]arolees are, of course, not without constitutional rights." United States ex rel Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1164 (2d Cir.1970). However, parolees are subject to "restrictions not applicable to other citizens," and a prisoner on parole enjoys only "conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); United States v. Polito, 583 F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir.1978) ("While petitioner's parole releases him from immediate physical imprisonment, it imposes conditions which significantly confine and restrain his freedom ...." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963)); Gerena v. Pezdek, No. 13-CV-953, 2015 WL 513145, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2015) ("Probationers and parolees, simply by virtue of their status ... enjoy only a conditional liberty dependent on their adherence to special probation restrictions."); Daniels v. Ralph, No. 10-CV-884, 2012 WL 2120591, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. June 11, 2012) (noting that "[t]he conditional liberty enjoyed by the parolee is dependent on observance of special parole restrictions" (internal quotation marks and citations removed)); LoFranco v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 986 F.Supp. 796, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("As a condition of release on parole, however, the Parole Commission may restrict a parolee's access to otherwise lawful activities."); Rizzo v. Terenzi, 619 F.Supp. 1186, 1190-91 (E.D.N.Y.1985) ("The parolee released from confinement has been granted but conditional liberty, and his liberty interest is defined by the terms of his release."); see also N.Y. Comp. Codes. R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 8003.3 ("A special condition may be imposed upon a [parolee] either prior or subsequent to release ... each special condition may be imposed by a member of the Board of Parole, an authorized representative of the division of parole, or a parole officer," memorialized by "a written copy of each special condition imposed.").
The Supreme Court has held that parole revocations implicate a parolee's due process interests, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and more recently, the Second Circuit has suggested that a parolee may have a due process claim where special conditions of his parole are impermissibly
To the extent that a parolee's special conditions may implicate his liberty interests, those liberty interests are not infringed "in the absence of a showing that the [parole] board or its agents acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Boddie, 2011 WL 1697965, at *2 (citing Pagan, 2006 WL 3626930, at *1); see also Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1243 (2d Cir.1972) ("[W]hen a convict is conditionally released on parole, the Government retains a substantial interest in insuring that its rehabilitative goal is not frustrated and that the public is protected from further criminal acts by the parolee. Although a parolee should enjoy greater freedom in many respects than a prisoner, we see no reason why the Government may not impose restrictions on the rights of the parolee that are reasonably and necessarily related to the interests that the Government retains after his conditional release."); Muhammad v. Evans, No. 11-CV-2113, 2014 WL 4232496, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014)
Therefore, as a parolee, Plaintiff has a limited due process right that entitles him to conditions of parole that are reasonably related to his prior conduct or to the government's interest in his rehabilitation.
Although parolees are entitled to certain limited due process rights in the conditions of their parole, those due process rights are not clearly defined. As with Plaintiff's claim regarding his discretionary sex offender designation, Plaintiff cannot recover money damages from Defendants for the special conditions that were imposed on him because neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has clearly established the process that is due to a discretionary sex offender before he is subject to certain special conditions of parole. See Taylor, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S.Ct. at 2044; see also Allen v. Coughlin, 64 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity in the context of a prisoner's due process claims where the New York Appellate Division had upheld a somewhat contrary rule to the rule set forth by the Second Circuit).
Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims seeking money damages from the imposition of special conditions, including the restriction to Plaintiff's subway access. The Court denies Defendants' qualified immunity challenge to Plaintiff's claims seeking injunctive relief from the special conditions of his parole — namely, the sex offender program and cellular telephone restriction.
As to the sex offender program imposed as a condition of Plaintiff's parole, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment, principally because Plaintiff "agreed to attend" the program prior to being released and because the program was reasonably related both to Plaintiff's designation as a discretionary sex offender and to Plaintiff's conduct while in prison. (Def. Mem. 3, 7-8.) As to the cellular telephone restriction imposed as a condition of Plaintiff's parole, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff "[i]s a discretionary sex offender, [he] was not allowed to possess"
The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff's conditions of parole reasonably relate to his designation as a discretionary sex offender. (See id. at 2-4.) Pursuant to Plaintiff's designation as a discretionary sex offender, he was required to comply with certain intensive conditions of parole, (see id. at 4), and the sexual offender program and cellular telephone restrictions are reasonably related to a designation predicated on "a pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior," N.Y. Parole Handbook § 3.13. However, in view of the Court's denial of summary judgment as to Plaintiff's designation as a discretionary sex offender, the challenged conditions must also be reasonably related to Plaintiff's past conduct. As the Court has previously stated, the relevant inquiry is whether the special conditions of the sex offender program and cellular telephone restriction are "reasonably related to [Plaintiff's] past conduct, are not arbitrary and capricious, and are designed to deter recidivism and prevent further offenses," Singleton, 2014 WL 3110033 at *3 (citation omitted) — not whether Plaintiff admitted that he was aware of the special conditions or knowingly violated them.
While in prison, Plaintiff was found to have engaged in lewd conduct on four occasions and touched a nurse's buttocks on one occasion. (Singleton Dep. 33:15-34:21; Def. Mem. 2.) The Court concludes that requiring Plaintiff to attend a sex offender program, ostensibly designed for his rehabilitation and to prevent recidivism, is reasonably related to Plaintiff's propensity to commit lewd acts and could conceivably deter him from committing future lewd acts.
The restriction on Plaintiff's ability to possess a cellular telephone with camera capability reads: "I will not own or possess a beeper, scanner or cell phone without permission of my parole officer. If given permission to possess a cell phone, I will not possess one that is video or photo-capable." (Def. Ltr. ¶ 35.) The restriction appears ordinary among other, similar restrictions on Plaintiff's ability to "purchase or possess pornography or any sexually explicit materials," (id. ¶ 11), "engage or participate in any online computer service that involves the exchange of electronic messages or establishes sexual encounters or liaisons," (id. ¶ 12), "call or view sexually explicit telephone, movies or television services," (id. ¶ 13), and "purchase or possess photographic or video equipment without prior and written permission of [a] parole officer," (id. ¶ 22). Alongside the many restrictions on Plaintiff's ability to create or possess pornographic material or own consumer items that could enable him to create or possess such material, the restriction on Plaintiff's possession of a cellular telephone with camera capability
287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir.2001)). Although Sofsky concerned federal conditions of probation subject to slightly more stringent standards than state conditions of parole, the court's reasoning applies here, where the cellular telephone restriction functions as an overbroad ban on an item simply because Plaintiff could use its functions to commit a future lewd act.
More significantly, Defendants have not provided the Court with evidence that the cellular telephone restriction was related to Plaintiff's prior conduct; rather, Defendants merely argue that Plaintiff was not permitted to possess a cellular telephone with camera capability because he was designated a discretionary sex offender. (Def. Mem. 4, 8.) Because there is no evidence before the Court that the cellular telephone restriction relates to Plaintiff's prior conduct, the Court denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claim seeking injunctive relief from the cellular telephone restriction.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court grants summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff's claims for money damages and as to Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief from the sex offender program imposed as a special condition of his parole. The Court denies summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief from his designation as a discretionary sex offender and for injunctive relief from the cellular telephone restriction imposed as a special condition of his parole.
SO ORDERED:
In order to establish a claim for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must satisfy two criteria: "one subjective, focusing on the defendant's motive for his conduct, and the other objective, focusing on the conduct's effect." Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 268 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir.2015) ("To state an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must allege two elements, one subjective and one objective."). As to the subjective element, a plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, would establish that the defendant's actions were wanton "in light of the particular circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct." Wright, 554 F.3d at 268 (quoting Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 262 (2d. Cir.1999)); see also Crawford, 796 F.3d at 256 ("[T]he prisoner must allege that the defendant acted with a subjectively `sufficiently culpable state of mind.'" (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992))). The objective component asks whether the punishment was sufficiently harmful to establish a violation "in light of contemporary standards of decency." Wright, 554 F.3d at 268 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8, 112 S.Ct. 995). However, because "routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society," only those deprivations that deny "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S.Ct. 995 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, even if Plaintiff could establish that Defendants acted wantonly, nothing in the Amended Complaint suggests that Plaintiff was deprived of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S.Ct. 995; see also Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 63 (2d Cir.2016) (remanding claim of excessive force under the Eighth Amendment for consideration of whether the conduct was "objectively harmful enough or sufficiently serious to reach constitutional dimensions" (citing Crawford, 796 F.3d at 256)). The Court dismisses Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim.
(Singleton Dep. 36:13-37:17.)
Id. at 374 (quoting Directive 8304(IV)(A)). Furthermore, that court noted that "nothing in the [D]irective mandat[es] the application of any specific parole conditions to discretionary sex offenders." Id.
(Singleton Dep. 18:25-19:5.)
